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TITLE OF THESIS
“RURAL ELITE AND PEASANT STRATEGIES IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF 
THE COFFEE MARKET IN VERACRUZ, MEXICO, 1989-1996”
ABSTRACT
This thesis is based on two main arguments. First, the coffee market is strongly 
regulated and embedded because of its natural setting and social make up. Coffee is a 
perennial cash crop mainly cultivated in tropical and semi-tropical mountains, where 
small producers have played an important role. Issues of labour intensity, land access 
and property rights, massive investments in infrastructure and credit, and cyclical 
behaviour of markets have shaped the emergence of coffee sector institutions. 
Countries, in which complex institutional arrangements were made to face these 
convergent factors, have succeeded in overcoming many “coffee crises”. I present the 
case of Atzalan, Veracruz, in Mexico, as a case of institutional failure and loss of a 
privileged opportunity for rural development in poverty-stricken areas.
Second, elites have commonly been neglected in analyses of how peasant practices and 
identities change in the context of agricultural ‘modernisation’. This is particularly 
pertinent in the context of Mexico, where caciquismo has long been of extreme 
economic, social and political significance, both within and beyond state institutions.
Elites are important in rural societies because they establish a privileged link with 
peasants, both in the coffee market and in other areas of social interaction. Their 
strategies of accommodation vis a vis the state and powerful actors have created 
opportunities for regional development, specialisation and integration in national and 
international markets. I present a historical perspective of a coffee producing region in 
Central Veracruz, whose local elites channelled federal and state resources, mobilised 
peasants and challenged state intervention in key economic activities. Elites are 
interlocked with peasant communities in many different and complex ways. Elites’ 
knowledge of coffee markets has an effect on business making and market institutions 
(contracts and grading systems, price formation, value creation incentives). In turn, 
peasant organisations and their economic strategies are strongly influenced by this elite 
framework.
GLOSSARY OF ACHRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ARIC Collective Interest Rural Associations (include both ejidos and small 
landholders)
ASA Asociaciones Serranas Agroindustriales (Barreda’s holding firm)
Banamex National Bank of Mexico
Banrual Rural Credit Bank
Bancomext Exports Promotion Bank
CAM Agrarian Mexican Confederation
CAP Permanent Agrarian Congress (umbrella organisation)
CCI Independent Peasant Central
CEIMSA Export-Import Mexican Company (forerunner of CONASUPO, state 
marketing company for basic staples)
CLC Local Credit Committees, community organisations integrated to the 
CRC
CLS Solidarity Local Committees
CMC Coffee Mexican Council, advisory board that replaced the IMC
CNC Peasant National Confederation, parachute organisation affiliated to the 
ruling party (PRI), which centralised regional Agrarian Communities 
Leagues, and Producers National Unions (sugar cane, tobacco, coffee, 
etc).
CNCf Coffee National Commission (1949), became IMC in 1959
CNCo Coffee National Council (created in 1993 after the IMC disappearance)
CNOC National Coordination of Coffee Producing Organisations, a network of 
independent regional organisations created in 1989.
CONASUPO Food Staples Marketing Board (regulated prices in destitute areas 
through a network of warehouses and retail shops)
COPLAMAR Marginal Zones Developing Program
CRC Regional Peasant Committee, a regional branch of the CNC’s structure.
CRS Solidarity Regional Savings (set up by the PNS to encourage the 
repayment of income support. In 1994-95 they became civil 
associations)
CRS-A CRS of Azotal
Fidecafe Coffee Trust, created in 1989 after the restructuring of FREC, retention 
fund
Ejido “Social property”, combining commons governance with individual 
property rights (since 1992 constitutional reform)
FNC National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia
FRC Solidarity Regional Funds (for Coffee), funds given by the Solidarity 
Program to social organisations in order to run ‘productive projects’. In 
the coffee producing regions they focused on processing and marketing 
coffee
FRC-A Solidarity Regional Coffee Fund of Azotal
FRC-PA Solidarity Regional Coffee Fund of Plan de Arroyos
FRC-T Solidarity Regional Coffee Fund of Tlapacoyan
FREC Coffee Stocks Retention Fund, created through an export tax in order to 
count the Mexican coffee stocks and administer the export quota
FRS-A Solidarity Regional Fund of Azotal
FRS-T Solidarity Regional Fund of Tlapacoyan
FRS-PA Solidarity Regional Fund of Plan de Arroyos
HYV High Yield Variety (usually dwarf hybrids with resistant and quality 
traits)
ICA International Coffee Agreement (1963-89 with intervals)
ICO International Coffee Organisation, based in London
IMC Coffee Mexican Institute (also known as Inmecafe, 1959-1993)
INI National Institute for Indigenous Peoples (involved with Solidarity 
coffee programmes)
JW Jehovah Witnesses (Millenarian Christian sect which reject the 
supremacy of the state and religious institutions over personal faith on 
God or Jehovah)
LIFFE London International Financial Futures Exchange
LCA Agrarian Communities’ League, state level organisations of the CNC
m.o.s.l. Meters over sea level
MECAFE Coffee Improvement Programme. This program was first sponsored by 
the USAID in Central America (mid-1970s). Introduced in Mexico by 
the IMC in the 1980s to improve coffee technology
NAFTA North American Free-Trade Agreement
NYCSCSE New York Cocoa, Sugar and Coffee Exchange, the most important stock 
and futures markets for washed rabica coffees (Contract ‘C’).
NCPE New Ejido Population Center
NYBOT New York Board of Trade
PCM Mexican Communist Party
PIDER Integrated Rural Development Program, financed by the World Bank in 
Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s
PNS Solidarity National Program (1989-1994), a set of income support 
programs to compensate for the impact of structural adjustment
PRD Democratic Revolution Party, main left wing opposition party
PRI Institutional Revolution Party (ruling party 1929-200)
PROCAMPO Income support and production subsidy programme, set up in 1993 to 
compensate NAFTA
PROCEDE Agrarian Entitlements and Urban Courtyards Titling Certification 
Program (brought about by the 1992 agrarian law reform)
Qq Spanish quintal = 46 kg (green coffee) = 100 Lb. American (green 
coffee)
ROYA Program designed to combat the spread of the ‘leaf rust’ (roya) in 
Mexico (late 1970s/ early 1980s), sponsoring resistant strains and 
agrochemicals.
SARH Ministry of Agriculture
SB Solidarity Brigade (PNS), a regional group of PNS promoters
SPA San Pedro Altepepa, Ejido and congregation community
SPP Planning Ministry
SPR Rural Production Societies, local organisations of small landholders
SRA Land Reform Ministry
sss Solidarity Associations, local organisations promoted to facilitate and 
update local organisations
TNC Transnational Corporation
UCI Independent Peasant Union
UE Ejidos Union, ‘second level’ organisations based on ejidos
UEPC Coffee marketing and production local groups (organized by the IMC to 
deliver credit and inputs)
UGOCEP Popular, Student, Peasant and Worker General Union
UNORCA Peasants’ Organisations National Union
UEPC Production and Marketing Economic Units (IMC’s functional local 
organisations of small coffee producers promoted since 1973)
UNPC Coffee Producers National Union, with branches in coffee producing 
states, and affiliated to the CNC-PRI
USAID United State of America international aid for development agency
9
CHAPTER 1
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING CONTEMPORARY PEASANTS
“In dealing with the multiple and complex problems o f  
development we have learnt that we must fashion 
generalizations at all kinds o f  ranges and be deaf like 
Ulysses, to the seductive chant o f  the unique paradigm ”
Albert Hirschman (1995)
1.1 Introduction
Two overlapping lines of inquiry cut across this thesis. The first line addresses a 
question regarding the social embeddedness of the coffee market, in particular: Why is 
the presence of peasant producers in the coffee sector so widespread and why do small 
producers survive in a market so tightly integrated and internationalised? The second 
line of inquiry, closely linked with the first, addresses the following question: What type 
of economic, social and political strategies account for the survival of small producers 
in the market and how do these strategies transform the coffee sector’s institutions? It is 
my contention that peasant and rural elites’ strategies influence one another in a 
permanent process of interaction and accommodation, which, in conjunction with the 
strategies followed by the state and international actors, shape the coffee market.
In this chapter I first discuss prevailing views on peasant and rural societies and 
different academic efforts aimed at challenging old convictions in order to underscore 
the need to build an interdisciplinary framework. The following sections outline 
different approaches which have tried to account for the various ways in which peasants 
interact with markets. On this basis I suggest a more dynamic approach, which 
acknowledges, on one hand, the peasant capabilities to adapt to changing international, 
regional and local environments, and on the other hand, the historical, regional and 
social complexities of peasants as a social group. Section 6 discusses, first, the concept 
of peasant in the light of structural and agency perspectives and how peasant abilities to 
act collectively depend on their strategies and, particularly, on the role of rural elites. 
Section 7 examines the contributions and shortcomings of both the rationality and the 
relativist theses and how they can illuminate my case study. Section 8 revises some of 
the concepts drawn from New Institutional Economics as one of the main sources 
inspiring the theoretical framework, which stresses the complexity of coffee producers,
which is in turn discussed in section 9. The main arguments and the research strategy 
are outlined in the last two sections of the chapter.
1.2 Towards an interdisciplinary framework
More than in other fields, peasant and development studies in general have questioned 
old convictions. This has happened for two reasons. Positivist and evolutionist 
certainties have been systematically criticised and deconstructed in many areas of the 
social sciences.1 The successful transition models -such as the American farmer path 
(Friedmann, 1978) and the junker path in England (Byres 1996 and Bernstein 1996)- 
have been reassessed as historically unique and atypical. Even the Western European 
stories about peasants’ backwardness, for example the ‘immobility of rural France’ in 
early times, have been re-examined by modem economic history. Peasants, along with 
the global restructuring of agriculture, have been transformed by capitalist markets.
Theoretical discussions on peasants and social change in rural societies tend to be 
polarised around two views. On one hand, the Marxist perspective, whose starting point 
is the ‘death of the peasantry’, to use Hobsbawm’s (1994, p. 289) expression, has been 
considered a theoretical framework and historical trend derived from the logic of capital 
accumulation, as well as a concrete development since the Second World War. On the 
other hand, we find all those perspectives influenced by theories such as Chayanov’s 
peasant economy (1966 [1925]), Scott’s moral economy (1976, 1985 and 1990) and 
new social movements’ perspectives on resistance and identities, which stress the 
endurance of peasantness despite penetration of agribusiness and financial capital 
(Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998).
In Mexico, the debate confronting ‘depeasantists versus peasantists’ took place in the 
1970s deepening rivalries between Marxist versus non-Marxist perspectives. From the 
former point of view, Bartra (1993) argued that a ‘permanent primitive capital 
accumulation’ has been historically related to a small peasant economy, which is
1 Elguea’s (1989) work on Latin America’s theories of development examines the debate between 
modernization and dependency theories, in the light of Lakatos research methodology. See also, Mouzelis 
(1988) Roxborough (1979) and Harrison (1988).
2 The label depeasantists refers to scholars alleging that the proletarianisation of peasants is a one-way 
inevitable process, whereas peasantists argue that peasants can resist proletarianisation in different ways 
and that capitalism cannot destroy all forms of non-capitalist production. Par6 (1991b) argues that this 
debate was extremely ideological and was rarely based on ethnographic fieldwork. From the 1980s 
onwards, she argues, fieldwork findings reveal that peasants adopt diversified strategies where wage 
labour and migration are just as important as the preservation of traditional agriculture and social 
networks of solidarity.
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destroyed and reconstituted. Peasant communities - overwhelmed by increasing 
population and demographic pressure on land, economic differentiation, rural 
unemployment and outward-migration - have become commodity producers and 
semiproletarians. According to this ‘proletarianist’ view, these findings are conclusive 
evidence of a general depeasantisation process (Foladori 1981 and Hobsbawm 1994).
The peasantists approach turns this ‘functionalist’ interpretation upside-down, to point 
at the resilience and reproduction of the family economy in the capitalist economy 
(Palerm 1980).3 The ‘peasant resistance’ view, for example, highlights household 
coping strategies, risk-bearing diversified activities, moral economic behaviour and 
collective reciprocity. According to this ‘peasantist’ view (Esteva 1983 and Warman 
1980), even if peasant families rely to some extent on wage labour and off-farm 
activities, full proletarianisation does not take place because of complementarities of 
commercial and subsistence production.
The Marxist structuralist perspectives tend to overshadow concrete analysis and 
fieldwork, as Mouzelis (1990) and Pare (1991b) argued. That is, they underestimate the 
historically-rich analysis of the peasant to proletarian transition, endorsing at the end 
reductionist and evolutionary models. The stress on economic determination and class 
analysis hinders identification of other complex factors of social change and expressions 
of agency, such as culture, ethnic identity, and hidden forms of resistance (Scott 1990, 
1985 and Gledhill 1996).
On the peasantist side, attention given to agricultural diversity may end up in cultural 
particularism that makes comparative analysis difficult. Ahistorical views of an isolated 
family peasant economy and, in general “peasantness”, deny the impact of colonialism, 
capitalist markets and nation-states on rural societies (Durrenberger 1984). Arguments 
about ‘everyday resistance’ may underestimate the complexity of “hegemony”,4
3 In the orthodox Marxist view the peasantry’s proletarianisation was instrumental to domestic market and 
free labour formation. Although this particular transition was fully accomplished only in early industrial 
capitalism (Bernstein 1996 and Harriss 1982), many leftist parties worldwide undermined the agrarian 
agenda of the peasantry. In this sense, neo-Marxist accounts of the proletarianisation path shared a 
functionalist view.
4 The concept is used in the Gramscian sense of dominance of ruling classes not only by violent means 
but essentially through constructing social consent and consensus, that is, maintaining the allegiance of 
the mass of the population. In modem societies the nature of politics, mass organisation, information and 
education, the national culture as political project and multiclass alliances, as well as a set of welfare 
reforms and concessions are important aspects of this process of hegemonic ruling (Sassoon, 1999; 
Gramsci 1995).
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particularly if the context of domination is not thoroughly taken into account (Roseberry 
1994 and Gledhill 1996).
An example of the structuralist and economist reductionism of Marxist analysis of 
peasants is the attempt at understanding peasant societies from their theoretical class 
location only, i.e. petit-bourgeoisie (labourers as well as owners of means of 
production). W olfs research program (1956 and 1957), represents a much richer effort. 
It takes into account the historical configuration of types of peasantries, which emerged 
under the influence of concrete historical conditions, including colonialism and 
capitalism, the formation of new nation-states, and the consolidation of regional 
agrarian structures and regimes of labour, all of which were influenced by diverse 
ecological environments, as well as resistance and adaptation of communities’ culture 
and social structures.
The ‘middle ground’ position (Arce 1993, Long 1994 and Kearney 1996), which 
advances a general theory for understanding a variety of phenomena -like interface 
analysis or identity differentiation- can be equally insufficient. Several authors have 
already pointed to the limits of stereotyped discussions about capitalist agrarian 
transitions and, in general, of dichotomous characterisations of rural groups as either 
peasants or proletarians (Shanin 1990, Gates 1993 and Byres 1996). Thus, on one hand, 
reciprocity, collective consumption, and prestige economy have been opposed to a 
rational, self-interested peasant, integrated in markets and stratified by economic 
differentiation. On the other hand, elements of coping, survival, ‘risk averse’ strategies 
of generally poor peasants, have been opposed, in turn, to risk-managing, profit-seeking, 
entrepreneurial strategies of farmers. Some have adopted the form of academic 
discussions, as in the case of Popkin (1979) versus Scott (1976), while others have 
developed within the political debate between state agencies, NGOs and political parties 
(in Mexico, the debate between peasantists and depeasantists was more a political 
debate on the ‘revolutionary’ role of peasants, than a theoretically minded discussion, as 
argued by Pare (1991b).
The viewpoint defended here is that peasant forms of organisation can only be 
understood as a concrete set of social relations and livelihood strategies in continuous 
change and strain, in line with Thompson’s (1980) reluctance to use class categories to 
fit in living processes of social groups. There is a dynamic link between structure and 
agency processes that determines the reproduction of ‘peasant’ groups (politics is a
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pervasive factor in structuring social relations of rural groups, value formation and 
deployment). Size/productivity, tenancy/productivity cannot be understood outside 
power relations (Herring 1984). I argue that Mexican peasants are the outcome of 
specific social relations and historical processes, as well as strategies of reproduction 
and resistance, which can only be properly explained with the help of an 
interdisciplinary approach provided by the embeddedness hypothesis and livelihoods 
framework.
Another theoretical tension in the debate on peasantries confronts the views of rational 
choice and neo-Marxism. Without trying to undertake a thorough review, some 
common problems and limitations, from which my later proposals will draw, will be 
briefly mentioned. Rational choice -  basically sharing the methodological individualist 
assumptions characteristic of mainstream economics - would make the following 
contentions about small commodity producers:
• Producers are rational maximisers; choices about crop scale, the level of 
specialisation and technology change are related to optimisation of returns. 
Constraints refer to scarcity of resources, a household’s demographic cycle and 
drudgery balance (Chayanov 1966), climate and other external risk factors 
(Popkin 1979).
• Primary producers have been induced to overproduce because of the distorted 
performance of markets: domestic price controls and imperfect information. 
Strictly speaking, peasant production (nil labour and land value) could no 
longer be representative among the vast majority of coffee producers world­
wide, as Geer (1971, pp. 52-53) contends.
• Given open market conditions, producers will eventually move out of the 
coffee business and find comparatively better uses for labour and land.
Neo-Marxist analyses, in turn, focus on the nature of social relations and mechanisms of 
surplus extraction. Some propositions of this wide-ranging theory would read:
• The peasant household is a consumption-production unit, which plays an 
important role in capitalist markets: to provide a cheap labour force and 
commodities (Palerm 1981, de Janvry 1981).
• The transitional nature of peasant forms of production is revealed in the 
commoditisation process, which leads to differentiation. Peasant forms of
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production are reproduced by capitalist social relations through economic and 
non-economic means (Bernstein 1996).
• Small coffee producers still remain in the market because of both, their 
functional roles in certain high-risk, low-profitability activities in which capital 
is not interested or not able to invest, and the simple reproduction squeeze 
(Bernstein 1977 and 1996).
1.3 Peasant forms ofproduction and capitalist markets
According to some 'over-optimistic' accounts (Netting 1993), characteristics of family 
farms, peasant economy and culture allow producers to successfully resist capitalist 
subordination, through food self-sufficiency, reciprocity, collective consumption, 
coping strategies and resistance tactics. Class formation is therefore not always the 
corollary of differentiation.
In the articulation-type variant (Palerm 1981), even in the case of producing 
commodities, peasants can achieve relative autonomy from the market, selecting 
‘spheres of exchange’ between the family economy and the regional market. In this 
way, peasants create, if not more advantageous, at least less adverse ‘patterns of 
articulation’ to the market, achieving an always unstable balance between cash-crops, 
seasonal wage labour and self-provisioning activities (Meillassoux 1972). They function 
in this way with two different systems of value, which means not only two ways of 
mobilising resources, but of setting priorities to the physical movement of labour and 
production, defining norms about effort and interest. One sphere is linked to the market, 
and specialises in generating short-term, but year-round monetary incomes. In the 
market sphere, producers draw income that they transfer, consume and invest in the 
domestic economy. In the second sphere, the links to the market are far weaker. At the 
centre of the domestic economy is traditional agriculture, based on rain-fed maize and 
bean cropping, which still provide the basic diet of mestizo highlanders. Apart from 
basic staples, the diversified household economy seasonally produces some fruit, which 
occasionally generate additional monetary income.
Instead of seeing traditional societies passively articulated to capitalist markets and 
bourgeois national states, I argue that modem peasants are the combined result of an 
unparalleled domination of capital and markets in rural societies, as well as of the new
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opportunities emerging from flexible labour markets and the emergence of new patterns 
of consumption, linked to environment, health and equity concerns.
These two value systems are regulated by 'cultural controls', which sanction the benefits 
from both sets of activities and have been the object of several theoretical propositions: 
beginning with Weberian-type methodological individualism, according to which 
aggregated behaviour creates social structures, like the peasant economy (Chayanov 
1966 and Scott, 1976) and rational peasant approaches (Popkin 1981).
In neo-Marxist theories (Herring 1984) the important question to address is not "just" 
how much land do peasants devote to commodity and self-consumption crops, or how 
many days a year do they hire themselves as workers, but the whole pattern of relations 
that explain their reproduction. The problem of quality is the conclusive point: effective 
control over means of production (including land) and autonomy from the market; 
sufficiency of food production and surplus holding and deployment capacity; 
dependency on wage labour income to reproduce the family economy; collective control 
of demographic pressures and external threats over land and political systems; and 
economic differentiation and private accumulation.
Marxist scholars question the existence of peasants as such, and have suggested that 
today the vast majority of contemporary rural producers are petty commodity producing 
farmers (including part-time farmers) or semi-proletarian agricultural workers 
(Hobsbawm 1994; Calva 1988; Pare 1991b and Bernstein 1982), due to the family's 
income dependency on off-farm wage labour and self-exploitation, or on ‘squeezed’ 
petty commodity production. Land ownership no longer means control over productive 
choices and access to the created surplus.
Labour use has been tested as the more relevant factor in class formation (Patnaik 
1980). Occupational differentiation (an almost universal trend in rural societies) 
provides valuable criteria, which challenge the existence of fixed borders in classi
location and the suitable units to analyse stratification (individual, nuclear family, 
household, community). Class formation has been sustained not merely on economic 
grounds; symbolic capital (status, authority, power and knowledge) accumulation also 
has to be taken into account (Bourdieu, 1986; Giddens 1978 and Weber 1992). Finally, 
it has been argued that agent "structuration" depends more on strategic behaviour 
(Giddens, 1995), rather than a direct translation of economic trends to the social
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structure (Harriss 1982a). Social location is not such a straightforward issue. It is 
supposed, for example, that either increased wage labour, or commodity production 
(and the productive use of surpluses to accumulate), leads towards class formation. But 
it has been widely argued that this trend is counter-balanced by smallholders’ 
demographic and socio-economic mobility (Chayanov 1966; Shanin 1990 and Netting 
1993). There is general agreement about unequal terms of trade and surplus transfers 
from peasant producers to rural elites and urban groups, but there is not consensus in 
defining the scope of these trends (i.e. the deployment of surplus is more important than 
its extraction, Herring 1984).
1.4 Social forms and peasant petty commodity production
Rural societies have developed different social forms to urban, “civilised” societies, 
which have attracted attention from analysts for centuries. Evolutionist theories 
(Redfield 1953) saw in ‘tribal’ (hence rural) societies the paradigm of past social forms, 
already overtaken by western societies. The Redfieldian rural-urban continuum - despite 
being academically outmoded - is quite alive in social scientists’ common sense. 
Without maintaining the evolutionist baggage, discussions on rural development 
institutions (North 1995, Bardhan 1989), still use this powerful metaphor (Which 
institutions would facilitate capital accumulation, higher savings and productive 
investment, and the reallocation of rural population in more profitable activities?).
While peasant communities historically emerged under the influence of state-cities - 
‘there were no peasants before the first cities’ (Redfield 1978) -, it was the development 
of the bourgeois cities that mark the demise of self-sufficient peasant communities 
(Kautsky 1988). Although attention by the end of the 20th Century shifted to sustainable 
livelihoods, poverty reduction and relief programs, the political agenda of economic 
restructuring has not invalidated peasant studies. On the contrary, peasant studies and 
rural livelihoods remain crucial background to understand many particularities of 
agrarian and political systems, agribusiness structures, labour migration patterns and, 
agroecology and biodiversity in most developing countries.
From the neo-Marxist point of view, the agrarian question has been revisited in 
numerous debates that have tried to assess the process of destruction of the peasants’ 
natural economy (another metaphor), imposed by the penetration of capital. After a 
primitive process of accumulation, there have been several paths towards the final
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outcome of proletarianisation or one of several historical forms of capitalist producers 
(farmer, junker, kulak, etc.). While introducing the historical perspective of peasant 
dissolution, Marxist writers have relied heavily on the transition metaphor - with an 
evolutionist bias - and on articulation, with the more ethnographic account of neo- 
Marxist French Anthropology (Meillassoux 1972). There have been several variations 
in Marxist analysis of the agrarian question, from the orthodox brand of proletarianists 
or depeasantists, in favour of rising agricultural productivity and expansion of 
agribusiness as historical necessity - to populist versions, or peasantists, against capital 
penetration and in favour of preserving tradition, contained in peasant social forms (the 
moral economy, reciprocity, political democracy, etc.) (Pare 1991b; Calva 1988 and 
Byres 1982). An attempt at ‘solving’ the peasant question was the Peasant Mode of 
Production theory (Meillassoux, 1972 and Palerm 1981), simplistically derived from 
Marx’s discussion of precapitalist modes of production {das formen and his Introduction 
to the critique of political economy, 1857), and its transitions to capitalism, particularly 
his proposal for differentiating an Asiatic Mode of Production.
Marxists have analysed peasants and their subordinated integration to the capitalist 
economy, trying to establish the general trends of their demise and final absorption (as 
proletarians or petite bourgeoisie). With the exception of Bernstein’s far-reaching 
comparative and theoretical analysis on transitions (cf. 1996), a frequent problem of 
transition-cum analysis is the lack of historical evidence of an actual process of 
convergent change, more or less predictable under general categories (from peasant to 
proletarian, from rural communities to cities, from diversified producers to specialised 
workers). Alternative views -  what Marxists would label ‘populist’ variants - (Netting 
1993, Foladori, 1981) have counter-argued that the complete extinction of peasants is 
not taking place. Rather a ‘refunctionalisation’ is occurring because of the weakness of 
internal markets (in the case of underdeveloped countries), political action on state 
agrarian policies (particularly land reform), and the flexibility of the family economy to 
adapt commodity production to capitalist markets, which has allowed communities and 
households to preserve control to some extent over the labour force, land and natural 
resources.
What such accounts have failed to explain is why capitalist markets have continuously 
penetrated and transformed rural societies, while preserving and reproducing peasant­
like, ‘backward’ social forms, different from large-scale capitalist agriculture. Some 
Marxist-orientated theorists argue that non-capitalist forms of production persist for the
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sake of capitalist accumulation needs, as long as they are a good source of cheap 
commodities and labour (Palerm 1981). However, this rather “functionalist” explanation 
neglects the agency process and the set of contradictions among different types of units 
of production and producer countries, which has to be addressed in relation to concrete 
evidence. With respect to the coffee market, there appears to be such a functional role 
for small producers (surplus transfers through cheap commodities).
One of the first problems confronted by peasant studies specialists is the difficulty of 
arriving at comprehensive theories of the nature of peasants across time and space.5 If 
peasants are understood as a subsidiary social form, not static but emerging from 
specific social contexts, rather than across social formations, one can understand that 
peasants are the result of specific social relations and socio-cultural formations. As 
systems of domination have changed, so too do the social structures in which peasants 
organise and reproduce, though the same could be said for all ‘classes’. The more 
fruitful analyses of peasants have come from middle-range (Merton 1996) or 
substantive (Waters 1994) theories or typologies, which considered historical context, 
regional level of analysis and a theory that could account for social complexity (gender, 
kinship and social stratification systems, rule and legitimisation of power, embedded 
institutions and markets, etc.). In this category the livelihoods framework is one body of 
literature that has addressed creatively many of the structuralist and functionalist 
shortcomings already discussed.
From class change to livelihood transitions and trajectories
During the 1990s valuable research work using the livelihoods framework was 
undertaken under the auspices of different projects, for example by the Institute of 
Development Studies (Sussex), the Overseas Development Institute (London), the 
African Studies Centre (Leiden University), and the Department for International 
Development (London), when it was officially adopted by the British Government.
Much of the influential writing using the terminology of livelihoods came from 
development professionals concerned with the impact of modernity on rural livelihoods, 
particularly on the rural poor (Chambers 1989, Chambers and Conway, 1992; Scoones, 
1998).6 Their approaches aimed at analysing poverty from the point of view of the poor,
5 Some discussions from the mid-1960s onwards focused on the social nature of peasants and their 
specific modes of production (Shanin 1990 and Patnaik 1980).
6 As one of its proponents pointed out “Sustainable livelihoods was embodied in the title of a conference
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arguing that poverty is as much a subjective experience as it is an objective condition, 
and that participatory research methods offer the best means for assessing poverty, and 
for capturing what people identify themselves as its principal dimensions and indicators 
(cfr. Bebbington 1999:29-30).
The livelihoods framework of analysis has to do with the observation of diversity of 
modes of livelihoods synchronically and the diversification of livelihoods in a historical 
perspective, or what Murray (2002: 152-153) calls circumspective and retrospective 
approaches, in that order. Overcoming the Marxist-type generalisations on peasants’ 
proletarianization and viability, the livelihoods framework pays attention to “the myriad 
transitions that have occurred in the ways through which people make a living, and the 
diverse assets they draw upon in the process” Bebbington (1999:43). According to 
Bebbington’s research carried out in Ecuadorian Andes, neither postmodern sceptical 
critique nor neoclassical economics interpretations of development capture the 
complexity of these transformations. They both fail to understand two interconnected 
phenomena. First, human agency: people’s ability to build livelihood strategies, nor 
necessarily based on agriculture or even on economic activities in rural areas, and to 
find market spaces in which they are “economically viable”, while sustaining an 
important link with rural places. Second, they also misinterpreted the enabling or 
constraining role of institutions, particularly those of the state. Post-modern and 
neoclassical economics narratives fail to account for the increased role of the state and 
other important agents, whose policies and interventions can foster rural livelihoods or 
facilitate their break down (getting caught in poverty traps).
In a multiregional work from a Marxist-oriented standpoint, Bernstein et al (1992) 
studied how particular patterns of agricultural development (commercialization of land 
and labour; formation of markets with social and institutional biases and inequalities; 
technical change; and government policies that favour some rural groups) were 
disrupting the livelihood opportunities of different types of people and social groups, 
intensifying processes of social differentiation in rural areas. They based the analysis of 
rural livelihoods on the grounds of agrarian structures and change, agricultural and non- 
agricultural resources and incomes, dismissing hidden assumptions on farming as a
(Conroy and Litvinoff 1988), caught on as a phrase, and then was progressively explored and elaborated 
for meanings of sustainable, of livelihood, and of the two words taken together (e.g. Chambers and 
Conway 1992; Bernstein et al. 1992).” Chambers 2004:5. The main research programme where the 
sustainable livelihoods framework was developed was based in the Institute of Development Studies at 
Sussex, involving work in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Mali, in particular (cfr. Murray 2002).
20
means of livelihoods, survival or a distinct way of life. Instead, they distinguished 
different types of farming, which in turn have different environmental and technical 
conditions, types and levels of resources, market linkages and government policies.
They found that patterns of commoditization and “development” are frequently 
conducive to poverty and environmental degradation, instead of acceptable livelihoods 
and sustainability. In such scenarios the rural poor engage in coping short term 
responses and resistance as well as long term livelihood strategies. These responses 
involve the reproduction on knowledge and cultural norms (Johnson 1992:283), and 
also manifold ways of disguised resistance and protest. Paradoxically, while they may 
individually or cumulatively bring about political change, they may also reinforce 
conditions of oppression they seek to resist (ibid p.283).
The livelihoods framework put forward a more sophisticated understanding of the 
process of impoverishment and deprivation distinguishing between underlying causes 
and immediate triggers, and stressing the relevance of social relationships rather than a 
‘state’ of poverty. As Rakodi (1999) argues, the livelihoods framework implies that the 
poor are not passive and that their responses have typically been based on ‘household 
strategies’.
Bebbington (1999:4) argues that to understand how people create their complex 
livelihoods, especially in a context of livelihoods based on a range of assets, income 
sources and product and labour markets, we need to consider peoples’ access to five
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types of “capital” asset: produced, human, natural, social and cultural capital. Access to 
these assets has three different enabling implications:
• A vehicle for instrumental action (making a living);
• Objects of reflexion, meaning and hermeneutic action (peoples’ livelihood
strategies for making living meaningful); and,
• Means for emancipatory action (peoples’ capabilities and power to act
challenging the structures in which one makes a living).
According to Bebbington “most livelihood decisions involve a choice to over-consume 
a particular capital asset at a given moment”, and in this sense “livelihood strategies are 
attempts at continuous management and modification of these substitutions, trade-offs 
and draw downs on different capital assets.” (ibid. p.30)
7 These 5 types of capital asset were also taken on board in DIfD’s framework for sustainable livelihoods.
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Some shortcomings and contributions
Most of the literature on livelihoods has a normative drive and at times tend to take an 
uncritical approach to “ways of life”, neglecting social complexity -  particularly at 
macro level of analysis -as well as power structures, the role of elites and the multiple 
ways they influence actors’ decision making.
The very focus on livelihoods seems to capture the complex outcome of making a 
living, achieving adaptive survival and somehow playing a role or fitting within society. 
This functional focus is usually made out of rich description of individual, family, group 
and community level strategies. This creates a risk of losing national and global 
dimensions.
The concept of access to assets neglects deeper problems of social relations and also 
simplifies complex issues of identity, networking and entitlements as “access to” or not 
access to, rather than explaining complex historical processes of transformation. Access 
does not ensure development or transformation of social relations.
Although the world becomes one global society in many ways, there are many areas -  
even in developed societies -  which are not totally dominated by monetary exchange 
and capital maximizing institutions. In this way, the use of the concept “capital” to 
analyze culture, social relations or skilled labour, may lead to inadequate theoretical 
characterizations. The idea of “lacking - social, cultural, human - capital” may simplify 
what is resistance to market relations, complex social sanctions to exchange and 
accumulation, unequal social relations, and specific forms of embedded rationality in 
disintegrating societies (peasant, ethnic, post-colonised communities). Equating all 
social “assets” to physical, cumulative, exchangeable “capital”, looses the main features 
of non-capitalist sources of livelihoods, non-market spheres of social action and 
different spheres of value.
An excessive emphasis on family survival strategies, mainly individual agency, may 
neglect a wider view on market trends, agrarian structures and collective action, as well 
as environmental issues and sustainable development.
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oNonetheless, the use of the concept livelihood (rural livelihoods, sustainable 
livelihoods) opened up a flexible framework to study rural trajectories (or transitions) 
without the straightjackets of deterministic theories. It offered a comprehensive 
narrative of rural change and diversified transitions, and the way rural families, 
communities and organisations devised strategies to cope with change. Along with a 
broader view on human development, gender and ethnic perspectives, or rights-based 
development, sustainable livelihoods and access to assets perspectives have challenged 
narrow poverty alleviation policies in rural areas, and have shifted policy making 
priorities towards complex social capital formation and bottom up participation.
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and other participatory methodologies and research 
tools for local development, have allowed rural actors’ worldviews to be known. 
Insights and research agenda within the livelihoods framework, particularly in the case 
of PRA, comprise a set of approaches, methods and values which seek to enable local 
and marginalised people to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of life and to 
plan, act, monitor and evaluate development initiatives (cfr. Chambers 2004:13).
An important contribution of livelihoods analysis is the rights based international 
development agenda. Within the development agenda it has come to the fore that 
poverty alleviation policies have to enhance people’s sustainable livelihoods, rather than 
delivering food or other assets.
In this thesis I intend to follow the social forms argument based on the embeddedness 
theory and livelihoods approach, taking on board critical perspectives on peasants as 
malleable social form and identity, rather than a fixed category. A dynamic view of 
peasants is adopted, where they are seen as a “social form” with extraordinary flexibility 
for adapting to changing scenarios. Contemporary peasants - paraphrasing Granovetter 
(1985) - are less socially embedded than peasantists think, but also less self-interested 
than rational choice analysts would accept.
Key to a more dynamic understanding of rural groups is to overcome, as much as 
possible, essentialist, evolutionist, economist and dichotomous characterisations. In this 
sense, I introduce three lines of analysis: historical, regional and “social complexities”. 
Table 1 summarises the three levels of analysis based on characteristics of the
8 “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and 
activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can COPE with and recover 
from stresses and schocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base” (DflD, 1999: Section 1.1, cit. in Murria 2002:154).
23
Mesoamerican peasantry. An important starting point is historical analysis of the 
concrete processes of colonisation and primitive accumulation of capital, which 
contemporary peasants have faced at some point. Based on such a diachronic 
perspective it is possible to evaluate the unfolding of social categories within rural 
societies (wage labour and labour regimes, capital and agrarian property rights). A 
second component are regional processes, the formation of commodity, labour and 
capital markets, the interactions between agro-ecological formation and the rise of 
capital markets and economies of scale. The third line of enquiry is the focus on social 
complexity, the emergence of social structures that influence markets and peasant social 
forms. In the next three sections I explain the main propositions of these three lines of 
inquiry.
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TABLE No. 1
Historical analysis Regional analysis and livelihoods Complex social forms and embeddedness
Disruption of old social formations 
(colonisation of indigenous peoples; total 
destruction or restructuration of peasant 
complex forms)
Note: peasants were not peasants always
Introduction of a new division of labour on a 
regional scale
Note: exploitation of resources and labour 
defined new community networks and new 
systems of rule
Reduction of complex non-capitalist social forms 
to functional units; destruction or 
re functional isation of old social forms and 
imposition of systems of rule
Note: absorption of elites, restriction to smaller 
local units (loss of regional complexity)
Constitution of specific types of subordinated 
peasantry (junction of fractionated peasant 
forms and colonial state system of rule)
Note: modem peasant social forms are the 
result of the junction between colonial rule 
and peasant exploitation, resistance and in 
some cases isolation
Integration to markets (commoditisation and 
new labour regimes), where structure and 
social function are defined by regional 
processes
Note: depending on the nature of resources, 
productive processes and economies of scales, 
markets penetrated peasant regions and 
adopted specific forms of integration
Emergence o f social differentiation and local 
elites, new forms o f mediated rule and 
legitim isation of new property rights
Note: capitalism continually erodes peasant 
social forms, but also reconstitutes some 
elements o f ‘traditional’ organisation, along with 
the market spaces it has provided them with
Emergence of new peasantries under the 
development of capitalism (appearance of 
commodity production)
Note: markets met specific types o f peasants 
in particular socio-economic contexts; these 
peasants interact, leam and react to capitalist 
markets.
Interrelation of peasant societies and markets: 
not creation and destruction of ‘marginal 
spaces’ in the capitalist economy, but creating 
conditions for new rural livelihoods
Note: according to constraints on capital 
accumulation (ecological, technological, 
social, scale), particular spaces for petty 
commodity producers are created
Elites’ business strategies influence 
interrelations with peasants (price formation, 
market structure, social expectations)
Note: historically there has been a social group 
of intermediaries above peasants - in part 
recruited from them - and below regional elites. 
These intermediaries can play many different 
roles depending on historical conjunctures
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1.5 Historical analysis and the problem o f peasant modes
There is no specific peasant mode of production -  i.e. commodity and Asiatic modes of 
production (Meillassoux 1972 and Palerm 1981) - but an unstable balance of rural social 
structures in underdeveloped capitalism. General theories that could explain the general 
dynamics of the peasant economy and its transitions towards capitalist forms have led to 
short-lived generalisations. Peasantries have been transforming and these explanations 
proposed an endless functional reproduction of peasants, either because of a lacking 
underdeveloped capitalism or long-enduring cultural and political formations 
(patriarchal structures, despotic states). Despite valuable insights derived from the 
family economy resilience vis a vis the capitalist market, these explanations fail to 
address several issues: first, the historical account of why particular markets profited 
from peasant forms of production while others destroyed them; second, relations 
between markets and peasants also affected capitalist forms of integration; and finally, 
these particular interrelations changed over time given different economic and political 
conditions (economies of scale, technology, land tenancy regimes).
On the other hand, advances in understanding different historical paths or transitions, 
though overcoming the shortcomings of the peasant modes of production, generated as 
many transitions as countries researched - the Russian, American, German and other 
paths (Moore, 1966; Goodman 1982 and Calva 1988) - adding little to our 
understanding of what type of historical problems were being solved in each transition 
and why.
This thesis tries to develop a more flexible approach to historical transitions along three 
lines of enquiry: 1) by tracing the adaptive roles of peasant family forms of production 
and their comparative advantage; 2) by assessing the scope of peasant agency and 
strategies (agendas, ideologies, livelihoods, elites); and 3) by assessing the extent to 
which politics, institutions and culture enforce capitalist accumulation (i.e. extra- 
economic means of integration). That is, taking coffee as a case I explain how the 
dominant capitalist mode of production integrates and transforms peasant livelihoods 
depending on available labour and land regimes, market structures and the technological 
horizon of capital.9
9 Given available technologies to exploit particular agroecological landscapes until the late 19th 
Century, costs of transport were very influential and somehow they are still important in shaping 
economies of scale and capitalist integration in different areas (Palacios 1983).
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1.6 Social structuration o f peasants: strategies and elites
Small coffee producers can develop “peasant” livelihoods and strategies for three 
reasons: 1) family forms of production efficiently use resources (land and natural 
resources, labour and social networks), based on traditional agriculture and flexible 
integration to markets; 2) the rural space (land and other entitlements, community social 
networks) allows a comparatively desirable livelihood; and 3) the ability of rural elites 
to elaborate, rationalise and plan complex strategies and social bargaining.
Contemporary peasants are shaped by capitalist markets, nation state policies and their 
own livelihoods and strategies. Capitalist markets push them to become free workers 
and consumers, but at the same time create spaces for peasants in some agricultural 
activities and particular regions when natural and technological barriers make capital 
expansion difficult, creating diseconomies of scale, high transaction costs and 
insufficient incentives for capital investors. Peasants and agrarian elites shape rural 
markets because they are a competitive force in the market. New spaces appear for 
small producers not only because of capital weaknesses characteristic of 
underdeveloped countries (Frank 1967; Amin 1976; Bartra 1993 and Diaz Polanco 
1977), but due to the ‘comparative advantage’ of small-scale units of production in 
those spaces. Furthermore, small producers have bargained for their position in cash- 
crop markets in many different ways: not only accepting marginal returns and stretching 
the use of family labour, but also negotiating state subsidies and access to land and 
natural resources, setting up co-operative organisations and even using social 
mobilisation. The way these forms of action affect the structure of rural markets has not 
been properly researched. Apart from the insights of neoinstitutional economics about 
market imperfections (ill-defined property rights, segmented land markets, lack of 
information and so on), we have to reincorporate politics in the analysis of concrete 
realities (i.e. the dynamic interrelation of business strategies - elaborated by elites - and 
market structures in plantation agriculture).
On the level of agency, the difficulties of small coffee producers to organise collective 
action will be analysed. Collective action depends on rational calculation of gains and 
structures of incentives (Olson, 1971), as much as on the ability to structure social 
action and political agendas at different levels. Awareness about socio-economic 
structures has been identified with political action. Many Studies on rural development
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have enthusiastically applied the concept of social capital to capture the complexity that 
was missing somewhere in the social and cultural realms, but in fact mislead and neglect 
the social complexity and political dimension of rural societies (see Harriss 2001 and 
Bebbington 1998). Capitalism has not expanded to many rural regions and niches 
because peasants can resist or shape such expansion even in the absence of political 
organisation and action. To do so, they deploy many resources for survival, what Scott 
(1985) calls ‘the weapons of the weak’. The recognition of the hidden resourcefulness of 
peasant resistance, their coping strategies and rationality -  albeit bounded rationality 
(March and Olsen, 1989) - was a step forward. However, it still seems short-sighted to 
neglect “hegemony”10 and see the economic - the productive capabilities displayed by 
peasants - as mere survivalist efforts, made by static and closed societies. In this thesis I 
build upon this framework to evaluate the ‘autonomous movement’ of coffee producers, 
which pursued without much success the appropriation o f  the productive process, after 
the state withdrew direct interventions in the coffee sector (see chapter 3).
The ability to engage selectively in labour and commodity markets as well as to 
undertake co-operative organisations, have formed an important part of such economic 
agency. Trust and representation are two problematic categories in peasant 
communities. Social obligations and interpersonal ties are still very influential in 
people’s lives. I advance the concept of ‘pre-emptive strategies’ to explain the 
interlocking of peasants, intermediaries and growers, the embeddedness of envy and 
distrust, and its effects on coffee market structures, business strategies and small 
producers’ detachment and social distance from elites and market incentives (see 
particularly Chapters 3 and 4). I build upon the insights of structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1995), which contends that structures both constrain and enable actors. 
According to this theory, knowledge allows actors not only to reproduce, but to 
transform social structures. This point draws attention to an important role of rural 
elites. Elites embody any framework for collective action and therefore concentrate to 
some extent social and cultural capital. Aside from ruling and class status, what it is 
important for our analytical framework are elite’s role and capabilities for market 
exchange coordination, knowledge development and bargaining with the state and other 
powerfull actors; and their functions of social representation and collective action. If 
elites are enabling of other groups’ advancement, do solve problems of collective action, 
widen the sphere of public domain and are pluralistic, while their power face checks and
10 See footnote 4 in this chapter.
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balances; chances are these elites may play a developmental role and will be conducive 
to higher social complexity. On the contrary, if communities lack the means to control 
elites’ predatory behaviour, if they are weak and simplistically exploitative, exclusive, it 
is likely that we will find negative developmental effects in rural societies. Instead of 
elusive egalitarian and simplistic assumptions about homogeneous rural livelihoods, it is 
important to assess the contradictory and rich functions that rural elites play in rural 
societies in terms of social change, political representation and human knowledge (see 
Bottomore 1964).
Capitalism imposes an extended social division of labour on peasant societies, far 
beyond its borders, simplifying in this way its societal structures. Social relations do not 
rest on abstract structures. They require not only what Moore (1966) called co­
ordinating mechanisms -forms of state - but societal coherence and continuity (a set of 
common norms and a moral of general application). While markets destroy rural 
livelihoods, they also create conditions for the emergence of new ones, which are not 
entirely functional to capitalist markets.
It is surprising how the analysis of contemporary peasants has overlooked the problem 
of societal complexity and elites.11 How could rural groups develop religion, 
knowledge, technology, productive organisation and livelihoods, if not through elites? A 
sound analytical framework to creatively integrate the understanding of social 
differentiation and political dynamics of particular rural regions, where markets and 
capitalist elites have not fully formed, is still missing. Development theories could 
enrich the analysis of deprived rural areas and their long term transformations, if the 
problem of elite formation is considered, not only in relation to the short-term, 
economic role of merchants and intermediaries, but from a historical and social 
perspective.
1.7 Rationality debate
The classical debate about the moral economy of peasants (Scott 1976 and Popkin 1976) 
played an important role in furthering a long-standing debate in Anthropology about the 
embeddedness of economic life in traditional societies (Polanyi 1944, 1957; 
Granovetter, 1980).
11 This view draws on different attempts to comprehend peasant society as a whole (Linck, 1996; Wolf, 
1957).
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Discussions about rural development also highlighted the extent to which peasants 
reacted to market incentives (Olson 1971; Popkin 1976 and Bates, 1981).
In this respect, several authors argue for the relevance of different approaches: 
rationality of peasants under specific constraints should be, according to Popkin (1979) 
the main focus; the moral economy and its survival principles (Scott, 1976) or the 
inherent strategic dimensions of everyday practices (de Certeau, 1996); transitions to 
capitalism, social differentiation and class struggle according to Marxist-led scholars 
such as Bernstein and Byres (1982).
The debate on the rationality of peasants, and in general of people in different societies, 
roles and institutions, has resulted in the recognition of different systems of knowledge
19and cultural values (Long 1995). The relativist thesis has gained acceptance, 
demanding empirical evidence about the particular behaviour and the rational systems 
that shed light on particular actions and decisions.
My research engages primarily with how economic rationality, used in a wide sense -
the ability to interpret and act upon economic structures to maximise returns - develops
unevenly among different rural actors, depending on how they become engaged with
markets and on market institutions (see next section). Rural social groups do not line up
from less to more rational, according to wealth or status. Peasants still practicing cycles
of traditional agriculture have a framework for complex calculations, planning and
making decisions, though protestant believers have revised tradition, developed formal
education and adopted modernisation strategies. Some coffee traders -  without formal
training - can out-perform bigger buyers in manipulating social networks, devising
margin-taking strategies and achieving faster turnover. Learning the workings of
concrete markets involves generations-long engagement and rationalisation of
experience, personal initiative and exposure with different forms of capital and its
concomitant disciplines (working out cost structures and the cost of money, producers’
prices and the real yield of coffee lots, not to mention price movement risks). However,
these processes are not entirely subjective and individual, for they depend on daily
11interactions, or interfaces, as well as on the influence of market structures and
12 See the debate between Bates (1997b) and Johnson (1997). The former defends rational choice theory 
as a grand theory, which only uses area studies to illustrate, while the latter defends the theoretical 
potential of area studies.
The interrelationships of peasants and other actors are not only physical encounters but exchanges of 
meanings and battles of knowledge (Long and Long 1992; Long and Villarreal, 1994).
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institutions; all play a significant part in developing the functional knowledge of 
markets among peasants and rural elites, as will be seen en Chapters 4 and 5.
1.8 Institutionalism and embededness
New institutionalism has drawn on different and quite heterogeneous theoretical 
approaches, particularly in economics, sociology and political science. Even though this 
school never abandons the main assumptions of mainstream economics,14 they draw on 
older institutionalist15 contributions to understand the logic of collective action and how 
social and political institutions shape, constrain or enable markets and individual 
maximising behaviour. North, in particular, revived a profound insight of Marxist theory 
on the role of superstructure (institutions, property rights) on social change 
(Kalmanovitz 2001). These approaches have become increasingly formalised, refined 
and powerful, as they intensify the debate with, and identify the limits of, neoclassical 
economics. However, other theoretical perspectives have greatly contributed to define 
formal and informal institutions influencing economic behaviour and outcomes. 
Economic sociology and organization theory, have elaborated a set of concepts with 
great potential to understand the link between structure and agency. Among the most 
relevant for this study, we find bounded rationality (March and Olsen, 1989) social 
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) and social capital (Putnam, 1993). Within 
economics, the main contributions come from property rights theory (North, 1986), 
transaction cost economics (Coase, [1937] 1988) and contractual theory (Williamson, 
1991).
New institutionalism, rational choice and public choice analyses have influenced our 
perception of development, to such an extent that their concepts are now standard 
discourse in the international development organisations. Particularly, the role of 
institutions in shaping market performance and individual preferences has taken politics 
(and the state) back into the analysis of development problems.
Robert Bates (1980, 1981, 1983, 1989 and 1997) with his comparative analysis of 
African agricultural markets and institutions from the early 1980s to his book in 1997 on 
the era of ‘open economy politics’ signals a period of an influential brand of the
14 Neoclasical economics assumes individual rational behaviour, a social tendency towards equilibrium 
and perfect information.
15 Williamson (1994) identifies the schools of thought that feed back into the discussion leading to New 
Institutional Economics. Harriss (2002) established key differences between old and new institutionalism, 
particularly how the latter disregards politics, culture and history.
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‘political economy of institutions’ from a rational choice perspective. He sustains a 
healthy and fruitful debate with post-colonial Marxism and mainstream development 
economics, challenging the former on its mechanistic understanding of the state and 
class interests, and the latter on the weight given to ‘external’ constraints over domestic 
policies. He used to criticise rational choice for its lack of historical understanding of 
politics and institutions in shaping market performance, applying the insights of new 
institutionalism (Williamson, 1994; North, 1986) to develop a political economy 
perspective on the ‘urban bias’ in public choice study of rural economies. His criticisms 
of mainstream economics, nevertheless, have led to a robust understanding of the 
potential interactions of markets and other institutions given the ‘right structure of 
incentives’ (i.e., property rights, competitive price formation, etc). He recognised that 
politics must complement institutional economics’ analysis to account for the complex 
dynamics of power and state institutions (Bates 1997c).
There are two particularly fruitful ideas in neoinstitutional analysis that are followed in 
this thesis. The first one is the general idea of transaction costs. Markets function in a 
complex social context that constantly engenders different levels of restrictions to 
market contracts and transactions. The second one, is that institutions play a decisive 
role in the evolution of economic systems; individuals’ ability to make rational 
decisions is strongly constrained by institutional frameworks and incentives, as well as 
culture. Competition in the international coffee market has come to depend above all on 
the quality of institutions (and not only on production and transaction costs). I draw on 
these insights to analyze the institutional framework regulating the Mexican coffee 
sector (see Chapters 3 and 6).
The embeddedness hypothesis
The concept of embeddedness has become widely used in the social sciences, 
particularly among scholars drawing on the debate between old and new 
institutionalism.16 It can be traced to Polanyi’s (1944) seminal work The great 
transformation: the political and economic origins o f  our time which highlights the 
multiple and reinforcing interactions between social and economic patterns of behaviour 
from prehistoric to modem times. Polanyi’s main concern is to underscore that markets 
are deeply rooted in a set of social institutions which further this dynamic -  though 
disruptive - form of economic transactions and, at the same time, contain the pace and
16 See: Harriss 2002 and Hollingsworth 1997.
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scope at which it expands through double movement cycles of regulation and 
deregulation (or self-regulating markets).17 This work has had a far-reaching influence 
in the old school of institutionalism, previously discussed, which is increasingly 
nurtured with insights from Sociology, Political Science and Anthropology. Thus, the 
concept of embeddedness helps to advance a longstanding intellectual and political 
struggle between classical and neoclassical economics, free marketers and 
protectionists, liberals and utilitarians, individualists and communitarians, neoliberals 
and neoKeynesians (Etzioni 1996 and 2002, Bellamy 1992).
Following Polanyi, Granovetter’s article (1985) “Economic action and social structure:
The problem of embeddedness” takes once more on board the deep-rooted
entanglements between economic and social practices, making the neo-classical efforts
of constructing abstract and formal analysis “a grievous misunderstanding” (p. 482);
that is, he argues that economic behaviour is embedded in social networks, not
conforming to the idealised markets of neoclassical economics nor to the atomised
decision-making of Parsonian sociology whose actors behave according to prescribed
roles. He proposes an embeddedness approach as a middle ground between under- and
oversocialized perspectives because:
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they 
adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of 
social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action 
are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations, (p. 487).
Grannovetter’s social relations include a wide array of practices, conventions, rules, 
norms, morals, laws and even emotions which shape economic behaviour, promoting 
trust, opportunism or malfeasance in complex, dynamic and differentiated ways.
Evans’s (1995) concept of embedded autonomy pursues a slightly different line which 
stresses the relationships between states and markets. In his view, successful 
developmental states shape in different ways business behaviour through a wide and 
changing gamut of interventions and incentives exhibiting a complex relationship 
between state and business. The former is autonomous enough to make long term
17 At the root of this theoretical insight is his concept of “fictitious commodities”and how the expansion 
of self-regulating markets through the collapse of regulations on land, labour and money (the three 
fictitious commodities) create socially destructive tendencies that sooner o later trigger the opposite 
movement for social protection and regulation. A free labour market destroys social bonding; a free land 
market leads to environmental destruction that undermines food provisioning; and a free money market 
destabilizes any social organization of production. See Polanyi 1944 and Talbot 2006:26-27.
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economic plans that respond to the national interests and not to any specific societal 
interest (business or otherwise); but at the same time its links and levels of penetration 
of business activities allows it to supervise, follow up and, when necessary, rectify 
economic plans.
Progress in the construction of a socio-economic paradigm (Etzioni 2002, Holligsworth 
and Boyer 1997; Hollingsworth et al 2002) reinforces how economic goals and social 
norms are intertwined in variegated ways across sectors and also at different levels of 
the social spectrum (global, regional, national and local). The concept of embeddedness 
is at centre of this paradigm which examines the multiple and subtle ways in which the 
social sphere interacts and shapes maximizing behaviour. The concept of complex 
embeddedness put forward by Muller (2002), one of the most important representatives 
of the socio-economic paradigm, distinguishes between embeddedness stemming from:
• Actors, i.e., an individual, an enterprise a multinational corporation, 
NGO, public entities or private associations;
• Environment, i.e., the influence of natural settings on productive 
processes, technologies and even social organisation;
• Institutions, i.e., continuity and cultural imprint on economic 
institutions,
• Or from a combination of all of these social conditions.
In his view, utility maximization is embedded in -and contained by- moral obligations, 
social bonds, organizational culture and knowledge of actors (see also Atzioni 2002, 
Platteau 1991); rational economic action is embedded in the environment, not only as 
the physical space in which transactions take place (the geographic distribution of the 
actors involved in transactions, the infrastructure linking the actors, market places), but 
also the religious and cultural environment sanctioning encouraging or inhibiting market 
interactions. In addition, rules, norms, regulations, conventions and other institutions 
mould and are moulded by individuals maximizing behaviour.
In the case of coffee producers studied in this thesis, the concept of embeddednes and 
social complexity is highly relevant, as shall be seen throughout the thesis, particularly 
in chapter two on the influence of natural factors on the organisation of the coffee 
sector, chapter three and four on the social construction of coffee markets, organisations 
and actors; and chapter five on the emergence of elites with particular business
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strategies and economic interactions with coffee producers. The two main arguments of 
this thesis refer to the embeddedness hypothesis:
1. Real rural markets are deeply constrained by natural and social settings. 
The humid tropical mountains of Atzalan have been the place of historical, 
demographic and political phenomena that interacted with the emergence of 
a new market. At the same time, the predominant presence of smallholders 
in the coffee market has shaped the depth, structure and efficiency of the 
coffee chain. In particular, the coffee market has been constrained by social 
sanctions (perceptions of collective good and fairness, legitimacy of 
property), coping strategies and embedded rationality. Profoundly rooted 
ideas and feelings about land reform, social distrust among classes, food 
safety and kin security have shaped the way the coffee market emerged and 
still works at local and regional level;
2. Elites were instrumental in shaping the coffee market through business 
strategies that constantly reflect the relationships with producers, at times in 
exploitative ways, and in another cases in partnership and distributive ways. 
The social position of merchants and leaders have allowed them to play 
different roles that no other actors play. They led social movements against 
state capture; they accumulated knowledge about the international and 
national coffee market, processing technologies and complex transactions, 
state regulations and incentives; they have also competed and cut down 
transaction costs and convey as much information as they see feet to 
advance their business strategies. While local and regional elites have 
managed to reproduce the coffee business they also set constraints to more 
profitable value-added strategies, partnerships and innovation. In this way, 
elites are a condensed form of social capital: they are elected, promoted and 
legitimized as leaders to act on behalf of the community. Limited and 
corrupted leaders betray this delegation of power and destroy social capital, 
trust and collective action. Loyal and creative leaders advance the common 
good, increase trust and widen the scope for collective action and social 
innovation.
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1.9 A framework for analysing peasants
Where coffee is the key regional commodity, coffee growing can be seen as a
151“hegemonic cash crop,” which influences the regional economy. This is an insight I 
used to understand the relevance of this crop, not only in terms of labour and capital 
markets, but the alignment of prices, average wages, land rentals, cost of services and 
inputs, and also in terms of the concentration of knowledge, expertise of rural elites and 
accumulated abilities for social and market bargaining. In short, a hegemonic cash crop 
saturates the economic and social structure and indeed the whole regional culture. Entire 
regional markets are thus shaped by hegemonic cash crops, such as sugar cane (Mintz 
1986), tobacco (Diaz 1985) and coffee (Paige 1997; Palacios 1983 and Roseberry, 1983).
I argue that coffee producers must be thought of as complex social actors, structured in 
different social categories and identities (peasants, commodity producers, seasonal 
workers, rural elites). They have access to land and agricultural assets, but are 
temporarily wage workers, by both need and choice. Coffee growers also cultivate 
staples for household consumption and different cash crops. They are used to labour 
migration during the slack season, as well as exchanging labour to face the peak of the 
coffee harvests and maize sowing. They belong first of all to a community, in which 
access to land (ejido entitlements and organisations) and kinship (first immigrants are 
the root of new family structures), were fundamental in shaping local identity. At the 
same time, coffee growers have created different kinds of associational and corporatist 
structures (from local associations to regional co-operatives and political organisations).
Thus, peasants can be analysed with the help of a wide spectrum of theoretical 
approaches, social concepts and categories (class, ethnic identity, status, and others). 
Peasant communities have been changing according to external forces (markets, state) 
and internal ones (generational discontinuities, demographic imbalance), within 
integrative and disintegrative processes.
Even if, at the macro level of analysis, a rural population has been relatively declining, 
as has the contribution of agriculture to gross domestic product, this does not prove that 
rural livelihoods are unimportant. Small producers have upheld their participation in
18 Generally speaking, there are several secondary local, regional and national export markets. Where coffee 
production is the leading local and regional commodity, the market structure is strongly determined by its 
production-marketing chains and time-space needs (Villaseflor 1991 and Nolasco 1985).
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some activities, including modem agribusinesses, and developed forms of adaptation 
and bargaining in new economic and political circumstances.
The problem of labour regimes and diversity of income-earning activities is paramount 
in building up an interpretation of small producers’ livelihoods, as well as in discussing 
their social location. The combination of seasonal wage labour and intensive use of 
family labour in the domestic economy is fundamental to explaining the reproduction of 
the household.
In the 1990s, there was an important reflection on the nature and political scope of new 
social movements, including rural actors (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998; Kearney 
1996; Foweraker 1995; Botey, Moguel and Hernandez 1992). Although my analysis 
does not share the assumptions of approaches based on evolutionist transitions of 
peasants to proletarians or petty bourgeois, I do not neglect the social reproduction of 
rural households and communities based on commodity production, self-provisioning of 
food-stuffs and wage labour. If it is true that household income is derived from a variety 
of sources, neither agriculture, nor wage labour could explain the whole process of 
social reproduction. To ignore the structural level of analysis would lead to accepting 
more or less subjective perspectives.
Although these works on new rural actors, new identities and new social movements, 
have made important contributions to highlight changes in informal politics and cultural 
resistance, it seems difficult to prove what is new without providing enough evidence of 
why and how local groups have effectively built up new cultural and political 
constructions (identities, agendas, organisations).19 Is there not historical continuity in 
new social movements? Are new identities embedded in organised groups’ agendas as 
well as in peasant family strategies? Have new rural actors overcome socioeconomic 
differentiation across class, ethnic and gender lines? These are some of the questions 
that need to be addressed to understand the ways in which rural actors’ agency develops.
Rural actors have no doubt developed multifaceted identities, and varied livelihoods. 
However, theoretical propositions have to explain heterogeneous empirical evidence at 
different levels - family, community, social groups, organisations - to demonstrate what 
is genuinely new, how tradition (continuity) was transformed and how the new
19 Knight (1994) criticised such approaches making the point that a disregard for history - when not due to 
sheer ignorance - has easily led to labelling social movements as new, even when they represent processes 
of continuity with the past.
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(identities, agendas, organisations) help to face (old) problems of socioeconomic 
differentiation, political participation and bargaining with the state.
From Marxist’s rural semi-proletarians (Pare 1991b and Bartra 1993), to 
postmodernist’s multi-identity peasant-like ‘polybians’ (Kearney 1996), there have been 
many attempts to conceptualise the nature of modem peasants, and the field is far from 
experiencing academic closure (Shanin 1990).
Summary o f main arguments
The theoretical and methodological framework I have outlined in this chapter suggests a 
revision of traditional approaches and concepts used to study peasants. I propose a wider 
use of the concept peasant and other social categories (worker, migrant, petty trader) in 
order to understand peasant livelihoods, not in the traditionally essentialist 
interpretations of the peasant, but rather in three distinctive ways: (1) the way in which 
small landholders use resources - labour, land and natural resources - based on an 
agrarian culture; (2) the way in which rural people engage and disengage from markets 
(labour, commodities), which allows them to recreate a rural space where they can 
preserve a relatively acceptable livelihood; and (3) the way in which being peasants -  
and identifying themselves with a peasant livelihood - is still meaningful for rural 
people.
Capitalist markets destroy and at the same time recreate spaces for peasants, usually 
explained in terms of ecological, technological and social barriers, which capital has not 
been able to overcome for several reasons. However, the presence of peasants and rural 
elites also reconstitutes such spaces and shapes commodity market institutions (in line 
againg with Bebbington’s place formation).
The ability of social actors to mobilise resources depends not only on political 
consciousness and co-operation, but also on the possibility to transform socio-economic 
structures through economic and cultural means: to create wealth and legitimise access 
to it, to extend the division of labour and to sustain a complex social organisation 
(networks, institutions, elites). Peasants’ social disposition to support elites has not been 
sufficiently analysed in the processes of social bargaining, engagement and 
disengagement from real markets and in the recreation of rural livelihoods.
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The formation of the coffee market in Atzalan was shaped by the process of land 
reform, described in Chapter 2. This process promoted a system of entitlements as well 
as constraints. It endowed poor people with land, but with limited access to other 
resources, such as infrastructure, technology and credit. More than intrinsic advantages, 
market incentives along with state promotion created the initial conditions for thousands 
of small producers to engage in coffee cropping.
Small producers have not only been resilient in producing coffee, but they have also 
influenced some of the regional structures and strategies of merchant and industrial 
capital through an efficient combination of traditional technologies, family labour and a 
diversified domestic economy. The complex strategies characteristic of small-scale 
coffee producers in the region can only be understood in the light of land reform, state 
intervention and the structure of the local coffee market, as is discussed in Chapter 2.
The characteristics of coffee producers’ organisations are studied in Chapter 3. Peasant 
co-operatives survived the withdrawal of the Instituto Mexicano del Cafe (IMC, the 
Mexican coffee board), assuming some of its former functions. However, in most cases, 
these top-down organisations ended up trapped in an inefficient use of capital, lacking 
technical and marketing expertise, as well as funding. They have contributed to the 
concentration and centralisation of coffee production along an international commodity 
chain.
The way the land reform was accomplished and the way the coffee board functioned led 
coffee market actors to develop pre-emptive strategies. While each actor tried to 
maximise his own share, in the long-run he narrowed down the room for a more 
competitive coffee business. I found that a set of stereotypes amongst producers, 
intermediaries, buyers and processors has made it difficult to break the vicious circle of 
distrust, inefficiency and economic loss. For a new institutional framework to develop in 
the coffee sector, actors’ mutual perceptions have to be redefined.
The factors explaining why ejidatario producers have survived in a marginal coffee 
producing area are examined in Chapter 4. The fact that coffee cropping is a labour 
intensive crop world-wide poses many interesting paradoxes regarding the tensions in 
labour regimes. The nature of coffee production has strong connections with labour 
regimes and the strategies of social actors. Some quality attributes are closely associated 
to the rusticity of coffee cropping and to the business strategies of the rural elite. Small
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producers are the social base of the coffee market. They prevail in numbers, 
geographical dispersion and in terms of the overall production.
The advantages of peasants in coffee production imply at the same time constraints. A 
diversified economy does not allow high yields in one particular crop, setting limits to 
cash generating capacity and accumulation. Labour intensive crop patterns (coffee, 
maize-beans) put under great strain the flexible use of family labour across different 
activities during the agricultural cycle. Thus, the priority of simple reproduction sets a 
limit to the social division of labour.
The ecological, technological and social constraints on coffee production play an 
important part in creating room for small producers in this market. Concerns about 
ecology, quality, sustainable agriculture and fair trade add a competitive edge to small 
producers.
The crisis and the strategies peasants pursue to surmount economic hardship change the 
position of coffee producers in the regional market, intensifying the trend towards 
managing two different value spheres, one organised around traditional agriculture and 
food-staples - in which family labour is crucial - and the other around coffee cropping 
and wage labour, in which regional markets are decisive. The interrelation of both 
provides the basis of modem rural livelihoods.
Rural elites are the subject matter of Chapter 5. Rural elites have played a fundamental 
role in shaping the coffee market, integrating, relating and subordinating in different 
ways peasants to capital. At the same time they are an active influence on peasants’ 
expectations and organisations.
Rural development policies set up a corporatist political system that has systematically 
co-opted local elites into limited political careers, as a means for legitimising and 
controlling rural areas. In the process, such elites are not only alienated from their 
original communities, but the potential developmental impact associated to their 
education and capabilities is seriously undercut, as is argued in Chapter 5. The 
Mexican political system has made it difficult for peasant communities to develop 
complex structures of representation and exercise the leadership of rural elites
20 The impact of elites in development has been one of the most important tenets of modernization theory 
(Bottomore 1964, Germani 1971 and Harrison 1988).
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01supportive of their local interests. As part of the structural adjustment, the Mexican 
state made a half-hearted attempt at displacing the old, corrupt rural PRI corporate 
clientele (mainly the Peasant National Confederation or CNC, by its initials in Spanish), 
but ended up accommodating new ones, not more democratic or economically efficient. 
However, new business strategies developed, showing stratified linkages with peasant 
producers and differential access to profitable market niches.
Chapter 6 examines coffee institutions in a comparative perspective and it also reflects 
on the Mexican experience and its possibilities to build a more efficient institutional 
framework in the light of the relatively successful story of Colombia. Chapter 7 offers 
some conclusions on the findings presented in previous chapters.
Research strategy
The main period analysed here covers the coffee price slump from the middle of 1989 - 
when no agreement was reached in the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) and 
international prices plummeted - up to the middle of 1995 - when signs of recovery 
became visible.
This thesis is the outcome of two stages of research and fieldwork:
• 5 months fieldwork in the harvest 1994-95 (December to April) to carry out in- 
depth interviews with producers and local leaders in several ejido communities 
of San Pedro Altepepan, Atzalan, with buyer-processors and exporters in 
Tlapacoyan, Xico and Mexico City, to accomplish a multi-level analysis, which 
would cover the local, regional and national settings.
• 2 months follow-up fieldwork at the end of the cycle 1995-96 (March and April) 
to apply specific research tools in Tlacolulan (family genealogies to analyse 
access to land; focus groups on fictitious kinship and social expectations; and a 
producers survey to study social networks and land markets).
The methodology employed synchronic-diachronic and functional-structural
00perspectives of analysis. I traced the evolution of social categories that explain
21 The Mexican state’s political structures matter, not only the logic of collective action (dispersed and 
numerous small producers, high costs and low returns to collective action, etc.).
22 The analysis of social functions need not be functionalist, conflict-free, organicistic, while the search for 
social structures can avoid structuralist over-determination. That is why it is useful to incorporate historical 
and dynamic perspectives into the functional and structural focuses, respectively. In taking advantage of 
Marxist social theory, I considered relevant criticisms and used more insightful analytical tools in managing
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contemporary peasants. The retrospective analysis of the coffee market went back to the 
land reform period and the formation of the local coffee market in Atzalan, the origins 
of coffee sector institutions and the beginning of the coffee crisis (see Chapter 2). 
Synchronic analysis focused on the functioning of family units of production (social 
networks, access to land and livelihood strategies; see Chapter 4 second section).
In terms of the analysis of structures, I analysed the agroecological and technological 
conditions of the coffee production process, the coffee market cycles and its sectoral 
composition (Chapter 4, first section). The analysis of surplus formation was 
undertaken: looking at income-generating activities during the agricultural cycle; the 
ways in which coffee surplus is spent and invested; and the process of price formation in 
the coffee marketing chain (Chapter 4). Particular attention was devoted to the 
interlocking of rural elites with the state and power structures (Chapter 5). After long 
sessions in which peasants, technicians, scientists and marketing consultants -in 
Atzalan, Xalapa, Mexico City and London- explained to me the many fine points of the 
coffee business, I realised some of the constraints of academic research on coffee. 
Getting to know the practicalities of the coffee cycle, the measuring systems and 
conversion rates along different types of coffee, the refinements of yield calculations 
and blending, and price formation, takes time and openness from the interviewee, but it 
was a vital input for writing up the whole argument. I tried as much as possible to ease 
and limit technical details, and put many of them in footnotes and tables, apart from 
appendices.
One of the main contributions of my research is that it is based on considerable 
fieldwork among coffee producing ejidatarios. I tracked family strategies -  particularly 
in Tlacolulan - to evaluate what I argue are the peasant identity and strategies of 
contemporary rural livelihoods: intensive use of labour and access to land based on 
social networks; the management of traditional cycles of agriculture (associated crops, 
chronic under-over consumption, build up and disinvestment of savings); a diversified 
economic strategy (basic food/cash crop association and diversified use of family 
labour); and reformulation of cultural and religious identities (see in particular Chapter 
4). I carried out approximately 200 individual and group interviews with producers (see 
Appendix No. 8). Group interviews were mostly used at the beginning of my research in 
each community in the form of non-structured interviews and fieldtrips to coffee fincas,
specific problems (Mouseliz, 1990, 1991, 1993; Stompka, 1993; Gledhill, 1994; Giddens, 1990; Harriss, 
1992).
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and focus grupos at a later stage on specific topics (religious groups interrelations with 
Loma de las Flores’ Jeova Witnesses; godparenthood in El Jardin; coffee crisis in 
Tlacolulan monthly assembly; social expectations and family life stories with Tele- 
secundary graduate students). In-depth interviews were carried out with knowledgable 
coffee growers, millers and regional leaders and with women on particularly sensitive 
issues. Although I only listed 7 formal interviews with women (see Appendix No. 8), 
there were many instances o f informal talking which were particularly useful to 
understand community life. Two examples stand out in terms o f valuable in-depht 
interviews with women. Raquel Arcos, a former administrative secretary o f Fondo 
Regional de Solidaridad Azotal, niece of one o f the most important leaders in the region 
(Jose Luis Arcos Lopez), became my key informant and also assistant in particular tasks 
(following the coffee “dollar” from producers prices to selling prices; mapping out 
leaders and delegates political connections and figuring out factional alignment, see 
Chapter 5). Albertina Rosas Flores, housewife and ejidataria in Tlacolulan, was very 
helpul during two weeks for reconstructing domestic consumption patterns and building 
up my case study around this SPA’s satellite community in relation to demographic 
pressure, leaseholding markets and family livelihood strategies (which were finally cut 
down to what is now Chapter No. 4). Albertina introduced me to Tlacolulan’s women 
with whom I figured out how this community founded by three brothers’ families 
became populated in three generations with hundreds o f Romeros and how initial grants 
of more than 10 hectareas became landholdings of less than half hectare. I did not 
attempet to construct a gendered perspective o f my research subject but their insights 
were very valuable to arrange my argument.
Actor /
No, of individual interviews
Coffee chain link and role Level of analysis
Officials / 12 SERVICE. Current coffee programs 
(income support and credit) and former 
IMC’s
National and 
regional
Technicians / 11 SERVICE. Current coffee programs 
and former IMC employees
Regional and local
Exporters (national buyers) / 4 BUYER. ESCARCESA and AMSA International and 
national
Grower millers (also regional 
buyers) / 4
PRODUCER and MILLER. Regional
Local buyers / 8 INTERMEDIARY. Local intermediary Local
Regional leaders / 20 INTERMEDIARY. Regional coffee 
coops, and agrarian and savings 
organisations
Regional
Local leaders / 21 INTERMEDIARY. Local coffee 
coops, agrarian and savings
Local
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organisations, community 
representatives
Landowners / 3 PRODUCER. Local grower Local
Ejidatario small producers 
(also labour migrants) / 35
PRODUCER. Ejidatario producers 
(form SPA ejido and neighbouring 
ejidos and communities)
Local
Leaseholder small producers / 
8
PRODUCER. Descendants of 
ejidatario producers
Local
Landless coffee pickers, mill 
workers and day labourers / 6
WORKER.Outside and local day 
workers
Local
I chose Atzalan for its rich agrarian history and for being a relatively neglected area in 
terms of coffee research (compared to Central Veracruz). After an initial fieldtrip to the 
region I started to build up my case study around San Pedro Altepepan ejido for its 
demographic and political centrality and its intense agrarian struggles (see Chapter No. 
2). Most of them usually started as informal talks with groups of producers in their 
communities (around a dozen ejidos in Atzalan), complemented with field visits to their 
coffee flncas and pulping centres. Then I chose 4 communities of San Pedro Altepepan 
Ejido, where I also did deep interviewing with key informants of four families in 
Tlacolulan, El Jardin and Equimite communities to go into details of agricultural 
calendars, costs of production, social networks and political issues.
The analysis of rural markets required an integral consideration of politics, which makes 
relevant the relationship between surplus and power (Bartra 1993; Herring 1986 and 
Bates 1981, 1997c) through patron/client relations, factional politics (caciquismo), and 
corporate control (Bartra 1993 and Gledhill, 1994). Asymmetric allocation of surpluses 
and control over means of production and strategic services (transport, trade) are the 
basis of differentiation processes. Apart from deep interviewing of rural leaders 
(intermediaries, ejido authorities, religious leaders, local bosses, ranchero buyer- 
processors), one of the contributions of this thesis is the analysis of rich material drawn 
from systematic interviews with coffee elites in the Tlapacoyan coffee producing 
region: leaders of producers’ organisations and coffee businessmen along the whole 
coffee chain -  from local intermediaries to big exporters. I tried to figure out the logic of 
their economic strategies and the way they were interlocked using life histories, 
genealogies, political mapping of factions and vertical integration charts (see Chapter 5 
and Appendix 5).
23 I chose SPA among dozens of ejidos in Atzalan because of their agrarian struggles, organisational 
initiatives and level of integration in the coffee market (see Chapter 2).
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Producing coffee is also reproducing a livelihood. I addressed the problem of agency 
looking at the whole set of responses, from family economy adjustments to collective 
action, trying to understand the “logic” of the peasant attempts to overcome the coffee 
market crisis. I used extensively comparative perspectives to highlight the diversity of 
knowledge, values and social expectations. Peasants’ strategies were studied in relation 
to the structural trends of the international coffee market: price instability, competition 
based on quality and market niches and coffee institutions. This exercise allowed me to 
understand their weaknesses and comparative advantages. I also systematically 
compared peasants’ strategies with those of other key actors in the coffee sector such as 
regional organisations and rural elites.
The study of the strategy of a social actor, as Mouseliz (1991 and 1992) and Sztompka 
(1993) argue, looks at the intentional component of the agency/structure relationship, 
and its level of consciousness (see also Ellis 1998). In many cases I integrate my 
findings that report producers’ opinions on the crisis and working of the international 
coffee market, on production costs and economic calculations, as well as on agrarian, 
religious and political issues.
The main methodological challenge to existing approaches on peasants and to this 
research, in particular, consisted in the manifold analytical criteria needed to understand 
coffee producers’ livelihoods in their heterogeneity and complexity.
My main purpose is not to describe circumstantial changes in cropping and wage labour 
patterns, degrees of commoditisation of peasants, or every-day resistance practices per 
se, but to find the relationship of these changes to the overall transformation of 
contemporary rural livelihoods. The main constraints of this thesis are in the eclectic use 
of different approaches.
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CHAPTER 2
COFFEE, LAND REFORM AND STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE
MAKING OF A REGION
In this chapter I start my case study by describing the historical background in which 
small coffee producers emerged: the ejidatarios of Atzalan, Veracruz. The chapter 
traces the origin of peasant coffee producers and the most influential factors shaping the 
coffee market in Atzalan. Special attention is given to the interaction between frontier 
colonisation, land reform and peasant movements, on one hand, and the efforts of state 
organisations to modernise the coffee sector, on the other.
Land reform in Mexico failed to transform poor peasants into progressive small 
landholders, and to promote democratic life in the countryside, just the opposite of what 
happened for instance in Costa Rica.24 Why did the state efforts to organize peasants and 
modernize this sector fail? Why do merchants, processors and intermediaries still 
exercise a great influence despite several attempts to make small producers 
autonomous?
In some countries coffee producers managed to strengthen their position in the 
international market, with a strategy of capital accumulation and modernisation, 
whereby a transition from a system of peasant producers and/or big growers, led to 
another dominated by small and medium modem capitalist farmers (Costa Rica, 
Colombia). When this happened markets and social forces promoted the consolidation 
of private property, fractioning of big estates into minifundia (small properties), and a 
firm hand against agrarian movements, which limited land distribution under private 
property rights, and allowed some control over unionism among rural workers, a low- 
wage system and a flexible labour market in the countryside. Through strong lobbying, 
coffee producers managed to influence policy-making. In the case of Colombia, 
producers were able to set up price-compensation mechanisms to transfer surpluses 
from bonanzas to crisis periods, and to manage directly coffee tax revenue to promote 
development schemes. Based on a strong union (National Federation of Coffee Growers 
of Colombia, FNCC), Colombian coffee growers built up a wealth of economic
24 Gudmundson (1989, pp. 221-225) analysed how in the Costa Rican coffee-based society, a ‘peasant to 
farmer’ transition took place, consolidating a petty bourgeoisie by the early twenty century. This process 
involved both political mobilisation and social change (restrictions on inheritance).
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organisations (warehouses, bank, shipping companies, etc.) and were able to get 
favourable policies (fiscal, monetary, commercial).25
I will argue in this chapter that these institutional arrangements never developed in 
Mexico due to, among other reasons, the path followed by agrarian reform and the land 
tenancy system it brought about, and to the corporatist intervention of the state, all of 
which generated divisions and clashes, seriously hampering the possibilities of 
cooperation and collaboration. Clashes between social groups in the coffee market, as 
among other sectors, are unavoidable when it comes to resource allocation and setting 
the domestic rules of a highly profitable market. However, in Mexico, even during times 
of crisis, the groups affected could hardly reach common positions and basic 
agreements.
My historical reconstruction relies on three very different sources, all of which 
challenge the authenticity of the official narrative of land reform in the area. First, all 
my interviews represent a rich source of empirical historical data, since they convey rich 
accounts and interpretations of individual and collective efforts in the struggle for land. 
Second, social geographers (Hoffman 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and 1995; Marchal and 
Palma 1985) have carried out a research project of great scope in Veracruz, which 
highlights the complex elective affinity between coffee production and highlanders’ 
culture. Coffee and peasants are closely and intricately intertwined with ecological 
niches. According to this account, Atzalan was populated quite late, in the context of the 
struggles for land reform. Consequently, the social tissue is constituted and reconstituted 
with violence as one of its most important components, though the range of violence 
varies from social-banditry to delinquency (and sometimes the line dividing the two is 
very thin). Finally, historians (Knight 1991, 1992, 1994a and 1994b; Skerrit 1996; 
Velazquez and Hoffman 1994) represent a third source in reconstructing the history of 
the region. Their interpretation recovers the influence of Veracruzan agrarian radicalism 
in the development of the region. Veracruz was, in their view, not only the point of 
entrance of goods and merchandise of different sorts to central Mexico, but of ideas and 
political currents of thought as well. Union Anarchism arrived at the port in Veracruz 
and constituted one of the most important ideological components of both agrarian and 
workers radicalism in the area.
25 See Chapter 6 for a comparative analysis of the coffee sector institutions and organisations in Mexico 
and Colombia.
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2.1. Migration, agrarian reform and demographic growth
Migration, agrarian reform and demographic growth were closely intertwined. They 
encouraged one another, gradually but decisively shaping the peasant economy in 
Atzalan. The agrarian reform was crucial in the relationships between peasants and rural 
elites, which, in turn, moulded coffee productive chains and the institutions in which 
they are embedded.
Big coffee plantations occupied most of the best coffee highlands in Latin America 
since the XIX century. But the chase after mountain slopes, rainforests and lands of 
marginal quality for coffee cropping is a more recent occurrence, linked to a process of 
frontier colonisation and land distribution. The emergence of an open peasant 
community in the mountainous basins of the humid tropics was linked to the fast spread 
of coffee (Wolf 1955, p. 461).
The Atzalan region was never populated by indigenous communities; villages and 
towns were the result of multiple migrations, the main components of which were 
highlanders’ search for land to make a better living. In order to guarantee labour, 
haciendas allowed the establishment of new ranchos in frontier lands in the early XX 
century. Immigration of peasant tenants grew within rancherias and around the 
hacienda's manor. In order to accelerate the productive use of lands, landless peasants 
attached to the haciendas were attracted and they settled permanently in the upper 
slopes.
Before the Revolution, families of highlander peasants left densely populated sierras in 
search of lands for maize cropping. The image of a land of promise, created in the 
lowlands to attract investors, also reached peasants (Hoffmann 1994a). Land reform was 
undertaken by the flow of landless people who first arrived in the piemonte. At the same 
time, land distribution further encouraged migrations, generating an unstable situation 
not only for landowners, but also for the first granted ejidatarios.
It is not the main concern of this work to analyse the results of the agrarian reform. 
However, in terms of later developments in the coffee sector, several issues are worth 
summarising. Landless peasants and rancheros pursued better conditions of living 
when, right after the revolution, they moved with their families to Atzalan. The wealth
26 Apart from Mexico, see the case of Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela (Roseberry et al. 1995; Price 
1994).
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of the forestlands for maize cropping was spread by word of mouth. Coffee cropping 
was just a minor activity at the time, as revolutionary armies and gangs targeted 
haciendas, ranchos and big fincas.
The promise of land reform boosted several migration flows, related to the pace of land 
distribution from the early thirties until the seventies. The main sources of out-migration 
were the populated south-western highlands of Altotonga and Atzalan, and to a lesser 
extent eastern Misantla’s highlands. Since the twenties, the agrarian movement 
unleashed a profound social and class restructuring: groups of peasants started to claim 
the lands they rented; landlords prepared themselves against land expropriation, pre­
emptively selling fractions of their estates; better-off merchants, former employees of 
the haciendas, corrupted officials and peasant leaders took advantage of the very low 
prices at which landlords had to sell.
Radical agrarianism and land reform
Veracruz -  one of the richest states in the country, with oil extraction and plantation 
businesses - played an influential role in the revolution, but the agrarian movement 
proper, did not appear until rather late. The first years of the revolution in Veracruz 
(1911-13) seemed to be more about elite politics and elections, except for some 
mobilised groups and new demands. Only when Constitutionalism gained a foothold 
in Veracruz territory and Candido Aguilar was appointed commander and provisional 
governor of the state (1914-17), did peasant movements and land reform gain 
significance.
While Zapatistas and Villistas were debating at the Aguascalientes Convention in 
October 1914, General Candido Aguilar passed a local agrarian decree, setting up the 
Comisiones Agrarias in Veracruz. With this agrarian project, he attempted one of the 
first revolutionary land distributions, in Atzalan highlands, allocating just one-hectare 
individual parcels under private property tenancy (the decree did not refer to any right 
for reconstituting communal forms of landholding or collective grants). Only tenants, 
colonisers and wage workers of expropriated haciendas, whose lands surpassed the 200 
hectares limit of the Agrarian Law No. 206, were considered eligible for land
27 This was a movement led by supporters of constitutionally elected President Francisco I. Madero 
(1911-13), against the coup d'etat by Victoriano Huerta. It aimed at restoring the constitutional order 
(according to the liberal Constitution of 1857), as it was linked to the maderista movement in 1910-11.
28 At the time Aguilar was an experienced military man and politician, according to Skerrit (1996, pp. 
33-34).
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distribution. Although Aguilar’s agrarian project was more of a political gesture, than 
an effective land reform, this initiative had national repercussions in the context of an
*)Q  3 / )imminent split between carrancistas and zapatistas (Fowler 1979:39-40; Skerrit 
1996:35-37).
Later on, 6 January 1915, Venustiano Carranza passed a law in order to attract peasants 
to the constitutionalist army -  against Zapata’s peasant agrarian reform upheld in the 
Plan de Ayala - allowing not only for the distribution of lands, but also for the 
restitution of dispossessed indigenous communities from public and private property. 
As constitutionally elected Governor of Veracruz (1917-20), Candido Aguilar went on 
distributing land, taking advantage of his privileged links with the federal government 
(he was a relative of President Venustiano Carranza).
Finally, after the Constitution of 1917, one of the first and most important federal 
agrarian regulations was the ‘Untilled Lands Law’, passed by President De la Huerta on 
23June 1920, to encourage land distribution of underused properties and to raise 
production in agriculture. This law laid out the obligation of landowners to cultivate all 
-  or most - of the arable lands throughout the agricultural cycle, and made
o  1
municipalities responsible for entitling local poor peasants to occupy untilled fields 
through rent or sharecropping contracts on a yearly basis and under fair terms.
Radical senator Adalberto Tejeda took office as Veracruz Governor at the end of 1920, 
after Victoriano Huerta’s rebellion -  financed by conservative forces, oil companies and 
American interests - and he launched a radical land reform based on peasant 
organisations. Governor Tejeda strengthened worker unionism (tobacco and textiles 
industries, housing movement, etc.) and communist leadership within popular 
organisations, two factors that influenced the agrarian struggles, which were about to 
take off.32
29 Followers of Venustiano Carranza, a former hacendado with a maderista and constitutionalist 
background. As provisional President Carranza was rather moderate, particularly after the Aguascaliantes 
Convention (1914), when Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata and other revolutionary forces pressed for 
radical reforms.
30 Zapatistas were a peasant army led by Emiliano Zapata, but also a strong agrarian movement in Central 
Mexico, based on indigenous communities’ land claims and influenced by magonism, a tum-of-the- 
century anarchist movement, who branded the “land and freedom” Zapatista flagship. (Katz 1981)
31 Peasants were able to apply for the amount of land they felt prepared to cultivate before the municipal 
authorities -  either verbally or by non-stamped letter. The 1920 law was an important complement to the 
agrarian law of 1915, benefiting not only landless peasants, but also all agricultural workers without 
access to ejido parcels, or with insufficient lands.
32 In her pioneering work on radical agrarism in Veracruz (1920-38), Fowler (1979) stressed the influence
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In 1922 communist leaders encouraged peasants in central Veracruz to -  tactically - 
organise themselves within Agrarian Committees, in order to claim land under the 
umbrella of the 6 January 1915 Law, to fight for more advantageous tenant contracts 
and fairer wages, and to promote collectivism among peasants (production and 
consumption co-operatives). The Peasant League of Veracruz (Liga de Campesinos 
Veracruzanos, LCV) was organised in 1923 and its local Agrarian Committees 
mushroomed thereafter. Political conditions for a genuine land reform seemed rather 
favourable. Tejeda’s administration supported the Peasant League and its Committees 
appointed agrarian-minded officers to the head of Municipal governments and Agrarian 
authorities, and communist leaders -  allies to the radical government - took control of 
the main posts in the agrarian movement. From 1922 to 1923, the number of land grants 
in Veracruz jumped 2.8 times (to 58,617 ha) and beneficiaries 3.4 times, to 11,393 
(Fowler 1979, p.61).33
In fact, radical agrarianism in Veracruz, from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s was one 
of the regional experiences that influenced most President Cardenas’ (1934-40) land 
reform program at the national level (Fowler 1979). However, in Veracruz, cardenism 
meant the beginning of the decline of land distribution, as agrarian organisations were 
incorporated and subdued into the PNR (predecessor party of the PRI), and ‘peasant 
guerrillas’ were dismantled.
But, while Tejeda and his closest collaborators were radical and supportive of land 
distributive policies, bureaucratic structures, at the regional and local levels, slowed 
down the process and followed a different path. Thus, one of the landowners’ most 
common tactics was to split up estates between relatives in order to conform to the legal 
limits (200 ha) on landownership. Another, even more effective, was to sell portions of 
land to rancher os, closely linked to haciendas as foremen, permanent workers and 
tenants, who formed a social belt around ejidos with better endowed lands and access to 
markets (credit and marketing channels).
of the alliance of the peasantry with urban forces, first and foremost with Governor Tejeda and 
temporarily with the Mexican Communist Party -when Almanza and Galvan’s pragmatic and moderate 
socialism led the influential Liga Campesina de Veracruz. She analysed how Federal forces and alliances 
clashed with this early agrarian movement in Veracruz, which finally set the pace for land reform at the 
national level (1934-40 cardenism), but paradoxically put an end to radical agrarianism in Veracruz.
33 According to early agrarian laws State Governors had the powers to carry out agrarian mandates to 
distribute land. Although this procedure was provisional and had to be ratified by Presidential Resolution, 
decentralized distribution explains why in regions like Veracruz -  where peasant pressures were stronger 
and political alliances propitiatory - land reform made considerable progress.
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Hacendados, rich merchants and coffee growers were not seriously affected by the land 
distribution of 1914-20. Recovery of sugar prices in the international market convinced 
some of them to go back to their neglected plantations. By 1921, 683 haciendas in 
excess of 1,000 hectares each (1.3% of total rustic properties) still possessed more than 
3 million hectares in Veracruz, 42% of them were owned by American and Spanish 
landlords.34
The slow and lasting official procedures put land claimants in a difficult position vis a 
vis local landowners. They had to remain working in haciendas and ranchos, or 
cultivating lands, while the agrarian procedures made progress. As the expropriation 
compensations were estimated on the basis of 10% of land value, proprietors were more
•ye
interested in keeping tenancy arrangements as advantageous and as long as possible.
The ravages of gangs and revolutionary armies caused additional damage. Communities 
with better access suffered the most. However limited, land reform promises, on one 
hand, and insecurity on the other, convinced many people to move towards safer fertile 
areas, making rural population mobile, open to external influences and prone to political 
manipulation (Fowler 1979, p. 35 and Hoffman 1994).
Agrarian movements in Atzalan. The first wave: 1920s-1940s.
There were in Atzalan two major episodes, or waves,36 of agrarian movements that 
influenced all forms of collective action. From the early 1920s to the end of the 1940s, 
under the influence of radical agrarianism in Veracruz, a first wave of land struggles 
was, by and large, a grassroots movement. In contrast, a second wave of agrarian 
reform, triggered by the agricultural crisis of the 1960s, lasted throughout the 1970s and 
was predominantly a state-led process.
The first land claims were based on two converging processes. On the one hand, the 
colonising migration of hundreds of families to Atzalan sierras, and on the other hand,
34 See Tanenbaum (1930) cit. Fowler (1979:44). In 1920 an American oil speculator, Jones & Co. arrived 
in the Atzalan sierra and bought 1,207 ha. Although development works never took place beyond the 
exploration phase, the presence of this American firm proved to be of great significance for the fate of 
San Pedros’ agrarian movement.
35 In Atzalan piedmont there were constraints on rented land, high fixed rents for maize and higher for 
perennials, debt bondage practices, and forced evictions among other abuses. SPA’s ejido archive and 
interviews with producers in several Atzalan towns (see Official Documents in Bibliography).
361 use this term in a descriptive way because land struggles were triggered by the conjunction of external 
and internal factors, and then receded for a while, until a new set of conditions allowed a new round of 
protest.
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the promotion of land reform by radical peasant organisations (the Agrarian 
Communities League of Veracruz and the so-called Executive Agrarian Committees at 
the local level). This wave of peasant movements led by migrants who arrived from the 
cold highlands, in search of lands to rent and employment in the lowland plantations, 
ended up with land distribution through Presidential Resolutions, which formally 
granted land and constituted ejidos. Land distribution, in turn, encouraged new 
migration flows.
In the aftermath of the revolution, the winning elite put into practice land distribution to 
appease the peasant poor and to avoid new regional rebellions. Nevertheless, getting an 
ejido grant was not a straightforward process. On the contrary, peasants had to fight 
landowners and overcome a very powerful agrarian bureaucracy. While the social form 
of this process appeared to be social mobilisation and political struggle, micro-histories 
of immigration to Atzalan showed an underlying accommodation movement of 
hundreds of families running away from revolutionary mayhem and trying to get access 
to land as tenants and organised claimants. In their search for land, peasants moved 
from one Agrarian Committee to a more successful one. Others bought land from 
landlords who -  in this way - tried to divide local movements and to prevent further 
claims on their lands.
The struggle for land was at the same time a process of frontier land colonisation based 
on a strategy of resistance and an economy of subsistence. At the beginning (1920s 
and 1930s), the arrival of more tenants to the region added to the strengthened Agrarian 
Committees, and they were consequently welcomed and rapidly integrated to the new 
communities. The first wave of agrarian movements was therefore considered 
inclusionary.
In trying to overcome the violent resistance of landlords to land reform, peasants 
organised and built up community life. To push forward land distribution procedures, 
Agrarian Committees had to sustain co-operation among peasants in order to resist
37 There are several similarities among different coffee producing countries in Africa, Latin America and 
Asia in this respect. For instance, the relationship between the carrying capacity of the coffee 
mountainous regions and the self-sufficiency strategies of peasant producers; high demographic densities 
and a prevailing minifundista sector; the territorial role of coffee trees and agrarian claims; the presence 
of multiple intermediaries and an all-encompassing state intervention in the coffee chain;(see Toulet et al, 
1994, pp. 26-36).
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violent opposition from landlords, carry out collective works and finance long-lasting
-JO
dealings in the state capital and Mexico City.
Land struggles in San Pedro Altepepan39 (1923-1941)
Before the revolution had started, the first immigrants arrived in Iquimite (now 
Equimite) and its neighbouring caserios (small set of scattered huts), one of them San 
Pedro Altepepa (SPA). Iquimite was the only important hamlet in the region; as it had a 
water spring and was a crossing point for muleteers in route to the highlands, 
southwards. It gathered tenants who arrived to clear forestlands and make a living out of 
cropping maize, beans and green chillies, as well as making charcoal that was sold at 
Veracruz port. The first records of SPA settlements come from as late as 1900, when the 
first two rancheros, Roberto Sanchez and Daniel Herrera, settled in the area to raise 
cattle and crop maize and coffee.
At 900 metres high, San Pedro is halfway from the main piedmont towns (where the 
sierra starts to elevate): Misantla in the east and Tlapacoyan in the west. According to 
family genealogies of San Pedro Altepepa, in the Municipality of Atzalan,40 the first 
wave of migrants (1910s to 1930s) came mainly from the highlands. To the Southwest, 
some migrants came from as far as Altotonga and Perote (more than 2,000 m.o.s.l.), but 
most of them from villages across San Pedro river, like Zapotitlan, Barrancones, Vega 
de San Pedro and Plan de la Luz (around 1,000 m.o.s.l.). A few came from the southern 
side of the mountains (Comales, and La Victoria, at 900 and 1,100 m.o.s.l., 
respectively). This is a very important precedent, for most of them knew about coffee 
cropping, a well established crop in Plan de Arroyos and Altotonga since the turn of the 
century. On the other hand, most of them were landless peasants moving from much 
more densely populated areas. They were also attentive to new opportunities to claim 
lands across-the-river estates. With the exception of a few rancheros that fled from
38 New claimants had to be accepted by the local assembly, comply with a declaration of agrarian 
principles, share the responsibility over collective matters and pay an annual fee for the maintenance of 
Committee dealings.
39 After a first survey trip to several communities in Atzalan I was very much interested in building up a 
case study in SPA for several reasons: its rich agrarian history; its privileged position in the coffee 
producing region of Atzalan (located within the high altitude strip); its pioneering wet processing mill; 
and the importance of its coffee cooperative.
40 Drawing from tele-secondary school students' reports, and from interviews with key informants in San 
Pedro Altepepa, I collected several genealogies.
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revolutionary violence (the case of Jose Luis Arcos’ grandfather), most migrants arrived 
as landless jornaleros (day labourers) or tenants in the haciendas and rancherias,41
In 1923, around 99 tenants from Equimite and San Pedro Altepepa (SPA) formally 
claimed, before the State Governor of Veracruz, their right to an ejido grant from the 
lands they were working in. But San Pedro landless peasants were not rewarded with a 
prompt resolution to their land claim. On the contrary, a three-decade long struggle 
followed during which the number of SPA’s land claimants more than doubled in the 
first ten years (1923-32), from 99 to 211 and then decreased to 179 in 1941, when the 
first partial grant was finally given to the SPA’s Agrarian Committee.
During the first two decades, SPA’s claimants sustained an intense bargaining with 
agrarian authorities in Xalapa and Mexico City, as well as with the agrarian corporate 
structure, particularly in the Altotonga Delegation of the Agrarian Communities’ 
League (LCA), an influential mediator between the authorities in Xalapa and Atzalan 
and the agrarian committees.42 As a consequence, SPA quickly developed a strong local 
leadership. Despite being isolated, local leaders became well connected to regional and 
state organizations.43
SPA’s claimants were often caught in exhausting struggles, not as fruitful for them as 
for neighbouring ejidos. As pioneers in the struggle for land in the region, they paid the 
price of first confronting the landlords’ power. Their organizational resources put them 
at great disadvantage. They did not have accurate information on the legal status of 
surrounding lands, within the legally binding 7 km ratio, owned by better organized 
rancheros and landlords.
41 Rancherias are medium size estates on the outskirts of haciendas, regularly owned by landlords’ 
foremen or relatives.
42 The Committee developed functions of local government and sustained a very active political life and 
connections with the Municipality and agrarian organizations at regional, state and even national levels. 
The Agrarian Committee was responsible for membership regulation (updating censuses and acceptance 
of newcomers); allocation of land tenants and collection of rents; administration of law and order in the 
community; appointment of the local Justice of the Peace and Municipal Agent; maintenance of local 
school and payment of teachers’ wages; rural road construction and maintenance; overseeing forest use 
and other federal regulations.
43 Among the first inhabitants was the Beltrdn family, whose head had participated as a low-ranking 
official in the Revolution. One of his sons, David, became the foremost figure in the local agrarian 
movement. He promoted the 1923 application for ejido lands and led the local guerrilla in the late 1920s. 
He was a militant in the Partido Estatal Socialista de Izquierda, a tejedista political party in Veracruz 
during the years of radical agrarianism. Along with other 5 SPA leaders, Beltrdn was detained by federal 
soldiers and then jailed in 1938. He was appointed to different local and regional positions, from Justice 
of the Peace, Municipal Agent and President of the local Agrarian Committee, to LCA Delegate in 1941, 
precisely when they finally were granted the land by Presidential Resolution. He was murdered shortly 
afterwards by the mano negra gang.
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After a decade of resistance and lobbying at all possible levels, in 1941, SPA tenants 
were granted ejido lands by Presidential Resolution. But the execution of the decree had 
to wait until 1953, when the Acta de Posesion y  Deslinde (Act of Possession and 
Measurement) was issued on partial completion, that is, it only delivered 564.6 ha from 
the lands of Guzman Carriles, leaving out those of Jones & Co. It took another decade 
of paper work and lobbying (until 1963) to completely fulfil the 1941 decree through 
the expropriation of 400 ha from Jones & Co.44 Altogether, SPA claimants had to wait 
four decades to get the land due to the corruption of the authorities and leaders, as well 
as to the power of landlords and an American oil company.
Rather than taking alternative courses of action, exchanging information and reaching 
agreements with regional organisations, Atzalan Committees frequently competed 
against one another to get the first alienable lands. Some leaders and better off migrants 
defected from the SPA’s Agrarian Committee in order to buy the very same lands under 
appeal, at very cheap prices.
From the 1920s, landowners were very successful in avoiding expropriation through 
different means, which included violent dissuasion, coercion, devastation and robbery 
of peasant communities, until 1929, when the SPA’s guerrilla was legally constituted 
and armed. Bribing civil servants and agrarian leaders was also quite common.
Additional difficulties were deliberately fashioned to hamper distribution. Committee 
members were often misinformed about the details of the agrarian proceedings and were 
victims of this and other forms of corruption. In 1925-28 agrarian officials and some of 
their own leaders, were bribed by landlords. In Atzalan, surveyors usually altered their 
fieldwork reports in order to protect lands subject to alienation.45
Leaders were often co-opted with concessions and privileges. Roberto Guzman Carriles, 
for example, former peasant representative in Altotonga, became a landholder and 
coffee grower. At the end of the 1920s he was an Agrarian Delegate from Altotonga to 
the Agrarian Communities League of Veracruz and also member of the Peasant
44 Interview with Ranulfo Barreda, Equimite, 29-01-1996. Barreda was a very active local leader during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. For seven years he was Justice of the Peace, commander of rural police 
(columnas volantes) during 1955-56, member of local and regional co-operatives and President of the 
SPA Ejido commissariat in 1960. He eagerly lobbied for the ejido grant completion of 1963, and figured 
out the network of complicity that had protected the American oil company.
45 According to several accounts, Ing. Lino Rodriguez Osorio manipulated his expert field appraisal in 
favour of different landowners close to San Pedro Altepepa and La Palma ejidos. Interview with Ignacio 
Rodriguez, La Palma, 1-2-1996.
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National League. He opportunistically bought lands from landowner Rosendo Villa and 
Jones & Co. and in 1928 was appointed representative of Jones & Co. Using his 
connections to the army and municipality, he played an important role in preventing, for 
more than two decades, the expropriation of his and other landlords’ lands against the 
claims of San Pedro Altepepa’s Agrarian Committee. He collected rents and sold lands 
to SPA’s peasants. In the early 1930s -with the backing of Municipal officials and 
federal soldiers - Guzman Carriles led a campaign of harassment, threatening SPA 
tenants with eviction and persecuting local leaders. By the early 1940s he was still 
promoting land purchases by instalments among the main leaders of the SPA’s 
Committee (Faustino Garcia and Ernesto Martinez) and other better off peasants 
(Rufino and Ladislao Ortiz).46
Other forces opposing land reform added bargaining power against ejidatarios, slowing 
or blocking in different ways land distribution. Once the revolution had weakened 
hacendados, many top ranking military men seized large properties. New landowners 
ran a very successful rural armed gang, first created at the end of the Revolution to stop 
crime and pillage along the sierra, with official backing (in fact the Mexican Army 
constituted and armed it). The ‘mano negra’ gang or pistolerismo -  as it was known - 
became an efficient way of thwarting land reform, killing leaders and spreading fear 
among claimants. First organized by General Parra, the mano negra was a wide network 
of local groups that reached Atzalan sierra, up to the eastern coastal plains. After the 
initial distribution of land, pistolerismo continued fighting against land distribution and 
the state support to agrarian guerrillas.
In Atzalan sierra, pistolerismo reappeared in the 1940s under the leadership of Jose 
Garcia -  a local from Quilate village. At first, this rural guard tried to control bandit 
violence and robbery. When Jose Garcia’s son, Santiago, took over, the guard’s 
allegiances changed, committing its services to defend landowners’ interests. Landlords 
used to pay Santiago Garcia for killing leaders and land claimants. In the mid-1940s, 
hearing complaints of recent murders, General Reyes -  head of the garrison at Martinez 
de la Torre - captured Santiago and seven of his gunmen, and had them shot on the spot 
in Quilate.47 As social violence, pistolerismo was not completely uprooted. On the
46 Interview with land struggle pioneers Benjamin Bautista and Benjamin Garcia, Equimite 23-03-1995. 
They got more land than they thought, because purchases were based on improvised, inaccurate maps. 
Interview to Ranulfo Barreda, Equimite 29-01 -1996.
47 Interview with Ranulfo Barreda, Equimite 29-01-1996.
59
contrary, it became an endemic and mixed expression of social banditry, caciquismo48 
and organized crime in the Atzalan highlands to the present day.49
The aim of fair distribution of plots according to agrarian norms (20 ha of rain fed lands 
or the equivalent in other types of land) was difficult to meet under the prevailing 
conditions in Atzalan, where landlords had considerable bargaining power to avoid 
expropriation. Scattered grants for one single ejido, social pressure from jornaleros and 
the descendants of jornaleros and ejidatarios, led to excessive splitting up of the land.
SPA’s neighbouring ejidos were more successful in getting their share of local estates, 
without that much resistance and violence. For half a century agrarian reform created 
expectations, sometimes unsatisfied, and a deep social conflict between rancheros and 
ejidatarios emerged. Endowment inequality created additional sources of discontent, 
especially among landless peasants. In some cases this conflict had been transformed 
through tolerance and co-operation, in others the potential for violence continued.
Small landowners took advantage of credit systems and markets, long before ejidos, 
because ejidatarios were entangled with agrarian movements, and time-consuming legal 
procedures, hoping for complementary land grants. In the 1940s coffee production 
doubled as tenants increased in numbers and credit was made available to rancheros. 
Those claimants who defected in order to buy land, later on became coffee growers and 
intermediaries -  Adrian Castelan, Felix Ramirez, Gustavo Berner, Eberardo Arcos and
48 Broadly defined, caciquismo is the rule of local bosses, based on factional politics, religious status and 
economic power. One of the most important functions and sources of power of caciques is their role as 
intermediaries between the community and the outside society (the state organisations of modem society) 
to promote commercial agriculture among peasant farmers. (Skerrit 1996, pp. 157-60).
48 Skerrit (1996, p. 29) suggested that in Central Veracruz -  compared to the North and South where 
indigenous commons were more important - a more mestizo culture involved closer relationships and 
shared values between peasants and patrons. Peasants would mobilise on the basis of a common notion of 
property, shared by landowners, showing that peasants were more susceptible to ‘modem’ conceptions of 
politics, organisation and mobilisation.
48 New Ejido Population Centers (NCPE) were a means to redistribute land to ejidatarios' descendants and 
avecindados (settlers without access to land), outside the 7 km ratio ruled by the agrarian legislation for 
new agrarian claims (Marchall 1985, p. 42.). Caciquismo has been associated with factional politics, 
corporate organizational structures of the formerly ruling state-party system (PRI and its sectoral 
corporations) and local control. In economic terms, caciques also can be middlemen {coyotes). See: 
Bartra (1993), Gledhill (1994) and Par6 (1993).
49 During the 1950s pistolerismo re-emerged as whole-sale organized crime, to the extent that ejidatarios 
asked for the establishment of rural police {columnas volantes operated in 1955-56). In mid-1960s drug 
traffickers made inroads in the upper highlands distributing poppy seeds among land claimants and even 
outlaws. All these expressions of local crime have been associated by ejidatarios themselves with 
pistolerismo (Interviews with producers in Equimite, SPA and El Avion).
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Seferino Leon - and they received credit from the marketing parastatal CEIMSA,50 
while Banamex bank financed buyers in Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos.
Once land was granted to the peasants of the newly established San Pedro Altepepan 
ejido (SPA), they agreed on a new allocation of ejido parcels, based on previous 
occupation of land. Since these arrangements were not certified, including access to the 
ejido’s common lands (tierras de uso comun), by the late 1960s concentration of land 
led to internal tensions and the need for a new redistribution.51
Second agrarian wave: 1960s-1970s
Martinez de la Torre’s agribusiness expansion during the 1950s and 1960s (coffee, 
sugar cane) attracted rural unemployed by the thousands, who added to the fast natural 
growth of ejido communities. Agitated by the crisis of Mexican agriculture (state 
investment slowed down and reference prices for basic staples declined), social pressure 
exploded. Among the targets of the outbreak were not only haciendas and big 
properties, but also granted ejidos. Rancheros and big landlords reacted united and not 
surprisingly won ejidatarios and small landowners to their cause, whereas radical 
leaders confronted everybody, and finished up either defecting or victims of state 
repression (as in the case of the Union Campesina Independiente, UCI). Nevertheless, 
some groups were relocated within existing ejidos or granted small plots of expropriated 
private and national lands.
Land distribution slowed down considerably during the Avila Camacho and Aleman 
administrations, and only revived with Lopez Mateos in 1958. From 1962 onwards, all 
national and available private lands were to be allocated to the establishment of new 
ejidos, to their expansion, or for new population centres.
50 Governor Miguel Aleman set up in the late 1940s the Compania Exportadora e Importadora Mexicana, 
S.A. (CEIMSA, forerunner of CONASUPO) to commercialise agricultural production, mainly maize, but 
also tomatoes, coffee and other cash crops to supply the Mexico City market during the off season in the 
northern producer states. Along with the Banco Nacional de Cr6dito Ejidal (BNCE), CEIMSA tried to 
promote commercial agriculture among peasant farmers. (Skerrit 1996, pp. 157-60).
Skerrit (1996, p. 29) suggested that in Central Veracruz -  compared to the North and South where 
indigenous commons were more important - a more mestizo culture involved closer relationships and 
shared values between peasants and patrons. Peasants would mobilise on the basis of a common notion of 
property, shared by landowners, showing that peasants were more susceptible to ‘modem’ conceptions of 
politics, organisation and mobilisation.
New Ejido Population Centers (NCPE) were a means to redistribute land to ejidatarios* descendants and 
avecindados (settlers without access to land), outside the 7 km ratio ruled by the agrarian legislation for 
new agrarian claims (Marchall 1985, p. 42.).
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Decline in available lands for distribution, and in prices of traditional crops, led to a 
long lasting agricultural crisis. Agrarian movements entered a new phase from the early 
1970s onwards, and they were met by increased state intervention in the countryside, 
and in particular in the coffee sector. Some authors (Alan Knight 1994b and Gustavo 
Gordillo 1988a) have differentiated agrarian reform as a result of direct popular actions 
claiming land - characteristic of the first phase of the agrarian movement - from a more 
state-led programme that absorbed the primary agrarian forces and converted peasants 
into potential allies, if not political clienteles, rather than social actors, as was 
increasingly the case during the second phase of the agrarian reform. The difference is 
not always obvious, and in the case Atzalan, just outlined, the main difference lies 
rather in the role of the state and local elites.
The second agrarian wave reached its heights at the beginning of the 1970s based on a 
renewed social pressure on land, triggered not only by demographic growth, but also by 
unfulfilled expectations of land distribution and development. New immigrants and the 
descendants of ejidatarios were restless because they had no access to land and 
decision-making within the ejidos. Differences in the size of land grants among 
neighbouring ejidos also played a role. In this context, and in contrast to the first wave, 
the second wave of agrarian movements can be considered exclusionary because 
landless peasants confronted ejidatarios.
Coffee expansion in this region (during the 1960s and 1970s) coincided with this second 
wave of agrarian movements emerging in Atzalan. In comparison to the first wave of 
agrarian movements, in the second one a different group of peasants took part and their 
goals were also distinct. Although land was still at the centre (completion of overdue 
grants and first or second extensions of the ejido), the social base of the movement was 
a landless sector of ejidos, both day-workers and the descendants of ejidatarios. 
Immigrants had come this time from a wider range of regions and longer distances, 
attracted by employment in the sugar fields and coffee flncas, as well as livestock 
grazing and rural roads construction.
Another important difference between the two movements was the role of entitled 
ejidatarios and the regional corporate structures of the CNC and LCA of Veracruz. 
While in the first period (1920s and 1930s) the struggle for land clearly placed peasants
53 According to Hoffmann (1993) throughout the region the pace of the agrarian reform is strongly 
correlated with demographic growth, both exercising on one another a mutually strong influence.
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of all sorts on one side against landlords, in the second period ejidatarios were put in 
opposition to landless peasants.
During four years (1970-74) landless peasants made requests before the Agrarian 
Reform Secretariat (SRA), both in Xalapa and Mexico City, without success. 
Dissatisfied with traditional organisations like Confederation Nacional Campesina 
(CNC) and Confederacion Agrarista Mexicana (CAM), for the lack of support, these 
landless groups started to organise in 1970 under the leadership of the Central 
Campesina Independiente (CCI), then closely linked to the Partido Comunista 
Mexicano (PCM). This group became one of the most important organised movements 
in the central sierra of Veracruz at the beginning of the 1970s. Due to ideological 
differences with the CCI-PCM, these peasant groups created in 1974 the Union 
Campesina Independiente (UCI).54 According to Ramos and Magnon (1984, pp. 11-15), 
they asked for solutions to the following problems:
• Delay and corruption in agrarian procedures;
• Eviction of tenants who used to clear forest lands for cattle grazing;
• Land grabbing by cattle ranchers and coffee growers;
• Demographic growth and pressure on insufficient ejido grants;
• Repression of independent agrarian movements -  linked to leftist organisations - 
through armed gangs and official organisations;
• Independent efforts at organising peasants and jornaleros.
UCI groups put pressure on ejidos, invading lands in Palmarcillo, La Noria, Rancho 
Nuevo and Vega Chica. The CNC’s “Jose Cardel” Ejido Union reacted strongly against 
the UCI movement, dividing ejidatarios from UCI’s landless peasants. Involved with 
barbasco,55 cattle and coffee in Atzalan and Tlapacoyan, the Ejido Union was created in 
1974 in the context of the nationalization of the barbasco industry and the emergence of 
strong peasant movements independent from the official CNC.
54 Interviews with Tom&s Navarrete, leader of the Quicempacayotl coffee cooperative, in Tlapacoyan, and 
former UCI activist (Februrary 10, 1995); and with Ignacio Rodriguez, one of the most influential leaders 
in ejido La Palma and former UCI grass-roots leader, he was candidate of the current left wing party PRD 
(Partido de la Revolucidn Democrdtica) to the Municipality of Atzalan (February 1, 1996).
55 Barbasco, dioscorea composita, is a wild climbing shrub. An active component -  diosgenine -  is 
extracted from its roots to synthesize steroids used in the pharmaceutical industry. After a boom in the 
1950s and 1960s, the transnational industries in Mexico faced opposition from regional movements, until 
the Mexican government backed regional groups to nationalise the industry, setting up a national 
umbrella organisation to collect and undertake primary processing of barbasco. The CNC helped to 
integrate Ejido Unions in the producing regions. Pedro Ramirez, from Atzalan, led the “Jos6 Cardel” 
Ejido Union and also the National Union of Barbasco Producers (Diaz 1986).
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In 1975, a demonstration in Martinez de la Torre’s Municipal Hall was violently 
repressed, starting a period of persecution of its leaders that finally led to the 
dismantling of the UCI. This event put an end to the second wave of agrarian 
movements.
The UCI experience, although dismantled by the detention and prosecution of its main 
leaders, gave way to different projects, including the struggle for food-staples marketing 
cooperatives (during the early 1980s), and the struggle to have access to roads that was 
led by local leaders for sierra communities.
The ever-increasing pressure on land and the emergence of a strong corporate agrarian 
structure (under the CNC peasant umbrella organization, closely linked to the state) 
completely broke up the last big properties in the lowlands during the second wave of 
agrarian struggles, in the 1960s and 1970s.
Land struggles and social differentiation
The social divide that cut across classes, groups and economic strata and the social 
structure became increasingly complex and differentiated, comprising merchants, 
rancheros, ejidatarios, jornaleros, hacendados, and big and small landowners, although 
in certain cases two or more of these categories were combined and interacted in 
different ways, sometimes in clear opposition and others in collaboration and 
cooperation. Rancheros who raised cattle and cultivated crops were no doubt the most 
complex group, who could simultaneously play two or more roles such as merchants, 
intermediaries {coyotes), owners and, occasionally, even ejidatarios. Ejidatarios were 
often part time jornaleros and land tenants.
Land struggles explain the scope and intensity of coffee producers’ engagement with 
politics and outward participation. At the same time, land distribution in this region is 
an important precedent to understand the pervasive social divide between a landlord- 
ranchero class (since hacendados had gradually disappeared) and ejidatario groups 
(which were not an homogenous stratum).
A very complex and tense relationship, of resentment and opposition, developed 
between ejidatarios and rancheros but, at the same time, they were doomed to depend 
on one another in many ways. If ejidatarios and rancheros had not been related by 
residence and kinship (they often came from the same background and sometimes they
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were direct lineage relatives), trade and other economic relations between them were 
unavoidable, as rancheros controlled retailing and other important businesses, like 
coffee, maize and livestock. A few rancheros were able to have both, ejido and private 
lands (like Eberardo Arcos or Ebodio Santillan), and occasionally they traded with both, 
big landowners and ejidatarios. These new small landowners consequently represented a 
social buffer, which successfully absorbed pressures on landlords.
Rancheros benefited the most from their intermediate position. Some of them became 
agrarian leaders, who had to learn about politics and to establish outside connections.56 
During the 1930s and early 1940s, the most difficult years for SPA claimants, leaders 
had to know the contents of agrarian codes (federal and local ones); follow up agrarian 
proceedings in Xalapa and Mexico City; maintain vital communication with the LCA 
structure, through hundreds of letters to agrarian representatives in Atzalan, Altotonga 
and Xapala; update local censuses and register contributions and rent payments; answer
en
official mail from Atzalan and Xapala; and fill in public service applications.
As private landowners, rancheros were eligible for coffee and cattle credits (during the 
1940s), long before ejidatarios knew about institutional credit and support programmes. 
Their privileged ties with other landowners and merchants made them natural 
intermediaries with ejidatarios in the main markets of the region. To neighbouring 
landowners, ejidatarios were a valuable source of cheap labour, locally available year- 
round; captive consumers; submissive business partners; also generous contributors to 
public works and utilities; and at the forefront in bargaining state resources and public 
services.
Ranchero grower-buyers took advantage of the coffee boom promoted by the IMC (a 
state organisation examined in the following pages). They ventured into buying 
processing facilities and competed with the IMC in buying coffee beans from producers. 
They usually located near the producing zones and benefited from close relationships
56 Faustino Garcia, for instance, became one of the most able and respected leaders in San Pedro Altepepa 
(SPA). He arrived in Equimite in 1920 from Landaco, Mecacalco, “getting away from both, the slavery of 
a waged peon”; he was illiterate -  like most leaders and claimant peasants - but soon learnt reading and 
writing -  in night school - in order to deal with an inescapable mountain of paper work needed to fight 
isolation and defend claimants’ rights against landlords.
57 Faustino Garcia (see previous note) led the SPA Agrarian Committee in the key years of cardenismo 
(1936-40). Ironically, a year after the SPA ejido was formally granted (1941), Faustino gave up his ejido 
rights as he decided to buy 60 ha from Guzm&n Carriles and forget about all the troubles. Faustino was 
one of the new landowners allowed to keep their lands. He continued in the coffee business, becoming 
one of the best growers and the only parchment producer, and went into livestock raising (Interview with 
Pablo Garcia, Faustino’s son. Equimite, 8-04-1995).
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with peasants, lending them money or merchandise in exchange for future coffee 
deliveries.
New small landowners succeeded in legalising their acquisitions, despite the fact that 
their landholdings were first claimed by Agrarian Committees, and that the law 
prohibited owners of claimed lands to enter any commercial transaction. At the end of 
the Cardenas administration and even afterwards, cattle ranchers and agribusiness were 
granted certificates against land claims (certificados de inafectabilidad agraria). This 
provision helped landowners to avoid new expropriations in favour of land-hungry 
neighbouring ejidatarios. To first generation ejidatarios, those who fought for land and 
still remember how they were let down by bureaucracies and leaders, and overpowered 
by landowners, the land tenancy structure was considered illegitimate.
Inequality and insecurity of property rights permeated all social relations and fostered 
mistrust and envy.58 Organization of small private property took place at the outskirts of 
ejidos, where ranchero families blossomed, taking advantage of both worlds: state 
support programmes, including institutional credit targeted to ejidatarios, and cheap 
labour from ejidatarios. Small landowners and/or rancheros benefited from the 
negotiations undertaken by ejidatarios with the Atzalan Municipality and the State 
government to promote basic infrastructure and public services, the long-lasting 
struggle they started even before land distribution. Ejidos built and refurbished a 
network of roadways almost with their bare hands. Rural schools and local clinics were 
likewise the result of ejidatarios’ efforts to promote local development. After decades, 
the conflict to some extent subsided, and landowners played a positive role in some 
areas of social life, improving technologies and activities (cattle genetic stock, coffee 
varieties and practices, modem citrus cultivation).
Fictitious kinship (compadrazgo) became an important institution that helped to narrow 
down the social divide. However, envy and memory fed from time to time social 
conflicts between rancheros, landowners and ejidatarios, since the institutional 
framework developed to represent functional interests promoted divisions. Sectors, 
endowment systems and political traditions deepened old and new contradictions.
58 After I finished my last fieldwork follow up in 1996, ejido lands in this region were certified and 
individually titled under the Programa de Certificacidn de Derechos Ejidales y Titulacidn de Solares 
Urbanos (PROCEDE), but it made little difference in terms of the social and historical problems analysed 
here.
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Cattlemen, big flnqueros and beneficiadores (plantation growers and wet millers), have 
played off this set of contradictions to their advantage. They made alliances with 
agrarian bureaucracies and ejidatario leaders, some of whom had become landowners. 
Later, they claimed subsidies and even income support along with ejidatarios, without 
being eligible. However, ejido reform - land titling, ffactioning and exchange - helped to 
narrow down a former social distance, allowing room for alliances.
Agrarian reform, demographic growth and collective action problems of coffee 
producing ejidos in Atzalan
Peasant families in Atzalan experienced very high demographic growth, strong 
pressures on land, and seasonal labour migration. Nearby agribusiness created a 
regional labour market, allowing peasants to work on a temporary basis without 
abandoning their crops. Expectations of land distribution and the need to overcome 
those pressures (not only political instability and economic hardship, but also violence), 
led producers to adopt different strategies of family integration within communities.
Demands for land increased up to a point at which landlords were overwhelmed and, 
under harsh economic depression and the risk of expropriation, the new landed elite 
changed tactics, and soon started to split property up until complying with the ruling on 
private property land ceiling.59 Hacendados and rancheros took advantage of the weak 
enforcement and legal loopholes. Illegal means of resistance, such as bribing agrarian 
officials and leaders and even using organized violence to prevent expropriation, were 
also systematically used in central Veracruz. Struggle among armed political factions 
and rebel gangs - financed by oil companies - created a violent environment.
But, agrarian radicalism in Atzalan developed as an internal process of confrontation 
between landless peasants and landlords, more than from an external influence of leftist 
groups. It developed its own dynamics given the particularities of the region. Violent 
clashes lasted for more than three decades because of weak and discretionary 
implementation of the land reform, the relative isolation of the region, and the 
effectiveness of landlord’s wide and strong networks of complicity with authorities and 
leaders.
59 The constitutional ceiling imposed on private property, according to the agrarian legislation of the 
1920s was relaxed. From 1934 the first Agrarian Code stated a legal limit for rain fed lands and perennial 
crops - such as coffee - was 300 ha, while for irrigated lands was 150 ha (Montfort 2000). In the case of 
cattle grazing, the limit could be higher, depending on the rate of grazing in different regions.
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According to Cambrezy (1993), in central Veracruz agrarian reform -  compounded by 
an ever increasing demographic pressure - brought about a massive ‘race towards land’, 
complicating distribution and leading ejidos to fail as a redistributive programme. The 
main congregations experienced demographic ‘saturation’.60 Agrarian Committees from 
these congregations participated in the land distribution process, and had to face the 
problem of limited land availability to accommodate numerous migrant families. As a 
result, hundreds of isolated caserios (a set of scattered huts) mushroomed in Atzalan 
and many ejidos were established in small grants.61 Most of newly established ejidos 
received grants from different plots of land. Family parcels were, consequently, 
scattered in several small lots. In the Atzalan region, the problem was particularly acute 
due to the successful resistance of landlords, rancheros and small landowners. Among 
other constraints emerging from this division, the inability of the agrarian movement to 
co-ordinate local initiatives and transform them into micro-regional projects was 
paramount.
In fact, various contradictions entangled the agrarian movement from the beginning: (1) 
Overlaps in committees, which were first meant to stop violence amongst peasants 
fighting over remaining lands that were sometimes from the same properties and often 
outside the boundaries of municipalities; (2) deceitful deals between peasant leaders and 
officials and landowners’ representatives at the regional level; and (3) the highly 
centralised structure of the ejido (Cambrezy 1993). However, the movement’s fate was 
not decided at the local level, but in government offices and banks.
Inequality of access to available land (extension, quality, geographical location) was 
unavoidable. Some communities performed exhausting battles to get their agrarian 
claims recognised. They suffered violence, and in the end achieved unfavourable 
distribution agreements. In contrast, latecomers to the agrarian process (active as well as 
passive beneficiaries of the second agrarian wave), took advantage of the room 
previously made and struck better deals without major efforts. In general, first granted 
ejidos were allocated good-quality and compact lands, while the following grants were 
stony, poor-quality lands in different patches. That is why timing was an important 
factor in terms of land grants. However, San Pedro Altepepan was an exceptional case.
60 Cambrezy found that by 1980, in central Veracruz, one out of two localities newer than 60 years was an 
ejido, and that the older the ejido the higher the proportion of non-ejidatario inhabitants on it (Cambrezy 
1993: 94).
61 There were 3,500 ejidos in Veracruz with an average size of 851 ha, compared to the national average 
of 3,389 ha. Cambrezy, ibid.
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Even if it was a pioneer peasant movement, it ended up with the worse part, surrounded 
by landowners and better-endowed ejidos due to the strategies pursued by powerful 
landowners.
More than half a century of ejido life radically transformed collective arrangements. 
Since land distribution begun in the 1940s, it was exchanged in different ways, although 
not under a completely developed market. Political, legal and religious ejido life 
changed especially after the coffee crisis (1989-93), despite constitutional provisions, 
since amended, and the political corporatist system in which ejidatarios were subject to 
a clientelistic relationship within so called peasant organisations.
In short, it was not the peasant poor who benefited the most from land distribution, but a 
middle peasantry. Those with bargaining skills, and resources to actually appropriate 
more land than initially allocated; and those always ready to take advantage of others’ 
misfortunes (which frequently meant purchases of land at very cheap prices), as well as 
from profitable businesses (retailing, money lending, cattle grazing, etc.).
2,2, The emergence o f small coffee producers and a rural bourgeoisie
During the second half of the 19th Century, changes in international markets led to the 
crisis of sugar cane plantations and to the boom of coffee in Mexico and, particularly, in 
central Veracruz, where coffee used to be traded by merchants and hacendados. Coffee 
was not important in Mexico until after the United States imposed restrictive measures 
in favour of sugar cane cultivation in Cuba, deteriorating the Cuban coffee sector (1845- 
50). The sugar policies of the USA forced Cuba to give up coffee production (1845-50), 
encouraging coffee business in Mexico, mainly in Veracruz. Millions of coffee trees 
were planted and processing plants established in central Veracruz and in the Pacific 
coast, most of them of German, Spanish, American and Lebanese origin.
After the civil war in the United States, coffee consumption grew fast, accounting for a 
third of the world’s demand. In 1888 a coffee plague in Brazil, the world’s major 
producer at the time, drove world prices to record highs. Expecting foreign revenue, 
President Porfirio Diaz promoted foreign investment by providing land grants for the 
establishment of new coffee plantations and allowing tax-free imports of fixed capital 
oriented to this activity. This promotion lasted until the early 1890s when coffee prices 
dropped again.
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Additionally, the modernisation of the Cuban sugar industry brought about a recession 
in sugar cane crops and refineries in Mexico (1890-1915). Some haciendas overcame 
the sugar crisis by undertaking coffee cropping and cattle grazing. This change affected 
the patterns of hacienda labour demand, which was no longer permanent, and 
encouraged tenants and rancheros to undertake coffee cropping on their own, to pursue 
a complementary source of cash income.
During the 1880s coffee cropping took off on a large scale in Veracruz’s sub-sierra 
areas (from Coatepec and Xalapa through Huatusco to Misantla). The railway line to 
Teziutlan (1890) linked the warmer mountain slopes and planes with new 
agribusinesses like sugar cane, coffee, tobacco and vanilla, in great demand both in 
Mexico City and export markets. The trade boom between the coastal planes and 
Teziutlan, crossing Misantla, Chiconquiaco and Atzalan sierras (today Atzalan is on the 
south-eastern part), allowed the creation of intermediate rancherias along muleteer 
routes and next to sources of water. By 1889 coffee was already the main export crop 
in Veracruz and a few years later (1896), the first drying machine was introduced 
displacing the huge sun-drying patios.
Teziutlan was one of the most important cities, the major trading and financial centre in 
the sierra, where rich families profited from long distance trade from the coastal planes 
and the sierra to central Mexico. It was the only regional loading point to Mexico City 
(tobacco, cattle), and also a place of export transactions (precious woods and vanilla). 
Only aguardiente64 and maize trade were based on regional networks, hauling cargoes 
up and down the sierra (Hoffmann and Velazquez 1993:125).
Elites in this region - big merchants and landlords in Teziutlan, Plan de Arroyos, 
Tlapacoyan and Martinez de la Torre - competed for priority access to state resources 
and control of the most profitable regional markets (coffee, citrus, cattle raising and
62 There was no clear-cut difference between haciendas, fincas, ranchos and rancherias in revolutionary 
Mexico. Haciendas, fincas and ranchos could mean big properties, as well as medium size estates. 
Considering local historical data, ranchos were small to medium size private properties with a diversified 
economy and linked to peasant families, which provided labour. Rancherias were housing areas that did 
not achieve the status of pueblo (town), inhabited by one or several rancheros (owners of ranchos) and 
their tenants and jornalero workers. These rancherias were also called congregations when the agrarian 
reform started (Guerra 1988:480-90 T-II).
63 Lowlands were depopulated shortly after the conquest by relocation of pueblos, cattle raising, western 
diseases, and exploitation (Estrada Garcia 1982, Garcia Martinez 1987), but it is believed that something 
different happened in the piedmont (Hoffmann 1994). Whatever the case, until the turn of the XIX 
century an important repopulation started to take place in this region.
64 Alcohol distilled either directly from sugar cane juices or from residual juices after the production of 
panela.
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trade). One of the most important areas of competition was the highlands’ harvests, 
which drove merchants to knit together trading and social networks. Along the well- 
established routes from the coast to the highland central towns (Teziutlan and Misantla), 
muleteers’ trade crossed this region exchanging products back and forth, including 
morteado coffee.65
While the highlands were already densely inhabited, the piedmont was much of a forest 
belt with scattered ranchos, under the influence of lowland haciendas, to which the 
lands originally belonged.
At the end of the XIX Century a new boost was given to private property under the long 
Porfirian term, particularly when the 1883 decree on colonization and the 1894 law on 
untilled lands were passed. These regulations allowed colonists and compahias 
deslindadoras to claim ownership of either national or untilled lands (informal, ‘empty’, 
‘under-utilised’), opening up access to the indigenous peoples’ commons.66
New allowances to claim ‘untilled lands’ and incentives for agribusinesses, like those in 
sugar cane and coffee, facilitated land concentration involving the most favourable 
lands for modem agriculture. In Veracruz alone, the number of haciendas more than 
doubled between 1890 and 1907, from 252 to 530 haciendas (Garcia 1989, pp. 131-179 
quoted in Skerrit 1996 pp. 11-13), particularly in the coffee producing cantons. 
Jalacingo canton -  where we find Atzalan today -  had, in 1907, some of the largest 
haciendas, as in the case of Rafael Martinez de la Torre and the Zorrilla family. 
Martinez de la Torre (after whom one of the main towns was named) acquired huge 
amounts of land in the coastal lowlands and sold off parts of them to colonists. In the 
case of the Zorrilla family, they bought out almost all of former Jobo’s estate in 
successive purchases, one of them (the Almanza estate) in the sub-sierra slopes. In this 
region, the Zorrilla family’s expansion was not contested. Zorrilla hacienda did not 
change substantially the pattern of land use, allowing rancheros to settle in small plots 
of land for cropping food staples or the more regulated tobacco, cattle, and 
exceptionally perennial crops, such as coffee. There were also extensive areas where
65 Morteado coffee are green beans dry processed and husked.
66 Mid-nineteen Century liberal laws (especially the well-known Ley de Desamortizacion de bienes de 
manos muertas, of 1857) promoted private property rights as a model upon which development and 
democracy could make progress, as was the case of small private property in France or in the USA. In 
Veracruz, there were equivalent bills as early as 1826, right after independence, although with little 
impact. Porfirista land laws were more successful in breaking up corporate land-holdings and, as a 
consequence, indigenous lands, many of which were successfully preserved since Spanish colonial times, 
were then expropriated by colonising companies.
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peasants could gain access to plots of land under differing contractual conditions, for 
instance share-cropping and tenancy arrangements. Such peasants were usually vital to 
the hacienda as providers of basic produce and labour at harvest time, either in 
exchange for land or for monetary payment.67
The pattern of dispersed agro-industrial development in Central Veracruz had important 
implications for the social structure of rural society in the following years. In the first 
place, demographic growth and pressure on land was much higher than in previous 
periods. Secondly, close links were established between urban and industrial workers 
and peasants during the revolution. Thirdly, peasants were also closely linked 
(geographically) to labour markets and urban centres. All of these factors influenced the 
subsequent struggle for land under the agrarian reform (Skerrit 1996:16-17 and Fowler 
1979).
The 1910 Revolution put a halt to these trends, first by disturbing agribusiness 
expansion and the land concentration process, through land reform. As was mentioned, 
new landlords were forced to divide up their haciendas in several estates. Secondly, 
violence drove out communities, frequently towards the safer highlands where 
indigenous settlements had been pushed since colonial times. Piemont lands in Atzalan - 
over 300 to 400 meters above sea level (m.a.s.l) - were still hardly inhabited, despite 
being inside the property of big estates. By the time the revolution broke out, mainly the 
better connected lowlands were exploited.
The development o f the regional coffee market
At the end of the XIX Century increased communications, trade and investments 
created conditions for new agribusiness in central Veracruz (tobacco and sugar cane 
production, alcohol distilleries, cattle raising and coffee cropping and processing). The 
growth of ranchos and haciendas drove colonisation of the rich piedmont forward, 
restructuring property relations and elite power. Recovery of sugar prices and a coffee 
bonanza by the second half of the 1910s, encouraged hacendados and rancheros to give 
peons -  landless peasants, mainly from the highlands - plots of forest land in exchange
67 Skerrit contends that in Central Veracruz economic opportunities (markets and infrastructure) had the 
greatest effect upon land prices, militating against the formation of very large holdings, giving place to 
rather medium size haciendas. Notwithstanding the diversity of landholdings, a process of deepening 
capitalist relations was taking place (Skerrit 1996:14-16).
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for labour. The first revolutionary agrarian laws (1915-1920) further encouraged 
colonisation of the piedmont.
th
At the beginning of the 20 century, however, the main towns were rather small. 
Martinez de la Torre was still a pueblo, compared to Tlapacoyan and Teziutlan Villages, 
and Plan de Arroyos was a rancheria, though influential as an intermediary merchant 
point right in the middle of the sierra. In the following decades Martinez de la Torre 
expanded because of the political will of the wealthiest families, the so-called ‘divine 
caste’ (Aramburo, Zorrilla, Legiga, Lapuente), who controlled trade to Teziutlan.
Members of the Avila Castillo family - from which president Avila Camacho’s family 
hailed - were important muleteers. When the 1910 revolution started they supported the 
winning constitutionalist forces. Manuel Avila Camacho (bom in Teziutlan and 
President of Mexico after Cardenas, from 1940 to 1946) displaced the ‘divine caste’, 
bought properties from them, beginning with the flnca Las Margaritas, and carried out 
in the mid-1940s an old project: the development of modem communications, 
connecting the lowlands with the coastal planes and the sierra. Between 1944 and 1946 
important federal highways were built, connecting the region to the center (Puebla and 
Mexico cities) and to the sea (Veracruz and Nautla ports): (Veracruz) -Perote-Teziutlan, 
(Mexico City-Puebla)-Zacatepec-Teziutlan, and Teziutlan-Tlapacoyan-Martfnez de la 
Torre - Nautla. After the national motorway to Nautla reached the foothills of this 
region, merchants developed new ties with the main lowland markets (in Martinez and 
Tlapacoyan) northwards, following parallel paths between the main rivers (San Pedro 
and Quilate).
At the same time, the construction of the Independencia sugar mill in the town of 
Martinez de la Torre (mid-1940s), attracted hundreds of workers and integrated piemont 
communities within sugar cane cultivation. Contract agriculture and merchant 
capitalists emerged along the main rural roads of Atzalan mountains. Before the roads 
were built, rows of mules with maize, panela69 and parchment coffee gathered in Tierra 
Nueva on their way to Plan de Arroyos, westwards through San Pedro river.
The monopoly enjoyed by big coffee merchant-processors of Misantla and Plan de 
Arroyos, and the debt bondage relations they established, were finally broken with the 
entry of new capital and competitors. Peasants no longer had to travel long distances to
68 Skerrit, David, personal communication, 23-Jan-1996.
69 Unrefined sugar loaf produced in small, artisan units of production (trapiches).
trade their coffee. Forty years of Plan de Arroyos hegemony in the highlands came to an 
end with the development of Martinez, and the former village of Tlapacoyan benefited 
greatly. Plan de Arroyos-Tlapacoyan road responded to the predominance of Martinez 
de la Torre’s over the sierra, but this was not enough to compensate for the new sources 
of capital and trade.
As post-war prices of coffee increased, buyers extended intermediary networks up to the 
highlands. In Tlapacoyan, CEIMSA and Banamex70 started to provide coffee merchants 
with credit during the 1950s. CEIMSA - a wet processing factory - recruited better-off 
coffee growers in Atzalan, including ejidatarios and rancheros from Almanza, Tierra 
Nueva and San Pedro Altepepan (SPA). From the early 1960s wet-curing factory in San 
Carlos also started to buy important amounts of coffee from small producers.
From then on, sugar industrialisation and citrus exports consolidated the hegemony of 
Martinez de la Torre over the sierra, overtaking Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos. The 
coffee business remained mainly in the hands of the old rich families of Tlapacoyan and 
Plan de Arroyos, because of their privileged links, on one hand, to exporters in Xalapa, » 
Coatepec, and Mexico City and, on the other hand, to highlander peasants. They 
welcomed and even promoted state intervention in their localities; and profited from 
technical assistance to establish the first modem plantations in the region (coffee flncas 
of around 100 hectares). The coffee bonanza during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the 
expansion of state infrastructure benefited the marginal lowlands of Tlapacoyan to a 
greater extent, compared to other coffee producing regions that had a much older
71tradition.
77The fractioning o f  Santa Rosa hacienda and the early stages o f  the local coffee 
market
Manuel Zorrilla was a Spaniard who settled in Teziutlan and accumulated vast 
latifundia in the late XIX Century, where he pursued several agribusinesses like cattle 
grazing, sugar cane, tobacco, vanilla and other crops. Nonetheless, Zorrilla opened up
70 Banamex stands for Banco Nacional de Mexico, a private firm founded with French capital in the XIX 
century.
71 For example, the highlands of Altotonga or Misantla, despite privileged links and closeness to Xalapa 
City, entered a long process of marginalization, after the development of direct links between Teziutlan 
and the coast through Tlapacoyan and Martinez de la Torre.
721 use this case to illustrate the process of land fractioning and coffee market formation, because it was a 
very influential hacienda in the region I studied and because the data for Santa Rosa was more readily 
available to me.
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opportunities for other haciendas - owned mainly by Spanish residents in Teziutlan - 
and ranchos of more than 100 ha each to undertake extensive livestock raising and 
plantation cropping, such as sugar cane and tobacco, increasing deforestation of the 
mountain slopes (Hoffmann and Velazquez 1993:125).
One of Zorrilla’s estates was the Hacienda of Santa Rosa, at the mouth of the sierra, 
where the Almanza village is located today (320 m.o.s.l.). Santa Rosa was a well 
integrated hacienda, with a sugar cane plantation, a sugar mill and alcohol distillery, 
tobacco cultivation, drying store and bulk packaging facility and cattle grazing. A rural 
road was opened from Teziutlan up to Santa Rosa. In the surroundings of the estate, 
Zorrilla allowed small rancherias to grow; they were populated by administrators, 
sharecroppers and wage-workers linked to the hacienda.
When the Revolution broke out, peasants had already started to arrive in Santa Rosa, 
attracted by the expansion of regional businesses and allowances to cultivate land. 
Under land tenancy contracts, they were permitted usufruct patches of land (usually XA 
to 1 hectare of maize, enough for a family to live on), in exchange for clearing the forest 
and working in the hacienda fields. They lived uphill in hamlets (caserios) and travelled 
to Santa Rosa hacienda by a donkey track. Tenants cropped maize, beans and green 
chillies; a family economy of self-sufficiency with small surpluses. Tenants’ surpluses 
(mainly maize) were marketed only through the hacienda. Almanza manor was a 
booming weekly market during the 1930s (and remained so until the 1960s, before its 
decline). Tenants went there to sell maize and a bit of coffee, buy sugar cane spirit 
(aguardiente) and panela (solid molasses), produced by the hacienda, and other 
manufactured products. Money lending and terms of trade were generally unfavourable 
until the coffee market developed (not before the 1950s).
Because of the isolation and distance to the main markets, in Teziutlan and Tlapacoyan, 
there were no big coffee plantations, only farms of 5-6 hectares. Zorrilla’s hacienda had 
other main ventures to take care of, like sugar cane and tobacco, best suited to the warm 
lowlands.
Coffee trade was still small and sporadic, and prices were rather low, but the crop 
slowly grew, based mainly on increasing numbers of tenanted small plots. Apart from 
maize and chilli, La Esperanza specialised in producing tobacco and jonoteras, used to
73 According to Downing (1988: 180), "Prevailing international market prices of coffee and national 
interest rates have only a remote relationship to the terms of these transactions."
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make cordage to tie tobacco leaves and dry them in the sun. Arriza and Panera were the 
only merchants who bought bola coffee, in exchange for salt, blankets, metal tools, 
panela and aguardiente.
One of the Spanish landowners, Paneras, took over the coffee trade using money- 
lending mechanisms and paying for peasants' coffee in kind. In this way, Paneras could 
make a three-fold profit: he charged high interest rates on credits; purchased coffee 
beans at prices below market levels; and overcharged coffee producers for the groceries 
they took in advance from his stores.
Santa Rosa hacienda resisted the first wave of agrarian movements (from the 1920s to 
the 1940s) with a heavy-handed response to peasant claimants, dividing up its 
landholdings and promoting certificados de inafectabilidad74 on agricultural and cattle 
grazing lands (1940s and 1950s). Nevertheless Zorrilla had sold around 3,000 ha to 
Channell Niermann, a Russian emigre, and associates. Another portion of the Zorrilla's 
estate - to the southeast of Almanza - was sold to Ignacio Olmedo, who by the mid-
nc
1950s sold again to Agustin Bello.
But social pressure mounted and big estates started to fall under the second wave of 
agrarian struggles (from the mid-1940s to the 1970s). A commercial association of 72 
small investors (Sociedad Agropecuaria Santa Rosa, SA de RL) bought the biggest part 
of the former hacienda, 1,753 ha. Other fractions went to the Niembro family and to 
ejido grants for two new settlements of landless peasants.
74 Since 1940 Presidential decrees were issued to protect cattle raising farms, which in this way were able 
to own up to 50,000 ha. The decrees were given constitutional status to allow landowners to get 
protection against land expropriation (fraction XV of Article 27).
5 In Chapter 5 there is a short life history of this grower-processor and his business strategy. We are 
using this example, which also highlights the connection of national and local levels of analysis.
76
Table No. 2
Buyers Individual purchases
Surface (ha) Land
Register*
Date
Soc. Agropec. Santa Rosa 1,753.00 12 11-1-1961
Micaela Prieto 201.40 405 6-VI-1964
Elena V. de Niembro 207.90 406 6-VI-1964
Ricardo Perez Ramirez 200.00 586 10-VIII-1964
Fernando Gonzalez N. 196.00 618 21-VIII-1964
Ma. del Carmen M. de Niembro 194.40 619 21-VIII-1964
Granted Ejidos Ejido grants
Cerro de San Francisco 180.00 764 23-X-1967
Penas de Almanza and Tierra 
Nueva
679.00 509 3-VII-l 968
Total 3,711.70
Source'. La Loma Ejido’s archive.
* Public Property Register (RPP) o f Veracruz State.
Coffee and systems o f production in Atzalan
Although profitable, coffee was a new and uncertain business, and a very demanding 
crop. It had to be harvested, pulped, dried and husked, before it could be sold in distant 
markets (Plan de Arroyos, Tlapacoyan or even Altotonga). If we take into account that 
newcomer families were small and that they had to manage with poor roadways, crop 
maize and coffee, as well as a backyard economy (minor livestock and orchards), labour 
capacity was always under stress. In contrast, maize was well known to all, it could 
always be marketed locally and was much easier to harvest than in the cold lands, where 
most o f them came from.76 Rent payments represented an additional burden when 
weather hazards spoiled harvests.
From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, San Pedro Altepepa’s ejido archive77 registered 
a constant increase in land tenants cropping coffee. In 1923 only a handful among the
76 According to genealogies of 30 families of San Pedro Altepepan ejido, most o f the landless peasants 
who immigrated to this basin came from the highly populated Chiconquiaco and Misantla highlands, from 
the south and southeast.
77 San Pedro Altepepan Agrarian Executive Committee. Documents, official mail and register of tenants 
and rents, 1923-1941.
99 claimants had coffee fincas. In 1929 there were 20 coffee producers and by 1930 as 
many as 86 out o f 114 tenants were cropping coffee, but 46 o f them had newly
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established groves, without production yet.
The agrarian movement reached its peak in the early 1930s and saw an avalanche of 
new-comers taking a double bet, that is, enrolling with an ejido claim group and 
establishing a coffee flnca. Although 28 families were cropping only maize, most of 
SPA tenants had already adopted maize and coffee as the main associated cropping 
pattern.79
The 1920 law o f ejidos in Veracruz regulated land contracts between owners of  
underused lands and tenants that tilled and made claims on them, providing a 
framework for fair arrangements while the agrarian procedure was in progress. Once 
landowners granted permission, tenant families cleared patches o f land and started 
cultivation, free o f charge during the first couple o f years. As soon as rents came into 
force, smaller amounts o f land were used for maize and coffee crops. Landlords gave 
access to land under restricted conditions because they were aware o f the risks o f land 
claims. The only way out -  at least temporarily - was driving away tenants, but that was 
not a conflict-free expedient.
It is clear that coffee contributed to settling families in the region, because fincas 
increased steadily there. Despite record low prices for coffee during the depression 
years, they were still advantageous for producers. While maize rents remained stable 
during the 1930s (at $ 1.2/ha), coffee rents were shifting but also much higher:
Table No. 3
COFFEE PRODUCTION, VALUE AND LAND RENTS IN SPA*
Year Value ($/Qq**) Value ($/ha) Rent ($/ha)
1935 55.00 220.00 11.00
1937 13.50 54.00 2.70
1939 35.00 140.00 7.00
* Estimates based on registered rents and a tariff o f 5% out of annual harvests’ value and an 
average yield of 4 Qq/ha. Source: SPA ejido archive.
** Qq = Spanish quintal = 100 lb of green coffee (see Appendix 6)
78 Although international prices had relative effect in remote communities, the 1929-30 jump in coffee 
lands rented out in Atzalan might have been linked to the short recovery in the international market, even 
if merchants in Almanza, Tlapacoyan or Misantla did not transfer price increases to peasants.
79 The Agrarian Committee of San Pedro Altepepa (then Iquimite) was asking for more than 1,000 ha of 
land, 5 ha each. Land claimants census counted 195 family heads in 1931 and 211 in 1932. From then on, 
numbers started to fall as troubles mounted for SPA’s Committee and neighbouring organisations were 
getting land first. The SPA’s family heads census went down to 109 persons in 1936 and again recovered 
to 173 in 1940, right before a favourable Presidential Resolution granted ejido lands to San Pedro.
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Maize production expanded sharply in the region and yields were very high during the 
first years after deforestation, based on “slash and bum” methods, while coffee was still 
attractive to small producers.
During four decades, up to the beginning of the 1970s, except for local elite -leaders 
and local intermediaries and merchants - most small producers cultivated mainly the 
Typica variety of coffee, applying traditional technology. The isolation of this region -  
located between rivers - violence and land distribution played an important part in 
explaining why this coffee producer region lagged behind in terms of technology and 
infrastructure, compared to the neighbouring Misantla region, for instance. Violence 
and the uncertainty generated by the agrarian movements slowed down new investments 
in coffee plantations. Even after the 1930s and 1940s, when most land distribution took 
place in the region, market transactions between producers and buyers were eroded by 
distrust.80
As one can see in Table No. 3, in next page, the main differences between the coffee 
plantations of hacendados and rancheros, on the one hand, and the fincas of peasants, 
on the other, were land extension, the degree of specialisation, wage-labour applied to 
weeding and harvesting, and the level of vertical integration. Variations in productivity 
were due more to patterns of association, natural characteristics of soils (depth and 
richness), plot orientation, and of course maintenance. The overriding constraints were 
distance to markets and transport costs. At another level, developing knowledge of the 
vagaries of local weather and the subtleties of coffee cropping and processing were also 
important factors for economic success. Despite those differences, the overall 
cultivation technology was very similar in terms of density, planting patterns, pruning 
and weeding practices, as well as the coffee varieties used. Peasants were always 
catching up with rancheros’ improvements, while the latter copied hacendados’ 
technology. Under the prevailing conditions in Atzalan, from the turn of the century 
until the mid-1940s, few changes took place in the way coffee was grown and beans 
processed.
801 will make the point - in chapter 5 - about why agrarian reform in Mexico prevented trust to spread 
among producers, merchants, processors and exporters; a crucial factor in the development of the coffee 
market in Colombia.
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Table No. 4 Coffee system s of production in Atzalan, Veracruz (1900s -1940s)
Typical
landholding
Mainly 2-5 ha o f rented lands (a few 10 
ha ejidatario parcels)
20-30 ha, private property
Typical 
coffee finca
Most tenants o f Yz to 3A ha (ejidatarios 
had 1-2 ha fincas)
Most o f 4 to 5 ha (few up to 30 ha with 
pulping centres and drying patios)
Location Partially cleared forest patches (rented) Flat lands with access to rural roads
Density and 
alignment
Irregualr pattern o f around 600 
plants/ha (squared 4.0 x 4.0 m)
Regular patterns o f 625 to 833 plants/ha 
(4.0 x 4.0 m or 4.0 x 3.0 m)
Variety Arabica Typica ((known as criollo or 
nacional) only
Mainly arabica Typica and some 
bourbon
Yield 4.0 to 5.0 Qq/ha (around 1 kg/plant) 5.0 to 8.0 Qq/ha (1 to 1 'A kg/plant)
Scale of 
production
From 2 to 4 Qq o f coffee, mainly 
natural husked (bola morteado)
20-40 Qq o f coffee, mainly seco de 
agua (up to 180 Qq with pulping 
centres)
Plants
management
Selective weeding and pruning o f  
“dried” branches; free growth; no 
fertilisation at all
Regular weeding; pruning o f “dried” 
branches and shade; semi-free growth; 
some fertilisation with manure
Canopy Productive ‘indian garden’: forest 
species and some pepper and fruit trees
Unproductive shade (forest species and 
jiniquil and chalahuite)
Labour Labour exchange among kin at harvest 
time (prestamo de botes)
Use o f wage labour for harvest and from 
tenants off-season
Credit From local money lenders (cash and 
kind), forcing purchases in advanced
From processors and big merchants in 
Tlapacoyan and Teziutlan
Processing 
of berries
Highlanders: hand pulping and sun- 
drying in soil patios; some left to dry in 
the cherry, then husked using wood- 
mortar (bola morteada).
Lowlanders: sold directly cherry coffee
Rancheros: pulped, soaked and partially 
dried beans (seco de agua*);
Hacendados: processed parchment in 
their own beneficios (wet curing 
factories)
Market
place
For cherry coffee: merchant money­
lenders in Almanza or La Noria 
(lowlands);
For husked beans: and Tlapacoyan 
highland markets: Plan de Arroyos, Las 
Truchas, Zapotitlan (one-day travel)
For seco de agua: hacendados wet 
curing factories in Almanza and Plan de 
Arroyos;
For parchment: Plan de Arroyos, 
Tlapacoyan and Teziutlan processors / 
exporters
Exchange Husked beans: Barter for metal tools, 
sugar, vegetable oil, spirit, paraffin, 
medicines;
Cherry coffee: debt bondage (groceries 
delivered in the slack season)
Rancheros: Monetary, with advance 
purchases (credit and inputs in the slack 
season);
Hacendados: Monetary, with advance 
credit before harvest
Crop
patterns
Associated coffee within “indian 
gardens” and maize, beans, chillies 
besides
Monocropping: tobacco, maize and 
coffee (and livestock)
Transport Mules and human Mule drove
Sources'. SPA-CEEA archive, particularly 'Manifestation de productos agricolas' of the 
General Treasury of Veracruz State, and interviews with producers, mainly Lauro Hernandez, 
from San Pedro Altepepa, whose family moved in from Barrancones (1931), where there were 
medium-sized coffee fincas; Porfirio Andrade, from Tierra Nueva, who worked as muleteer for 
the first coffee fincas in the hacienda of Almanza and La Esperanza ranch (early 1940s); 
Ernesto Maldonado (JLAL’s brother-in-law), whose father owned a 30 ha finca in the highlands 
and also bought coffee from peasants (1940s).
* One-day sun dried beans. See Appendix No. 6
Qq (Spanish Quintal) = 245 kg cherry or berry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment or 46 kg of green
beans.
In traditional fincas, coffee plants were left to grow freely; with heights of 2 to 5 metres, 
they looked like trees rather than bushes. Typical coffee plants had a productive life of 
30 years, or even longer. Common densities were of around 625 trees per hectare ( 4 x 4  
metres, symmetric alignment), sometimes higher. An important feature of traditional 
coffee cultivation was the survival of primary vegetation, providing shade for coffee. 
Under such conditions, soils were still rich and well protected from erosion, making 
fertilisation unnecessary. To the extent that inputs were hardly used, the management of 
natural processes, that is the biological cycle of coffee plants, was the defining 
characteristic of available cropping technology. While ranchero fincas were fully 
integrated in regional markets and monetised, peasant coffee was partially exchanged 
with local money-lenders and merchants.
The first modern coffee business in Atzalan: the Topetefs plantation (1950s)
After the main haciendas in Atzalan region had been divided through continuous 
purchases and to some extent distribution to peasants through agrarian reform, in the 
mid-1950s the first two large coffee plantations were created in this region, with 
technical assistance from the National Coffee Council (CNCf by its initials in Spanish), 
created in 1949 to develop and spread modem cropping technology. One of these 
plantations was established by the retired Senator Rosendo Topete -  a prominent
Q 1
politician in Veracruz - and shortly afterwards, a second was created by Agustin Bello, 
another member of an affluent family in Tlapacoyan.
Topete first bought 350 ha of private property, free of agrarian claims. He met Justo
o 9
Fernandez in Veracruz, the 'Mexican coffee baron', who suggested that Topete get
81 He had a rich political career during the 1950s as he was senator and then federal deputy for Veracruz. 
Later on he was appointed President’s Private Secretary and ran for the Governorship of Veracruz. 
Interview with Rolando Topete, grandson of Rosendo Topete, and coffee grower and buyer himself. 
Loma Bonita, 2-2-1996.
82 An Austrian immigrant in the early XX century who became -  after establishing a coffee business in
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into the coffee business. Around 500 people were hired to build several roadways to 
connect Loma Bonita ranch to Tlapacoyan and to establish a 50 ha coffee plantation, 
using the coffee Typica variety.
Both planters first used the Typica, but very soon introduced Bourbon, and later on 
Mundo Novo and other improved coffee varieties. At a very slow pace, by trial and 
error, these wealthy growers spread the new plants, without a major breakthrough in 
coffee cropping technology. Densities remained almost the same, and new varieties did 
not overtake Typica yields.
Again, as had been the case with the federal motorway from Teziutlan to Nautla port, 
and Martinez de la Torre sugar refinery, Senator Topete had the bargaining power to 
channel public resources for building the vital access roadways up to their new 
plantations. The old rural road (rodada) of Santa Rosa hacienda, stretching from 
today’s Almanza to Tlapacoyan, was improved and extended up to Loma Bonita’s ranch 
(Topetes’ plantation), close to San Carlos’ ranch (Bello’s finca).
Once the new plantations started to supply coffee, new communities emerged in the 
lower slopes and the local coffee market opened up. Topete and especially Bello, who 
built a small processing plant with sun-drying patios, also traded coffee from highlander 
ejidatarios, leaving debt-bondage arrangements behind and creating market-led 
institutional alternatives further away (Plan de Arroyos and Misantla).
At the beginning of the 1960s greater state intervention improved conditions for further 
modernisation of coffee production. Changes during the Echeverria administration 
(1970-76) and a new emphasis on land reform and peasant agriculture (Grindle 1990, 
pp. 190-94), expanded coffee modernisation programmes. In order to overcome the tight 
control of intermediaries over small coffee producers, massive investment was 
undertaken from the mid-1970s onwards based on local UEPCs.
Market engagement and changes in commodity production
For the most part, small producers in Atzalan did not engage in coffee cropping on a 
specialised basis, as compared to Misantla, Huatusco or Coatepec producers. Since the 
beginning of the XX Century, they combined small plots of coffee with bigger maize
Las Animas, Veracruz - the main “coffee baron” in Mexico.
83 Ibid.
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fields, which was the leitmotif of migration flows to the soil-rich sierra. Before most of 
them engaged in coffee production, small producers relied on marketing maize 
surpluses. Based on slash and bum of forestlands, peasants had for several years a very 
good soil for maize cultivation. They usually paid rents with maize and still had 
surpluses to sell to lowland ranchos, already involved with profitable crops, such as 
sugar cane, tobacco and cattle.
Allocation of land and labour responded to maize cropping needs, while coffee 
occupied tiny patches. But in two decades (1960s and 1970s) coffee expanded rapidly in 
peasant regions. What were the incentives for small producers? From the peasant 
perspective, four advantages of coffee cropping stand out:
1. Manageability and resistance. Coffee is a labor intensive crop that allows 
flexible management year-round, except for harvest. Coffee is also a resilient 
perennial, well adapted to mountain slopes, where no other crops easily prosper 
without major investments.
2. Complementarity within the peasant economy. Coffee’s seasonal regime adapts 
well to maize/beans traditional agriculture, both in terms of the agricultural 
annual cycle and the timing of harvest and coffee incomes, just before the main 
tonamileM maize crop. However, labour, land and to a lesser extent market 
connections are important constraints.
3. Territoriality. As a perennial crop, coffee bushes were used for strengthening 
possession rights and boundaries, and eventually a land claim. Coffee producers 
were first tenants, but on ‘empty’ spaces, so they could rent as much land as 
they could afford to cultivate and pay for.
4. Profitability and terms of trade. Coffee cropping expanded within the limits of 
exchange needs, land and labour availability. During the period of greater state 
regulation, thousands of producers found a secure source of income (despite 
surplus appropriation and administrative mismanagement, inefficient cost 
structures, corruption and political corporatism).
Coffee markets were controlled locally by merchants, who practised debt bondage and 
advance purchases at cheap prices. There were no roads through which coffee loads 
could be easily mobilised. To overcome this problem, some producers had to process 
their own coffee bola morteado (dried beans in the cherry and husked). Then they had
84 Tonamile means in Nahuatl, “sun’s maize crop”, and is a winter crop.
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to undergo 6hr-12 hr journeys, carrying coffee bags on mule backs to the nearest towns 
where the coffee markets were more developed, and where they could strike a better 
deal. Nevertheless coffee was sold in exchange for merchandise and cash, most of the 
time.
As markets developed, bigger producers invested in local facilities and expanded coffee 
cropping and modernized beneflcios, which were still small-plots of no more than 5-6 
ha at the end of the 1940s.
Land distribution also boosted food staples during the 1930s and 1940s, but production 
and cultivated land declined from the early 1960s onwards. Coffee production grew 
slowly, but consistently, based on a continuous increase in the number of growers and 
surface, right from the late 1920s to the beginning of the 1970s when federal investment 
multiplied considerably. Traditional export crops entered a decline as land reform 
advanced. Thus, the vanilla market sunk after the early 1920s; tobacco and to a lesser 
extent bananas were severely hit by the 1930s depression. Sugarcane saw a huge 
expansion with the Independencia sugar refinery, from the mid-1940s up to the 1980s 
(Hoffmann and Velazquez 1993, p. 120).
A complex interaction with labour markets created conditions for upholding coffee 
associated cropping. The Independencia sugar mill and the citrus and fruit exporting 
agribusiness in Martinez de la Torre provided seasonal employment to small coffee 
producers in Atzalan sierra, with the advantage of being close to their households and 
coffee lands.
Almost at the same time, federal infrastructure programmes linked the Tlapacoyan 
region to the centre of the country (Mexico City) and to Nautla seaport, on the eastern 
side. The expansion of the Nautla federal motorway allowed export agribusiness to 
rapidly develop. Citrus and coffee, as well as the sugar industry (parastatal) grew in 
Tlapacoyan, Martinez de la Torre and Misantla.
In sum, the development of the coffee market in the region was a slow and cumbersome 
process due to several problems: labour was scarce from a very early stage forcing 
hacendados and rancheros to design mechanisms (such as debt bondage and tenancy 
arrangements) to attract and attach landless peasants; a very fragmented and inefficient 
network of communication made transportation of goods, labour and investments 
extremely expensive and difficult; credit emerged very slowly and was very expensive;
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and last, property fractioning and demographic growth proved the predominance of 
micro land holdings which did not allowed economies of scale, the introduction of 
modem technologies and more efficient forms of cooperation.
2.3. State intervention in the coffee sector
The small coffee producers’ sector was to some extent an outcome of the land reform, 
particularly in Veracruz, but state policies complemented the project, for they 
encouraged small producers to enrol in a ‘coffee welfare system’. The logic of a 
regulated international market added to a national strategy of state-promoted rural 
development, feeding back into one another and allowing diversion of funds and 
accumulation of inefficiencies, both of which together conspired against the 
development of a vigorous, well integrated coffee sector. The IMC, in particular, altered 
in many ways the functioning of the market, the expectations of small producers and the 
strategies of merchants and processors.
The coffee boom of the 1950s led to price increases and consequently to an expansion 
of production units, overcapacity and overproduction, ultimately precipitating a fall in 
coffee prices. The US promoted the first agreements in Latin America to manage supply 
and demand and maintain prices between 120 and 140 dollars per 100 pounds. Coffee 
prices, it was believed, would improve economic conditions and would help, thereby, 
prevent a social revolution like the one Cuba was experiencing.
The efforts to regulate the coffee markets first crystallized in several agreements of 
regional scope (starting in Latin America), which attempted to control exports and 
regulate prices. Later on, as a greater number of countries realised the benefits derived 
from a regulated framework, an International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was reached in 
1963. The main arrangement of this agreement was a quota system, which was to be 
annually revised. However, ICA entailed not only a set of rules, but a local organisation 
that was to administer the quota assigned to each country. The local counterpart -  which 
in Mexico started as the CNCf - was responsible for financing production according to 
international prices, retaining and administering surplus production - in excess of the 
agreed quota- regulating productive capacity to stick to the quota and undertaking 
research and development, as well as training, in order to diversify production and 
inhibit growth of productive capacity.
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A new intermediary, the IMC, and a new bureaucratic elite
The National Coffee Council (CNCf) was originally founded to profit from the coffee 
boom of the 1950s, but it easily accommodated later on to the new regulated market, 
based on an international quota system. Stimulated to get tax revenues from coffee 
exports in order to finance his ambitious import-substitution industrialisation program, 
President Aleman created in 1949 the National Commission of Coffee (CNCf) 
(Downing 1988, p. 181).85 The CNCf would promote modem coffee production through 
distribution of new varieties and technical assistance to producers. The USA created 
strong incentives to increase production after the Korean War. Large planters, 
processors and exporters directly benefited from CNCf s technical assistance, new 
varieties and market information. According to government statistics, at the end of 
WWII total coffee production and average yield had been stationary for almost a 
decade, at the level of 100 thousand sacks, coffee surface increased only marginally and 
productivity was declining. With a world deficit of more than two million sacks, coffee 
prices rose to their pre-depression levels. As new varieties canie into production and the 
coffee frontier expanded, exports more than doubled between 1948 and 1953, from 
31,241 to 69,038 tons {ibid).
A Colombian specialist86 trained a group of 20 agronomists in 1949-50. They 
distributed the first plants to ejidatario producers at the beginning of the 1950s. A small 
office was established in Tlapacoyan, which functioned with a small team of two 
‘empirical technicians’ and an agronomist in charge. The CNCf agronomists learnt the 
new cropping practices, like seedling production in nurseries, the shaping of plant 
structure through pruning, drainage and shade control. With very simple tools and a 
one-to-one approach, the CNCfs technicians spread - at the beginning of the 1950s - the 
new coffee technology through practical demonstrations.
Since the mid-1950s and throughout the 1960s, incentives like the establishment of 
nurseries and technical assistance were monopolised by a small elite of leaders and 
producers, ready to experiment, assimilate modernising ideas and try the new varieties 
and coffee technologies. CNCf extensionists could mainly reach communities next to 
existing rural roads. They were commonly attracted with favours (food, tips and even
85 Advisors to the government optimistically believed there was potential for trebling production in less 
than six years. Alem&n created several Commissions, including Maize, Coffee and Fruit (interview with 
Ing. Cecilio Villarreal, pioneering CNCf technician, 20/11/1997).
86 Hired by Bancomext, Juan Pablo Duque -  experienced technician of the FNC - first came to run 
confiscated German fincas in Soconusco, Chiapas (Interview to Cecilio Villarreal, ibid.).
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bribery). In SPA no more than a group o f about 10 people had constant relationships 
with CNCf technicians, particularly better o ff ejidatarios, peasant leaders, rancheros 
and the owner o f the first beneficio in SPA, which was later bought by a local 
cooperative. (Interview with SQT 16/3/95 ).
Gradually, some o f the practices recommended were adopted and yields improved. 
Before the CNCf started its programmess, average productivity was about 4-5 Qq/ha. 
By the end o f the 1960s, some flnca yields increased to 12 Qq/ha. Nevertheless, exports 
grew modestly and wide modernisation did not develop as planned. The expansion of 
the coffee market along with land distribution in piedmont lands (1930s and 1940s) 
incorporated marginal producers. Coffee cropping had already expanded from the 
highlands down to piedmont slopes, but the creation o f ejidos furthered this process and 
shaped the regional coffee market. Peasants adopted coffee since the very beginning as 
an important petty cash-crop (Downing 1988:179). Therefore, increased production of 
coffee depended on the extension o f surface cropped, as illustrated in next Table.
Table No. 5
1930 (ha) % in total 1960 (ha) % in total Increase %
Private property 144,000 93.50 269,000 70.60 86.81
Ejido lands 10,000 6.50 112,000 29.40 1,020.00
Total 154,000 100.00 381,000 100.00 147.40
Source: Hoffman (1994b, p. 352).
While the coffee frontier in private lands did not even double in three decades, the ejido 
sector expanded geometrically, more than ten times. The key to this phenomenon was 
state promotion o f coffee in the so-called social sector, that is, one decade o f intensive 
agricultural extension and applied research. The CNCf introduced high yield varieties 
(HYV) in 36,000 hectares (only 12% of the total coffee lands in 1959) and trained 3,000 
producers, expanding the coffee frontier 140,000 hectares during the decade 1949-1959 
(Beaumond 1985, pp. 162-68). This was a much faster growth of coffee production than 
in the two previous decades without state involvement.
Good post-war prices and an expanding international coffee market -  Africa emerged as 
an increasingly more important exporter - soon overtook demand. The 1956 crisis 
facilitated a new cooperative framework, the so-called Mexico Agreement, a first
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continental retention scheme that started in 1957. From this mandate a more powerful 
regulatory scheme emerged, based on national coffee boards. In 1958 the former CNCf 
was transformed into the Mexican Coffee Institute (IMC, commonly known as 
Inmecafe, the Spanish acronym) integrating to it a processing plant (confiscated from 
German businessmen). The new coffee institute started to intervene directly in the 
market, buying small amounts of coffee, and promoting for the first time technical and 
organisational conditions for a modem coffee market: experimentation, training and 
technical assistance to producers.
From the mid-1950s the IMC created experimentation sites, one of them in Ixtacuaco, 
near Tlapacoyan city, Veracruz, with the purpose of adapting and improving coffee and
o n
other crops. The IMC commissioned a research project from social anthropologists to 
assess its limited price regulatory power in the field. They identified a private network 
that linked intermediaries to small producers and relied on money-lending and debt- 
bondage. The consultants recommended strategies similar to those of the intermediaries, 
particularly regarding collecting sites and forward credit (Downing 1988 and Nolasco 
1985).
Peasant mobilisation and unrest in rural areas during the 1960s and early 1970s met 
with government direct participation in agriculture through parastatals and commodity 
boards (for instance in coffee, tobacco, sisal and barbasco), trust funds, commissions 
and programmes aimed at regulating relations between TNCs/private industries and 
producer organisations. From the mid-1960s onwards, the state decided to intervene in 
key agricultural sectors to regulate and promote their development. Particularly from the 
early 1970s -  during the Echeverria administration - state agencies became deeply
o o
involved in the agricultural and semi-industrial stages of many processing chains.
87 As part of the new International Coffee Agreement, during the 1960s a share was retained from each 
coffee sack actually exported in order to finance diversification projects, which in the end benefited big 
landowners and better off ejidatarios in the lowlands, where little coffee was in fact planted (Villaseflor 
1987, p. 401, and interviews to Andres Villaseflor 2/2/98 and a former IMC Delegate in Tlapacoyan 
2/7/96).
88 At the peak of this process, in the early 1980s, the Mexican state had consolidated in two decades at 
least 20 agribusiness chains (such as sugar cane, cotton, henequen, strawberry, barley, coffee, dairy, 
tobacco, coconut, barbasco and others) (Diaz P. et al 1985). State agencies acted as business facilitator, 
market intermediary, regulator and arbitrator of the relationships between producers and TNCs. 
Especially after the agricultural sector started to decline in the early 1970s, the state deepened its direct 
intervention through diverse agencies and policies. The government reactivated land reform, promoted 
second and third level producer organisations (UEs, ARICs); and tried to soften social conflicts and to 
assert national sovereignty over primary resources (Labastida 1976).
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In the case of coffee, generous budgets were allocated to the IMC during the 1970s and 
the first half of the 1980s, almost without supervision by a higher authority, although 
the Ministry of Agricultural and Water Resources (SARH) was charged with overseeing 
IMC’s performance, while the SPP (Planning Ministry) scrutinised its spending 
practices. IMC infrastructure grew at an impressive pace, with involvement in 
substantial areas of research, technical assistance and marketing.89
High international coffee prices (from 1976 up to the early 1980s) and the following oil 
bonanza, gave the IMC room for manoeuvre. Resources were channelled into coffee 
development, on a massive basis, without a clear strategy. Output increased 
approximately by a million coffee bags per decade, based on a continuous expansion of 
the coffee frontier. Particularly in the minifundista sector, coffee cropping grew 
considerably in marginal lands,90 some of them newly distributed through land reform. 
Entire regions in the Pacific coast were opened to coffee cultivation with IMC technical 
assistance, funding and purchasing centres.
Impact on merchant and processor strategies
The CNCf -  which was to become the IMC - did not displace former intermediaries and 
merchants. Buyers and exporters had strong positions in the coffee regions, and went on 
buying coffee from small producers. Some of them had direct political connections, and 
secured privileged access to export permits, and even technical assistance and 
subsidised inputs from the IMC. Many of the biggest plantations were established with 
IMC support.91 Very few went on integrating vertically, acquiring modem processing 
infrastructure and expanding their access to export markets. Instead of competing, 
improving efficiency and building on the private sector’s advantages over the IMC -  
cash payments to producers, quality controls and brand names - many either opted out 
or adapted, profiting as much as possible from the regulated sector (export permits,
89 By the end of the 1980s, the IMC employed almost 7,000 staff and temporary employees, mostly 
administrative.
90 IMC (1991) estimated that 96,634 ha of coffee in Mexico (17.25% of total surface) were inapt, and 
identified marginal-quality lands according to 3 main criteria: 1) Temperature: lands below 600 m.a.s.l., 
with annual average temperatures of more than 22° C. 2) Geographic location', regions with high risks of 
frost in the Gulf of Mexico slope (Hidalgo, Puebla, San Luis Potosi, Querdtaro and north Veracruz). 3) 
Rainfall', regions with long-lasting droughts (3-6 months) in central and north Pacific Ocean slope 
(Guerrero, Nayarit, Colima and Jalisco).
91 The cases of the finca ‘Las Lagrimas’, Rebolledo Clemen’s -  former solicitor of the coffee baron Justo 
Fernandez, and first Director of the CNCf - and of Senator Rosendo Topete’s Loma Bonita ranch, are but 
two early cases (1950s). There were perhaps hundreds of other private modem fincas set up with IMC 
resources (technical assistance, seedlings and equipment). Interviews with ex-IMC staff: Cecilio 
Villarreal (ibid) and Andres Villaseflor (ibid), senior agronomists, and Nicolds Hemdndez, technician 
(2/7/96).
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subsidized inputs and technical assistance). Big processors and exporters made huge 
margin profits during the IMC-quota system period.
However, the IMC did affect merchants and processors in Tlapacoyan and Plan de 
Arroyos, as well as intermediaries and money-lenders at the local level, who benefited 
most from highlander coffee. At first, they were fiercely opposed to the new institution 
because they thought new varieties were useless, but after a while they proved to yield 
larger harvests.
From the 1940s and particularly in the early 1950s -  thanks to good international prices 
and abundant credit for coffee - private investors established new wet processing 
facilities in Atzalan (Almanza and Plan de Arroyos). Copying what moneylenders used 
to do, private processors started to give peasants credit for consumption goods during 
the slack season (April and May) in exchange for cherry coffee.
As a result of the new conditions for selling cherry coffee, producers also expanded 
fincas, giving up the labour intensive production of cafe bola (husked pod coffee). 
Coffee growers in this region started to sell cherry coffee to nearby beneficios. Only 
producers from very remote areas sustained the intensive process (green coffee from 
naturally dried cherries) because carrying heavy loads on poor roads meant high costs.
By the early 1970s, the IMC added new forms of intervention in the coffee market, 
hiring and creating new processing facilities in the region (as it did in the rest of 
Veracruz). The objective was to speed up supply capacity in order to achieve the 
quarterly export quota assigned to Mexico, and on the other hand, to prevent 
competition from private or co-operative organisations.
With this over-capacity, the IMC slowed down the formation of a private semi­
industrial processing sector, and the integration of producers’ co-operatives at the local 
level. In Tlapacoyan, the IMC operated two big wet and dry processing facilities:
a. Atzinta in Tlapacoyan, at the very centre of the region, was the main beneficio 
(wet mill) where cherry coffee from the whole region was received, piling up
92 Interview with AMSA’s General Director, Eduardo Esteve (1 l-Dec-1997).
93 The economies of scale pursued by the IMC - when the quota system was still operational - brought 
about huge administrative costs, losses of different kinds, and a general inefficiency, only sustainable 
with the great margins of profit the ICA allowed for some years. Before 1989, Veracruz had more than 
half of the total IMC processing infrastructure nation-wide.
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long truck queues outside the Atzinta during the harvest peak (December to 
February); and
b. Tepeycan, in Plan de Arroyos, a region known for its high altitude good quality 
coffee and well ‘developed’ grower productive culture.
Through these two beneflcios, the IMC exercised a regulatory function in the region, not 
always wanted by local elites, nor, in the end, by producers. The PIDER program was 
one of the federal funds that built up wet-processing facilities and pulping centres (a 
patio with washing tanks and a simple machinery for pulping cherries) all over 
Veracruz. Later on, by the early 1980s, the Regional Development Program (well 
known as the XXVI Budget Branch in the Federal Administration) also funded 
complementary processing facilities, vehicles and stocking infrastructure. Most of the 
social sector’s processing capacity was formed under PIDER and ROYA programmes. 
Part of it ended up in the hands of merchants or local bosses, as soon as the IMC 
withdrew from the coffee fields, and the local coffee organisations (UEPC) almost 
disappeared once the massive funding from the IMC was cancelled.
Impact on the expectations o f small producers
At first, small producers opposed the new IMC coffee technology, particularly the use 
of high yield varieties (HYV). Adopting the new technology was a slow process, first 
started by local elites best suited to allocate land to experimentation with new varieties 
and input-demanding technology. Contrary to common belief, the IMC never promoted 
on a massive scale the more intensive technological packages. What became known as 
the IMC technology was a rather semi-intensive package. In the first period, 1950s and 
1960s, the CNCf and first IMC focused on assimilating, adapting and spreading modem 
practices, developed elsewhere (basically in Hawaii, and Colombia). With the exception 
of local elites and regional enclaves of modem farming (Soconusco, Coatepec, 
Xicotepec), producers were slowly adopting some of the practices recommended by 
IMC technicians, like the use of fertilizers, production of seedlings and pruning. Full 
modernization was never uniformly introduced, nor comletely accomplished.
The MECAFE - Spanish acronym for coffee improvement programme - was first 
developed in El Salvador during the 1970s with USAID funds. It aimed at modernising 
coffee technology, spreading the use of green revolution type of practices: introduction 
of HYV seedlings and higher plant density per hectare, intensive use of agrochemicals,
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and technical assistance (Rice and Ward 1996). MECAFE was introduced in Mexico at 
the beginning of the 1980s and focused on plant renovation, variety substitution and 
coffee technology modernisation (HYVs, higher densities per hectare, suitable shade 
trees and regular use of fertilisers and pesticides). The ROYA programme focused on 
preventing the spread of leaf-rust disease (roya), introducing new strains, sound 
agricultural practices and effective pesticides.94 Producers pointed out that with 
MECAFE and ROYA programmes ‘everybody was planting the new varieties’.95
These programmes enjoyed massive federal funds to deliver agrochemicals, coffee 
seedlings from new varieties, manual and mechanical pulpers, as well as credit in cash 
to carry out the pertinent jobs. All resources were applied with considerable subsidies, 
on condition of complying with the technical advice given by IMC technicians to 
restructure coffee plots. Every year a group of producers was incorporated in a three- 
year renovation programme. But in 1982 a financial, end-of-sexenio, crisis hit the 
government, and consequently the IMC budget, forcing the agency into a deep 
restructuration. IMC streamlined departments and staff, cutting down technical 
assistance. Although rehabilitation and renovation programmes went on, by 1985-86 its 
decline was well underway.
The IMC created a strong bond with small producers and adapted their cyclical 
strategies to forward credit and input deliveries to such an extent that the IMC 
withdrawal seriously destabilised the market. In sum, the IMC transformed in different 
ways the relationship between merchant capital and petty commodity producers, that is, 
between rich buyer-processors and merchants, on one hand, and peasants, on the other, 
through diverse mechanisms, some of which are still alive in peasant memories.
Recap and conclusions
Coffee producers in Atzalan very early on were involved with land markets, even before 
ejido lands were granted. At the beginning of the XX century, a coffee producing zone 
emerged in the Chiconquiaco and Atzalan mountain slopes. Two decades later, the 
prospect of land distribution encouraged new land tenancy arrangements, leasing and
94Little was achieved but fortunes were accumulated through corruption. Years after the exaggerated fear 
of roya (Hemileia vastatrix), agricultural practices were proven sufficient to control this fungi: weeding 
and shade pruning to cut down excess humidity, fertilization and pruning of affected branches, would do 
a goodjob.
95 Meetings with producers in Tlacolulan, El Jardin, Equimite, SPA, and Loma de Las Flores; February 
and March, 1995.
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purchasing private property plots as well as trading with coffee groves. Coffee and land 
distribution progressed as part of a process of frontier land colonisation. The economic 
basis for this was the association with maize and coffee, and tenancy contracts between 
new settlers and private landholders (hacendados or rancheros).
Once the state developed, communications and agribusiness expanded in the lowlands, 
during the 1940s and 1950s, and entrepreneurial coffee fincas were established for the 
first time. Peasants learned new techniques and coffee varieties from private growers.
Only with massive state investment in basic research and technical assistance, coffee 
modernisation took hold on better endowed ejidos on a wider scale, and peasant 
producers introduced, to some extent, a green revolution-type package (pruning, use of 
inputs and higher densities per unit of land). The combined effect of state support for 
infrastructure, subsidised inputs and extensionism, as well as good internal prices 
(during three decades, the 1960s to the 1980s, despite lows and highs) helped to sustain 
small producers.
Coffee became an important source of income for ejidatario producers as available 
lands for distribution ran out, demographic pressure on grants increased and terms of 
trade started to be unfavourable for food staples (particularly after the 1970s). An 
additional factor was the incremental loss of the extraordinary soil fertility in maize 
fields, although federal investment in coffee became particularly strong from the second 
half of the 1970s (the oil boom period) to the mid 1980s.
In short, two aspirations drove landless peasants to Atzalan by the thousands during the 
1920s and 1930s: access to land and access to a booming market based on maize and 
coffee. As part of the land distribution procedure, land claimants were supposed to pay 
rents for the lands they were tilling and intended to get hold of. Agrarian struggles in 
Atzalan stretched out for almost half a century. During this process peasants were 
manipulated by state agencies, leaders and corporate organisations -  which 
intermediated land distribution - and even by landlords (eager to capitalise from rent 
payments and compensation). The so-called radical agrarianism in Veracruz had mixed 
results. It created a strong social movement, but one that ended up very much dependent 
on government policies and was unable to lead the land reform process on the ground. It 
served the interests of better off ejidatarios and rancheros, and was conducive to 
dividing entitled ejidatarios from landless peasants and jornaleros (day workers). The
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ability of agrarian organizations to bargain for public resources contributed in the long 
run to reproducing a thick layer of intermediaries, hampering the functioning of 
economic organisations, such as the coffee cooperatives.
The ejido institutional framework imposed rigidity on ejido land markets -  though it did 
not eradicate them altogether - which tightly constrained the ability of peasants to gain 
access to institutional credit and to mobilise resources. Furthermore, ejido institutions 
had other drawbacks, such as: (1) constraints on local government with restricted 
powers; imposition of communal duties that became unbearably unfair when inequality 
stretched the labour capabilities of poor families; and legal dispositions, reinforcing 
corporatism and clientelism; (2) division of social groups according to ‘sectoral’ 
functional organisations (peasants’, landowners’, agricultural workers, etc.), which 
limited the influence of ejidatarios, and favoured the emergence of money-lenders and 
private landowners as likely predominant local groups; and (3) a labour burden in terms 
of road maintenance unequally distributed between ejidatarios, and in comparison with 
private landowners.
All this notwithstanding, for several reasons the role of the IMC and its ‘coffee social 
welfare’ were much more complex than just an instrument for rent-seeking. The IMC 
transformed underdeveloped regional coffee markets, which initially relied on debt 
bondage (money lending linked to forward sales at low prices) and unequal terms of 
exchange with peasants. The IMC operational scheme evolved along the lines of 
merchant practices, opening purchasing centres and advancing credit to small producers. 
The main principle was to create informal collateral,96 based on individual productive 
capacity (calculated at 50% of expected harvest). Credit was given on the basis of 
collective trust, a sort of “solidaristic” collateral involving an entire local group. In this 
way credit was distributed in instalments (fertilisers and cash), adapting IMC’s credit 
scheme to the perceived needs of peasants. To get credit, members of UEPC were 
required to carry out a set of jobs and technical recommendations to improve 
productivity. Credit was conditioned to an on-site check by IMC technicians who 
supervised producer activities. The idea of the IMC was that small coffee production 
would evolve parallel with modernising ‘the social sector’, improving yields
96 Small producers had in general no collateral, due to the small value of their assets, mainly land. In 
many cases lands belonged to ejidos, and were disqualified from use as collateral by law. The 1992 
reform of the 27th Constitutional Article, allowed ejidatarios for the first time to alienate their property 
rights in the market, but constraints remained on selling or investing in the land, as well as on using land 
as collateral.
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continuously through plant renovation, research and development of new varieties. But 
the IMC scheme failed in several respects, particularly because it did not convey to 
producers knowledge about the complexities of the international coffee business, 
regarding in particular price formation, production costs and quality standards. The IMC 
did not undertake research and adaptation in the region but spread a homogeneous and 
partial technological package, without looking at the patterns of labour use, crop 
association and seasonality of agriculture in different regions. In short, the IMC failed to 
introduce small producers to a joint venture, with its risks and gains, investment needs 
and decision making to face a dynamic market, with changing rules, among others, for 
the following reasons. First, bom under the umbrella of the quota systems in the mid- 
1950s, the IMC never foresaw market-led reforms. Instead of intensifying production 
and increasing yields continuously, the IMC expanded the coffee frontier to marginal 
lands and often adjusted its agenda according to other than economic criteria. 
Productivity rates increased from 5Qq/ha in 1949, to a national average yield of 12 
Qq/ha at the end of the 1960s, basically due to technical assistance and new varieties. 
But according to the Institute, productivity in small producer fincas (less than 20 ha) 
stagnated during the 1970s and fell to 6-8 Qq/ha in the 1980s (Beaumond 1985, pp. 
162-66). And even if these figures seem inaccurate, given the scope of coffee 
investment during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, it is widely acknowledged that 
the IMC did not reach more than half of the total number of producers, and that those 
who benefited the most from the full application of IMC's technological package were
07medium and big growers.
Second, the IMC created, during the 1970s, a high capacity for primary processing to 
meet quarterly exports -  under the quota system - overlooking the processing capacity 
of the private sector. With excess capacity, compared to Mexico’s export quota, and 
based on an undersized domestic consumption market, the IMC could not undertake 
modernisation any further.98
Third, capture of peasants as well as welfare transfers happened in Mexico. High 
production costs, especially inputs and transport, administrative and supervision costs
97 See: Hoffmamm (1982), Beaumont (1985), Diaz (1994) and Interview with Ing. Nuflez, ex-IMC 
Delegate in Tlapacoyan (2-Jan-1995).
98 In Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica there is a strong consumption market that influences the perception 
of quality and the priority of the sector in terms of public spending. A domestic market also offers a 
cushion during crisis. Apart from promoting cropping technology, in these countries merchants and 
producer organisations, along with governments, have developed different coffee institutions (from 
standards of labour and regulations on suitable lands for coffee, to roast and ground coffee marketing and 
quality labelling). See chapter 6 for country comparative perspectives.
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were indirectly subsidised through cheap credit. The IMC functioned as a patron to 
small producers, but also as an umbrella to unions and co-operatives, which could not 
exercise influence on the coffee sector’s strategy, let alone on macroeconomic policies, 
such as exchange rate and fiscal policies.
Fourth, social and geographical distance required intermediaries and marketing 
networks. Unless some forms of centralisation arrived on the scene (co-operatives or 
other organisations), peasants and small producers were not able to engage directly with 
buyers. Several factors played against primary producers: deterioration of coffee 
cherries after 24-36 hours of picking; high transport costs from communities to selling 
points (usually 3-5 hours distance on shattered roads); knowledge and negotiating skills 
for marketing parchment coffee; and an urge for cash because of debts previously 
contracted or just "postponed consumption," and the expectations of materialising 
coffee incomes.
Contrary to the ideology of independence, which coffee family farms developed in 
Costa Rica or Colombia, in Mexico the agrarian movement - with a socialist orientation 
in Veracruz - structured an ideology of dependence on state intervention and protection. 
Coffee producers were not exposed to market bargaining from the very beginning 
(1900-1950). The structure of incentives operating during 1949-1973, benefited mainly 
producers close to the IMC bureaucracy, those with more land and resources, or just 
power, but ready to bet and invest in the new coffee package. When small producers 
were ready to learn and apply the new technologies, opportunities and information were 
missing. During three decades, the IMC played all the roles - intermediary, buyer, 
processor, research, development and technical assistance agency, and development 
bank - preventing market mechanisms from enhancing productivity and quality. At the 
same time, homogenous price structures, irrespective of costs and quality, input 
subsidies and bulk selling, represented negative incentives to producers. Strong 
distortions in the structure of prices no doubt affected the competitiveness of 
plantations. Manipulation of exchange rates, wage levels, subsidies on inputs, technical 
assistance and credit were crucial to achieving profitability and competitiveness.
However, the shortcomings and failures of the IMC cannot be explained only in terms 
of capture, due to the presence of peasant movements -  agrarian and price bargaining 
struggles - and social alliances among producers, technicians, leaders and bureaucrats, 
defending different development projects for the coffee sector. Social legitimacy of
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property is crucial for the formation of a competitive sector, at least in three respects: a) 
it creates conditions for the development of efficient property rights institutions; b) it 
facilitates social interaction, cooperation, business making and complex social 
interaction within organizations, institutions and business enterprises of rural groups; 
and c) it allows sustainable formalisation of property rights, freedom and flexibility of 
use. Land reform in Veracruz was one of the most radical experiences in Mexico, but it 
also entailed a disruption of the social tissue of ranchero regions, as I have shown using 
the coffee sector as a case in point.
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CHAPTER 3
PEASANT ORGANISATION AND COFFEE INSTITUTIONS 
3.1. Introduction
Structural adjustmente started in Mexico since 1986, but it took the controversial 1988 
electoral campaign to reach coffee sector out. In 1989 the triple crisis of coffee 
exploded in Mexico which set liberalization in motion: a severe frost in the Gulf basin, 
the international price drop and the closing down of IMC. By 1993 IMC’s operations 
had completely finished. In ists place, from 1990 to 1994 Solidarity programs tried to 
compensate the spaces left by the IMC (income support, infrastructure upgrading and 
marketing).
Despite liberalisation of the coffee market and its political-institutional framework, state 
agencies remained the main actor in the sector." While the macro strategy of the ruling 
group made these changes irreversible, coffee sector restructuring was the battlefield of 
regional interests, as well as the site of clashes between several agencies.100 The 
centralised nature of the restructuring process, its narrow and short-term economic 
basis, along with its large budget and organisational looseness, became the setting for an 
intense game of accommodation among federal and state bureaucracies, as well as 
regional and local elites.
Furthermore, the independent coffee organisations could only marginally influence the 
process of infrastructure privatisation (or devolution) and, in most regions, failed to take 
root and occupy the spaces left by Inmecafe (IMC) and the weakened coffee branch of 
the PRI’s peasant organisational structure (the CNC’s Coffee Producers National Union, 
UNPC). Very frequently independent producers’ organisations ended up entangled with 
the political agendas of leftist leaders and their limited local grass-roots support, as well 
as with the demands of the coffee market. These demands included financial discipline, 
competition among producers, bargaining with powerful buyers and self-management of 
wet processing facilities (called beneficios) without suitable technical skills and
99 According to Snyder (1997), the Mexican coffee sector underwent a process of re-regulation under 
neoliberal restructuring. New reforms failed to promote producer participation and market efficiency, but 
regional organisations proved better suited to the task.
100 Basically, the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH) and the National Program of Solidarity (PNS).
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financial back up. Interestingly enough, the first ‘independent’ movements against the 
IMC during the mid-1980s focused attention on increasing the domestic price for 
coffee, rather than opposing the inefficiency and lack of accountability of IMC policy 
on coffee price formation.
But, why do peasants prefer to act locally, often rejecting vertical integration and 
marketing organisations, and even avoiding stronger bargaining positions, like 
participating in co-operatives for processing berries or deepening market integration? 
Evidence as to why small coffee producers never pursued full-scale modernisation 
under the IMC technological packages has already been examined. Drawing on my 
fieldwork in Atzalan, in this chapter I describe how the old practices pursued by 
Inmecafe, in terms of distorting the formation of prices and lacking a sound structure of 
market incentives, were persistently reproduced. The disappearance of IMC was not 
immediately superseded, and was also followed by other forms of indirect regulation, 
equally disruptive. Producers’ organisations becoming the counter-parts to this process 
-  sponsored by the state - played the role formerly taken by the IMC, profiting from 
privatisation and selling off processing infrastructure, which did not necessarily 
improve the position of small producers in the market.
3.2 Coffee surplus, price formation and peasant movements
A key problem in understanding peasant responses and strategies is to find out how 
surplus is created, used and distributed by all the agents involved in the process, either 
through markets or non-economic means (coercive instruments or institutional claims). 
Until the 1950s producers were hardly exposed to price incentives. In the case of 
Atzalan, the coffee market functioned in isolated mountainous areas on the basis of 
‘customary prices’, actually defined by money-lenders and merchants in non­
competitive markets.
When the coffee board was created to stabilise internal prices, establishing purchasing 
centres and delivering credit, it faced a strategic problem in sustaining its regulatory 
functions. The board had to fix an internal price in advance, without knowing what the 
actual international price would be at the end of the cycle. When the ICA’s economic 
clauses operated in 1982-1989, a price band (120 dollars per 100 pounds minimum; 140 
maximum) made it possible to anticipate future price movements under manageable 
margins. But for some years the ICA was not operational, and prices were fixed 
basically by supply and demand. The main challenge was to set internal prices at a level
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that would enable the IMC to solve three sets of problems. The first set was how to 
establish remunerative return to producers - that is, a price - to compensate for actual 
costs of production, allowing reasonable benefits according to producers’ average yield. 
This was complicated. Which costs of production were applicable? The IMC defined 
theoretical cost concepts, given a semi-intensive model finca - usually of 1,600 coffee 
plants/ha with specialised shade (IMC, 1989b) - the type the IMC had promoted. Only 
in those regions with good communications and regular technical assistance from the 
IMC did such costs apply.101
The IMC defined its price structure based on regional operational costs, including 
cultivation costs, but never gave public access to this information in an accountable 
way, nor discussed with any producers’ representation how operating costs were 
calculated. On the contrary, officials managed price formation as a discretionary power 
tool. Regional costs of production data were important as a reference to the social 
pressures coming from the specialised coffee producers, those from the central region of 
Veracruz or Chiapas, with the highest average yield, more politicised and dependant on 
credit and the services the IMC provided.
Supposedly the IMC had purchasing standards, but the room for discretion was very 
wide, and there were not incentives for quality.102 Quarterly deliveries under the quota 
system encouraged the pursuit of economies of scale, rather than quality-oriented 
mechanisms. Consequently, producers of good quality coffee made considerable 
transfers to the inefficient ones, especially to the most productive growers (with modem 
technology).
The IMC had to absorb operational losses and discounts over quality were passed on to 
all producers. Not only in Mexico, but in other countries where producers had no first­
hand information, technical skills and lobbying capacity, coffee boards managed this 
price pressure towards a bottom line, defined by minimum wages or customary prices. 
Above all, peasants found marginal returns acceptable due to the absence of alternative 
commercial crops in the steep mountain slopes and to the coffee welfare system.
101 Most small producers did not reach that technological stage (as demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4). See also 
Diaz P. (1992), Nolasco (1986) and Diaz C. (1991).
102 This was a major obstacle for the development of the Mexican coffee sector. In an interview (6-Nov-1997) 
with a former IMC expert, Andres Villasefior, he recognised that the IMC did not correct the problem of quality. 
Having parchment standards at national level the IMC failed to enforce them properly, and to develop regional 
ones at all stages of the coffee chain.
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The second problem was the need to set a price that would meet IMC’s operational 
costs and working capital needs. Although the IMC received a federal budget, 
theoretically high enough to meet its financial needs, reality was different. Federal fiscal 
cycles meant the IMC never had cash in time for starting harvest purchases, a crucial 
factor for regulating prices in the field, and had to borrow from SOMEX (a 
development bank specialised in infrastructure), or commercial banks at higher interest 
rates. Forward credits were about 50% of the total value of production, implying the 
need for large amounts of cash at one time. Inflation, budget cuts and losses generated 
chronic indebtedness, despite the fact that the federal government wrote off year to year 
deficits. By 1989 the IMC’s accumulated debts rose to more than two times its annual 
budget (IMC 1989).
The IMC transferred some of its operational costs into the coffee price, inflating in this 
way actual transformation costs. This practice was somehow hidden, as the legal status 
of parastatals clearly prevented them from generating their own income sources. As 
soon as this information reached producers, their leaders and advisors, they understood 
part of the manipulation process of internal price formation, which sparked social 
movements in most of the cases.104
The third set of problems triggered by IMC price policy, relate to trade and the structure 
of incentives. A high price for coffee affected industries and consumers. Too high a 
price for coffee would increase pressures for imports, as happened in 1990-1992 when 
roasters and manufacturers claimed there was not enough domestic supply, but this was 
usually an excuse to put pressure on the coffee board and undermine demands from 
organisations. At the same time, maladjustments between forward credit, real cost of 
money and real prices led IMC to huge losses.
During the years of economic restructuring, from 1982 on, there were price controls on 
basic food staples, coffee among them, so there was no room for accommodation
103 IMC (coffee), Tabamex (tobacco), Proquivemex (barbasco), etc., were all decentralised public enterprises, 
regulated by an inefficient federal fiscal regime and sectoral policies. Parastatals had no financial autonomy, i.e. 
they were not allowed to retain their own incomes. Instead they had to transfer all surplus earnings to the 
Federal Treasury, which in turn allocated their respective budgets each fiscal year. The Ministry of Agriculture 
(SARH), formally scrutinised IMC budgets and income policies, but there was no real monitoring and 
evaluation of results. Parastatal managers were never held accountable, except to the President, who in turn, 
appointed most of them. Deviations were negotiated politically and deficits absorbed by the Treasury on a 
regular basis.
104 S. Quiroz (SPA, 29-Jan-1996) and I. Rodriguez (La Palma, 1st -Feb-1996) -  Atzalan local leaders - 
participated in the 1982 movements against the IMC, and they remember how the IMC tried to argue against 
any price increase, making evident unjustified entries and overpriced cost concepts.
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through price rises. Additionally, exchange rate regulations encouraged an overvalued 
peso in order to secure cheap grain imports and, from 1989 on, to facilitate all kinds of 
imports, as an anchor against inflation. Apart from the price fall, from 1.2-1.4 dollars 
per pound to only 50 to 90 cents (during the crisis 1989-1993), coffee producers’ returns 
diminished by 40% due to overvaluation of the Mexican peso. The IMC was carrying a 
burden of debts, partly due to its inefficiency and illegal politically-led spending, and 
partly due to its inability to react flexibly to the international market.
In sum, the IMC manipulated price structures to cover up multiple and variegated 
inefficiencies, the capture of bureaucracies at federal and regional level, and the 
exhaustion of a wasteful economic strategy dependent on international quotas and high 
prices. Instead of a terse transition to a more efficient market-led institutional 
framework, the restructuring of the coffee sector in Mexico was a political operation in 
which ‘politicians’ ruled instead o f ‘technicians’.105 The main objective was to eliminate 
the IMC, privatising its infrastructure while controlling the discontent of producer 
organisations hit by a severe crisis.
Price formation synthesised social pressures from all agents for increasing their 
respective surplus share and challenging that of others, the kind of nuances that escape 
the orthodox Marxist approaches discussed in Chapter 1. While ejidatario peasants in 
Atzalan recognised coffee market actors and the way they acted, it was very difficult for 
them to figure out how to influence market prices. Other agents were in a different 
position, since their claims were better defended and even legitimised by market norms. 
Two examples illustrate the problem:
a) The price for cherry coffee tends to be defined by the international quotation of 
Mexican prima lavado in the New York Stock Exchange.106 Theoretically, the price for 
coffee beans should be deducted from a downward cost structure, each agent covering 
production costs and a reasonable return. In practice, price integration was manipulated
107by brokers and buyer-processors, separate from local intermediaries. Brokers make
105 In 39 years there had been seven managers in the coffee board, most of them “technicians” and only a few 
licenciados with administrative experience. During the IMC restructuring (1989-93) there were five politicians 
as managers.
106 According to a study prepared by Andres Villasefior in 1992, producers were paid around half the quotation 
price for the Mexican prima lavado (US$45/100 Lb) and only 2% of the value of 100 Lb of final products. 
Personal communication (6-Nov-1997).
107 In Tlapacoyan buyers were fixing low price levels, taking turns in offering the best price to producers (A. 
Celis, Manager of TLASA/Atzinta, 23-Jan-1996). To avoid competition, in some isolated communities 
intermediaries agreed on a price band. That was the case in the lowland communities of El Zapote, Belisario
102
discounts on a systematic basis (8, 10 or even more points from current price), taking 
advantage of their control over tasters and deliveries in transit (particularly in Nuevo 
Laredo Mexico-USA border). Buyer-processors and industrialists profit from net yield 
gains and the quality value of coffee (not paid to cherry producers). Quality 
classification, assessment of defects and net weight also allow surplus appropriation,
1 OSlegitimised by marketing norms, difficult to challenge other than by bargaining power 
and, to a lesser extent, on technical grounds.
b) Processing sub-contracts (<maquilas) have to reflect a mean cost of processing plus an 
average margin of profit, that is an average ‘market price’ in a specific region, but in 
rural areas such charges frequently present themselves as cartel arrangements among 
buyer-processors.109
Without the information, expertise and guidance from able elites, peasants often 
followed dysfunctional strategies of social mobilisation led by agrarian organisations, 
especially the Confederation National Campesina (Peasants’ National Confederation, 
CNC) -  part of the corporatist structure of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) and the so-called independent movement.110 Despite ideological and 
organisational differences, both based their political identity on a peasant programme, 
which included claims, and socio-economic and political demands.
The IMC and the ARICs
The Mexican Government tried to reactivate agribusiness and investment in agriculture 
with the Ley de Fomento Agropecuario (1981). One of the changes this law introduced 
was the prospect of association between landowners, or - in general - private investors,
Dominguez, La Palma and Norberto Aguirre, at the peak of the harvest 1995-96 (December-January), when a 
Topete intermediary, having a margin for a higher purchasing price, managed to increase his ‘commission’ by 
lowering the producer price for berry coffee (La Palma producers, 11-Dec-1994 and Rolando Topete, 2-Feb- 
1996).
108 American and European coffee quality classification standards contain a wide array of defects, sometimes 
outdated nuances, which are the object of subjective interpretation and serve brokers and industrialists’ stronger 
bargaining power. Stereotypes about a country’s coffee quality can be influenced only with a good deal of 
lobbying, PR efforts and a well designed marketing strategy (Geer 1976, Richards 1980, and Renard 1990). 
Among big brokers and TNCs relations of trust supplant those technical barriers (Marshall 1988).
109 At the beginning of the 1990s producer leaders denounced processors in central Veracruz for lowering their 
processing fees arguing this was a dumping practice employed against organisations recently integrated in the 
business. (Diaz P., 1992).
110 In Mexico, the self-styled independent organisations defined their autonomy by opposition to PRI. In the 
region I studied there were two variants: the Independent Peasants’ Union (UCI), a radical leftist agrarian group 
which emerged in the early 1980s (see Chapter 2), and one of UCI’s branches, the Quicempacayotl co­
operative, active since the late 1980s and closely linked to the Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones 
Cafetaleras (CNOC), a network of regional and local coffee producing organisations.
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and ejidatarios, regardless of land tenancy. The so-called Rural Associations of 
Collective Interest (ARICs, by its Spanish initials) had this purpose. A few years after 
the law was passed, several of these associations appeared in the region around coffee 
marketing: ARIC Misantla in 1981, and a couple of years later, after its early success, 
ARIC Tlapacoyan and ARIC Plan de Arroyos. In 1982, sixteen regional organisations 
from Oaxaca, Veracruz, Chiapas and Puebla created ARIC National, whose experience 
influenced the most important independent organisations in the coffee sector. These 
associations, which by and large represented elite interests, were created to confront and 
limit the power of the state monopoly and also to make more transparent the process of 
price formation, as well as to check discretionary practices and inefficiencies in the use 
of coffee surpluses.
By that time it was clear that the IMC was managing the sector with inefficiency, 
corruption and preferences to some private processor-exporters. The IMC was 
responsible for allocating Mexico’s export quota through quarterly permits, but these 
were sold in the black market. Furthermore, producers started to perceive that domestic 
prices were not fair, and that the alcances -  remnants between the reference price paid 
during the harvest and the actual price achieved in selling transactions - they were used 
to were missing.
The emergence of co-operatives and different sorts of organisations followed a pattern 
of state-led initiatives, elite seizure of the spaces created, fast growth, momentum and 
decline. Some coffee merchants and processors in Misantla, Plan de Arroyos and 
Tlapacoyan actually took the initiative of organising the aforementioned ARICs 
(Hoffman 1982). They knew best about the IMC profit margins, so they took advantage 
of widespread discontent launching the new organisations. Good prices in the 
international market entailed high earnings from the very first exporting deals, 
following a quick support from producers and different agrarian offices, anxious to get 
hold of this successful and politically promising avenue of organisation.111
Awareness of unfavourable terms of trade in the coffee sector emerged at the end of the 
1970s, paradoxically during the coffee boom and Mexican oil bonanza, but mainly in
111 The Mexican government tried to face the long-standing crisis of agriculture inducing a transition of agrarian 
organisations to become economically viable. The ‘second level’ organisations - Ejido Unions - had not 
performed as expected (due to clientelism, corruption and lack of access to capital). Along with Credit Unions, 
Marketing Co-operatives and other ‘polycentric peasant instruments of power’ (Gordillo 1988b), ARICs were 
seen as an alternative (Diaz P. 1986). ARICs were soon integrated in the CNC’s corporate apparatus (see 
Chapter 5).
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isolated areas where transport costs were higher and supervision of IMC staff very 
relaxed. Indigenous peoples in Chiapas realised their unfair treatment from IMC staff, 
i.e., heavy transport charges over coffee price and irregularities in operating credit and 
purchasing centres.112 Of a more limited scope - but originating in the same problems - 
was the initiative of San Pedro Altepepan’s ejidatarios to purchase in 1978 the first 
privately owned beneficio. Important at that point was the way in which the IMC 
scheme was called into question for the first time, losing legitimacy and discretionary 
powers. It was forced to absorb increasing costs despite diminishing returns. In addition, 
organisations were getting confident in taking control of purchasing centres, storage and 
primary processing; they even attempted to take over IMC’s financing functions. In the 
early 1980s ARICs could gain access to export markets and discovered wide margins 
and producers’ potential to manage the whole coffee chain up to intermediate and final 
consumers.113
Under mounting financial pressures and economic instability, at the end of the harvest 
of 1981-82, the IMC was running into trouble for paying producers what is known as 
alcances. In May of 1982 a wide movement broke out in central Veracruz demanding 
from the IMC a price increase (ultimately granted at 5.8%). Producers distanced 
themselves from the PRI’s CNC and established a new organisation, the Coffee 
Producers Union of Veracruz (UPCV). In 1983 organisations of the northern sierra of 
Puebla and Chiapas joined together, and others followed later on, bringing together 
official and independent coffee organisations. This wider movement put new demands 
on the IMC such as: an increase of berry coffee price by 66%; elimination of IMC 
administrative expenses; exemption of producers from contributing to the FREC (a 
coffee fund financed by an export tax); a stop to illicit purchases of early and late 
harvests of big producers by corrupted IMC staff, who bought low quality coffee that 
diminished the overall merit of small producers; an increase of IMC volume purchased 
up to 60% or more of the national production; opening the IMC Administration Council
112 Irregular operation of purchasing centres, lack of funds to pay in cash and insufficient storing capacity, 
fraudulent weighting and unfair quality discounts and stealing of liquidation price remnants (staff retained 
cashable receipts presenting excuses to affected producers arguing that their receipts were not issued; and the 
former usually did not insist, nor complain). Flores et al 1988:151. Interview with Luis Guzman, former 
purchasing centre receptionist in Veracruz and Chiapas, April 17, 1992.
113 There was a similar phenomena when tobacco producers discovered Tabamex’s export margins in the early 
1970s in Nayarit, Mexico (Diaz et al. 1986). Olson (1971) and Bates (1981) explain this phenomenon in other 
countries.
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to producer representatives and, last, the nationalisation of the coffee industry to make it 
depend on the IMC.114
There was a visible increase in the political initiative of these new independent groups, 
compared to the inability of the CNC’s quiescent organisations. Radical left-wing 
activists and advisors, prescribing an “autonomous shift”, synthesised producers’ claims 
from the late 1970s and combined elements of a contradictory nature.
With the evidence of a study of international market prices, leaders from Veracruz, 
Oaxaca, Guerrero and Chiapas launched a clear challenge to the way IMC had allocated 
coffee income through price formation.115 Accusations about corrupt deals with big 
producers added an important charge against the IMC management. Although leaders 
mentioned the quality factor, they did not build on this, nor did they make a connection 
with specific forms of producers’ participation in the IMC Administrative Council.116 
Even though they had pointed out problems of corruption and inefficiency, 
paradoxically they not only asked the IMC to increase its coffee purchases up to 60%, 
but even proposed that a nationalised coffee industry should come under IMC control.
Given the poor results in terms of price increase, leaders started to talk about a 
battlefield shift towards an ‘appropriation of the production process’, meaning by this an 
access to processing infrastructure and export markets (i.e. vertical integration). These 
new organisations expanded in several coffee regions, although in Veracruz the official 
UPCV (Union de Productores de Cafe de Veracruz) could not take hold among small 
producers. Several factors might explain what happened, but one is paramount. In 
Veracruz, the ‘pro-agrarian political culture’ - the constitutional agenda of land 
distribution and peasant freedom - is deeply rooted, and so are CNC’s ejido unions, 
leagues and committees, which give corporate form to those claims. Though weakened, 
the CNC structure was far from dead, and the same could be said from the political elite 
that supported it for decades through a myriad of channels.
114 Excelsior, June 28, 1983, cit. in Flores et al. (1988, pp. 155-156).
115 Other movements had become similarly aware of income structures in commodity chains. In the mid-1970s, 
students in Chiapas helped barbasco producers challenge the monopoly profits of multinationals, prompting the 
government to intervene through a board. In the early 1980s an interesting alliance between Tabamex’s 
technical staff and tobacco producers in Nayarit took place against the tobacco parastatal and multinationals 
(Diaz P. 1986, 1988).
116 Several leftist political parties and organisations -  the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) and UCI 
(see Chapter 2) - were very active among coffee producers in the 1980s, but none of them developed a more 
sophisticated framework to challenge official policies.
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United in 1989 as an umbrella network, Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones 
Cafetaleras (CNOC), coffee organisations acquired for the first time national influence. 
From then on, the demands of independent organisations to participate in the IMC 
restructuring process played a central role in the future of the coffee sector.
3.3 The coffee sector restructuring and the government’s room for manoeuvre
Producer responses to the coffee structural crisis started when the IMC’s regulatory 
system began to erode in the early 1980s. In eastern Mexico, coffee producers’ 
discontent was channelled by new independent organisations, Veracruz ARIC among 
others (Celis et al. 1991), because the CNC’s traditional National Union of Coffee 
Producers showed itself incapable of challenging the institutional framework (the IMC) 
they had always benefited from.
Small producers were already adapting to the less favourable prospects they perceived, 
given the clear signs of financial and marketing troubles of the IMC. At first, they kept 
an eye on new developments with demonstrations and formal complaints (fair payment 
of alcances and price increases), hoping the IMC would get things right.
The 1988 Presidential Election campaign made the complaints against the coffee 
parastatal sound stronger, and added the CNC’s affiliates own demands. From the PRI’s 
Coffee Sector Consultation Forum (mid-1988) onwards, the new governing elite took 
the initiative away from the independent coffee organisations. Parallel to public 
discourses, the newly elected President -  Carlos Salinas - and his cabinet were taking
117decisions about radical changes in the agricultural sector.
A new organisational trend emerged within the corporatist structure during this period, 
adopting some of the independent movement’s experiences in integrating peasant 
economic instruments (enterprises), particularly around Credit Unions. The Salinas 
group created alliances with the north-western producers’ organisations (UNORCA), 
which had distanced themselves from both the corporatist CNC-PRI structure and 
traditional leftist parties. UNORCA developed a framework for integrating an 
autonomous peasant movement, able to negotiate with the state and to integrate the so-
117 Elimination of subsidies and parastatals, the ejido reform, trade liberalisation and the creation of income 
support Solidarity programmes (Cornelius and Myhre 1998).
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called “economic instruments of power”, that is, marketing and financial services
1 1 Q
vertically integrated with producers.
Once in office, President Salinas’ team had unambiguous ideas about what to do with 
the IMC, despite the rhetoric about IMC restructuring. Through the Solidarity National 
Program (PNS) the government channelled resources directly to communities, 
displacing traditional intermediary organisations within the corporate structure, and 
created a new umbrella for controlling independent organisations (the Congreso Agrario 
Permanente, CAP). In this context, the future of regional leaders and their projects to 
reshape the IMC, along with the CNC-UNPC, emerged at the wrong moment (see 
Chapters 5 and 6 on coffee elites).
The government had to respond to a complex set of issues dominating the political 
agenda of the coffee sector. First, given the wholesale trade liberalisation strategy, the 
CNOC’s position favouring the renewal of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) - 
due to finish in September 1989 - was out of the question. The government thought 
opening up the international coffee market was unavoidable for many reasons, namely 
USA pressure on this issue, macroeconomic coherence and unsustainable IMC’s 
indebtedness. Opening the coffee market was an advantageous move for Mexico and 
other Milds’ members, for their exports and revenue could immediately increase.
Second, the ‘Presidential campaign commitments’ generated political pressures of all 
kinds - within the corporatist structure and other coffee organisations - to make use of a 
coffee fund (FREC) made out of a tax on exports, and to reform the IMC to improve 
producers’ conditions. Salinas’ staff had their own interpretation of this agenda, 
subordinating the ‘IMC restructuring process’ to the priorities of liberalisation.
Third, there was a realignment of all major organisations -  of producers as well as of 
entrepreneurs - involved in the coffee sector, that lobbied for the IMC infrastructure 
privatisation. The ruling group devised a double strategy, aimed at improving 
profitability in the ‘efficient’ producer sector, and at the same time, at subsidising
118 UNORCA’s autonomous strategy for peasant organisation was influenced by leftist advisors {Lima de 
Masas, of Maoist inspiration). A key figure among them was Gustavo Gordillo, who made a theoretical 
synthesis of that experience, adding insights from new institutionalism and elaborating on the constraining role 
of state agencies and the need for vertical and horizontal integration to markets, mainly through financial 
services, processing and marketing infrastructure. With personal links to President Salinas, Gordillo became 
Under-Secretary for Agricultural Policy and Producers Organisation, while the autonomous movement was the 
implicit new paradigm to reorganise the corporate structure and modernise agriculture. His group was very 
influential in orienting the IMC restructuring process, mainly the so-called Transferencia programme 
(devolution of beneficios to producers’ organisations).
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‘inefficient’ peasants through income support programmes. All state organisations 
realigned around this strategy. The rural development bank (Banrural) eliminated the 
so-called marginal producers (i.e. peasants) from its clientele, and focused its financial 
services on ‘profitable’ producers, raising credit quotas according to actual costs of 
production.
The Ministry of Agriculture (SARH) appointed a commission for dismantling IMC 
infrastructure and dividing it into smaller units and selling them off to suitable 
organisations. IMC officials had nevertheless an important voice in bargaining over 
which organisations could take part in the allocation process and what type and size of 
units would suit them.
Apart from disposing of processing facilities, the Agriculture Ministry (which headed 
IMC operations) was actually excluded from any substantial decision-making on 
national coffee policies. The leading voice was that of the Inter-ministry Spending- 
Financing Commission, formed under Treasury Ministry guidelines. During the three- 
year transition process (1990-92), the IMC restructuring and final liquidation was 
supervised by the Commerce Ministry, responsible for formulating an important part of 
the liberalisation policies.
Salinas’ government first launched a package of measures around the Programa de 
Transferencia, which sold the former IMC processing infrastructure to the private and 
social sectors119 dismantled the coffee board and eliminated any direct participation of 
the state in the coffee market, bringing four decades of state regulatory intervention to 
an end. Part of this package was a programme for transforming the former local 
Producing and Marketing Unions (UEPC) into legally recognised organisations: 
Sociedades de Solidaridad Social (SSS, Social Solidarian Societies), Sociedades de 
Produccion Rural (SPR, Rural Production Societies) and other associative figures 
formally able to absorb assets and get credit. This programme was managed by the 
Agrarian Reform Ministry, jointly with the IMC. A decentralised agency of the 
Agriculture Ministry, INCA-Rural provided technical assistance to producers.
At the same time, Salinas’ administration set up the famous Solidarity programme under 
the umbrella of the Budget and Planning Ministry (SPP). In mid-1989, an ad-hoc inter- 
Ministerial commission deliberated on how to implement IMC restructuring, and the
119 It considered three types: a) letting contracts open to purchase of 16 wet beneficios', b) associative processing 
subcontracts in 3 dry beneficios', and, c) constitution of small pulping units (Diaz P. 1992).
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SPP devised a Solidarity cushion programme for small coffee producers. The 
unexpected severity of the coffee price drop in the international market from July 1989 
and the frost the following December, accelerated the implementation of official plans. 
Along with contingency measures (food supply and interest-free marketing credits to 
organisations), the restructuring process in fact started to take place.
While Solidarity lured regional coffee organisations into bargaining for free-interest 
marketing credits, at the local level this programme induced beneficiaries to constitute 
Local Committees, as a condition for distributing income support on an individual basis.
In this way the government succeeded in widening the gap between regional co­
operatives and community-based organisations. As the leaders of the Congreso Agrario 
Permanente (CAP) and CNOC organisations acknowledged, Solidarity avoided the 
‘natural’ integration of the former UEPC into the already organised coffee 
associations.120
3.4 Strategic scope o f responses to the coffee crisis
Why did the traditionally politicised coffee sector not resist the wholesale dismantling 
of the IMC and coffee sector policies? Besides public demands for compensatory 
measures, they could not reverse the direction of new coffee policies, nor focus grass­
roots discontent. Several reasons explain why coffee producer organisations were not 
successful in managing the crisis and challenging the official coffee restructuring 
project: (1) the divisions among national umbrella peasant associations and their coffee 
producer branches; (2) representational confusion of government-sponsored regional 
coffee funds, which became brokers as they distanced themselves from producers; and 
(3) the natural tendency of small producers to disengage from risk, dependency and 
other unfavourable arrangements (either market or organisational). All of them entailed 
a lack of strategic vision among coffee producer organisations.
The national organisations: fighting a losing battle
Given a discretionary overflow of resources, regional coffee organisations devoted the 
time of their top-ranking leaders to lobbying Solidarity, as it became the most readily 
available source of financing, if not the only one. Bancomext -  the state bank for
120 Interview with Luis Hernandez, CNOC’s Advisor., Mexico City, 25-Nov-1994. CAP, National Forum of the 
Social Sector’s Coffee Producers Organisations. August 1991. Summary of the Discussion Group No. 3, by 
Luviano, G., CNC Delegate, p.2. Tejero, M., CEPCO’s Advisor, CNOC Working Papers of the Analysis 
Meeting..., p.3
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exports - allocated credit lines through the Banrural, but there were requirements to 
meet (mainly guarantees, a sound export project, and high interest rates) and hence they 
were less advantageous than Solidarity’s credit arrangements. Regional organisations 
concentrated on petitioning for marketing credits, particularly Solidarity’s. Thus little 
pressure was exerted on the Commerce and Hacienda Ministries, which led the process 
of liberalisation, the NAFTA negotiations and took the main decisions on coffee 
policies. The state reorganization reduced the visibility of former coffee organisations. 
The Rural Bank, for example, serving ‘profitable’ producers, was out of reach for most 
coffee organisation.
The largest regional organisation in Tlapacoyan (the ARIC) was at the time bankrupt 
and inactive. The rest of the corporate structure - the CNC’s National and State Coffee 
Producers Unions - were divided by different regional agendas and loyalties to 
bureaucratic groups. Lacking producers’ backing and leverage - the source of which had 
been IMC’s largesse - they were unable to launch any significant initiative, and were 
generally superseded in terms of membership and resource allocation by independent 
organisations.
In this context, by the beginning of the 1990s, CNOC grew as the main national actor in 
the coffee sector. They were the only coffee organisation challenging the restructuring 
of the coffee sector, on the grounds of alternative policies including a return to a quota 
system and the adoption of a retention scheme and allocation of Solidarity resources 
through regional organisations according to actual membership. While CNOC advisors 
and leaders frequently knew more about coffee markets than most public officials, they 
were unable to formulate new practical economic strategies.
Co-operatives and marketing social organisations controlled no more than 12% of 
national parchment coffee in 1992-1993, but after that they were the only actor able to 
generate a new coffee strategy. Given CNOC’s weak bargaining power, at best, it was 
only able to compete with local intermediaries. Its leaders generally failed to seize 
opportunities for asset formation and vertical integration at a higher level, and instead 
continued to operate the obsolete technology the IMC passed on to them. After the first 
two years they witnessed a self-defeating over-accumulation of processing capacity and 
low profit margins for processing berry coffee (the most important income for 
organisations, for members do not pay contributions).
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CNOC was a varied network of regional and local organisations, comprising very poor 
micro-plot indigenous producers and medium-size, semi-intensive specialised 
producers. In general CNOC’s main coffee ‘business’ strategy was vertical integration, 
more suited to the needs of medium-sized producers than poor small producers. 
Although they ran a marketing firm to help member organisations deal with exports, it 
did not build a more sustainable basis for long-term market transactions. In 1995-96 it 
operated credits in dollars and many of the member organisations were unprotected 
against the impact of devaluations, resulting in considerable losses.
Although CNOC became the most consolidated coffee organisation in Mexico, with
professional advisors and marketing experience, they could not play a more decisive
role in the coffee sector, at the level of national policy-making. While they progressed
regionally in many areas, as a national actor CNOC kept demanding from government a
‘well defined national coffee policy’ and insisted on not repaying Solidarity income
101support, when those resources were transferred to them. On the other hand, Solidarity
successfully undermined CNOC’s efforts at playing a constructive role in the coffee
sector. Solidarity and INI officials played a distracting role without having a substantial
100set of concessions to bargain with.
A neo-corporatist type organisation emerged from formerly independent organisations, 
strongly promoted by President Salinas through the PNS. In particular, the Workers, 
Peasants and Students’ Union (UGOCEP), which channelled considerable funds and 
made opportunistic moves to increase the access of their coffee clientele to Solidarity 
marketing credits, thanks to the personal support President Salinas gave to them. These 
divisions among national umbrella organisations (corporatist, neo-corporatist and 
independent ones), and the distance from grass-roots support, made it impossible to 
challenge the coffee restructuring agenda on a national scale.
Regional organisations: between brokers and producers.
- At the regional level, independent organisations and producer groups had more room for 
manoeuvre, although the lack of technical skills, funding and experience made them 
vulnerable to bankruptcy. Regional Solidarity Funds (RSF) were created as a continuity
121 During CNOC’s 1995 National Congress (Xalapa, February 10-11), member organisations did not reach 
agreement on this issue, i.e. repaying Solidarity production subsidised credits or demanding that the federal 
government waive these credits as a form of income support. Participant observation.
122 Participation of the author in the unofficial meetings CNOC/INI-Solidarity. July 1991.
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of the Solidarity Support Program for Small Coffee Producers. The PNS transferred the 
management of the latter programme to producers in order to make it self-financed. 
Paying back what was at first considered income support, allowed producers to set up 
their own Fondo Regional de Solidaridad (FRS, Regional Solidarity Fund). Instead of 
paying back Solidarity, producers paid their organisations in kind, constituting a very 
cheap source of funding. With FRSs, Solidarity officials in Veracruz tried to bypass 
‘corporatist’ organisations, launching a new type of leader, and consolidating an 
economic instrument of self-financing. In the case of Tlapacoyan, the region’s coffee 
Solidarity Funds could not reach a consolidation stage, as they never became grass-roots 
organisations and ended up in the hands of local and regional elites. Mis-managed and 
overtaken by more experienced entrepreneurial organisations (Asociaciones 
Agroindustriales Serranas in Tlapacoyan, analysed in Chapter 5), they practically 
disappeared as early as 1996.
The few regional organisations that stood up to the crisis and made it to the 1994-95 
recovery, were facing representational problems. Overwhelmed by market discipline, 
regional organisations and FRS either failed to compete or started successfully to 
embrace vertical integration under the control of new elites.
Solidarity’s Cajas de Ahorro (local savings groups) were a slightly different story. They 
had initial support from several communities where savings were managed honestly. 
However, the unpopularity of the main leaders of the Regional Coffee Fund, and a fraud 
in the Azotal’s savings group -  which functioned as a holding company- many 
communities withdrew their savings between 1995 and 1996. After that experience, 
however, payments due to the regional fund were displaced to local funds. By the end of 
the 1990s these local funds were still running with favourable conditions, particularly 
because they had access to cheap credit when this was scarce and expensive.
Local organisations and producers' distrust
During IMC restructuring, the government aimed at promoting “viable scale” 
organisations, giving priority to regional groups (usually highly politicised) and 
facilitating the integration of former UEPCs, according to the influence zone of
191beneficios. UEPCs were transformed into legally recognised organisations: 
Sociedades de Solidaridad Social (Social Solidarity Societies, SSS) and Sociedades de
123 Olvera, Hoffmann and Mill&n (1994) and Diaz P. (1992) point to the bias against independent organisations, 
loyalty conflicts and lack of identification between producers and ‘their’ organisations.
Produccion Rural (Rural Production Societies, SPR). As in most of Veracruz and the 
rest of the country, in Tlapacoyan, SSS and SPR have usually played a passive role, 
showing signs of existence only when public resources were available, allowing local 
bosses to advance their own projects (see chapter 5 for the case of the privatisation of 
Atxinta, the biggest beneficio in Tlapacoyan).
Existing independent organisations in Tlapacoyan region - such as Quicempacayotl Co­
operative (CNOC’s affiliate) - did not link to these local organisations (SSS and SPR), 
as they were considered to be under the control of the CNC corporate structure and 
Solidarity (i.e. the government). Instead, regional organisations tried to set up their own 
sections and representatives. It was not uncommon to find in the same community two 
or three different local coffee organisations.
None of the regional organisations in Tlapacoyan -  independent or not - considered an 
alternative strategy to integrate producers to the market under more advantageous terms; 
they all followed -  perhaps unintendedly - the type of strategy established by the IMC 
during the years of the export quota system: production of bulk quality coffee and 
vertical integration. They also failed to enhance the multi-directional economic 
strategies of peasants (the only viable perspective for building up a peasant 
organisation).124
However, the new top-down, state sponsored regional organisations -  Solidarity’s 
Coffee Local Committees - never succeeded in replicating the success of the UEPC, 
based on flexible arrangements at the local level. UEPCs were designed after a detailed 
analysis of the actual dynamics of the regional coffee markets in Mexico, as functional 
and semi-formal organisations emerging from the IMC’s own mandate for promoting 
producers’ organisations, but not from any agrarian or secondary law, as in the case of 
ejidos, ejido unions, SSS, SPR and ARICs, or co-operatives and credit unions 
(Downing, 1988). The single most important characteristic of the UEPC was the peer 
group collateral, an efficient way of delivering credit with high repayment rates 
(usually above 90%). The group was responsible to the IMC for each individual credit 
and it was expected that repayments could only be made in full, otherwise the group had 
to take responsibility for individual shortfalls. It was an advanced scheme at the
1240ne of the few regional coffee organisations that developed a peasant strategy was the Union de Ejidos de la 
Costa de Guerrero; not without experiencing the failures of the “productive process-appropriation” strategy, 
they have tried to integrate coffee within a diversified and sustainable regional strategy, as Celis (1991) and Paz 
and Cobo (2000) show.
125 Francisco Piedra Gil, former Director of Organisation at the IMC, personal communication, 15 June 1995.
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beginning of the 1970s, when for example Banrural (a rural development bank) 
operated credit on an individualised basis (either to individuals or groups), with long 
lasting bureaucratic procedures (subject to sound collateral: i.e. land titles or other 
mortgageable assets), delayed deliveries (fiscal cycles never matched agricultural 
needs), low repayment rates and high insurance costs, apart from corruption (Grindle 
1990; Cruz 1995; Escalante 1992).
Of course this set of rules represented the institutional form of the relationship between 
producers and the IMC, but there were deviations from the norm. Among coffee 
producers, delegates were likely to benefit more than their peers, for they were closer to 
IMC extensionists and officials, and sometimes corruption emerged from these 
priviledged relationships. As a former extensionist put it, when a UEPC member did not 
pay back his credit, he was not taken into account in next year’s forward credits, but if 
the debtor was a grillo (a politicised producer), he was normally exempted from any 
disciplinary measures. Some local leaders made their first step into politics through 
the experience and contacts gained as UEPC delegates. And when the IMC’s 
infrastructure was dismantled, only some of the better-off producers manage to get 
pulping machinery and sun drying patios to produce parchment, mainly those who had 
privileged knowledge and contacts with former IMC technicians and officials, since
177most of them were UEPC’s delegates.
3.5 Peasant strategies and coffee producer organisations
When coffee producer organisations started to participate in the market, leaders and 
advisors realised that most peasant producers gave limited support in exchange for 
receiving “good prices” (i.e. better than those of private intermediaries). If during the 
harvest ‘their’ organisation ran out of cash, paid by instalments or delayed payment, 
producers would not hesitate to desert the organisations and sell to private buyers, even 
at a lower price (provided they paid in cash at once). On these occasions leaders became 
frustrated and criticised the underdeveloped, retarded, rustic productive culture of
17fipeasant coffee producers. Even well intentioned leaders are apparently unaware of
126 Interview with Nicolas Hemdndez, former IMC extensionist and advisor to the FRS Azotal, Tlapacoyan, 3- 
Feb-1996.
127 Such infrastructure was sold by IMC at concessionary prices to UEPC. When these units were regularised 
into SSSs or SPRs, to be entitled to hold property, the issue of common ownership of coffee processing assets 
was not clearly dealt with. It was easy for leaders and better off producers to ultimately appropriate machinery 
and facilities.
128 Cobo and Paz (1992, 2000) include excellent reflections on Guerrero coffee producers and their ‘disloyal’ 
reactions to their regional organisation, though one of the most peasant-minded and complex in Mexico. Diaz
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two problems: first, the constraints peasants face in becoming fully engaged with a 
market-led organisation, and the fundamental contradictions between producers’ 
strategies and marketing organisations; and second, the concomitant advantages of 
private intermediaries given the organisations’ higher operating costs and risks. Four
19Qmajor areas of constraints put peasants at odds with their own organisations:
1. Control over production and risk reduction. Under open market conditions, dealing 
with coffee can be extremely risky for an improvised organisation, because of the big 
capital volumes involved and the price volatility. There is always a time-gap between 
the purchase of berry coffee in the field, which is a major component of costs of 
production, and final selling operations to intermediaries and/or processor-exporters.
The bigger the time-gap, the higher the risk of getting caught by a down turn in the 
market price for coffee, as happened to almost all coffee organisations during the 1988- 
1993 crisis when they had to sell parchment or gold coffee at a price lower than costs of 
production leaving huge losses and credit defaults everywhere.
Once producers deliver their coffee they lose control over a product, which is the object 
of claims by many different market agents. Apart from commissions, intermediaries, or 
coyotes, make their margins out of quality classification, price differentials and 
weighting; processors manage net yields at every processing stage and can also make 
unfair quality and weight discounts; finally, commissioned exporters make margins out 
of quality premiums -  as well as unfair discounts to producers’ cooperatives, 
intermediaries and local processors - lower interest rates on working capital and 
currency differentials. The problem of leaders’ lack of accountability deserves special 
attention. Apart from mismanagement of wet beneficios and incompetence in marketing 
decision-making (low turnover, bad contracting and selling deals), most coffee 
organisation leaders in Atzalan reproduced the fraudulent practices of intermediaries, 
adding some of their own, like overestimation of management, administration and 
processing costs. At every stage agents engage in pressure tactics and pre-emptive 
strategies. If producers delivered their coffee under consignation schemes, based on 
partnership, they could easily lose everything, because no one in the coffee market was
Pineda (1992) offers evidence of producers' lack of support to organisations in Veracruz (Interviews with 
Miguel Ugalde, Antonio Concha, Alberto Andrade, Gabriel Barreda, Rolando Topete).
129 I draw on participant observation of coffee organisations in Atzalan region, integrated in the Fondo Regional 
de Solidaridad Azotal (Solidarity Regional Fund of Azotal, FRS-A), harvests 1994-95 and 1995-96. Most of 
these local organisations were created during the coffee crisis 1989-1993 under the auspices of four Solidarity 
programmes (emergency marketing coffee credits, income support for small coffee producers, IMC’s 
infrastructure transferral and the creation of regional coffee funds).
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fully accountable. Cooperative representatives could be involved in deceitful or 
disadvantageous contracts, fouled by intermediaries, processors and exporters. This was 
a common practice after devolution of the processing infrastructure to producer 
organisations. Trucks were robbed, entailing heavy losses because insurance cover was 
practically not-existent and 'protection' fees had to be paid to police patrols.
Theoretically, co-operatives could speculate, but they usually faced cash pressures to 
stretch capital turnover and pay producers for their coffee. To the extent that producers 
lacked the means to sustain any sort of control over their coffee while managed by 
organisations, they opted out. Distrust of organisations reduced the efficiency of capital 
use and the room for manoeuvring sale contracts.
2. Trust and financial efficiency. Small producers were not able -  or willing - to finance 
their organisation’s purchases. They demanded full payment and were altogether 
reluctant to make concessions on grounds of financial efficiency (coffee deliveries as 
consignation sales cut down financial costs for co-operatives). While most of the co­
operatives tried to delay or at least split payments to producers - in order to intensify 
capital turnover - producers put pressure in the opposite direction: immediate payment 
of the full coffee price. An exceptional case was that of organisations in which 
producers accepted a partial payment at the moment of coffee delivery and a remnant 
after the harvest (similar to the IMC scheme). This was the case of Chaparro Grande’s 
local coffee organisation, in the neighbourhood of San Pedro Altepepa, where ranchero 
families prevailed over ejidatarios, but cohabited with them constructively. Despite 
being a member of the FRS-A, the local organisation was able to prepay only around 
50% of the total price to coffee producers’ deliveries. In most cases, organisations had 
to pay up front a very high proportion of the expected final price (90% of the whole 
market price).
3. Specialisation versus diversification and the use of credit as a consumption fund. 
Peasants used income support -  and credit, when available - delivered by organisations 
and state agencies as a consumption reserve, financing simple reproduction (i.e. food 
purchases rather than buying fertilisers or agrochemicals). As long as yields were low 
and terms of trade unfavourable, default always tended to appear, becoming a vicious 
circle difficult to break out of. Banks and other institutions that delivered rural credit 
had difficulty maintaining financial services to ‘unprofitable’ producers. Even small 
producers’ organisations, disciplined by markets in terms of adopting cost minimising/
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profit maximising strategies, found it difficult to overcome peasants’ ‘productive 
culture’. The temptation of opting for a populist solution, accepting producers’ default 
on a discretionary basis, led organisations to economic failure. Enforcing financial 
discipline - market prices for producers, adding actual cost of money to credits, etc.- 
was unpopular, as it as usually imposed upon members, outside of any grass-roots 
control over organisations. Property rights over a co-operative’s assets (processing 
plants, vehicles, etc.) were not clearly defined, and there were no effective checks and 
balances on employees, advisors and leaders. While organisations focused on the coffee 
business, producers pursued diversified objectives, that is, not only maximising their 
coffee returns. Most coffee co-operatives were not able to diversify capital flows 
according to households’ diversified strategies.
1104. Control over commodity chains was held by financial capital and transmitted to 
commercial capital, leaving co-operatives to play a functional role in centralising 
peasants’ production. Most organisations became a dependent link in the coffee chain, 
because very few had access to credit and export markets. The more coffee 
organisations integrated into the market and regulated peasant production, the greater 
their organisational specialisation and complexity (larger and professionalized staff, 
introduction of accounting and administrative systems). As organisations became bigger 
and more complex, they related to their constituencies on more asymmetric terms, often 
marginalising peasant communities from decision-making and, instead of ‘empowering’ 
them, they tended to alienate local elites. Coffee organisations with diversified assets 
and advanced development projects, for instance in the southern state of Guerrero and 
northern sierra of Puebla, endured a complex and increasingly more diversified 
apparatus - with coffee processing plants, warehouses, vehicles, fertiliser concessions, 
retailing shops, marketing teams, etc. - but the gap with peasant communities increased 
as well.131
My fieldwork in the Regional Coffee Fund of Azotal during two cycles, revealed two 
major constraints preventing organisations from being profitable and sustainable: their
130 Commodity chains analysis focus on global organisation of production, processing and distribution, 
usually along a network of interlocked processing links of a particular commodity. A commodity chain 
may follow vertical as well as horizontal forms of capital integration and value adding. In the case of 
coffee see Ponte 2001 and Talbot 2004.
131 Comparison of extreme right and left ‘peasant’ organisations has not been undertaken from this point of 
view, though it might be enlightening. The Union de Ejidos de la Costa, in the southern state of Guerrero, a 
long standing leftist organisation, played complex social roles in the sierra and coastal municipalities; in the 
northern sierra of Puebla, while right-wing Antorcha Campesina built a stronghold among coffee producing 
indigenous communities, absorbing also local governance functions.
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economic strategy and the structure of incentives facing them. In Atzalan they carried 
on with the same IMC practices. Among the most important problems they faced were: 
deficiencies in market information; accounting, administration and price formation; 
professional management, risk assessment and operating strategy; and working capital 
and turn over. Checking the stock exchange for daily coffee quotations was challenging, 
although organisation leaders managed to be fairly well informed on prices, even 
without formal market analysis. Introducing accounting was very difficult, first, because 
leaders had little schooling and were always hesitant to transfer decision-making to 
administrators or managers and, second, because leaders were looking for personal 
gains, while administrators were challenged, bribed and co-opted. Local organisations 
were run by producers themselves, while the regional organisation (FRS-A) hired only 
an accountant and occasionally a taster. Nevertheless, the latter took no part in decision­
making, while the former had a strictly administrative role. Personnel with scant 
qualifications -  usually part time producers - ran the wet processing facilities under the 
direct leaders' command. While intermediaries collected coffee from the best spots 
(highlander communities), organisations were obliged to buy all the harvest from 
communities. Establishing recollecting points, enforcing quality controls, setting price 
structure and selling transactions were always a matter of a leader’s discretion. Due to 
producers’ lack of trust and leaders’ inability to bargain for better prices and contracts, 
organisations were always way behind private buyers and processor-exporters in terms 
of capital use efficiency (turnover).
Another area of major constraints was the structure o f  incentives that did not properly 
compensate quality, risk, labour and the stakeholders’ rights to coffee capital. Once 
coffee was under an organisation’s control, the status of coffee deliveries (coffee 
capital) was not at all clear. First of all, the FRS-A bought beans from all small 
producers in Atzalan communities, whether or not they were members. While 
organisations put pressure on producers to finance wet processing and marketing costs 
and risks (by taking an advance payment), most producers wanted to be paid the full 
price, and were always hesitant to take part in any further commitment. Therefore, if the 
FRS-A had any profits at the end of the business cycle, the organisation’s leaders were
119more or less free to decide how to use them. Secondly, as long as the price structure
132 The FRS-A split profits among local organisations, according to coffee deliveries. Then, they usually did two 
things: first, they paid for outstanding repairs in wet processing installations, and second, they organised a 
community party.
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did not reflect stakeholders’ participation in capital formation and risk taking, there 
were no incentives to commitment and quality.
With respect to the regime o f  labour remuneration, Atzalan coffee producers tended to 
involve all kinds of labour in their hard and non-differentiated agricultural labour, 
including that of leader-managers, beneficio workers and administrative personnel, 
failing to set up price incentives to producers as well as performance incentives to 
beneficio workers and staff. Compared to other private beneficios in Tlapacoyan, the 
FRS-A paid very low wages to workers and staff, creating perverse incentives 
(disregard for quality processing, overuse of inputs and fuel, petty robbery of coffee, 
tools and office items, etc.).
After the frost of 1989, the first years of full operation were the cycles 1993-94 and 
1994-95, when the four Regional Funds operating in the Tlapacoyan region (Altotonga,
Plan de Arroyos, Tlapacoyan and Azotal) were the only organisations with subsidised 
working capital -  even if it was limited. This advantage became prominent in the region 
after the peso devaluation of December 1994, when many coffee organisations 
defaulted, and the bankrupted financial system cut credit lines to the coffee sector.
The lack of a sound economic strategy and the technical inability to operate transferred 
beneficios, left organisations in the Tlapacoyan region without the advantage they 
started with. A leader of the FRS Plan de Arroyos said:
‘We had everything in our hands, but did not know how to take advantage of it.
We could have bought the former ARIC Tlapacoyan warehouse, [but were 
unsure about it]... and finally Barreda133 seized the deal and we ended up having 
to join the venture under his lead, not to be left out. We were the only ones with 
money to buy coffee, but it is no longer the case and the opportunity was 
wasted.’ 134
Part of those resources facilitated by Solidarity were ‘drained’ to the personal benefit of 
leaders, but there were also important losses in the form of damaged lots (excess 
fermentation, contamination, etc.) and wasteful operation; and overall incapacity to 
create and capture value according to market rules.
In the cycle of 1995-96, Solidarity finally handed over the coffee support programme’s 
budget to the FRSs and regional coffee organisations, which had been used as a
133 Member of a family of trades in Plan de Arroyos, Gabriel Barrera became a prominent leader of the coffee 
elite in Tlapacoyan. His role as coffee leader and entrepreneur is analysed in chapters 5.
134 Francisco Cecefia, leader of the FRS of Tlapacoyan. Interview, 28-Jan-1996.
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renewable income support fund, partially integrated with small producers’ repayments, 
particularly new transfers. The FRS Azotal reduced its purchases considerably, for they 
forecasted tight competition for berry coffee and the repayments of the 1994-95 cycle 
had been very low and therefore, operating capital was very limited. By 1996-97, when 
I followed up the FRS-A operations, many of the local organisations were dealing 
directly with traders, outside the FRS-A, and most of the coffee infrastructure was out 
of order.
3.6 Organisation, representative democracy andcaciquismo
From the first co-operatives, promoted early in the land reform period (1930s) as an 
organisational and productive alternative for ‘rural proletarians’, to the later ejido 
unions, ARICs and Solidarity-sponsored associations, a vicious circle was created by 
the state’s efforts to encourage rural organisation. The short-lived schemes of the first 
half of the 1990s were more or less similar. Directed to implement Solidarity 
programmes (the coffee income support programmes), local delegates were chosen, then 
leaders were appointed to a regional organisation (the FRS-A). Although at the local 
level there was more room for the community to elect their local representatives in 
general assemblies, delegates were easily manipulated by more experienced leaders and 
second-tier appointments (top posts) were usually fingered by the corporatist regional 
structure (Atzalan-Tlapacoyan-Altotonga CNC and PRI).
Representatives convened in -  irregular - monthly assemblies exercising no voice. 
These meetings were commonly very formal, leaders reported in broad terms about the 
state of the coffee cycle and “consulted” on issues already lobbied upon. Delegates had 
no background information and had little opportunity to consult their constituencies. 
Most producers thought representatives lacked formal skills, experience and even the 
nerve it takes to speak out and outperform cacique leaders. Unequal access to education 
and outside experiences endowed some with the ability to exercise a greater influence in 
the process of decision-making. As Ignacio -  a local leader from La Palma and former 
PRD candidate to Atzalan Municipality - explained,
“Some delegates to the coffee Fund [FRS Azotal] hardly read and write. How 
could they know if the numbers they are given are right? Besides, leaders [the 
members of the Directive Council] know how to treat them, giving them a taco, 
and a refresco [a soft drink], and sometimes pasaje [travel expenses]. They 
come back to the community and do not know what to say; we ask them if they 
questioned how it is that such and such problems are happening, and they just 
shook their heads and rise their shoulders.”
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Why, despite the abundance of coffee organisations in the region, was it that difficult to 
build up representative organisations? And more important, why did it become almost 
impossible for communities to control representatives? There were several factors as far 
as the coffee producers’ experience is concerned, which I examine below in the light of 
experiences in Atzalan and the role of local leaders and their relations with peasant 
coffee producers.
Centralisation o f leadership
As noted earlier, small coffee producers’ livelihoods compelled them to avoid, as much 
as possible, engaging in collective action outside the community. Thus, it is likely that 
state organisational initiatives ended up enhancing caciques’ positions, increasing the 
social distance between them and common people, breaking down local bargaining 
mechanisms. Caciques’ local rule was visible, but people somehow bargained within the 
community, either through kin relations, god-parenthood and other alliances, or by 
informal consensus building (women’s gossiping being one example). Once caciques 
were incorporated into self-contained committees and regional councils, the delicate 
relationship between bosses and people was easily undermined. The more powerful 
caciques displaced would-be leaders from high positions and the local power system 
tended to centralise around a few bosses. Solidarity’s experiments for generating new 
grass roots elites, through local assemblies, and then delegates’ assemblies, failed as 
other state projects did.
In a market where minifundia producers prevailed, there had to be an agent who 
centralised coffee production and facilitated its successive transformation in the 
commodity chain. That agent appeared in two forms: one was the producers’ own 
organisation, and the second, the ‘coyote’ private intermediary.135 Although they were 
seen as competing in an antagonistic manner among themselves, it is more accurate to 
look at them as two different market agents, who competed but were offering two 
different services.
Apart from paying the whole price in cash (what is known as precio muerto), coyotes 
waited long hours on the spot, and bought any amount of coffee. Compared to them, 
organisations had limited cash and usually put pressure on producers to finance the 
organisation accepting either a pre-liquidation price (from 80 to 90%, and rarely less
135 Chapter 2 analysed the historical role of intermediaries, both private and institutional.
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than that), and the rest at the end of the harvest, or to wait two or three weeks for 
payment, while the organisation was able to process and actually sell the coffee lot. It 
was not uncommon for organisations, at the peak of the harvest, to run out of cash and 
stop purchases at a certain volume, leaving producers with no other choice but to sell to 
coyotes.
There were hardly any stable, trusting relations between organisations and regional 
buyers, unless the relation was corporatist, as was the case of the Plan de Arroyos ARIC 
and its holding, the Asociaciones Agroindustriales Serranas, both under the personal 
leadership of the coffee leader-entrepreneur Barreda. In the 1994-95 harvest, the 
Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos FRSs experimented entering into a subcontracting deal
1 ^7with processor-exporter Antonio Concha, which was on the verge of failing because 
the FRS did not meet its commitment to deliver all its production to his beneficio, the 
main problem being pre-emptive distrust and inability to bargain for a favourable 
contract.
Under conditions of poorly developed institutional markets, the ability to get 
information, compare and bargain over the price of coffee highlights the role played by 
leaders. Good negotiators had to build up personal relations with buyers, though this 
approach was seen by producers as evidence of leaders’ entanglement and corruption. 
Most of the price negotiation process was invisible to lay producers, so - as a rule - they 
did not trust what leaders told them about prices, transformation costs and margins of 
profit.
In the case of the SPA, the main positions of ejido authorities (President, Treasurer and 
Secretary) were concentrated in the hands of full-time agrarian leaders, mainly 
belonging to Serafin Quiroz’s political faction. They also controlled the local coffee co­
operative, in which shareholders had no voice, despite holding formal annual 
assemblies. Sometimes, Quiroz played the neophyte-but-loyal leader, cheated by all- 
knowledgeable brokers, knowing well enough how to treat people in order to hide 
personal interests.
At the regional level, most FRS’ delegates had no access to learning from the coffee 
transactions with brokers and buyers. Only those who belonged to prominent political 
factions joined the inner circle of leaders and picked up experience, prevailing over the
136 Gabriel Barreda was one of the main coffee leaders-entrepreneurs in Tlapacoyan (see Chapter 5).
137 Concha’s activities will be examined in Chapter 5.
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rest. That is the way Jose Luis Arcos (JLAL) -  the main leader of the regional coffee 
organisation (FRS-A) - recruited his faction: Julian (Tierra Nueva) and Pedro (Azotal), 
both new cacique breeds without agrarian careers or experience with coffee before the 
start of the Solidarity programmes. Afterwards, they bought fincas and dealt in coffee. 
Other local bosses did not succeed in creating regional alliances, and were more prone 
to fail in the business. Managing the FRS’ coffee programmes allowed JLAL to prevail 
over local caciques of the Atzalan region. The traditional boss Serafin could not widen 
his influence in the region, nor could other lowland factions; on the contrary, they 
started to withdraw after the 1995-96 harvest (La Palma, Norberto Aguirre, El Zapote).
The reproduction of cacique factions prevented FRS delegates from consolidating a 
collective life and improving their technical skills, hence, leading them to become only 
a subsidiary power.
Every time the state talked about modernising rural Mexico, setting up rural 
organisations and centralising peasant production became the major objective. As noted 
previously, state development agencies and PRI’s corporatist structure facilitated the 
emergence of this type of centralised representation. It is not surprising that the 
combined effect of the vertical coffee market structure and the corporatist policies in
1 'JCthis sector brought about a long line-up of cacique-type leaders.
Unaccountable practices and lack o f  incentives
Most of the local organisations in Atzalan (SSS, SPR and CLS) did not have a proper 
organisational life after the UEPC disappeared along with the IMC, later on (end of the 
1980s). Had it not been for Procampo and Solidarity income support programmes, those 
overhauled organisations would have disappeared much earlier. There were no regular 
member meetings, and the annual general assemblies - when they took place - were 
organised always with great delay, and representatives were not replaced in due time.
In San Pedro Altepepan there was one general assembly of the influential coffee co­
operative, which marked the end of the harvest. But there was no transparent accounting 
report (coffee volumes purchased, processed and sold; average prices paid to producers; 
weight losses; net yield and sales by lots; expenses and net profits). The treasurer
138 African auction markets present a very different structure, allowing producers direct marketing of their 
harvests, establishing a direct link between the merit of their coffee and price incentives. The corporatist 
structures of rural Mexico have fed back into the practices of state agencies and private intermediaries, creating 
a very segmented and disorganised coffee market.
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usually forgot his “accounting book”, but remembered diesel and electricity bills, and
offered access to “those who would be interested”. Quiroz, the permanent leader,
presented an overview of the main results, describing anecdotally all kinds of problems:
bad experiences with buyers (delays in payments, unfair classification of quality and
discounts) and lack of liquidity for extending purchases among associates and
“preventing private buyers from paying low prices”. The assembly-par(y was a well 
1known performance.
Such lack of accountability explains why contributions for meeting the costs of the ejido 
authority - not to say coffee representations - were painstakingly collected. Distrust in 
leaders shaped people’s reluctance to cooperate towards their personal expenses. In the 
case of coffee organisations, the problem was even worse. Producers were not at all 
happy to be taxed under any circumstance. As members did not pay contributions, 
organisations did not have their own legitimate resources. Leaders used the assets of 
organisations as personal savings, and financed their activities as they wished, including 
their political careers.
When Solidarity officials tried to promote new - supposedly accountable - elites, they 
just spurred tensions within communities, and ended up reshuffling new and old elites 
in the new power positions (Solidarity’s Coffee Funds). And when they put forward 
new organisational practices, like information meetings and election assemblies, the 
actual results were far from democratic.
Even if information was provided in good faith, most delegates were not trained to 
understand administrative matters. For example, during the General Assembly of the 
Solidarity Saving Case Tlapacoyan-Plan de Arroyos, in February 1995, the substantive 
issues, such as the reinvestment of profits or compensating for inflation with a higher 
interest rate, were not discussed. An agreement on sustaining a lower-than-inflation 
interest rate, of 12% per year, was all it took to approve such a delicate matter. It was 
assumed by officials and leaders that peasants were not willing to pay a higher interest 
rate, but there was evidence that coffee producers understood a great deal about the 
workings of credit. They usually tried to avoid borrowing, but when the need appeared
139 Usually nobody dared to challenge the co-op “reports”, although smiles and whispering were very lively. 
The Barreda’s (Equimite) are famous for blathering criticisms, but which end up amazingly in support of 
Quiroz. Others, like Pablo Guerrero (Jehovah Witnesses’ follower from Las Flores), criticised the lack of 
elections and accountable management, but gave up for the sake of safety. The main event was the barbacoa 
party (oven cooked meat, beer, soft drinks and dancing music), also known as the “espumilla” party because it 
was financed by selling espumilla coffee (leftovers however sold at discount prices).
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they took loans from the informal market (Diaz P., 1992). What they were not ready to 
do was to trust leaders and staff, hence taking the risk of accepting a real interest rate 
that would end up benefiting leaders. The expenses incurred in generous lunches and 
drinks at these meetings were usually very high and became, a way of corrupting 
delegates. Ironically, the lack of incentives publicly given to representatives, made them 
reluctant to commit themselves to serve the community as efficient promoters of coffee 
producers’ interests and, consequently, delegates avoided responsibilities, except when 
they were bribed.
Corporatist policies and dysfunctional rural organisations
As part of development programmes, state agencies promoted many different rural 
organisations, sometimes with overlapping membership and functions. The state used 
the criteria of land tenancy and land-holding size to define who should be a beneficiary 
of state programmes and public services. The same criteria ruled the structure and 
functioning of rural organisations, creating artificial boundaries among rural groups. In 
this way ejidatarios were isolated from, and even put in confrontation with, landowners 
and the landless local inhabitants (avecindados). This gap took institutional forms as 
state agencies were set up according to agrarian entitlements, for example the Rural 
Bank was initially ‘Banco de Credito Ejidal’, primarily oriented to serve ejidos. In the 
end, landowners’ bargaining power was able to channel most of the government 
spending to rural development, and among ejidatarios, only those better organised 
groups (that is, belonging to the corporatist structure) could benefit.
Economic activity was another criterion used by the state to organize peasants. Formal 
coffee organisations - state induced and legally registered- prevented grass-roots efforts 
from becoming alternative options of organisation. If peasants were not only coffee 
producers, a more representative organisation could have spread its concerns to different 
activities, at different times during the agricultural cycle. What appear marginal, 
resistance-led community practices sometimes remained so because producers lacked 
conditions to progress towards a complex organisation, which could manage resources 
across several economic activities during the agricultural cycle: food and cash-crop 
marketing, input provision, financial services, etc. Although producers are keen to 
evaluate their efforts in coffee production, their focus has remained localised at the level 
of individual ftncas.
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Coffee producer groups wondered about ways of overcoming high transport costs, 
dependence on intermediaries and* monopoly traps, including the inefficiency and 
corruption of coffee organisations. For the most part, those efforts ran outside formal 
organisations, which were only used by default. If some Solidarity coffee organisations 
survived was because of its appropriation by elite groups and to a lesser extent due to 
community participation. State support has also been influential to allow these 
functional organisations to cover losses.
Rural people learned to play with different state-imposed identities: ejidatario, peasant, 
poor and coffee producer. Nevertheless, the game involved extraordinary costs (time- 
consuming meetings, applications and evaluations), and people got fed up with so many 
institutional requirements. Rural organisations (co-ops, credit unions and other formal 
associations) forced people to adapt to formal structures, not the other way around.
Dysfunctional education and low levels o f technical skills
Communities always tried to appoint people they trusted who were able at least to read 
and write. Though many people could do so formally, there was little social practice of 
those skills through recording, evaluation and written communication. On the contrary, 
despite increasing levels of literacy, it remained dysfunctional in different ways. Formal 
federal basic 9-year education added almost nothing to rural livelihoods, except the 
expectation of undertaking urban jobs. Graduates often left communities, and those who 
stayed had no job options for a creative use of their “skills”.
In the Azotal FRS there was only one secretary and most of the staff were relatives and 
leaders’ subordinates. Without exception leaders were operating the coffee processing 
plants, sometimes with the help of a less ignorant fellow, but no graduates, not to say 
coffee experts. Rural enterprises were frequently run by personal friends of the 
caciques. All jobs were concentrated by leaders and their factions in a very inefficient 
way. Needless to say, there was no scheme for training youngsters as mechanics and 
electricians, coffee tasters and sellers, although coffee specialists were badly needed in 
every producing region.
In this context, coffee organisations’ delegates were chosen from among registered 
ejidatario producers, leaving out educated youngsters, who were potentially good 
choices. Land scarcity and the ejidatarios’ practice of delaying land inheritance - a 
tactic for getting protection until relatively old age - deepened a generational divide,
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which stopped new generations from taking part in the exercise of local power. The 
ejido institutional practices were also a barrier to entry of the landless into community 
decision making. For every ejido landholder there were around five landless ejido 
inhabitants: ejidatario descendants, land tenants and avecindados (the strictly landless).
There was no unified framework for local governance. The peasant version of 
accountability - community service in exchange for prestige - had almost disappeared in 
these mestizo communities. Ejido representation was highly limited outside agrarian 
issues. Public works’ penalties for minor infractions were no longer exercised. As 
explained above, the only way out was to appoint local bosses, better placed for 
bargaining with the state agencies.
Conclusions
Peasants failed to put up intermediary functions and despite several state-sponsored 
organizational efforts, the superiority of private intermediaries prevailed. Among many 
other reasons, this was because the practices that distorted the structures of prices and 
incentives were reproduced even after the pro-market reforms. It was also because 
organisations, whether independent or official, never seriously questioned the prevailing 
structural problems for an efficient co-operation, i.e., the dispersion of peasants throughout 
a mountainous and disconnected region; the difficulties to form well integrated chains of 
production in order to aggregate value and a structure of incentives not fostering quality, 
product differentiation and information.
Organisations and their leaders did not induce a learning process to enrich producers’ 
economic, social and political capabilities, as well as entrepreneurial skills that would, in 
turn, enhance their bargaining position. On the contrary, a rather backward peasant 
ideology was reinforced time and again in order to facilitate corporatist control through a 
rather widespread political device practiced in the PRI: placing peasants, wage-workers, 
small landowners, more successful agricultural producers, coyotes and other intermediaries 
at odds with one another, fostering confrontations which made cooperative undertakings 
between these groups extremely difficult.
The very idea of justice that peasants endorse -  embedded in agrarian struggles and 
demands - could have served as a mechanism to check the market demands of other 
agents and build a consensus around what is socially appropriate and acceptable
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regarding the distribution of surplus. Instead, it became an identity obstacle to build the 
relations of trust required for more constructive and productive collective endeavours.
In addition, the economic strategies of small producer and coffee organisations were 
always in tension. Most productive organisations in rural Mexico were created by state 
agencies, according to the functional objectives of rural development policies, that is, 
modernisation and increasing production. Government efforts at reviving the UEPCs to 
integrate second-tier organisations that would manage the privatisation and devolution 
processes in the coffee sector were disputed from all quarters (local bosses, existing 
official and independent organisations, political parties). While competition forced 
organisations to rationalise costs and price margins, they also were expected to fulfil 
social functions (pay the best prices, buy coffee the harvest all along, redistribute gains). 
The only way organisations could possibly meet these two worlds was through complex 
production, consumption and saving strategies, moving the highland coffee capital 
along the agricultural cycle in the different markets in which peasants were integrated. 
At the same time, in order to achieve such a sophisticated strategy, organisations would 
have needed to internalise the functioning of a market economy. They would have 
needed to teach, convince and collectively figure out peasants’ engagement with 
markets. Contrary to this grass-roots perspective, the emergence of a new elite profiting 
from heading these top-down organisations did not help in building more constructive 
intermediary functions. As will be seen in more detail in Chapter 5, as elites became 
increasingly successful in integrating with the market, they distanced themselves from 
the very peasants they were supposed to represent.
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CHAPTER 4
SMALL SCALE COFFEE PRODUCERS: WHY AND HOW DO
THEY SURVIVE?
4,1 Introduction
Much confusion about the rationale of peasant production in capitalist markets arises 
from naturalistic assumptions140 and their evolutionist corollaries of transitions from a 
peasant stage to a proletarian or bourgeois one. The hypothesis of the natural economy - 
used by Marx to shed light on the general evolution of primitive social forms to 
capitalist markets - presents several problems if taken as an historical roadmap. Modem 
forms of peasant economy are more related to capitalist markets, than to ancient 
formations.141 As suggested in chapter 1, the use of categories such as ‘peasants’, ‘semi­
proletarians’, ‘simple commodity producers’ (SCP), or ‘petty capitalists’ presents many 
problems unless we consider the historical transformations that give rise to such rural 
livelihoods.142
This chapter focuses on the production of coffee, as a specific crop produced for 
exchange and adapted within peasant’s traditional agriculture. In the region studied - 
Chiconquiaco/Misantla sierra - the emergence of the coffee market allowed peasant 
families to make use of their particular advantages -  labour abundance and inherited 
knowledge of agriculture - to adapt coffee to their livelihoods, retaining in this way a 
measure of formal control, a physical close contact with, and manipulation of, 
individual coffee plants and plots.
In order to understand why and how small scale producers survive in the coffee market, 
one has to consider the interaction between objective and subjective factors. I consider 
as objective factors all those related to the structure of the market, which produce and
140 O’Brian and Roseberry (1991, p.5) argue that the naturalistic assumptions attributed to peasants (on 
one hand, use-value orientations and non-accumulation strategies; and, on the other hand, the family 
economy or the household as a production-consumption unit) in the past cannot be simplistically applied 
to the family economies of the capitalist present.
141 That is the case of the Mesoamerican ‘closed corporatist peasant community’ studied by Wolf (1956 
and 1957) and its cargo system (Korsbaek 1996), the civic-religious hierarchy.
142 Deriving the concepts of social class (working or peasant) from the formal categories of the capitalist 
mode of production, entails substituting a relationship historically lived for a static and reified entity. See 
Thompson (1966:9). The framework of livelihoods allows due attention to agency of rural actor as well as 
to the many trajectories of agrarian change (see chapter 1).
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reproduce spaces for peasants and depend on the natural and geographical determinants 
of coffee production, other economic determinants such as the overlapping of different 
cycles affecting the dynamics of this sectoral market, the so-called labour problem, the 
characteristics of cherry producers (cereceros) and the process of surplus formation. 
The subjective factors, in turn, include at least three strategic components: First, the 
family economic strategies revolve increasingly around livelihoods diversification (Ellis 
1998): coffee associated to other cash-crops and foodstaples, as well as seasonal labour 
migration. Second, social networks facilitate access to land and coping strategies (or in 
other words access to different forms of capital. See Bebbington 2001). Third, coffee 
income is still used to strengthen peasant patterns of production and livelihoods (rather 
than capitalist paths).
Mainstream economists tend to believe that coffee is a homogeneous commodity, whose 
prices are explained by supply-demand fundamentals. What is missing in this stylised 
picture is the social and political complexities of the coffee market, the conflicting 
interests and strategies of coffee producing peasantries and capitalist growers, as well as 
the segmentation of the market. This is precisely why price-led adjustments are difficult 
to reach at and are also short-lived. The profit maximizing behaviour of thousands of 
capitalist growers is met by the “squeezed” reproduction of millions of peasants and 
small producers. Anticyclical mechanisms deliver incentives for long term adaptation 
and competitiveness, while procyclical ones and “open market politics” deepen the 
effects of speculation and instability.
An understanding of these interweaving cycles and how institutions internalise its 
management offers a superior analytical base than supply-demand linear models.
The aim of this chapter is to understand coffee production among ejidatario landholders 
of Atzalan not only in terms of the ‘economic niches’ they occupy (a very labour 
intensive activity), but in a more comprehensive way.
Section 2 analyses how the main natural conditions of coffee production affect supply, 
quality, labour regimes and production systems, to such an extent that they deeply shape 
the market.
Section 3 explains the structure and dynamics of coffee market and how they constrain 
long term decisions, while at the same time create spaces for peasants’ livelihoods,
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which entail relative advantages.143 It then analyses the distinctive rationality of small 
producers and why they adopt procyclical strategies that frequently lack the backing of 
sound institutions.
In section 4 small producers’ strategies are considered in detail. Their agricultural-cycle 
based economic strategies, associating food and cash crops with an intensive use of land 
and household labour; patterns of access to land and the role of social networks; the way 
they confront labour bottlenecks; the adoption of subsistence tactics and family 
economic strategies to face the coffee crisis. Here key findings of fieldwork are reported 
extensively examining small producers’ strategies and how they differ from better off 
producers. Finally, reconsideration is made on “peasant rationality” and how it is 
influenced by deeply embedded culture and old and new religious ideas.
The role of labour is examined as a key factor of peasant livelihoods in Atzalan. Social 
reproduction depends on labour - allocated to subsistence farming and wage labour -  
more than on the behaviour of commodity markets (coffee, plantains and citrus). To the 
majority of Atzalan’s small landholders, coffee - still one of the few viable cash crops in 
this mountainous region - sustains peasant livelihoods. Only a few of these small 
producers -  ejidatarios and landowners - started an upward differentiation movement 
based on capital accumulation (as will be examined in chapter 5). Changes in economic 
strategies (adoption of modem technology and other risk taking investments) on the part 
of producers, are not triggered by short-term factors (i.e. a few years of good prices), 
but rather, by a set of convergent changes, like the cultural impact of labour migration, 
religious organisation, social networking (close contact with merchants) and, in sum, a 
collective perception of enduring favourable trends in the market and state support 
programmes.
Adjustments to coffee supply are only possible in the long term, but there are always 
conflicting economic strategies and adjustments. Intensive technology growers are more 
sensitive to cycles because they rely on massive use of agrochemicals and plant
143 Many authors have argued the economic advantages of small producers from different theoretical 
standpoints. Generally speaking, Marxists have looked at this phenomenon in a historical-structural 
perspective, sustaining the self-exploitation argument (peasant families’ ability to produce food and 
absorb part of the reproduction costs of labour, and to react to commodity price drops intensifying labour 
(Bernstein 1982 and 1992); and capitalism’s inability to completely remove non-capitalist forms of 
production (Palerm 1981). Based on functional, cultural and micro perspectives, many others have 
defended the efficiency of small-scale farming (Netting 1993) and the ability of peasants to resist state 
domination and market integration (Wolff 1966 and Scott 1996). As was argued in chapter 1, the critical 
use of both perspectives, keeping in mind the macro-micro and the structural-functional levels of 
explanation, helps to understand the complexity of peasants, rural elites and markets.
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renovation, as well as large amounts of credit. However, countries with specialised 
coffee institutions may soften the impact of cycles, through financial instruments that 
allow gradual adaptations to market changes. Peasants tend to follow the ups and downs 
of the coffee market, and they tend to lack the backing of sound institutions 
(microfinance and insurance mechanisms, instruments to increase economies of scale, 
etc.). Provided specialised market institutions are m place, big growers may be able to 
invest during price slumps while small producers may receive transfers from savings 
made at peak price periods. More than short term advantages (i. e., exchange rate), 
competition is defined by long term institutional advantages (R&D, anticyclical 
provisions, long-term financing instruments).
4.2 Natural determinants o f coffee production
The agroecological conditions of coffee production bring about specific spaces for 
peasants, particularly in the case of Arabica coffee, adapted as an under storey tree in 
forests between 1,000 and more than 2,000 m.a.s.l. The primary differentiation of coffee 
beans comes from the two worldwide commercially used species: Robusta and Arabica, 
each having a different ecological niche and agricultural requirements.144 Coffee’s 
ecological niche and agricultural requirements -  temperature, rainfall, canopy, ripening 
periods, picking and berry processing and average yield- entail relative advantages for 
highland peasantries over other larger scale producers, particularly in the high rainfall 
tropical mountainous areas where weed control and harvests remain major activities 
requiring high labour inputs.
Temperature. Given its temperature tolerance range (68 °F ±10), the altitude at which 
coffee is actually cultivated depends on latitude (N-S). Between the latitudes 25 °N and 
25 °S, the upper limits are determined essentially by thermal constraints: coffee resents 
cold winds - especially during the flowering period - and does not resist frost (not the 
slightest in unshaded plantations).
Rainfall Being a perennial evergreen, coffee requires subsoil water at all times, except 
during the dry period, when the plant slows down growth (vegetative rest) to initiate 
flower buds. The number of distinct rainy seasons in a region determines blooming and 
the harvest regime. Harvesting methods primarily depend on the number of flowerings
144 Appendix No. 7 presents the general characteristics of each coffee species. However, modem hybrids 
do not conform to this conventional classification.
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and terrain. In high rainfall areas weed control is a major activity, requiring 
considerable labour inputs or herbicides (Pieterse and Silvis 1988, p. 8).145
Canopy. Shade has an equilibrating effect on the tree. The canopy reduces temperature 
changes depending on the environment and soil, and preserves soil fertility by adding 
organic matter and -  through leguminous trees- nitrogen. Shade also protects soil from 
erosion caused by heavy rain, winds and excessive heat (which decompose Nitrogen). 
Shade is advantageous with good rainfall and proper management. It contributes to 
weed and pest control, through higher biodiversity (Nestel 1995). Under primary 
vegetation, coffee and shade plants retain much of the sunlight, discouraging weed 
growth. This process, in turn, diminishes the physiologic activity of coffee trees and 
naturally controls some plagues and diseases, allowing lower temperatures on the 
surface tissues of the coffee bushes, which prolong their productive life.146
Ripening periods. Rainfall and temperature affect the rhythm and time-span of 
flowering and latter on berry ripening. Shade is an important factor that slows down 
fruit maturity. Generally speaking plain-sun plantations have faster and shorter harvest 
periods, as is the case of major areas in Brazil, making mechanical harvest feasible. The 
timing and rhythm of harvests, in turn, influence labour regimes. Faced with a short 
harvest season and high costs of labour, for instance, Brazilian big estates opted for 
harvest mechanisation, despite lower coffee quality and price.
Picking and berry processing. The use of particular picking and processing methods is 
not entirely a technical choice, but the combined result of the productive behaviour of a 
coffee variety (Arabica or Robusta), rainfall regime, labour availability and coffee 
market profitability trends. Robusta and some Arabica varieties retain berries on 
branches after full ripening, facilitating natural drying. Since Robusta beans -with 
stronger taste and caffine content - bring the lowest prices, it is not profitable to 
undertake the more expensive wet-processing. New high-yield Arabica hybrids tend to 
drop ripened cherries, so harvest has to proceed quickly at peak periods. Pulping has to
145 In Colombia, where most coffee is cultivated without shade trees, broca (hipothenemus hampei) 
control is expensive and tends to damage quality to some extent.
146 Plain-sun high-density plantations severely damaged soil in Colombia during the 1950s (Palacios 
1980). In Guatemala, in the late 1980s large plantations were abandoning high densities (10,000 trees/ha), 
considered to be very sensitive to changes in real prices for coffee (inputs and labour). Due to high costs 
of inputs (fertilisers, weed and pest killers), some modem plantations have introduced temporal shading 
during periods of low prices (Graff 1986), like Brazil.
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be carried out no more than 12 hours after harvest. Both family and wage labour are 
needed to undertake either selective or strip picking.
Average yield varies according to coffee variety, soil and climate, and production 
system. There are gross generalisations in the coffee literature about average yield, 
which do not consider varieties, densities, size of plantations and systems of production 
(not to say rate of substitution or pruning-stumping cycles). This is an old problem that 
makes aggregate coffee statistics inaccurate. New technologies and varieties have 
increased yields, shortening the time to get first harvests (to almost 2 years), although 
new pests and diseases impose setbacks and sometimes radical reallocations of 
producing zones.147
The early dominance of Latin American countries is the result of fewer coffee diseases 
and pests.148 Latin America offers advantageous natural conditions for agriculture 
(possessing a quarter of the world’s cultivable land, a third of inland waters and half of 
all tropical forests, apart from lower use of agrochemicals than the world average).149
The problem o f quality. Shaded coffee - as in peasant diversified fincas - compares 
advantageously to commercial plantations (full sun-light exposure) because shade 
provides soil protection and even temperatures, natural fertilisation, higher CO2 and N 
retention, biodiversity and beneficial predators, better sun-light conversion rates, and 
longer grove life-spans (Nestel 1990 and 1995; Moguel and Toledo 1996; Babbar 1993 
and Lopes 1988). Quality is associated to multiple factors, but mainly colder climates 
found in the highlands, particularly with canopy trees.
There is still no conclusive research on the correlation between the attributes of coffee 
(aroma, body and taste) in the cup and the causal factors, but there is strong evidence 
that highlander shaded coffee may have a positive effect on coffee quality. Much of the 
knowledge of growers, processors and roasters is practical, acquired by experience and 
transmitted in the trade.150 Cuppers tend to associate in a more methodical way151 this
147 Java was displaced from its leading role in the coffee market, early in the XVIII century, while most 
Southeast Asia had to turn back to robusta variety due to nematode infestation during the 1970s and 
1980s.
148 Latin American coffee plantations are healthier than Asian and African ones, giving cost structures and 
quality a relative advantage. Expansion of the coffee berry borer slightly changed this picture (Interview 
with Mexican coffee expert A. Villasefior (6-Nov-1997). See also Diaz-Cardenas (1997) and Graaff 
(1986:41).
149 FAO, Regional Office for Latin America and The Caribbean. 2003. “Trends in Latin American 
agriculture 1990-2000.” Internal document.
150 See note 19.
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practical knowledge, creating records and personal databases of regional samples, from 
which they develop their blending preferences.
There are three reasons that make clear-cut cause-effect relationships difficult to 
establish. First, environmental conditions bring about distinctive adaptation of coffee 
plants. Second, in contrast to industry, full normalisation and standardisation of 
agricultural processes are very difficult to achieve. Third and last, quality in the cup is 
an aggregated outcome of cropping, processing, roasting and even packing techniques, 
each of which entails alterations of a pattern that can easily occur.
In conclusion, the more favourable -  and competitive - agroecological conditions for 
coffee cultivation are still rather rustic: high mountainous lands, varied canopy, tropical 
and subtropical weather and a mix of intense sunlight, cold temperatures, high moisture 
and rich soils. Although there are exceptions, like the southern plains of Brazil or the 
islands of Hawaii, most coffee producing regions conform to this rustic environment of 
the tropical highlands where peasantries live (Tulet et al. 1994).
4.3 Institutionalisation: understanding structure and dynamics o f coffee markets
Coffee is a complex commodity market, the second source of export incomes 
worldwide, just second to oil. Most of coffee cropping takes place in a wide area of the 
tropical and subtropical mountains, involving a labour intensive activity of around 20 
million small-scale producers and hand-picking workers.
The nature of the exchange of centrally planned, geographically concentrated, large 
scale and capital-intensive annual crops -  like cereals - is very different. The 
coordination of the international coffee markets has been based on the structures of 
national states, first, and on the international organisations created by the oligopolistic 
interests of the main consumer countries (USA and western Europe) and a handful of 
transnational corporations, on the one hand, and the two main producer countries (Brazil 
and Colombia), on the other. Governments and corporations have set rules for 
marketing and price setting, namely classification systems, based on which the stock 
exchanges in New York, London and other European cities, big brokers and buyers rank 
stocks and influence the global price structure. The logic of the commodity market
151 According to statistical analysis, the traditional cupping method is not verifiable, because there are 
always physiological and psychological risks (Lingle 2000). It is not scientifically known what the key 
compounds are in the desirable sensorial evaluation of each coffee variety and type (sniffing techniques 
are still used at some point). Coffee quality assessment is to a great extent affective and descriptive.
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players is to maximise operational profits by forecasting and covering for price changes. 
By definition, the international market organisations are not concerned with supply 
regulation (it is for the market mechanisms to set the supply-demand balance, futures 
and short-term delivery price finding, stocks and business cycles). The functioning of 
these markets create two important effects, first, the movements of coffee contracts have 
little to do with physical coffee supply-demand trends, but influence expectations in the 
real coffee chain, and second, global investors can take profits from coffee capitals 
modifying the workings of coffee cycles (Gilbert 1997). The greater the market 
instability, the better their business.
National organisations coordinate and regulate production standards and internalise the 
coffee market’s rules. The strategies and organisations created by each producer country 
aim at maximising returns (fiscal, capital and labour) in this way:
• Expanding the share of exports given the national natural endowments;
• Substituting, inducing and backing producers’ collective action in the coffee 
chain;
• Maximising profit margins, and particularly tax revenue and returns to capital;
• Reducing the impact of cycles on export output and incomes.
Most producer countries once ran highly regulated legal and institutional frameworks 
for production, processing and marketing, along with different price stabilisation 
schemes, as counter-cyclical mechanisms. However, since the quota system ended in 
1989, most of them have adopted open market, “neutral” and procyclical strategies, 
adding at best non-pegged price income support mechanisms during crisis. Depending 
on historical and institutional factors in each producer country, entrepreneurial growers 
use counter-cyclical strategies (the best way to maximise returns is to invest during 
crisis), while peasants always follow the coffee cycle (the lower the income, the smaller 
the investment in coffee).
Understanding how this intricate institutional framework passes price incentives on to 
producers, and how they adjust their diverse strategies, is fundamental to figuring out 
the interests of coffee market agents. Brazil and Colombia benefited for decades from 
valorisation schemes; Colombia and Costa Rica took great advantage from the boom of 
the 1970s to undertake massive modernisation; the USA created effective barriers to 
entry in the industry and the stock markets; Latin-American and African countries
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“captured” peasants’ coffee surpluses; and retailers, roasters and the soluble industry 
benefited from chronic overproduction and cheap coffee.
International institutions promoted investments to increase worldwide coffee supply 
after the 1989 crisis; entire regions became unviable in Latin-American lowlands; 
bankrupt speculators and brokers appear during every cycle, while big grower- 
processors become heavily indebted during long-lasting crisis. This natural, social and 
economic complexity has created room for small-scale family producers, despite many 
efforts to fully rationalise production.
4.3.1 Shortcomings o f mainstream economics* analysis o f  coffee
Economists have long studied coffee markets, and consequently, it is widely believed
that “coffee demand is deeply understood” (Bates 1997, p. 176). However, conventional 
1wisdom very often misunderstands the structure and dynamics of coffee markets, 
leading other economists like Maizels (1997) to examine many unsolved problems 
relating to the nature of the crop and to the presence of millions of small scale producers 
who enter the market under a rather different rationality than large scale producers’.
It is out of the scope of this thesis to challenge the methodological basis of coffee 
econometric models. I will only highlight a few points that prove the serious 
shortcomings of coffee economics and the way they influence coffee sector institution 
building and policy making.
Among the demand side problems, which are poorly understood, we find the margin for 
substitution between different types of coffees (or sectoral markets), as well as the 
regional, sub regional and micro regional differences in costs of production and in price 
formation. With the advent of chronic oversupply, demand and consumption patterns 
weigh increasingly on the international coffee market, which clearly becomes a traders- 
consumers market, rather than a producer market.
Conventional wisdom remains misleading particularly when it comes to price, demand 
and income elasticity. Demand is said to be highly inelastic with respect to price, that is, 
to some extent consumers do not react to price increases. Maizels, however, makes a 
critical assessment of coffee econometric models finding several problematic areas on
152 ‘Coffee fundamentals’ analysis is strongly influenced by econometric models, the backbone of 
mainstream economics (Krugman 1996). This reliance on modelling represents one of economics’ main 
strengths: the logic and unity of its reasoning, but its main weakness too.
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the side of demand, such as the lack of data on actual consumption; habits which are
essentially non-rational and make demand inelastic; dynamic income-related
adjustments of demand and the saturation point of individual consumption (Maizels
1997:151). And still more important, regarding the treatment of coffee quality
1 *differentials, there is an elasticity o f coffee types substitution, i.e., the sectoral
structure of demand, (Geer 1971), which accounts for a simple fact, that people have 
taste and hence preferences leading to a strategy of product differentiation between 
ground and roast coffee, soluble, liquor, flavoured or non-coffee substitutes (tea in the 
UK or soft drinks in the USA) (Maizels 1997:143-44).
Consumption trends are less understood; demand shifts in the late 1980s and 1990s 
were not predicted. Among others, the transitions of tea-drinking countries to low 
quality, instant coffee, and then to higher quality roasted beans; the boom in the 
specialty market since the 1980s in the EUA (after a long period of low coffee grades); 
the higher rates of consumption of coffee-substitute beverages (beer, soft-drinks and 
juices, etc.) in some countries; the evolution of high quality brews to saturation and 
differentiation of soft-drug and energetic beverages; the increased consumption of 
espresso based coffee beverages;154 or the unprecedented post-1989 stagnation (despite 
historic-low prices).
There are also misconceptions on the side of supply. Economists think of coffee 
growers as investors trying to maximise the use of coffee capital. While a sector of 
producers is clearly of an entrepreneur-type, most small producers do not fit the label, 
and they account for the vast majority of growers and an important amount of the total 
production world-wide.
For more than 50 years, economists have debated the ‘perverse’ supply function of 
peasant producers in developing countries, by which they mean a misfit with the 
expected rational-maximising behaviour (Ozanne 1992). While sometimes small 
producers react to falling prices with higher output (to compensate for income loss), this 
is rarely the case in the coffee market. Alternative opportunities and constraints vary 
greatly according to the degree of diversification of the family economy and integration 
in the market (in terms of capital, commodities and labour). The type of producer under 
examination does make a difference. Reaction to market changes will vary a great deal
153 Until the 1980s an econometric model took into account the demand for coffee by types, focusing on a 
group of Latin American producers (Lord 1990, cit. in Maizels 1997).
What Ponte (2001) ironically calls ‘latte revolution’.
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depending on whether producers are peasants with high levels of self-sufficiency, or 
highly specialised commodity producers.
The price for coffee a year before is commonly used as the main independent variable in 
coffee supply models.155 Although an influential factor, there are other equally relevant 
factors producers take into account, both related to coffee and other farm and off-farm 
activities. More important, there are intermediate institutions that transform real price 
incentives in a rather contradictory way. Rational decisions cannot be based only on 
short-term price experience, due to the perennial nature of coffee cropping. As 
economists have realised, individual and aggregated supplies are not the same; and in 
the coffee market even more so. Polarised social structures generate differentiated 
incentives, distorting the terms of competition at different levels. Thus, at one extreme 
we find peasants and small landholders, having generally no more than 2 ha of coffee 
plants in Africa and Latin America, but representing between one-third of the total 
number of coffee producers -  in the most modernised countries, like Colombia - and 
more than three-quarters in most producer countries.156 They associate coffee cropping 
not only with food staples but also with wage labour. Their coffee plots show mixed 
technologies (in terms of coffee varieties and density, and cultural practices) and very 
low to medium yields. Small producers react usually to changes in commodity and 
labour markets according to past experiences, rather than to formal forecasts (Ortiz 
1976, 1983). The price for food and labour are paramount in defining the income 
balance of agricultural and off-farm activities. Supply elasticity of small producers, 
hence, depends on the level of self-sufficiency and surplus production capacity. In 
general terms they have a pro-cyclical reaction to price changes. When prices go down, 
but are still above wage levels, producers will tend to accommodate to available income 
(consumption is residual) and find alternative options to complement diminished 
income, which often means neglecting coffee plants. If prices remain close to local 
wage levels for several cycles, it is likely that producers will respond by reducing coffee 
jobs to the minimum (collecting the harvest), taking marginal returns. Only if prices
155 The rational expectations framework is considered the best way to predict choices of commodity 
producers facing market uncertainty (Newberry and Stiglitz 1981).
There are no reliable coffee statistics to weigh the participation of big, medium and small land 
holdings worldwide considering not only size but also systems of production. Graff (1986, pp. 33-34), for 
example, assumed medium-sized holdings to be from 5 to 30 ha, somehow representative of Latin 
American countries, but the difference with large and small farm sectors -  considering different factors 
other than size - is not clear. In Colombia, for instance, most modem coffee producers have no more than 
three hectares. The displacement of big coffee plantations evolved from the crisis of the 1930s up to the 
slump in 1989-94 across Latin America, including Brazil (Roseberry et al. 1985; Junguito and Pizano 
1992 and Bates (1997).
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sink below this floor for too long -  time relates to alternative sources of income - will 
producers cut down coffee trees and move towards alternative cash crops or long-term 
labour migration.
While demand for coffee changes dynamically according to income and price 
movements, tastes and alternative consumption products (stimulant brews, soft drinks), 
supply adjusts slowly to these changes. As prices for final products tend to be 
stationary, rather than replicating the price movements of raw beans, income and price 
elasticities are high. Big changes in consumers’ available income do not lead to a 
proportional increase in coffee consumption.
Maizels (1997) introduced for the first time different equations for output harvested area 
and planted area, because the former is a short-run decision, while the latter, a long-run 
investment decision. Additionally, he introduced a real producer price (producer price in 
local currency deflated by the local cost of living index) to capture opportunity cost of 
the work involved in harvesting, as well as the value of the crop. To some extent, he 
also considered the biological cycle of trees and a time trend that accounts for the yield 
curve (Maizels 1997:157-160). According to him, elasticities were not statistically 
significant, reflecting imperfect data and also the lack of methodological references to 
interpret results.
In making the case for a more complete understanding of the way the coffee market 
functions,157 I suggest considering several problematic and tightly interconnected areas 
that can together account for the survival of small scale producers. I deal with the first 
two in this section: first the cyclical behaviour of the coffee market, which exerts a 
determining influence on market dynamics, institutions and actors’ strategies; and 
second, sectoral and niche markets, which make room for peasants’ coffee. The third 
area is dealt with in the next section: the strategies of small producers -  and their 
distinctive rationality - to accommodate coffee in their livelihoods. Distortions in the 
structure of market incentives and state promotion are other problematic issues.
157 Pioneering efforts towards such comprehensive study of the coffee market have emerged from 
different disciplinary fields, including Tulet et al. (1994) in social geography; Palacios (1983) and 
Roseberry et al (1986 and 1995) from history and social anthropology; Nestel (1990 and 1995) and 
Cannel (1983) in Ecology; Downing (1988) and Bates (1992 and 1997) in institutional analysis; Stewart 
(1992), Maizels (1992, 1997), Gereffi (1994), Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) and Gilbert (1993 and 
2003) in economics of commodities.
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4.3.2 Overlapping cycles affecting coffee supply
The coffee market is extremely unstable for both natural and socio-economic reasons, 
which materialise in a complex set of overlapping cycles affecting supply in different 
ways. Biological, weather and harvest cycles make coffee market agents take 
counteracting provisions to soften the negative effects of natural cycles on supply. 
Strategies of stock build-up and long positions in futures markets are used to overcome 
shortages. However, these strategies in fact feed other cycles that are linked to 
consumption and the level of income, not to supply.
Coffees of equivalent type and flavour, similar transport costs sharing the same harvest 
cycle, are likely to undergo competitive pressures. That is the case of Mexican and 
Central American coffees -  known as “Other Milds” -, with similar harvest seasons 
(around October to March), located in the same region and with similar quality 
attributes. In contrast, Colombia enjoys practically year-round supply due to a second 
small harvest and stock carry-over. The entrance of Brazil’s huge harvest in April-May 
usually pushes the prices down in the stock market, particularly for Robusta and lower 
grade Arabica coffees.
These seasonal problems create temporary supply imbalances and speculative 
movements throughout the coffee year. The big TNCs of the coffee industry have the 
power to bargain wholesale contracts - at discount prices - directly with the coffee 
authorities (Clairmonte and Caranagh 1988; Bates 1997), building stocks at a cost- 
efficient level according to their business strategies, blending methods and purchase 
policies. They usually have research departments in the main producing regions, which 
forecast harvest and advise on stock policies.
The chaotic behaviour of weather presents complex patterns that can be partially
modelled, but not predicted. In Brazil alone, apart from droughts and heavy rainfall
problems, there have been between 2 and 7 frosts of different intensity per decade since
1the 1930s. What happens to Brazilian production affects the world market. The 
concentration of production in this country further increases the impact of. weather 
variations. However, there have been recurrent frosts, storms, droughts, and pest 
outbreaks (particularly during crisis periods) in all producing regions, adding to coffee 
market instability.
158 The correlation coefficient between annual production fluctuations in Brazil and the world was 0.93 
from 1960 to 1980 (Akiyama 1982:7) and in 1992-97 still was 0.73 (own estimates).
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The biological rhythm of coffee plants entails a biannual variation or bearing cycle, that 
is, a year of intense production followed by another of rest. The biological cycle varies 
according to coffee plant genotype and life yield curve, although it is strongly affected 
by climatic conditions and agricultural practices, particularly strip picking (Cannel 
1983, p. 262 and Bailly et al. 1992, p. 57). Productive life and renovation cycles are 
intertwined because trees undergo productive decline, a problem that growers face with 
different methods of renovation of vegetative material if they want to avoid sharp 
production and income drops. Massive renovation (by row or section) is expensive, and 
creates income imbalances. It is a common practice to scale down this task combining 
two techniques: pruning and renovation.159
Natural cycles constrain the supply-demand balance, inducing specialised institutions 
such as boards and stabilisation funds to attempt to regulate such cycles. Growers, 
traders and investors adopt rational strategies, reacting to coffee cycles that may trigger, 
in turn, long-term consequences, risks as well as profit-making opportunities.
In addition, there is a long-term cyclic movement in world stocks (Pieterse and Silvis 
1988, p. 41), which has a strong negative correlation with prices (Akiyama and Duncan 
1982).160 Beyond a certain point, accumulated stocks overcome actual consumption and 
tend to depress prices; below a certain floor level, the opposite occurs. Information on 
actual stocks, both in consuming and producing countries - though hidden and 
manipulated - is vital in determining market trends.
The standard inventories for wholesale traders and the industry used to vary between 
one to three months of consumption, while for retailers only lasted two or three weeks 
(Volvergang 1988). After the end of the quota system, most of the cost of stock 
financing was transferred to producing countries. Stock cycles are greatly influenced by 
climate, so they cannot be fully predicted. Stock building has had a speculative 
component to avoid the risk of shortage.
159 Stumping or rejuvenating pruning consists of cutting the tree down from its stalk(s) to regenerate all 
vegetative tissues. The second technique is to spread out new planting in different age rows, dividing the 
burden of renovation. The Veracruzan pruning consists of renovating every year only one of 3-4 main 
stalks, in order to allow production in all trees.
160 There were four major stock cycles during the XX Century. The last cycle started in the early 1990s, 
when demand and supply were more or less balanced and stocks low, and yet prices failed to recover 
accordingly (until a retention effort was announced in summer 1993, and clearly when the Brazilian frosts 
hit in 1994).
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Long-term international price cycles affect coffee supply too. During the period of free- 
market (before 1906), the cyclical behaviour of the international market was explained 
in terms of demand and business conditions in the consuming countries, climatic factors 
affecting production in Brazil and lags in the adjustment of supply to price. In the XX 
Century, major institutional structures were created to regulate the domestic and 
international coffee markets, altering its performance. Nevertheless, long-term cycles 
persisted, strongly anchored in consumption and business cycles in developed 
countries.161 But a new phenomenon emerged: the great leverage of coffee organisations 
modified market actors’ perceptions as well as future trends. Two types of organisations 
in particular structured market transactions: the coffee boards or bureaus, on one hand, 
and the stock and futures markets, on the other. Since the recession of the 1930s, and 
particularly since the second post-war boom, state regulation was paramount in 
arranging the coffee sector’s structure of incentives in all producing countries. After 
1989, that infrastructure collapsed to a great extent, without the complete removal of 
national states’ regulations. From then on, a new market-led institutional framework 
emerged. Apart from a much faster internationalisation of cost structures in producing 
countries, the balance of power shifted radically in favour of consumer countries and 
TNCs’ in the coffee industry (Oxfam 2002).
The interaction between financial, natural and productive cycles can be very disruptive 
and there are very few anti-cyclical institutions with integrated action at all levels. 
Coffee capital flows do not always respond to agricultural cycles and production needs. 
In general, coffee croppihg has an endogenous stock of capital, more or less stable along 
the coffee cycle. Quite often, there are banks or specialised funds - as well as informal 
credit - which specialise in coffee producers’ seasonal needs. Efficiency in this sector 
depends a great deal on timely access to high volumes of working capital and cost- 
efficient insurance during the coffee season (harvest, processing and marketing). 
Intermediaries, producers’ co-operatives or parastatals have to manage credit very 
efficiently to maximise coffee capital rotation (turnover cycles) and reduce the relative
161 Polanyi (1957) predicted a cyclical “double movement” in which the extension of self-regulating 
market conditions inevitably generates counterbalancing social regulations. As Talbot (2004:27) suggests, 
the prevalence of open market conditions in the coffee chain since 1989 has unleashed the price cycle 
(overproduction, price fall, pressures on states to compensate income loss, and so on) and has made room 
for a “new agreement” in the international market.
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costs of money (per unit of output). As a very general rule of thumb, it is calculated that 
50% of the value of current production is needed to mobilise harvests.
Managing these overlapping and interconnected cycles demands a very complex 
division of labour amongst different agents of coffee agribusiness (weather forecasting, 
consumption and stock market research, stabilisation funds, etc.). While brokers in the 
international stock markets are better prepared to deal with the financial cycles and 
TNCs and big brokers with those cycles derived from marketing and stocks, peasants 
are best fit to manage the natural cycles (biannual bearing, plants’ productive life, etc.) 
due to the condensed knowledge frameworks mentioned above.
In general, small producers lack the support of organisations that understand and meet 
their needs, promoting their interests in terms of credit, insurance, stabilisation schemes 
and diversified use of productive capital, and that is why they tend to pursue a pro­
cyclical strategy (the lower the price of coffee, the smaller the amount of inputs and 
labour spent on coffee production). While small producers are handicapped to profit 
from upward price swings (as big producers do), the opposite is also true: during price 
crisis they do not take the full blow of long-lasting slumps, mainly due to their ability to 
cut down returns to capital and labour (standards of living), produce food and other 
associated crops and move to other available activities (without fully abandoning 
coffee). Furthermore, entrepreneurial growers, processors and exporters face greater 
levels of uncertainty. The more they expand, the higher the level of complexity for 
managing their businesses, forecasting market behaviour, planning investments and 
covering risks.
In short, peasant producers manage the natural coffee cycles in different ways; first,
taking returns to labour and decreasing consumption, and even quitting temporarily
(they come back with price recovery). At the same time, they allow the natural
1environment to sustain the coffee plants.
162 This is the general estimation of coffee sector administrators in Mexico, and it coincides with 
intermediaries’ working capital funds in the field. According to income structures in Central America, 
similar parameters apply (Pelupessy 1991).
163 Taking advantage of slow growth and biodiversity’s synergies under shaded conditions; root-level 
stalk cutting or intercropping are some of the tactics peasants employ.
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4.3.3 Coffee differentiation and sectoral markets
Sectoral differentiation of the international coffee market has created new spaces for 
small-scale producers, not only in the lower price-tag segments, but also in the upper 
ones.
Coffee is not a homogeneous product. There are two main markets, clearly distinctive 
for they correspond to the main commercial species, Robusta and Arabica. The latter 
used to have two subtypes, emerging from the two main processing methods: washed 
(used in almost all Latin-American Arabicas, except for small quantities of naturals164 
and most Brazilians and unwashed (Brazilians).165 Most small-scale parchment 
producers use rustic pulping techniques, while big grower-processors of both unwashed 
and washed Arabicas are capital intensive. The washed Arabicas subgroup is branched 
out again in two divisions, this time according to “quality” standards: Colombian Milds 
(Colombia and Kenya, mainly) and Other Milds (Mexico and Central America). The 
next classificatory criteria among Arabicas are altitude and export quality standards,166 
mixing local singularities and labelling (some countries have regulations all along the 
coffee chain). In general these criteria establish the altitude-latitude where high quality 
beans are commonly found in each country and producer zone. There are plain export 
quality (“prima lavados”), and superior qualities like “high altitude”, “hard beans”, 
and others. Chronic overproduction has encouraged medium, big-growers and some 
small-scale producer organisations to move to high quality niches in which value-added 
improves the terms of trade. On the other hand, the vast majority of small producers in 
the world undergo a process of decreasing returns, disinvestment, neglect and lower- 
quality production generating new competitive pressures among different types of 
coffee. Cheaper coffees -  Robustas from Africa and Vietnam - invade world markets 
(particularly via soluble), while the specialties sector is growing faster than total 
consumption. Much of these sectoral and niche market processes are under-researched 
and the dynamics of price formation are then inadequately understood. Generally
164 Dried on the tree (particularly in dry regions like the Pacific coast of Mexico).
165 Washed refer to a profuse use of water as lubricant (pulping), vehicle, fermenting-facilitator and 
mechanical remover of the mucilaginous cover for parchment production.
166 There are in general two major export quality standards or blends influenced by the two major 
consumer markets (the USA and Europe). They both consist of a catalogue of imperfection categories that 
establishes the maximum number of defects in each category permitted in a sample. The American blend 
allows 5% defects and the European blend only 3.5%.
167 The term ‘hard bean’ figures in grade descriptions of Central American coffees grown at relatively 
high altitudes where maturity is slower producing a harder, less porous bean (although there are many 
exceptions to this generalization).
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speaking, given a considerable price increase in one type of coffee, the demand for the 
contiguously inferior quality coffee will increase (Geer 1971), provided that price and 
relative scarcity remain unaltered.
Mild blends make minimal use of Robustas, while bitter blends have Robustas and 
unwashed Arabicas as their main components. Speciality coffees are new market niches 
developed since the early 1980s, that use mainly high-quality washed Arabicas 
(gourmet, organic, single origin and varietals and flavoured, among others), although 
they include some high quality unwashed Arabicas and Robustas. Hundreds of peasant 
organisations are producing organic, ecological and gourmet coffees, frequently with 
the help of NGOs, environmental168 and several solidarity organisations.169 The soluble 
industry incorporates lower grades like unwashed Arabicas -  natural and Brazilian 
coffees - Robustas and non-export quality beans.
The crisis initiated in 1989 produced a quality-reducing effect, since historic-low prices 
forced small producers to decrease the use of inputs and agricultural jobs. As a result, 
the vast majority of coffee was of lower quality by the end of the 1990s than 15 years 
before, while at the same time there emerged new high quality niches to supply the 
high-income consumer. Some countries and organised producers with access to 
technical assistance, capital-intensive technology, price stabilisation and marketing 
organisations are catering to those high-quality niches (Colombia is emblematic in this 
respect). Given a depressed level of prices for both, Arabicas and Robustas, the price 
gaps among them are narrower than they were under “normal conditions”.
Coffee quality does not appear just as a natural process. It has to be created in a given 
economically viable scale, transferred upwards to successive transformative and 
marketing processes, before it can be recognised and paid for. Competition for the 
quality-led consumer markets (such as those of Northern Europe), affects specialised 
small farms, in which modem technology and efficient coffee organisations depend on 
long-term investment back-up. In this sense, the liberalisation of coffee markets put to 
compete not only price structures, but above all the quality of coffee organisations and 
institutions in each producer country. Apart from the natural endowment (soil, climate, 
and altitude), the coffee quality profile of a region is shaped by the interaction of coffee
168 The Smithsonian Institute promoted a price incentive for bird-friendly coffee in Central America and 
Mexico. In this case the connection with peasants lies in the use of shaded systems of production that 
preserve nitrogen-fixing trees and use less agrochemicals (Rice and Ward 1996).
169 Max Haavelar, Fair Trade, Cafe Direct, Oxfam, and other solidarity organisations promote direct 
marketing, sustainable agriculture and higher than market prices for small producers’ organisations.
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producers with intermediaries, traders, and state agencies (chapters 5 deals with this 
issue). The extent of vertical integration and modernisation is also important: the 
establishment of intensive-technology coffee plantations; the development of processing 
and transport infrastructure; and the research and development of local hybrids. That is 
why, historically, quality markets used to be linked to big plantations, but the massive 
emergence of smaller landholdings and new institutional frameworks in the mid-XX 
century radically transformed the producing dynamics of Latin American coffee 
regions. While most of small producer coffee flows to the market as an undifferentiated 
product, a sizeable proportion reaches the top grades.
The coffee industry has been unable to fully substitute the ‘natural qualities’ of green 
coffee (taste, aroma and others). While aiming at this goal, in the short term big 
conglomerates focus on reducing raw material costs (cutting down the relative volume 
of coffee beans per unit of instant coffee), eliminating supply heterogeneity by blending 
and standardizing high volumes of raw coffee with generic attributes and smaller 
amounts of high quality coffees. And this trend leaves room for small-scale producers 
who provide that ‘general’ quality coffee worldwide and also high quality grades, paid 
at lower prices.170
4.4 Small producers strategies
Small-scale coffee production is a flexible petty commodity production enterprise, even 
though the management of a coffee producer family finca  is far from that of a typical 
capitalist plantation, due basically to the small scale of operations, the paramount 
importance of family labour and the role of coffee in diversified peasant strategies. 
Small producers think of coffee as an activity that brings about the benefits of market 
exchange (cash income), but also the insurance for an acceptable livelihood. For them 
coffee income is worth the amount of products they are able to get in return (food, 
clothes, tools, medicines, and livestock). But being a coffee producer is more than an 
individual choice, for land entitlements, knowledge and the commitment to engage in 
coffee cropping is a life-time project passed from one generation to another. Coffee is 
linked to the history of the region, because the coffee market developed through a long 
historical process (reviewed in chapter 2) involving public and private organisations and 
institutions.
170 See the case of Indonesian coffee (Bennet and Godoy 1992) and Mexico (Diaz P. 1992).
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There are some economic factors that explain in principle why small producers may 
enter the coffee market. First, there are no strong barriers to entry in the primary stages, 
from cropping to processing of parchment coffee. Second, given the emerging 
complexities in bigger coffee plantations, there are no inherent economies of scale 
(Gudmundson 1995), nor mechanical correlation between farm size and technology- 
yields. Third, there are strong barriers to access capital (land, inputs, credit and 
infrastructure), even if there are few technical requirements that lead to economies of 
scale (Roseberry 1995, p. 13). Fourth, coffee is a very labour intensive crop due to 
agroecological and technical constraints. Unevenness in the harvest season and quality 
of pickings entail a cost efficiency barrier to wage labour in coffee plantations, creating 
a comparative advantages for family labour (Stolcke 1992).
In understanding peasant livelihoods we have to look at the way a typical peasant family 
meets consumption needs, and allocates seasonally land and labour to different 
activities. The prices of cash crops behave erratically and wages are also highly 
variable; that is why coffee producers’ income cannot be accounted for with one- 
cycle/single-crop analysis.
Being peasant in Atzalan means a self-assumed rural identity and a set of entitlements 
within the community (mainly land and associated rights, like dwelling and access to 
social resources) and managing a way of living around traditional cycles (religious, 
agricultural), though not necessarily depending on agriculture. The traditional
171agricultural cycle plays a role as a structuring mechanism, around which resources 
are administrated in a highly integrated and self-managed way. At the same time, the 
cycle makes room for short- and medium-term planning, as well as for experimenting 
(repetition is the framework for systematic comparison and trial and error innovation). 
Additionally, by cultivating every year peasants fulfil legal dispositions that make them 
eligible to corporate social benefits (Procampo or coffee income support, for instance).
171 Friederichs (1986) finds the agricultural cycle as one of the most important social structures in peasant 
communities. Medina (1990) has studied how changes in the traditional agricultural cycle (based on the 
milpa -maize crop- complex) in Southeast Mexico have influenced the religious fiesta calendar and may 
signal the deterioration of the civic-religious hierarchy (cargo system). While Atzalan immigrants never 
reconstructed a cargo system, and only a minor part of the fiesta calendar survived, much of the 
traditional maize cycle continues. See also Ellis 2001 on the relationship of agriculture seasonlity and risk 
bearing strategies.
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1 79Although small coffee producers are not entirely self-sufficient, they manage on a 
year-to-year basis a long-run livelihood. This is the strategic profile of the peasant 
domestic economy explored in section 4.4.4. The position of small producers in the 
regional coffee market is not merely a result of structural objective constraints, but a 
combined result of intended efforts to improve living conditions, and unintended moves 
(choices, bets, guesses and experiments) around both coffee cropping and non-coffee 
activities. Both, intended and unintended actions revolve around managing agricultural 
cycles, while making intensive use of labour, land and social networks.
4.4.1 Economic strategies and cycles management
Traditional agriculture, particularly the maize cycle has a decisive influence on the 
reproduction of peasant livelihoods, and it is at the heart of a cultural matrix of the 
Mesoamerican-rooted communities. The main objective of the agricultural calendar is to 
synthesise an accumulated knowledge, but it is much more than an agricultural almanac: 
it is a worldview and a condensed knowledge of biological cycles and climate 
dynamics, as well as a planning devise (defines the right time for every task and the way
177of interweaving crops cycles). Furthermore, it provides an organisational framework 
for ritual life because the agricultural cycle is closely linked to a religious calendar and 
a ‘prestige economy’. Deterioration of traditional agriculture affects to some extent the 
political and social organisation of peasant societies.174 Most of Atzalan mestizo 
communities have seen their religious calendar considerably eroded, if not confined to a 
single festivity, the community’s patron saint.
From,San Pedro Altepepa upward, highlander communities only have one winter cycle 
for maize or tonamil, while in the lowlands two cycles a year are possible. A first 
decisive issue in managing wisely household resources is to determine the timing of 
crops, from soil preparation to sowing. Early or latecomers will face advantages and 
risks later on in the agricultural cycle, both in terms of labour needs and natural hazards. 
Two basic decisions ensue: how much a producer should sow and when. The first
172 In peasantist approaches diversified small coffee producers are seen as entirely self sufficient and 
sustainable (Moguel and Toledo 1996), an oversimplification of many paradoxes that small producers 
confront (discussed throughout this thesis).
173 Atzalan highlanders have their own measuring system based on units of 20 fractions that combine 
land-work and work-time as a single dimension, allowing very accurate
calculations.
174 Medina (1990) has studied in Southeast Mexico how changes in the traditional agricultural cycle 
(based on the milpa -  maize crop - complex) have influenced the religious fiesta calendar and may signal 
the deterioration of the civic-religious hierarchy (cargo system).
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question refers basically to land and labour constraints in the household, while the 
second refers to the conditions of taking advantage of biological cycles and rhythms. 
Early maize croppers have the advantage of having the harvest first, but very early 
maize tonamil may not endure very cold weather at the early stages. Moreover, early 
engagement with tonamil maize can affect the ability to cope with coffee picking, 
precisely at its peak and when the best cherries ripen.
Maize tonamil is sown in January and February, or even as late as April, but the risk of 
losses for late croppers increases considerably because strong southern May-winds hit 
and bend young maize canes without the cobs reaching full size (losses can be half of 
expected harvests). Those that are sown in January/February are strong enough to resist. 
Nonetheless getting started late in the calendar offers the advantage of freeing labour for 
the coffee harvest until it is over, which is advisable because prices usually are better at 
the end of the harvest, and late harvest increases the likelihood that maize stocks will 
last until the next harvest.
Coffee complements the maize and beans agricultural cycle, in two well-synchronised 
ways. Maize and beans are mainly self-consumption crops, whereas coffee provides 
much needed cash for part of the year. Secondly, cultivated together, they create a 
synergy of incomes and labour continuity throughout the year. Coffee harvest incomes 
(October to March) finance tonamil maize sowing at the beginning of the year 
(February-March), while maize harvests ensure a basic food to get through the slack 
season (April and May) and to concentrate on at least some of the coffee cultivation 
jobs (weeding, pruning, fertilising) until the new harvest comes again. It represents a 
‘friendly’ activity for poor people, for coffee is a relatively advantageous crop when 
compared to very few other viable cash crops in this mountainous region (citrus, 
plantains and pepper). In addition, coffee is a hardy perennial of relatively easy 
maintenance. Flexibility and complementarity of traditional coffee flncas are vital 
characteristics since they allow a family to cope with labour demands of a diversified 
economy. Finally, coffee makes viable the use of otherwise idle lands (stony, poorly 
soiled with steep slopes).
Peasants rely on a sound management of cycles to increase the chances of an acceptable 
livelihood. They make use of a condensed rationality, not always consciously 
assimilated and processed: ‘we crop maize the way we do it because that’s the way we
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were taught to do it’.175 In multicropping systems with a forest-like structure, natural 
cycles come into play, reducing management time and energy transferred to the 
agricultural system. Peasants free themselves from the need of staying in the field, that 
is, from constant on-site supervision of coffee fincas and maize plots. In this way they 
‘maximise’ off-farm activities, while the coffee finca produces by itself.
The household economy is organised around cycles, such as the two crops of maize, the 
annual labour and consumption cycles, or the extended family’s demographic cycles, all 
of which influence peasants’ strategic and contingent choices. Of course, coffee 
producers are also influenced by contingent factors, intuitive actions, and first-hand 
reactions, which frequently generate unintended outcomes (i.e. the removal of shade 
trees to plant orange and plantains aggravated coffee disease and soil erosion; or selling 
fincas just before the price recovery). The overriding issue is that cyclical management 
provides peasants with the structure for strategic complex decisions.
The key for managing agricultural cycles is mastering synergies of an associated pattern 
of crops. Mountain slopes present several soil types, shapes and suitability for crops 
even in the same individual lot. The more each producer gets to know his land’s 
potential, the greater the chances for obtaining good harvests. Among other features, 
Atzalan producers have an expertise in identifying sunlight exposure. Plots with oriente 
(eastward land) are better sun-lit, which means fast-growing conditions and less risk of 
fungi-related diseases. That is why land with oriente are preferably allocated to maize 
cropping. Moreover, they have an extensive classification of lands. Coffee needs 
permeable soils and good drainage, and producers have a sophisticated labelling of soils 
even within a small patch of land.
However, some producers have lost this traditional knowledge. As a producer from El 
Jardin recognised in talking about the agricultural calendar, ‘some producers have the 
curia (skill) of choosing the ‘tender’ moon for sowing’. Not everybody can do it any 
more. They no longer believe in it or are unable to assess the moon’s effect on planting 
and harvesting.
Understanding coffee cycles provides producers with an advantage in managing coffee 
groves. Apart from the biological biannual cycle (different for each coffee variety),
175 With a few exceptions, like the Jehovah Witnesses (JW), most ejidatario producers embrace this 
traditional inheritance. Rawls (1955) defines institutions as the summary of past practices.
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there are recurrent droughts and frosts and the lifetime cycle of the finca - from 30 years 
or longer depending on different factors.
According to the agricultural pattern of each producer, the seasonality of crops defines 
time frames for labour, both on-farm and wage labour. Food security defines the priority 
of specific activities: access to land and wage work to be able to produce foodstuffs. 
The discipline required for food provision is greater than the discipline of coffee cash 
cropping. With a reasonable harvest of maize and beans, peasants can think ahead about 
maintenance work on coffee groves, orange trees and livestock raising. Producers 
specialised in coffee are less likely to engage with the labours required for full self- 
sufficiency. Modem coffee cropping disrupts the traditional management of complex 
cycles promoting a simple and specialised mono-cropping. The IMC created a system of 
deliveries attuned to traditional agriculture, on which producers ended up depending.
Peasant families’ consumption undergoes seasonal adjustment on the basis of annual 
and perennial crops as well as seasonal flows of cash income. Peasants try to balance 
two groups of basic consumption products: (a) manufactured products that are 
predominantly acquired through cash exchange (i.e. sugar, oil, salt, soap, pasta soup, 
rice and most vegetables); and (b) self-produced or gathered foods (backyard livestock, 
eggs, maize, beans, orange, plantains, chillies, etc.). I did some calculations on the 
relative weight of those products throughout the year based on a basic consumption 
basket of a nuclear family. I started the exercise by establishing a priority ranking (see 
Apendix 4):
1. Essential goods throughout the year (either produced or exchanged);
2. Seasonally available products consumed depending on cash flows and season;
3. “Luxury” goods mainly consumed in the peak of coffee cash incomes.
Three observations result from these calculations. First, there was a strong seasonal diet 
adjustment in the basic family basket in which maize and beans were the essential food 
staples with their different forms of preparation and combination along the maize cycle. 
Second, the aggregate result of such seasonal adjustment is a period of 4 to 6 months of 
“under-consumption” in which market products are minimized, making maize, beans 
and other self-produced items last to the limit. But with the coffee harvest comes 
approximately 4 to 6 months of “over-consumption” in which different “luxury” (i.e. 
beer, meat), desirable (i.e. soft-drinks, biscuits, candy) and relatively expensive market
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items (i.e. clothes, shoes) are incorporated, as well as other food stocks and basic 
working tools replenished for the next cycle. The final point is that this flexibility can be 
explained by the diversified strategies of the family economy -  seasonal wage labour is 
important to compensate shortfalls - and by around half year of under nutrition (which 
particularly affects children and women).
Pure social categories -  peasant, wage labourer, farmer - are difficult to find in “really 
existing” rural societies. Even farmers in developed countries make use of unpaid 
family labour, informal sharecropping contracts and barter. Modem small-scale coffee 
producers in eastern Mexico behave sometimes like typical petty-commodity producers, 
but engage in atypical cash crops (double purpose plantain and orange crops); some 
family members are commonly labour migrants; and they retain limited self­
consumption capabilities (maize and beans). When coffee terms of trade change, they 
can opt out of wage labour, or turn to self-sufficiency, giving up temporarily wage 
labour. Ranchero growers in Atzalan, for instance, during booms, perform as capitalist 
entrepreneurs, but they prefer to adopt strategies of resistance (closer to those of 
peasants) when credit is expensive, marketing risks are high and profit margins are low. 
Production of commodities and surplus does not entail full commoditisation of the 
household economy.
The much-needed bridge between structural categories -  commodity producers, 
peasants or workers - and social reproduction is the management of resources, physical 
and social, within dominant units of production (family ejido parcels). The extent to 
which a peasant household has lost the ability to access critical assets (land, social 
networks) and manage complex biological cycles (relying more on agrochemicals and 
inflexible disciplined labour regimes), can point to identifiable transitions. In sum, to 
understand coffee growers -  peasant, petty-commodity producers or capitalists - it is 
important to consider their productive strategies.
In the following Table (No. 6) I summarise the main findings of my fieldwork in 
Atzalan, describing three types of producers and their economic strategies during the 
1990s:
• Small-scale peasant producer with access to ejido lands (as tenant or ejidatario, 
makes little difference), with a typical flnca of VA -2 ha. After the 1989-92 
crisis, the vast majority considerably increased labour migration, neglecting
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their fincas. A slow come back took place due more to the 1994-95 price 
recovery, than to government handouts.
• Small ranchero grower - either ejidatario or landowner (land tenancy makes no
t 7Adifference), with bigger landholdings and specialised coffee fincas, where 
one could still recognise IMC-technology (specialised shade, regular densities). 
Ranchero growers went through the crisis disinvesting assets like trucks and 
livestock, and some intensified other businesses (retailing and plantains).
• Grower-processor with more modem unshaded fincas in better conditions, 
had serious financial problems (indebtedness). They were the only ones 
investing during the crisis -  replanting, weeding and fertilising - and reaped the 
benefits of price recovery. Apart from buying and processing coffee with small 
margins, cattle ranching was also an important activity. Labour supply and 
supervision was a constant problem for them.
176 A more detailed analysis of some of these small ranchero growers is in chapter 5.
177 A more detailed analysis of these grower-processors is in chapters 5.
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PEASANT E JID AT ARIO-SM ALL 
PRODUCER A
RANCHERO E JID AT ARIO-SMALL 
GROWER B
GROWER-BUYER-PROCESSOR 
(MID-BIG)c
Role of 
coffee
1. Complementary source o f cash income
2. Peasant livelihood’s economic pivot (low  
maintenance & associated crop)
1. Capital accumulation
2. Part o f ranchero strategy and lifestyle 
(synergies coffee+cattle+maize)
1. Capital accumulation
2. Specialised and formal business
3. Part o f farmer lifestyle (coffee+cattle)
Landholding 4 ha (in Tlacolulan) 20-40 ha 60-150 ha
Typical finca U/2 -2 .0 0  ha 5-10 ha 50-100 ha
Coffee
technology
Diversified shade; irregular under 1,200 
trees/ha pattern; many varieties
Unproductive shade; regular 1,600-2,200 
trees/ha pattern; mainly caturra & MN
Unshaded; regular 2,200-2,600 trees/ha 
pattern and caturra & MN.
Coffee yield 6-10 Qq/ha (most below 8 Qq ) 16-25 Qq/ha 20-30 Qq/ha
Conditions Poorly maintained and in varied transitions 
(low densities, weed and pest infestations, 
unregulated shade; intercropping with 
maize, plantains and oranges)
Neglected (lack o f pruning, shade regulation 
and weeding) but still in recognisable shape: 
even density across the finca and shade in place
In good shape but without all desirable 
maintenance (2 fertiliser applications 
instead o f 3, replanting and pruning 
deficits, etc.)
Use of land Diversified (intercropping) and intensive use 
(based on traditional knowledge & access 
through social networking)
Specialised and intensive use (based on modem 
technology)
Specialised and intensive use (based on 
market information, scale economies & 
modem technology)
Labour
forms
1. Family
2. Labour exchange at harvest peaks (among 
relatives and neighbours)
1. Family labour
2. Wage labour at harvest peaks
l.W age labour at harvest, pruning, 
weeding and fertilization (seasonal 
contracts with outside peasants)
2 .Beneficio and farm workers
Labour
interlocking
Family labour -> extended (women & 
children)
Labour exchange <- -> with fellow peasants 
Wage labour sell to rancheros and 
growers
Family labour -> nuclear (women & children) 
Wage labour -> hire local ejidatario-peasants
Wage labour hire mainly outside 
peasants (social sanction problems with 
locals)
Credit needs Family consumption (during harvest to 
bridge cash payment o f  coffee)
1. Labour intensive jobs (harvest, pruning, 
fertilization)
2. Inputs
3. Pulping and basic processing (oreado coffee)
1. Labour intensive jobs
2. Inputs purchase
3. Processing parchment
4. Working capital (to buy cherry coffee)
5. Marketing parchment
156
PEASANT E JID AT ARIO-SM ALL RANCHERO EJIDATARIO-SMALL GROWER-BUYER-PROCESSOR (MID­
PRODUCER A GROW ERB __________________________ BIG)C 
Credit
interlocking
Credit -> receives from small producers (in 
kind) and as income support through 
cooperatives & institutions (no access to 
institutional credit)
Credit receives from regional buyers 
and input suppliers (advanced 
purchases)
4r gives in kind to peasants (in 
exchange for coffee and labour)
Credit <r receive from brokers and/or roasters 
-> finance local intermediaries
Technical
assistance
1. Borrowing from rancheros and growers 
and pragmatic experimentation
2. From organisations (very limited)
1. Private (input suppliers)
2. Institutional (very limited; with the 
IMC were privileged)
1. Private: input suppliers and brokers;
2. Hire wet mill (beneficio) experts and cuppers
Competitive
advantages
• High resistance to cyclical crisis (low  
reliance on credit and inputs; high level 
o f diversification o f crops and income 
sources; certain level o f  self- 
consumption)
•  Potential for efficient collective action 
within the community
• Specialized knowledge and potential for 
export quality production
• Certain level o f integration (pulping and 
basic processing)
• Closeness to peasants’ labour and 
coffee supply
• Specialized knowledge and potential for high 
quality produce (able to reach export markets)
• Vertical integration (processing o f  parchment)
• Certain level o f  diversification (basically 
cattle)
Competitive
disadvantages
•  No access to capital and technology, low 
productivity and diseconomies o f scale
•  Labour bottleneck at the peak o f coffee 
harvest (sowing maize tonamile is due)
•  Low bargaining power (sell fresh cherries 
and lack market information)
•  Weak collective action among 
communities (corrupt and inefficient 
organisations)
• Diseconomies o f scale and no access to 
export markets
• Limited access to credit and technology
• High supervision costs (labour 
problem)
• Low bargaining power and marketing 
skills (high risk o f speculating with 
parchment)
•  Low res istance to lasting slumps
• High dependence on massive credit (provided 
by brokers)
•  Quali ty consistency problem (labour problem; 
intermediaries mixing; obsolete technology)
•  Low bargain ing power (unfair discounts)
Market
interlocking
a. Peasant sells & takes best priced  local 
cooperatives or intermediaries (no 
allegiance)
b. Peasants collect themselves and sell-> 
regional buyers
Producers (fill coffee bags with stones, etc) 
->cheat<- coop, leaders (misappropriate 
income: weighting, profit distribution)
Producers sell parchment (and pay back 
credit) <r trust regional buyers 
acquire & finance 
Local pickers (average hand picking) 
ranchero producers use debt bondage 
and patron-client relationships
Growers sell parchment 4r trust -> exporters and 
roasters buy and finance 
Intermediaries (buy, mix & free ride) 
->distrustgrow er-buyers change them 
Pickers (strip-picking, theft) cheat growers 
(tolerate, no price incentives for yield and 
quality)
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PEASANT EJIDATARIO-SMALL RANCHERO EJIDATARIO-SMALL GROWER-BUYER-PROCESSOR (MID­
PRODUCER A GROW ERB BIG)0_______________
Management 
& strategy
• Use o f  measuring framework (traditional) 
based on surface/yield correlations, 
agricultural cycle and past experience
• Planning in terms o f  household 
reproduction: a) medium term: building 
up suitable economic strategy (food/cash 
crops balance and off-farm activities); b) 
short-run: solving agricultural cycles and 
spreading out o f agricultural jobs
• Basic administration techniques to 
assess cost/benefit relations, cost o f  
money and coffee yield (berry -> 
parchment)
• Desirable model: a) long-run: higher 
density finca and vertical integration 
(truck & modem pulping centre) and 
synergies with other crops and cattle; b) 
short-run: solve capital and labour 
bottle-necks; maximise profits
• Use professional administration to assess 
cyclical instability, cost o f  money and coffee 
yields (berry->parchment) and quality.
• Planning in terms o f the coffee business cycle 
and market competition: a) long-run: higher 
vertical integration and achieve export 
capacity; b) short-run: solve plantation 
maintenance, high working capital needs and 
maximise turnover and net profits
Regulatory
devices
• Low ability to transfer surplus to crisis 
(disinvest savings assets: livestock) and 
have to neglect coffee
• During recovery add up a pro-cyclical 
reaction investing in some fertilization 
and finca improvements.
• Some ability to save and transfer surplus 
income (petty trade incomes and/or 
disinvest accumulated assets)
• During recovery add up a strong pro­
cyclical reaction investing surpluses in 
fertilisers and finca improvements.
• Higher ability to transfer surplus to crisis 
period, to speculate with price-recovery and to 
take full advantage o f it.
• Savings capacity for coffee capital 
replacement and for investments transfer: 
cattle, land, coffee, citrus, etc.
Constraining
market
institutional
arrangements
• N o access to credit and technical 
assistance (income support is only for 
food consumption);
• Lack o f incentives for improving coffee 
fincas, quality o f pickings and engaging 
(as partners) in coffee processing;
•  No financial services to use savings 
productively and move coffee capital 
across crop cycles and off-farm activities
•  Price paradox: low prices put pressure on 
returns to labour, while high prices 
increase working capital needs o f 
producer organisations
• Limited access to credit, income 
support programmes and technical 
assistance;
• Lack o f incentives for improving coffee 
quality and engaging in long-term 
relationships with processors-exporters;
• Limited financial services (main source 
are merchants and coffee buyers) to use 
surpluses, acquire inputs and 
manufactured products (sold to 
peasants) and get credit during harvests
No collective action (sometimes join or
even lead peasant organisations)
• institutional: high cost o f money and inflexible 
credit arrangements: working and fixed capital 
(irresponsive to coffee cycle); no R & D; 
negligible price incentives for quality (top- 
bottom); inefficient mechanisms for surplus 
transfers to slump periods and productive 
investment
• infrastructure: high transport costs, obsolete 
processing assets
• social, opportunistic behaviour and clashes 
with wage labourers; distrust, high cost o f  
labour supervision and barrier for higher 
quality
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“Based on Tlacolulan producers’ census (March 1995), meetings with producers and field visits in 12 coffee producer ejidos in Atzalan, and participant observation of 
several peasant household (mainly Laureano Hernandez in SPA, Cirilo Moguel and Gabino Monfil in El Jardin, and Gaudencio Claudio in Tlacolulan). 
b Based on interviews and participant observation in several ranchero households, fmcas and pulping centres (Pablo Garcia in Equimite, Victor Ramirez in El Jardin, 
Pablo Guerrero in Las Flores, Jacobo Guzman Jr. in SPA). 
c Based on interviews and participation observation in growers’ households, wet processing beneficios and plantations (Rolando Topete’s 75 ha plantation in Loma 
Bonita, Agustin Bello’s 110 ha fmcas in San Carlos, and Andres Villasefior Jr.’s 54 ha plantation in Los Naranjos).
Source: Fieldwork 1995-97 (see index of interviews, focus groups and field visits in Appendix No 8).
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Based on the field data I gathered in land use in Atzalan ejidos -mainly San Pedro 
Altepepan, Equimite, Las Flores, El Jardin and Tlacolulan- it is possible to reconstruct a 
broad picture o f how coffee has been historically associated with maize and other crops.
Graphic No. 1
Evolution of a typical coffee producer's landholding in Atzalan
3.5
Coffee 
Maize 
Other crops
2.5 -
03
X
0.5
1920-3Os 1940-5Os 1960-70s 1980-90s
Source. Fieldwork
Note: other crops are fruit trees, grassland, sugar cane and beans in the 1920s to 1950s;
orange and plantain trees and beans from the 1960s up to now.
If we compare the two extreme points, we can observe, apart from the reduction in size 
of landholdings, a shift from maize/coffee to coffee/maize, entailing drastic economic 
and social change. Behind this process o f commoditisation, there was a complicated 
land reform and an important expansion o f  regional communications and productive 
infrastructure financed by federal programmes during the 1960s and 1970s. ‘Modem’ 
coffee cropping and citrus agribusiness developed very quickly in the 1960s, precisely 
when maize registered a steady decline, hitting crop patterns o f peasant agriculture.
Once the economic and institutional environment stopped being favourable to 
traditional crops as well as to coffee (particularly after the mid-1980s), most peasant 
groups in Atzalan -  who used to produce surpluses o f maize and beans - started a slow 
coffee cropping technology adjustment. They reduced land allocated to food staples, 
and those who were rapidly becoming specialised coffee producers, started to rebuild 
their maize self-consumption capacity and diversify their cash-crops patterns, and all 
introduced oranges and plantains. The length and distance o f labour migration flows 
increased considerably. Despite many attempts at shifting cash crops (from coffee to
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vanilla, citrus and macadamia nuts), steep slopes and cold weather, as well as envy and 
petty robbery, became major barriers for diversification and innovation.
With the 1989-94 coffee crisis small coffee producers in Atzalan undertook 
considerable adjustment of cropping patterns (see Table No. 9). Peasants were always 
reluctant to increase coffee densities per hectare above the level they felt able to 
manage, both in terms of family labour and input costs. Half of the harvest was 
concentrated in two peak months (December and January) and the average picking 
capacity of an adult is 60kg per journal. This means that the maximum capacity of a 
nuclear family (3 fully able adults or the equivalent combining women’s and children’s 
labour) would be in the range of 14 Qq/ha a month. With more members or access to 
labour exchange networks, one family could increase its picking capacity to 16-18 
Qq/ha. If they had more than one hectare -  which is common - the equilibrium point is 
lower than that: the higher the total coffee output, the lesser the ability of a family to 
cope with harvests on its own. The average yields in Atzalan in the first half of the
17ft1990s fluctuated between 16 and 10 Qq/ha. In this respect, peasants rely on their own 
labour and prefer to reduce all kinds of cash payments (wage labour and 
agrochemicals). Instead of maximising overall output per hectare, peasants maximise 
the health and productivity of each tree (reached at 1,333/ha);179 in other words, they 
minimise the level of attention to the finca  and extend the life span of the trees.
Although Atzalan is a rather traditional coffee producer region, it did not fare badly 
during the crisis, compared to other coffee producer regions in Veracruz (Atzalan 10 
Qq/ha against 8Qq/ha in most of the state and 12Qq/ha in more modem coffee 
producing regions of Cordoba and Huatusco). This can be explained by two main 
reasons; first, the stronger effect of the crisis in regions more dependent on input, credit 
and technical assistance; and second, the differential effect of plants neglect and soil 
exhaustion on the same regions.
Ranchero coffee producers reacted to the crisis differently than small peasant producers. 
Here I demonstrate the differences through a comparative analysis of typical production 
costs, beginning with a ranchero commodity producer’s finca , in which the landowner 
was able to sustain the IMC technology package.
178 Consejo Veracruzano del Cafd, Unidad de Apoyo a la Production, 1997.
179 See footnote 44
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TABLE No. 7
IMC’s Technology and Best 
Practices for Small Producers 
(mid 1980s)
Atzalan Coffee-Producing Peasants’ 
Adjusted IMC package (1992-95)
Tree density Semi-intensive density and 
specialized plantations:
a) 1-666 to 2,222 plants/ha180
b) use of specialized shade
Mixture from rustic (25%) to semi- 
intensive densities:
a) Less than 1,300 plants/ha
b) Diversified shade (orange & 
plantains)
Coffee
variety
Use of HYV such as dwarf red 
caturra and F-6 Gamica
Mixed varieties (former HYV mundo 
novo and bourbon and even traditional 
typical)
Coffee
pruning
2 prunings (rejuvenation and 
formation)
1 partial pruning (clearing off  
unproductive branches; a 1/3 o f  
producers did nothing)
Shade
pruning
1 tree shade pruning (Ingas 
species) to have homogeneous 
80% shade
None (most do not have specialised, 
inga’s shade)
Renovation Renovation o f a third o f the 
plantation every 5-8 years
None
Weeding 2-3 weedings (using machete to 
avoid erosion)
Only 1st weeding, before harvest 
(using herbicide FAENA and 
machete)
Fertilisation 2 applications o f fertilisers (10- 
12-16 formulae)
0-1, 25 % applied only one after 
harvest, using generic urea: (NH2) 
2CO
Pesticides
use
Use o f agrochemicals to control 
pests and illnesses
None (there was mild occurrence o f  
leaves rust or roya)
Replanting Nursery’s seedlings for partial 
renovation and plants 
substitution
20% substituted dead plants (using 
fallen beans -naturally sprout- as 
seedlings)
Yield Mean yield o f 20 Qq/ha Actual average yield o f 10 Qq/ha
Source: Based on a survey o f small coffee producers in the state o f Veracruz (Diaz 
1992), and fieldwork during 1995 and 1996.
180 As IMC research specialist, Villasefior did experiments in Mexico with 11 different densities -from  
833 to 6,664 trees/ha- during 8 cycles and found that the optimum combined yield (kg/plant and Qq/ha) 
was 2,222 plants/ha. However, at single-tree level the highest y ield  was obtained with 1,333 plants/ha. 
See Villasefior 1991:59.
181 Producers recognised the need of fighting pests and plagues -and  have the skills to do it- but had no 
means of buying the required chemicals, despite calculating a net loss o f 15-20% of the expected harvest. 
Diaz P. 1992:56.
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TABLE No. 8
Annual
Qt
Labour (journal) Inputs
Qt Cost $ Subtot Qt Cost $ Subtot
Weeding 4 3 15 180 21
Faena
42 336 516
Fertilisation 2 3 15 90 10 urea 
50 kg- 
sacks
60 1,200 1,290
Pruning 1 20 15 300 - 300
Replanting 
(1 l-seeds 
nursery & 
transplantin 
g)
1 12 15 180 !/4 urea 
50-kg 
sack
60 15 195
Harvest 1 67*
*
0.58/kg 2,320 - 2,320
Total 117 3,070 1,551 4,621
Source: Interview with Pablo Garcia, El Equimite, 8-March-1995
* Based on a coffee finca o f almost plain sun, semi-intensive technology (1,600 trees/ha) with a 
productivity o f 16 Qq/ha (4,000 kg/ha), (current N$/ha, March 1995).
** Based on a handpicking rate o f 60kg per journal.
It is important to observe that the normal yield on a representative semi-intensive 
ranchero coffee finca (see Table 3 portrait o f Pablo Garcia’s 24 Qq finca ) was reduced 
by a third because o f more than five years o f crisis (low prices, frost and IMC 
withdrawal) to only 16 Qq. The key feature o f modem coffee technology is an 
intensification o f the natural productivity o f plants through fertilisers (28% of total
costs) and the regeneration o f productive tissues (pruning + replanting = 10% of total
1 8 0costs). In a plain sun plantation, weeds grow faster and are more persistent. In this 
case, Garcia did 4 weedings (11% of costs) and applied a systemic herbicide to save 
labour.
Labour is always a major cost component in modem technology plantations (the higher 
the productivity, the larger the harvest labour costs). In Garcia’s finca, coffee picking 
represented half o f overall crop costs and if  all labour concepts are considered these rise 
to 2/3 o f total costs.
182 In this exercise Pablo Garcia did not consider strict renovation, which is a major capital investment in 
modem technology plantations.
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Graphic No. 2
Cultivation costs in a ranchero finca, Equimite, 1995
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Graphic No. 3 
Labour and input costs in a ranchero coffee finca, 
Equimite, 1995
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If we turn to an average peasant finca (like those found in Tlacolulan), it is possible to 
note structural differences in coffee management.
Table No. 9
Annual Labour (jornal) Inputs Total
Qt Qt CostS Subtot Qt CostS Subtot $
Weeding l l 15 15 21
Faena
42 84 99
Fertilisation l 3 15 45 8 urea
50kg-
bags
60 480 525
Replanting l 2 15 30 - 30
Pruning l 10 15 150 - 150
Harvest l 25** 0.58/kg 870 - 870
Total 41 1,110 564 1,674
Source: Tlaco ulan coffee producers’ census, March-1995.
* Based on coffee fincas mixed technology (1,100 trees/ha) with a productivity o f 6 Qq/ha 
(1,500 kg/ha). In current N$/ha, March 1995.
** Based on a handpicking rate o f 60kg per journal.
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Graphic No. 4
Labour and input costs in a peasant finca, Tlacolulan, 1995
Labour
15%
The 1994-95 harvest was not typical because o f good prices and the peso devaluation o f  
December 1994 that improved the terms o f  exchange for coffee. In previous years, even 
rancheros had cut down considerably the standard maintenance o f coffee fincas. 
Peasants’ fincas were in very poor condition because they had concentrated in off-farm 
jobs and sustaining maize and bean crops.
Given these considerations, it is possible to draw some comparative perspectives 
outlined in Table 9:
Table No. 10
Ranchero finca Peasant fincas
Per ha Per Qq Per ha Per Qq
Total costs 4,621 289 1,674 279
Labour costs 3,070 192 1,110 185
Inputs costs 1,551 97 564 94
Monetary costs 77% ~ 34% —
Labour/inputs 2:1 — 6:1 —
Gross benefit a 6,579 411 2,526 421
Labour returns b 2,025 126 2,785 464
Wage coffee labour0 10 — 14 —
Capital returns d 84% — 22% —
a Production value - total costs of production
b Theoretical wages of non-paid family labour + theoretical dividends to labour capital (gross 
benefit/non-paid labour investment) 
c Labour returns / 200 days coffee cycle
d Gross benefit / monetary production costs (as a proxy to capital investment) 
e Production valudjornales
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For both, ranchero and peasant producers coffee cropping is a source of self- 
employment, but much more so for peasants. For the latter, family and unpaid exchange 
labour are the only sources of labour, and its theoretical market value is six-fold the 
investment in productive inputs. During the crisis years peasants reduced the use of 
inputs even more. For rancheros around 2/3 of all labour has to be hired and the ratio 
labour/inputs is only 2 to 1.
If we consider coffee to be a source of employment rather than a profit-making
183business, peasants were very efficient in creating relatively well-remunerated jobs. 
Peasant coffee producers were able to draw high returns to labour, considered as the 
theoretical wages of non-paid family labour plus the dividends to labour capital, and a 
mean coffee wage of 14 pesos (calculated as the daily returns to labour during the 200- 
day coffee cycle), that is almost the market value of the jornal (N$15). It is a reasonable 
income because they do not spend 200 jornoles, nor in coffee only. Although peasants 
invest around 41 effective jomales, they have to stretch labour time because of weather 
conditions (several days of intense rain and cold at harvest time or extreme heat during 
summer). On the other hand, the total output in peasants’ coffee fincas considers 
intercropped orange and plantain trees and by-products (firewood), most of it for self­
consumption.
Rancheros obtained a reasonable return to capital (quite above the normal rate of 
interest), while peasants did not get any real return to monetary investments (if inflation 
is considered).
As already mentioned, this snapshot of coffee fincas has several limitations. During the 
harvest, coffee prices changed considerably, so average prices were a bit lower than 
reported here (for March 1995). Actual returns were also lower due to inflationary 
pressures and the peso devaluation. As I argued in critically assessing the models 
employed by economists, a full coffee cycle has to be considered to make serious
1 O A
calculations.
183 This coincides with similar findings in Colombia among peasant producers, which are predominant in 
coffee (with less than 2 has). See Forero, 1999.
184 The indicators presented here as orders■ of measure (not the figures on their own), are useful to 
understand the logic of peasant coffee production.
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4.4.2 Access to land and social networks: are they poverty traps too?
One o f  the main components o f peasant livelihoods in Atzalan is access to social 
networks, and land is at the centre o f those agrarian society entitlements. Landholding 
rights in SPA imply having ejido grants or access to customary exchange and other 
informal market arrangements. The difference among communities is the density o f  
social networking, which allows peasants access to land, the basis o f  community 
membership and o f coffee producing livelihoods. Access to land is achieved through a 
wide array o f arrangements, from allowances from better off relatives to traditional 
rentals, as well as many variants o f sharecropping.
According to a coffee producers sample I carried out in Tlacolulan in 1995, there 
were 66 small producers with access to land (263.5 ha), either o f  their own or held 
through different exchange arrangements (called provisionally “rentals”). Around 
three quarters o f the land was held as ejido “property”, and 23% -  also ejido land - was 
“rented in” from relatives in Tlacolulan and from neighbouring communities via 
informal, unpaid or traditional arrangements (see Graphic No. 5).
Graphic No.5
Coffee producers' agrarian structure in Tlacolulan,
1995
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In terms o f land use , 38% was cultivated with coffee (specialised and most o f it 
associated with other crops), 35% with maize (apart from some maize intercropped with 
coffee), 14% was grassland and the remaining 13% was for the most part stony, idle 
land, apart from some patches o f  beans and backyard orchards.
1851 conducted a non-discriminating sample of all coffee producers present in Tlacolulan in March 1995 
that compared favourably with the 1994-95 Coffee Support Program INI-PNS Census,; both registered the 
same total coffee land (90 ha) and similar number of producers, 66 in my sample and 74 producers INI- 
PNS. Considering that the programme’s census had some errors (2 duplicated names and beneficiaries 
without coffee), the sample was a consistent census.
186 People referred to sharecropping-like, traditional rentals and all kinds of concessions as “rentals”.
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Graphic No. 6 
Use of land in Tlacolulan, 1995
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“Leaseholdings” were intensively used for maize and coffee crops, allocating relatively 
higher weight to maize than ejido landowners.
Graphic No. 7 
Use of Ejido Leaseholdings in Tlacolulan, 1995
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Access to land was unequal. More than half o f  the land was held by 16 “landed’5 
ejidatarios (with 9 ha each on average), while the upper medium strata (2-3 ha) held 
21% o f the ejido land. The interesting phenomenon is that 20 “landless”188 coffee 
producers with no ejido “property” -  ejidatario descendants and avecindados 
(inhabitants) - were able to get hold o f 16% of ejido lands through different 
arrangements. At the opposite extreme, microfundia ejidatarios with less than 2 ha 
(N=14) accounted for only 9% of total land in the sample.
187 Landholdings of 9 ha - with a coffee finca of 3 ha - cannot be considered as typical of a landed group, 
given the Tlacolulan agrarian structure there is a clear gap between them and the under-2 ha groups.
In SPA landless day workers are hardly ever coffee producers, except for ejidos in which two 
conditions are common, one, social networks facilitating land-labour exchange and, two, fractions of land 
are available to the poor because productive use for them is not cost-effective (they are distant and/or bad 
quality).
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Graphic No. 8 
Access to ejido land by strata, Tlacolulan, 1995
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Along the same lines, the ability to “rent in” land was also unequal across strata (see 
Graphic No 9). Small ejidatarios (with less than 2 ha) were also the least able to take in 
additional land (altogether 11% of total exchanged land). The “landless” stratum was 
the most capable o f taking in land (more than two thirds o f all “rented” land). The next 
stratum with more leases (15.1%) was the upper-medium one (2-3 ha). The upper 
stratum was the only one “renting out” land (28 ha) to Tlacolulan coffee producers, 
mainly to relatives (the other 32 ha were rented-in from neighbouring ejidos and to a 
lesser extent private properties). This means that the upper stratum was the centre o f a 
network o f land (and labour) exchange, as well as the central node o f a political kinship 
network (see footnote 50).
Graphic No. 9 
Access to land by strata, Tlacolulan, 1995
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The average landholding in Tlacolulan was 4.0 ha, including coffee finca and milpa 
(maize) plots o f almost the same size (around VA ha). The picture o f land use changes -  
particularly for maize - if we take into account stratification. While coffee fincas tend to
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be even across strata (just above one hectare, except for under 1 ha strata), maize fields 
are unequal. For the three lower strata, maize fields are smaller than coffee fincas, but 
for the upper strata they are equal or bigger than fincas. This has to do with 
minifundistas’ labour constraints (they rely more on seasonal wage labour) and, 
although coffee is more flexible to manage, it is also a perennial crop that cannot be 
easily adjusted. While maize tends to fit in accessible land, coffee tends to adapt to 
available labour. Landed ejidatarios have a double interest in maize, it feeds livestock -  
bovines, working animals and backyard species - and provides a marketable surplus, 
profitably, because of subsidies (allocated per hectare). On the other hand, better 
endowed ejidatarios are less attracted to establishing bigger coffee fincas (only one had 
a 3 ha finca) because of the risks involved, particularly the high financial cost of 
harvest. At the same time landed ejidatarios had grassland for small-scale cattle 
ranching and maintaining working animals; small patches of beans for self-consumption 
and only a few had specialised plantain and orange fields. Minifundistas had no 
specialised fields other than maize milpas; they associated coffee with citrus, plantains 
and other productive shade trees. Only in cases of extreme hardship, did poor families 
start to intercrop maize and beans in their abandoned coffee fmcas, cutting down shade 
trees.
Most minifundistas grew milpas in the best available land, and only planted small 
amounts of squash and beans.189 If they owned only bad quality land, they preferred to 
plant coffee and rent in suitable land for maize cultivation from relatives or neighbours. 
Again, the poorest landless were the ones taking rent-free patches of bad-quality land to 
produce low maize and beans yields.
One of the striking features of the ejido land-market in Tlacolulan was the importance 
of “rentals” and the number of the landless peasants (20 out of 66 coffee producers) 
having regular access to land through customary arrangements. As the following table 
shows, there is a high demographic pressure on land met by a flexible and informal land 
market, which allow the landless poor to produce as much foodstuffs and coffee as 
average landed ejidatarios. The strong complementarity between coffee and maize crops 
is explained by seasonality, but also by labour and income synergies: the first coffee
189 The narrow variety of associated crops in both maize fields and coffee fincas shows the level of 
deterioration of traditional milpas and shaded fincas. Varied patterns of association relate to complex 
agricultural cycles, a wealth of agricultural knowledge and cultural continuity (locally adapted varieties, 
soil preservation and poly-cropping technologies, biodiversity balance). See Moguel & Toledo, 1996; 
Netting, 1993 and Rice & Ward, 1996.
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incomes are used to prepare the land for tonamile maize crop; maize harvests sustain the 
household for several months while the household head works elsewhere; finally wage 
labour finance the coffee harvest.
Graphic No. 10
Percapita landholdings and use of land by strata, Tlacolulan, 1995
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There are many incentives to rent in land. It is a way out o f  landlessness as ejidatario s 
descendants start planting coffee trees in easy-access lands and build up savings via 
gradual improvements. Tenants are free from ejido collective duties (collective works -  
or faenas - twice a month and many more cash or in-kind contributions), and at the 
same time are able to receive income support from state programmes. Some indicators 
show that they profit from this situation (they tend coffee trees better and have yields as 
good as landed ejidatarios).
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Table No. 11
Strata Total
land
Rent in land Coffee land Maize land
(1) (2) (2/1) Tot
0 )
Rent
(4)
(4/3
)
Tot (5) Rent
(6)
(6/5)
(ha) N = (ha) (ha) % % (ha) (ha) % (ha) (ha) %
landless 20 41.15 40.78 67.37 99.10 23.55 21.38 90.7
9
17.90 16.90 94.41
0.1-1.0 7 9.40 4.75 7.85 50.53 5.50 2.00 36.3
6
3.50 2.50 71.43
1.1-2.0 7 14.00 2.00 3.30 14.29 8.60 0.50 5.81 5.50 1.50 27.27
2.1-3.0 16 56.00 9.00 14.87 16.07 21.00 3.00 14.2
9
21.00 6.00 28.57
Above 5 16 144.00 4.00 6.61 2.78 27.50 2.00 7.27 35.00 2.00 5.71
TOTAL 66 264.55 60.53 100.00 36.42 86.15 28.88 30.9
0
82.90 28.90 34.86
Source: Coffee producers’ sample, Tlaco ulan, March 1995.
As Table 10 shows, in 1994-95, total exchanged land in Tlacolulan -  excluding 
purchases - was 60.5 ha, 25% of all agricultural lands. This is a very high proportion 
compared to traditional rural land rental markets in Mexico and Latin America.190 This 
exchange considered family concessions, traditional rents and sharecropping-like 
contracts, all of them informal arrangements.
The high proportion of “rentals” has several possible explanations:
• Exchange incentives. There are always patches of unsuitable land (exhausted, 
stony or close to mountainous areas where wild animals cause heavy losses), and 
excess land amongst labour-scarce families and the elderly or disabled; these 
lands are underused and open for the needy. Ejidos'> land grants were made out 
of several fractions, hence distant parcels are quite often hired or sold.
• Social sanctions and networks. Better-off ejidatarios feel socially obligated to 
help less fortunate relatives through customary land arrangements (concessions, 
fixed rent or sharecropping contracts); old-age parents bargain help from 
siblings retaining land rights and exchanging land for labour either through fixed 
rent in kind, or access to land in exchange of tending an elder’s finca or milpa. 
At the same time, there were some former ejidatarios, fed up with ejido 
contributions and faenas (collective work), who decided to get rid of their land 
rights and rent in land instead without the burden of social obligations.
• Capture o f  handouts. The former IMC’s subsidies and income support 
programmes created incentives for agricultural production and land use (food 
and coffee crops), so people tended to subdivide -  sometimes deceitfully - one 
ejido parcel into several parcels, increasing the number of eligible beneficiaries 
within a family.
It is not easy to make a clear-cut differentiation, particularly between the first two forms 
in which exchange incentives usually mix up with social sanctions (these are precisely 
socially embedded markets). It is really difficult to ascertain -  even for local ejidatarios 
- the extent of artificial land partitions, because there are extended families in which 
married siblings still live and work together with their parents and other brothers 
(regularly during the first years in which the new family has few and young children). 
Later on, new families separate completely and form nuclear families with their own
190 The range of land rentals in Latin American countries is between 5 and 15% (see Diaz et al 2002), 
while official agencies in Mexico have always underestimated this phenomena with figures below 5%, 
Tlacolulan figures compare closely with rates in Asia (30%).
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land. But this issue also has to be seen the other way around, for coffee producers have 
also influenced state agencies’ policies, according to local custom and practices. In any 
case, my guess is that in my database no more than 5% of “rentals” could be considered 
artificial land exchange contracts.
Graphic No. 11 shows different land exchange arrangements that are classified in paid 
and non-paid terms. There were 36 coffee producers in Tlacolulan engaged in 56 
different bilateral deals with a total of 60.5 ha. In the case of traditional rents, these 
were clearly the vast majority (71% of the total surface), whereas all kinds of 
allowances represented 29%.
Graphic No. 11 
Land exchange contracts in Tlacolulan, 1995
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Traditional rentals were always fixed-rate in-kind, although there were exceptions 
according to a field’s productive conditions or other special circumstances. Several 
tensions arise from these arrangements. Upholding fixed-rates for a crop with 
historically increasing yields (coffee) creates an additional incentive for entrance 
through renting in lands. In the case of maize - with decreasing yields - peasants try to 
keep leases to a minimum, although some -  with clean milpas- get access to 
Procampo’s income support.
There were many kinds of allowances. The first one is outright support for those 
relatives who need it most (new families, sick and landless poor). A second one 
involves the bargaining process of inheritance (it takes the form of an exchange contract 
of mutual support between the parents who give out land and the sibling who works 
their lands). The third one consists of a form of exchanging land (for maize cropping 
during two or three years) and labour (for clearing forestland or weeding grassland or
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fincas). The last one is a temporal concession (newly established fincas, frost damaged 
or in the process of renovation).
Access to suitable lands for maize requires annual negotiations that usually involve 
social ties of a different nature. A family has commonly several possible sources of land 
based on different networks from kinship to labour exchange and godparenthood 
networks among upper strata families.191
In the case of coffee allowances or rentals, there is a particular method of land clearance 
improvements. Since coffee was first cultivated by land-claimant peasants in Atzalan, 
an unusual market exchange of coffee plants emerged, allowing tenants with no secure 
property rights to move flexibly “coffee capital”. That practice is very much alive. 
Underused poor-quality lands are commonly offered for clearance, rent-free during two 
or three years. Poor peasants can take a small plot (1 ha or so) to establish a coffee finca 
and then when a good opportunity or need arises, they can sell the trees to the landlord 
or somebody else. In this way, landless peasants are able not only to access land and 
build up coffee capital savings of some importance, but sometimes they can get land of 
their own (either buying the land they were renting or selling the trees to buy better land 
elsewhere).
Drawing on my interviews with producers (not statistically representative), there is 
evidence of a very dynamic ejido land market during the coffee crisis (1989-1994). In 
that period Tlacolulan coffee producers bought and sold around 89.7 ha in 20 
transactions,192 equivalent to all coffee lands and a third of the total cultivated lands in 
1995. Out of the 89.7 ha, 59% was exchanged among local families, a third was bought 
outside Tlacolulan (in the bordering ejidos) and only 8% was sold to outsiders. Around 
half of these sales did not involve coffee, but an attempt to eliminate unbearable ejido 
contributions, unload undesirable lands or simply moving for different reasons (old age, 
violence). The other half of transactions related in one way or another to the price
191 God-parenthood provides an extensive network of potentially useful relations (Wolf 1966 called them 
vertical-dyadic-manystranded coalition). That is why better-off rancheros or local bosses are sought after 
as godparents, while poor people have fewer of these connections. In El Jardfn I conducted an extensive 
investigation of god-parenthood networking and found a close relationship between wealth and the 
number of god-parenthood links, with a few exceptions (prestigious people like coffee leaders or 
teachers). El Jardin 5.13. See Gil Mendieta and Schmidt for a social networks analysis of political power 
in Mexico (1999).
192 Most transactions were made after 1992, when the constitutional agrarian reform took place, but I have 
no means of establishing a cause-effect relationship, since the coffee crisis, which reached its bottom in 
1992, could have had a stronger effect.
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slump: people selling and leaving for good or clearing part of their assets (debts, 
survival) and those taking the opportunity to increase landholdings at cheap prices.
Land markets in Tlacolulan, 1990s 
Graphic No. 12
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Coffee producers underwent a transition from specialised coffee production towards 
associated fincas using a diverse mix of cash crops and food staples. Most producers 
faced the crisis not by intensifying coffee productivity, nor abandoning coffee altogether 
(the two foreseen scenarios by officials and specialists of international organisations). 
Among the mainstream adjustments they introduced were:
1. Asset liquidation, during more than 5 years of problems (triple crisis: IMC 
privatisation, price slump and the 1989 frost) many people had to consume and 
sell livestock, trucks and even land to get by. The 1994-95 recovery served to 
rebuild the backyard economy (many producers I interviewed were buying piglets 
and poultry), to invest in house improvements and tending their crops).
2. Food staples, cut down total maize and beans surface to a minimum just to cover 
consumption needs and get income support (Procampo).
3. Finca pattern, remove partially unproductive shade trees (ingas) to interplant 
orange and plantain tress and, in the case of land-scarce producers, even maize 
and beans.
4. Coffee maintenance, reduce considerably the number of weeding, pruning, 
fertilisation and other maintenance jobs to a minimum, but with the recovery they 
did not manage to bring maintenance back to normal.
5. Wage labour, the pattern of local migration changed to longer distance and 
periods of labour migration (for the first time massive flows to the USA and major
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cities in Mexico). However, better prices for coffee in 1995 induced many 
migrants to come back to tend fincas and maize fields
6. Other coping activities’, women started to complement the family income with 
petty trade, catering and other local jobs, as well as finding alternative foodstuffs 
(they rediscovered plantain tortillas and the use of wild herbs); some men went 
fishing and even stealing (all of which created conflicts). This trend went on 
beyond the short-lived recovery.
These reactions had clear limits. All of them depended on compensating for losses and 
establishing conditions for another cycle. Under-consumption has to be met at some 
point with “normal” consumption -  if not over consumption - depleted assets (tools, 
livestock and cash savings) have to be refilled and so on, otherwise the family 
undergoes absolute impoverishment and cannot face the agricultural cycle which 
requires energy, planning, minimum assets and social arrangements (labour exchange, 
land clearance). In relatively more specialised coffee producer communities (like 
Equimite or San Pedro Altepepan) or in the land-scarce lowland ejidos, mass migration 
became a structural change. Many families did not come back and some disintegrated; 
only very few managed to introduce some changes in land-use patterns (specialised 
plantain and orange fields). A small group of producers entered the business of 
intermediation (coffee, plantains, pigs, petty trade); they usually had little or no land at 
all, but had social connections, marketing skills and small savings.
Tlacolulan offers the imprint of a cooperative model based on social networks of land 
and labour exchange, coffee marketing and governance.
4.4.3 Strategies to face the labour problem
The labour intensity of coffee cropping - a common argument in explaining small
producers’ presence in the market - involves several issues. Uneven mountain lands,
dispersion of fruit in several branches and different ripening rhythms through the coffee
1harvest hindered complete mechanisation. As long as these structural constraints are 
not overcome and labour remains relatively cheap and abundant, coffee in most 
producing regions will be picked by hand, and selectively. Recent history seems to
193 Modem coffee technology -  Green Revolution type - was developed from the 1950s, making possible 
a mechanised and almost automated cropping system. There are in use motor shakers and multi-fingered 
harvesters, none of which have produced efficient results. They damage coffee plants and collect 
unevenly ripened cherries, apart from requiring widely spaced coffee rows on even ground.
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favour flexible labour arrangements based on small producers’ family labour and/or 
landless workers.
Capitalist units (usually plantation grower-processor-exporters) may well encounter 
three problems by introducing more efficient technologies: reliable labour supply, 
gwa/z'/y-deteriorating factors and competitive financial services. In any case, the most 
productive technology depends on substantial working capital. To figure out how 
important this dependency is, we could use the metaphor of ecological friction: the 
more modem coffee cropping speeds up production and distances itself from the natural 
environment of coffee, the greater the demands on capital to compensate for at least 
three main imbalances: soil exhaustion and plant over-aging; a higher level of pests, 
plague and diseases; and loss of some natural qualities of coffee.
The ecological milieu stops working for the modem coffee system, the way it works for 
peasants’ diversified fincas, where the bond coffee/ecological niche has not been totally 
upset. Without an array of suitable institutions and organisations (financial, research and 
technical assistance), big modem coffee plantations are very vulnerable.
Labour amounts to about 50 to 90% of total coffee cultivation costs worldwide, 
depending on the choice of technology. It follows that the key to understand producers’ 
strategies is timely supply and efficient use of labour. During the crisis of the 1990s 
(there was only a slight price recovery in the 1993-94 harvest), small-scale producers 
adapted primarily through increased wage work and reshaping cropping patterns: they 
strengthened food-staples production, and resized and altered coffee fincas, making an 
intensive use of available land and labour.
To face labour needs, the family unit can follow a combination of alternatives: adjusting 
the size of the coffee grove (to available household land and labour) and hiring 
jornaleros. The problem with using wage labour is three-fold. First, the family unit 
enters a tighter competition to keep up with wages paid elsewhere (Martinez’s sugar 
refining mill, citrus and pineapple plantations, and also coffee growers). Second, 
peasants’ chronic cash shortages, make the use of credit necessary, but this is scarce, 
expensive and only available from buyers and local merchants. When coffee prices are 
low, credit, inputs and even wage labour are not affordable to small producers. And 
finally, the problem of efficiency, since temporary piece-rate pay is a disincentive 
selective picking of properly ripened cherries. Jornaleros tend to find their way around
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the payment regime, speeding up cherry collection by strip picking or “branch milking”. 
This practice damages plant branches and lowers the net yield of coffee beans (green 
berries do not develop weight, nor quality in the cup), resulting in productive losses and 
price discounts.
During slumps coffee groves are neglected, and then job opportunities in the coffee 
sector decrease. Under such conditions day labourers, landless peasants and many small 
coffee producers prefer to migrate to lowland citrus and pineapple plantations and 
nearby cities, because they get better wages there. With good coffee prices in a 
minifundista region, labour becomes scarce and wages go up because everybody gives 
priority to his own flnca and the need for supplementary incomes diminishes. Only 
landless locals and some immigrants engage in wage labour on a full-time basis.
The vast majority of Atzalan small producers confine themselves to a short business 
process in the coffee chain, cultivating and selling fresh coffee cherries, that is why they 
are known as cerecero producers.194 Ripened cherries tend to fall and spoil, and after 
picked, cherries last around 24 hours only. As a consequence, producers have no 
flexibility to wait, not even a few days, for a more advantageous market price. In 
contrast, pergaminero producers pulp and dry their own coffee beans (parchment) and 
are able in principle to wait months to market their beans, and have additional 
bargaining power, if they have adequate storing facilities and financial support (which is 
usually not the case).
Atzalan producers have historically drawn to some extent on self-reliance strategies 
intensively using family labour (self-employment and wage labour) and ejido lands. As 
has been seen, there are arrangements between ejidatarios and their relatives and 
neighbours for exchanging labour (prestamo de trabajo), which is a way of 
concentrating family non-paid work at peak times. Even hiring wage labour for coffee 
harvests or maize sowing can be considered -  under certain conditions - an indirect 
labour exchange in terms of time.195
194 Pulping and drying coffee cherries are labour intensive processes, which require infrastructure and 
enough sun-light during the harvest season. In Mexico most Pacific-coast coffee producer regions have 
evolved from cherry to parchment production, but in Veracruz - in the eastern Golf coast - around 70% 
of producers have remained fresh cherry producers. This is the result of natural constraints (high relative 
humidity throughout the harvest season), as well as the concentration of more than half of the national 
‘wet’ processing infrastructure in Veracruz (Diaz P. 1992).
195 When the amount of labour hired approaches the amount of labour sold in the market and, moreover, 
when there is not a rational calculation of the cost-benefit relationship of selling one’s labour over buying
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To intensify the use of family’s work capacities, labour must be freed from a single 
source of income (what peasants call “desembromar” or avoid distracting). Except for 
harvest and weeding, the rest of the cultivation process consists of continuous 
intermingled interventions (a visit to the field might be directed at pruning coffee, but at 
the same time to gather firewood and tend fruit trees). This strategy allows spreading 
out and stretching labour inputs to the limit. Even poor ejidatarios tend to use 
herbicides to reduce manual weeding time and/or avoid hiring labour. The key to this 
type of diversified-risk portfolio strategy is peasants’ ability to engage and disengage 
from markets, adjusting selectively cash crops and wage labour according to perceived 
terms of exchange. Two conditions are necessary to carry out this strategy:
• A buffer economy: access to land and its relatively high carrying capacity are 
convergent conditions combining food crops and backyard livestock; and
• Seasonal labour migration to nearby cities and lowland plantations, which 
supplement on-farm incomes and does not interfere with the maize cycle and 
coffee harvest calendars.
The second option to face labour needs is to adjust the coffee grove size to meet harvest, 
weeding, pruning and fertilising jobs according to family labour. In Atzalan and 
elsewhere,196 there is evidence that historically small-scale producers have adjusted 
coffee fincas to be manageable by the family.
Even if the coffee labour problem seems to be successfully addressed by ejidatario 
landholders, a closer look reveals some ‘fault lines’ in this labour regime (Roseberry 
1995: 18). In first place, small-scale production leads to labour interdependence, but 
also to constraining bottlenecks. Labour requirements concentrate around harvest 
(October-April), particularly during its two-month peak (usually December and 
January). The starting point of the harvest varies within one-month time-span, and the 
ripening pace is uneven as well: first and last pickings are low-yielding, while 
intermediate ones are the best, both in terms of coffee volume and net yield (bean 
weight). The producer's family is usually unable to face the harvest peak on its own. 
Furthermore, in homogeneous microregions, labour demand rises synchronically
others’ labour, these arrangements are not common but happen, particularly among some lowlander and 
highlander families (with different harvest timing).
196 Contrary to the concentration process in Colombia before 1970, three decades later the average size of 
coffee plantations went down from 3.5 to 1.3 ha per head, while total coffee surface decreased 17%. 
Garcia & Ramirez 2000:3.
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creating shortages particularly at the harvest peak. The end results are some fruit losses 
and working schedules bordering physical limits197 - including the contribution of 
women and children (who quite frequently are absent from school during harvests). 
Having said that, it is important to acknowledge that the integration of women and 
children's labour and initiative in the coffee economy (picking and managing arraces), 
tends to favour more open communities.198
But there are two further labour fault lines. Unevenly arranged coffee fields pose the 
problem of labour measurement and exchange reciprocity (for instance, in terms of 
quality pickings), which combined with the synchronicity of coffee ripening in local 
fincas creates the tendency to default on cooperation. Finally, there is the generational 
continuity and capital formation problem. While an important part of ejido landholders 
are aging, young ejidatarios’ descendants are in general not interested in undertaking 
traditional agriculture as a livelihood.199
Small producers make decisions about alternative changes, only after several bad 
harvests, usually 2 to 3 years of very low prices, or even more if job opportunities are 
not available. In the case of Atzalan, coffee producers began migrating to the USA and 
distant cities not in 1989 or even 1990, but mainly in 1992 and 1993.
Labour and input investments are made before knowing actual selling prices, and during 
coffee crisis there is somehow an expectation that prices will improve (past experience 
on cycles). Only when things get really harsh, when there are no other cash incomes 
(plantains, oranges or remittances), nor job opportunities available (known and 
affordable), do small producers make radical changes in their economic strategies.
197 Under 30-34 °C heat and high humidity jornaleros work for no more than 8-9 hours, while peasants 
work in their fincas for 10-12 hours, particularly during the harvest peaks.
198 When picking berries women socialise among themselves and reinforce their bonds with children; 
their “gossiping” can be very influential in community matters. Paramount to better off ejidatario families 
are women’s entrepreneurial ventures investing and increasing coffee incomes. Additionally, women are 
able to keep arraces (last pickings) as savings for the slack season, and they claim this coffee-money as 
retribution to the efforts of themselves and their children. Papua New Guinea presents many similarities 
in women’s bargaining of coffee incomes (Sexton 1986, pp. 60-62). Women’s labour outside silk- 
producing peasant households gave place to a “social form” or urban-rural strategy which became 
influential in the early “diffused” industrialisation of the Italian piedmont (Bull and Comer 1993, chapt. 
2-3).
199 I did an informal focus group in SPA’s TV-Secondary School among a dozen older pupils and asked 
them what they would like to be after graduating. Nobody talked about going on to university and the 
great majority hoped for what they considered attractive jobs: truck drivers, retail staff, police guards, and 
so on, that is, low-skill and low-paid urban jobs, but perhaps just above peasant status.
181
The opposite reaction seems to be much faster. Migrants tend to come back after one or 
two good coffee cycles. The price recovery of early 1994 attracted Atzalan peasant- 
workers to the 1994-95 harvest. By the fall of 1995 there were many more people 
coming back, despite the international price reduction, compensated with the peso 
devaluation and income-support programmes.
In short, most small producers add their own labour to the local market in three different 
ways: self-employment in their own coffee fincas, exchange-labour with neighbours or 
family and wage work in growers’ plantations. If we consider the year-to-year 
fluctuations in coffee prices and wage labour in the regional market, we can understand 
why it is difficult to prove the hypothesis that peasants are ready to accept marginal 
returns to labour as the bottom line price for picking, processing and selling coffee.
4.4.4 Subsistence and economic strategies
Family "strategies" rely on "coping" tactics like food and labour self-sufficiency, 
diversified food and cash crops, seasonal wage labour and cooperation, cyclical 
management of resources and consumption. However, few economic strategies account 
for the vast majority of coffee producers reactions to the coffee crisis:
I. The socially isolated poor peasants, with limited access to land and social 
networks, who rely on wage labour, hope to save and invest in land to become 
fully entitled ejidatario. They are highly dependant on rancher os.
II. The organized poor and medium peasants, with complex social networks and 
communal governance structures, establish a certain distance from local elites and 
hope for family improvement. Their strategies (influenced by a traditional- 
religious worldview) are based on an intense use of land, labour and cooperative 
organisation..
III. The specialised coffee producers, linked to local elites with privileged access to 
institutional support (IMC, Banrural, Solidaridad, etc.), have good quality lands 
close to roads. They aim at regional and vertical integration of agribusiness 
activities (coffee, citrus, maize). These specialised producers substitute the 
insurance of social network with specialised knowledge and contacts with market 
and state agents. Most of them are political entrepreneurs (professional peasant 
leaders) and coffee organisations are one of their favourite income capture means 
(see next chapter).
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IV. The small-scale ranchero growers and processors, who benefited from access to 
institutional support and freed themselves from ejido obligations, aim to become 
local entrepreneurs through coffee vertical integration and economic 
diversification. They benefit from ejidatario labourers and costumers (petty trade 
and money lending).
Peasants’ activities show patterns of behaviour and values transcending mere biological 
survival and resistance, although these concepts can be useful to understand rural 
societies. Status achievement, a sense of fairness, and intended efforts to improve the 
next generation's chances of a better life matter too. However, consciousness, awareness 
and formal rationalisation are not always an ingredient of peasant responses. There are 
‘traditional’ systems (social resources and technology) at work allowing individuals not 
to rationalise whole sets and processes, step by step, in terms of time, effort, choice, 
outcomes, monetary costs and gains when these concepts apply. The management of 
cycles is one form, because it provides a structure within which flexible variations 
accommodate. Innovators react creatively making shortcuts and adapting agricultural 
cycles to new challenges and opportunities. They avoid in this way continuous 
reproduction of traditional systems and they are usually located in the upper strata or in 
the outskirts of ejidos, at a distance from local bosses and political factions.200
The problem of effort and taste, frequently neglected in analysing how people meet their 
needs, remains another shortcoming of the survival/basic needs focus. Peasants share an 
aesthetic and affective dimension of life. Along with word playing, hard drinking and 
socialising, flows a rich communicative exchange of experiences, information and 
argumentative talking.201 As a result, there is always an ongoing evaluation of social 
options in the community, which influences individuals’ decisions of either remaining 
on the land (sometimes at a high physical expense) or, walking out to find a job as a day 
labourer in nearby agribusinesses or as worker in the construction industry in the nearest 
cities.
200 Herring (1984) analysed productivity and social consequences of local agrarian settings with highly 
concentrated power structures. Cancian (1992) tested the idea that mid-upper social segments are the most 
prone to change and innovation. According to my fieldwork, the middle strata are the most conspicuous 
innovators, but I also found that social distance from power structures is important.
201 See Kerkvliet (1990) and Ulin (1984) who -  following Winch - argue for the importance of common 
language and language games in understanding social relations and peoples’ rationality (rationality is the 
informal logic of a shared life experience of a community of speakers or a cultural tradition), therefore the 
relevance of anthropological fieldwork.
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What is considered a basic need also varies a great deal, depending on social 
expectations, experience and status, as well as economic strategies. Thus, well-off 
ejidatarios and landowners share a basic ranchero lifestyle. For them the ethics of 
“right” implies: first of all, keeping your business (livestock, fields and other 
businesses) in shape. ; and, secondly, ensuring your family’s health and status while 
maintaining minimum social duties (religious fests, civic contributions and god- 
parenting and some labour alliances with poor peasants).
In contrast, the worldview and ethics of the majority of peasants (“endemic peasants” 
who are landless and minifundista ejidatarios) place family wellbeing as the first “right 
thing to do” (very basic health and food consumption), but this is commonly a collective 
endeavour, involving not only a nuclear but also an extended family. Compared to 
better off families -  who tend to avoid social obligations of food sharing and economic 
support to the needy - poor families rely much more on social networks of help and 
exchange. “Endemic peasants”, who only work outside in nearby labour markets during 
the dry season for no more than a couple of months, can do without many of the items 
of well-off ejidatarios, no matter how desirable they can be for young men and women.
Proletarianisation - as indefinite emigration - can take place on an individual or family 
basis, but it is not always irreversible, not necessarily the result of a cumulative 
impoverishment. Apart from successful stories of people who have returned with 
savings -from the USA and Mexico City - to buy land or livestock, many emigrants kept 
their lands in Atzalan and came back temporarily to collect coffee in the 1994-95 coffee 
price recovery. Among the families that emigrated for good, many stayed in nearby 
cities, sustaining relations with their families and even businesses.
In bad times, the level of attention to all farm activities can be reduced to nil, except for 
maize and beans. The bottom line for food security is access to a piece of land, a few 
kilograms of seeds and some meals to sow a patch of milpa (maize field). Considering 
the social networks, these basic resources are almost guaranteed. A patch of land can be 
borrowed from a relative or a neighbour in exchange for labour or even for free. The 
same applies for maize and bean seeds. It is almost a social obligation to provide those 
in need and ready to work.
Producing maize and beans for self-consumption is for many a safety net, to overcome 
income shortfalls. The fact is that peasants’ ability to produce enough food and to store
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it through the slack season and until the next coffee harvest, has disappeared for 
different social, economic and agroecological reasons.
Coping strategies are rounded up by coffee incomes but, when they fail, basic needs 
change completely. If price drops stretch for many years, as in 1989-93 or 1995-2003, 
the ability of social networks to sustain collective survival diminishes considerably.
Wage labour is a second safety valve because there is always the last resort option of 
going down on a three-hour trip to the citrus export plantations and lowland ranchos to 
harvest, weed and fertilise. This is why, after five years of coffee crisis, many families 
survived without turning to long-term migration and carried on with coffee cropping.
Market forces, not only ‘basic needs’, exercise a strong influence on the amount of 
surplus production. Surplus does not necessarily mean remaining product, after meeting 
household consumption needs (Patnaik 1976 and 1987). It is simply the product sent to 
the market (even at the cost of under-nourishment). ‘Doing without’ can even be 
considered an adaptive strategy in the short term.
4.4,5 Peasant rationality: surplus, productive investment and cooperation
The current price of labour, the previous years’ price for coffee and the overall cost of 
basic consumption goods together influence peasants’ expectations of what is 
considered a ‘good price’. In case of high prices, that is, ‘reasonable’ terms of exchange, 
small producers invest part of their surpluses in coffee and reduce wage labour. In the 
opposite case, ‘bad’ prices for coffee discourage small producers and push them to 
neglect coffee trees, increase the use of wage labour and turn to other cash crops. The 
rationality of different types of producers differs in one specific way, namely their pro­
cyclical or counter-cyclical strategies upon coffee price instability.
The model of producers as rational maximisers following price incentives takes little 
account of the many different and complex rationalities at stake. Most producers in 
fact make rational calculations, but they rely on condensed knowledge frameworks:
202 There is an extensive literature within Economic Anthropology, challenging formal explanations of 
economic rational behaviour. See, in particular, the contributions of Polanyi (1957) on non-market forms 
of exchange and the long debate on the redistributive/differentiating functions of prestige economy (Wolf 
1957, Cancian 1965, Smith 1977, Greenberg 1981 and Korsbaek 1996).
203 Gadamer (1994) distinguishes three types of knowledge: practical, rational and technical knowledge 
(phronesis, episteme and tejne, respectively). Condensed historical knowledge basically corresponds to
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a. Choices about renovation of the stock of trees, either by intensely pruning 
defective plants or by new planting assumes medium- to long-term planning and 
requires institutional incentives (otherwise peasants do these tasks sparingly).
b. Coffee producers change collectively their medium term expectations based on 
the institutional framework of the coffee sector, which determines how fast and 
pressing a crisis is felt by the vast majority of producers (small, medium and 
even big ones), or to what extent booms allow technological modernisation.
c. Coffee producers constantly monitor the terms of trade among different farm 
and off-farm activities. Unless legislated against,204 they move assets across at 
least three economic spheres: food-staples (maize, beans), cash crops (coffee, 
citrus, bananas) and buffer investments used to store and dispose off savings 
(backyard livestock).205
d. Coffee incomes create unequal incentives in different producer regions 
according to prevalent rural livelihoods. Where returns to labour are the key 
feature of small-scale coffee producers’ strategies, and few or no cash generating 
activities are available, a “perverse” reaction to lower than costs of production 
prices can be expected (i.e. carry on the harvest). On the contrary, where labour 
markets are very competitive and coffee productivity is high (wage labour is 
then crucial to pick up the harvest), lower prices for coffee may lead 
immediately to a lower harvest. Five years of crisis -  without state support - 
made plantation growers in southern Brazil move to soy production, while many 
millions of peasants worldwide went on with -  diminished / lower quality - 
coffee production.
One of the most important findings of my research is the fact that small coffee 
producers generate surpluses. But there are not enough, nor sound instruments, for 
surplus savings and productive investments readily available to them. Private banks do 
not offer appropriate services for traditional agriculture, as ejidatarios are not
the practical knowledge, which according to Gadamer has a very different structure from the other two 
forms of didactic knowledge and is derived from the exposure to vital concrete situations.
204 In Kenya there are long standing prohibitions to plant and cut coffee trees in designated areas. During 
the recent crisis Colombia introduced tighter regulations and incentives to restrict coffee planting in 
suitable areas, while in Mexico, the government decided to restrict the establishment of new coffee 
plantations to suitable lands of existing coffee producer regions only.
For Colombia, Junguito and Pizano (1991 and 1997), recognised the importance of this triple synergic 
pattern. In eastern Mexico, Diaz P. (1992) distinguished many more variations to this pattern. See Sexton 
(1986) for Papua New Guinea and for Brazil, Stolcke (1995).
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considered attractive customers (due to high transaction costs and risks, low profitability 
and lack of collateral).206
Thus, surplus is spent on (compensating for postponed) consumption, tonamil maize 
and beans investments, debt repayments, coffee flnca  maintenance, tools, and hard 
drinking.
Coffee income does not only replace coffee producing assets, but also those of 
associated crops and other activities within and outside the finca. Buying and raising 
poultry, pigs and cattle continue to be very important forms of saving and productive 
investment of coffee incomes. In different coffee producer regions, livestock has played
*)(Y1the role of safety net, in case of coffee slumps. In Atzalan communities, pig raismg 
stands out as the most important alternative, due to uneven terrain and the manageability 
of costs (not as high as in the case of bovine cattle).
Non-Catholic coffee producers in the area have undertaken interesting changes in the 
patterns of surplus investing and consumption. Conversion to so-called Protestant sects 
has spread widely in coffee growing communities. Particularly, the Jehovah Witnesses 
(JW) group has increased its membership by a considerable amount, exercising a strong 
influence in local life. According to my observations, they have introduced incentives 
for material and educational improvements (health and cleanness; better nutritional 
habits; prohibition of alcohol and other vices; promotion of literacy), making a positive 
impact on savings, self-help and cooperation.
Although there are also Catholics trying to save and invest in new crops (i.e. specialised 
orange fields), and improve living conditions (i.e. sending children to school), there is a 
lower level of cohesion and organisation among them. Apart from unequal opportunities 
and an individualist behaviour, Catholics criticised JW for their lack of commitment
towards the whole community, moral disguising and even misappropriation of
208resources.
206 There have been new financial projects in rural areas, such as the Cajas Solidarias de Ahorro, which 
have induced saving and borrowing practices, despite some abuses of local bosses.
207 In Colombia there have been incentives to integrate coffee cropping with cattle raising and food- 
staples, not only to counter overproduction of coffee, but to encourage the synergies of the three sectors: 
use of fodder, transformation of coffee pulp into forage and self consumption (Junguito and Pizano, 
1993).
208 I cross-questioned many Catholic and JW coffee producers of SPA and Loma de Las Flores, 
respectively, on the opinion of each other and the apparently higher standards of living and cooperative 
organisation of JW. See interviews to Guerrero family of Loma de las Flores, March 1995, Nb 4.12-4.65,
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There is evidence in other regions of an expansion of Protestant influence, in terms of 
numbers and impact on community life, encouraging scepticism about getting involved 
in local politics and functional organisations and weakening traditional corporatism.209
Regarding the logic of collective action, ejidatarios have different forms of cooperation 
such as faenas (community labour), sharing costs of public works and services. The 
ejido faena is a traditional institution in indigenous and, in general, in peasant 
communities, which consists of a contribution in kind (usually labour or its equivalent 
wage) of all land entitled families, as a duty towards the community. There are also
1 A
coffee co-operatives that have a contradictory relationship with peasants’ strategies.
Co-operatives run high financial costs and risks, while producers frequently get to the
harvest with great cash needs and only hope for selling coffee cherries as soon as
harvested - at the highest price possible. Only a few communities have managed to buy
independently small pulping centres, but they are regularly underused because of the
1 1lack of working capital to buy, process and market at least seco de agua or semidry 
coffee (producing parchment requires big drying patios or driers, as well as financial 
risks).
While giving up otherwise potential profits in processing and collective marketing, 
small coffee producers allocate a higher priority to the whole household economy. They 
lack the material means, social contacts and technical skills of merchants, and they tend 
to distrust co-operatives. Coffee cannot be easily centralised and marketed by common 
peasants, a task which implies either big amounts of money just to buy and resell the 
beans, or strong collective action, trust and marketing expertise.
Conclusions: old and new spaces for peasants in capitalist markets
In the first section of this chapter we evaluated the objective factors of coffee cropping. 
Coffee is a tropical crop with strong colonial roots (the North finances, trades and 
consumes, while the South crops). The natural determinants of coffee cropping
and Catholic priest Juan Vasquez M, of Tierra Nueva church, 28 January 1995, Nb 1.63, among many 
others.
209 David Skerrit, personal communication (June 13, 1996). Similar to Atzalan peasant communities, in 
the neighbouring northern sierra of Puebla state, Garma Navarro (1987: 91-133) found that in Totonacan 
indigenous villages, protestant groups created a balance to local bosses’ power (caciquismo), alternative 
identities and roles for women and youth, and more abilities to adapt to modem capitalist markets. With a 
few exceptions (i.e. schooling, collective works), protestant groups in Atzalan and elsewhere have been 
rather sceptical about getting involved with civic institutions and local government.
210 Chayanov (1966) pointed out that co-operatives fulfil capital’s need of centralising peasants’ 
production, regardless of their political facade.
Paradoxically, higher prices for coffee strangle collective action.
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(climate) are the basis for a prominent presence of highland peasantries worldwide. At 
the same time, the inability of modem technologies to entirely supplant labour - and 
brake the increasing presence of small-scale coffee producers - influence decisively 
labour regimes and price formation in coffee markets.
In the third section of the chapter, the overlapping of cycles affecting the coffee market 
was used as an explanatory hypothesis to overcome the shortcomings of linear 
modelling of mainstream economics and better understand the conflicting interactions 
of different actors of the coffee market. While peasants react in a rather procyclical way, 
entrepreneurs and growers act with more independence from short-term cyclical trends, 
thanks to specialised institutions. Cyclical price slumps recurrently eliminate 
‘inefficient’ commercial producers of all sizes, but traditional coffee cropping systems 
are more resilient and -  under certain conditions - sustainable.
In the last section of this chapter I analysed the subjective factors that help explain the 
position of small-scale producers. Through the analysis of small producers’ strategies 
we found three particular components that are deeply rooted in peasant livelihoods: 
local knowledge and rationality, social networks and bargaining with the state.
First. It takes a long time and skill to master mountain ecosystems to adapt coffee to the 
vagaries of local microclimates. Natural conditions shape coffee systems of
9 1 9production, providing the material basis for differentiated peasant livelihoods. In the 
case of Mexican tropical mountains, peasant communities have recreated Mesoamerican 
cultures and productive wisdom. They have associated coffee with traditional crops like 
maize, allowing small producers to soften the impact of price slumps. In this way coffee 
markets are shaped by peasants’ livelihoods, social networks, cultures and politics, 
explaining why coffee producing basins worldwide share certain characteristics. 
However, peasants’ knowledge and stewardship of coffee is hardly recognised through 
market incentives. Knowledge goes through a complex process of formalisation, 
whereby those who have the institutional means to rate it (through cupping, certification 
and proprietary rights, and sheer marketing) finally appropriate the “hidden qualities” of 
peasant produce. It would be nonsense to grade peasant coffee\ still the best coffees in
212 One of the failures of orthodox Marxism is understanding ecology as a given object of human rational 
activity. Although, Marx in his early writings considered that transforming the nature and material 
conditions of production, humans transform themselves (see Mouzelis, 1979; Giddens, 1997), “Deep 
Ecology” advance a more holistic argument (Capra 1996).
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the world come from shade-grown plantations, traditional or exotic varieties (non- 
HYV), selectively picked cherries and rustically-processed single-origin small batches.
Second. Social networks provide small coffee producers a framework to solve important 
problems such as access to land, exchange labour, knowledge sharing and market 
information, safety nets and marketing coordination. The intensive use of land and 
labour are key components of peasant strategies, not without tensions that are regulated 
through social sanctions. The dispossessed poor in peasant communities are those with 
restricted access to these social networks (disinherited or family-less, limited 
Godparenthood and high-status kin relationships, and interfamily violence).
Third, the international coffee market is a political market, marked by high levels of 
state intervention (if not regulation). Chapter 2 showed to what extent coffee production 
has always been a development policy priority for Mexico. Coffee and agrarian 
conflicts have been very much associated, but land reform has not always been the 
solution to social tensions. State influenced producer organisations along with market 
institutions (laws, regulatory standards and also informal arrangements) have commonly 
solved the coordination problems generated by a labour intensive and geographically 
dispersed crop. Therefore, bargaining with state agencies has been a central component 
of coffee markets, as described in chapter 3. The interaction between peasants, rural 
elites and processing and export companies is mediated by the state. In the 1990s, such 
bargaining changed considerably the agenda from land grants and price setting towards 
income support and alternatives for sustainable rural development on the highlands.
At the same time, more or less corporatist or independent organisations and leaders 
from different backgrounds, ideological bent and commitment to peasant communities 
have mediated bargaining with state agencies. Local bosses, political factions, religious 
groups and local organisations can enhance or weaken social networks, issues that are 
discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
RURAL ELITES AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN THE 
TLAPACOYAN REGION
Research on caciquismo made it clear that power structures played an important role in 
shaping markets (Bartra 1976; Warman 1984; Pare 1982 and Frederich 1986). Social 
anthropology showed caciques as a historical product, which could be traced back to 
colonial times, when old elites were subjugated and incorporated as part of a system of 
indirect rule. However, the most traditional forms of power in indigenous communities 
have more to do with post-independent (XIX century to the present), rather than pre- 
Hispanic, Mexico (Aguirre Beltran 1952 and Korsbaek 1996).
In their attempts to modernise rural Mexico, post-revolutionary policy-makers borrowed 
from anthropological insights and embarked on a crusade for integrating traditional 
communities into a modem Mexican nation-state. In the 1970s the state launched a 
more radical initiative to overcome these structures. The main targets were rural 
marketing structures within important agribusinesses (sugar cane, tobacco, barbasco, 
coffee, etc.). The main regulatory vehicle employed was a wide network of state 
agencies (marketing boards, funds and many other types of state enterprises). A 
condition for state intervention was encouraging peasant organisation as never before, 
this time based on agribusiness and commodity chains. If on one hand, state agencies 
weakened traditional intermediation structures (debt-bondage and traditional 
monopolies were considerably reduced), on the other, they created new spaces for 
intermediaries and widened the political field for caciques. A similar phenomenon 
happened with the neoliberal restructuring of the coffee sector in the 1990s.
By the mid-1980s the political class had come to realise that the state was incapable of 
successfully organising peasants. Both, politicos and technocrats arrived at the same 
conclusion, but based on very different assumptions and policy consequences. The 
Salinas administration (1988-94) cut down CNC corporatist rights over the state budget, 
though it did not challenge political clienteles, nor did it implement other democratic
213 In a personal communication, Beatriz Paredes, Agrarian Reform Under-Secretary (May 1985) 
underlined the failure of state policies in delivering development and democracy to rural areas, as well as 
the crisis of the CNC structure.
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reforms in the countryside. This administration, in fact, reformed the corporatist 
structure trying to modernise the CNC management with former leftist leaders and 
independent organisations involvement in backing government’s policies (Harvey 1994 
and Gledhill 1996).
Many studies on coffee (Early 1982, p. 78; Nolasco et al. 1985 and Salazar et al 1992) 
tend to simplify the way small producers integrate in commodity markets overstressing 
the exploitative role of caciques and merchants. While there are some regions in which 
in fact monopolistic conditions, debt bondage and semi-slave labour exploitation 
continue, in most coffee producer regions there have been important changes. In the 
first place, because coffee producers have some room for manoeuvring that has to do -  
in the absence of market competition - with social balances (moral sanctions and 
prestige economy) and individual tactics (pre-emptive measures); second, because 
intermediaries quite commonly play not only economic roles (i.e. collecting coffee), but 
political and social ones as well; for instance they can perform leading and coordinating 
functions, allocating time and personal resources to political representation and to 
negotiating public services (in municipal or even state offices); and they can also be 
high-status individuals (collective fiestas sponsors; compadres to many families, etc.); 
and lastly, because intermediaries and caciques can hold of traditional knowledge and 
expertise in dealing with private market agents or state agencies.
The chapter builds on the story of land reform and state intervention through a coffee 
board (the IMC), laid out in Chapter 2, the emergence of dysfunctional organisations 
unable to represent small producers’ interests, as shown in Chapter 3, and the way these 
have sustained an important presence in coffee production based on both intrinsic coffee 
market’s constraints and peasant family strategies, in Chapter 4. This chapter argues that 
important features of traditional rural structures have survived most attempts of 
modernisation because their main agents (coyotes, caciques, growers, millers and 
buyers), the organisations they represent and the strategies they pursue lower transaction 
costs, both economic and political, such as those associated with the business cycle, 
know-how and conflict. Factors such as the prevalent regimes of payment to producers, 
intermediaries’ commissioning, operational schemes, and the underlying expertise on 
how coffee value is formed, exercise great influence on particular business strategies. 
Although markets set a price ceiling, many other things depend on bargaining power, 
expertise and specific constraints.
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5.1 Coffee intermediaries' strategies
The IMC set a paradigmatic operational scheme among small coffee producers. Table 
No. 11 shows that they copied several practices used by intermediaries like forward 
credit and strategic positioning of purchasing centres, in order to counter their influence, 
creating a vast network of purchasing centres; UEPCs, Support Centres, Regional 
Delegations and experimental camps without parallel in rural Mexico.
Table No. 12
Intermediaries IMC
Credit Forward purchase (in kind and cash 
in dry season and before harvest)
Forward purchase (inputs and cash 2-4 
times a year, including slack season 
and pre-harvest)
Contract form Informal, including debt bondage and 
social obligations
Informal, solidarian collateral through 
UEPCs
Purchasing
centres
Local networks operated by coyotes 
with a revolving fund
Same local networks, but operated by 
UEPCs and IMC staff
Payment form Cash 2-4 instalments (cash and kind)
Price incentives No Alcances (final price differential)
Other services ‘Help’ with credit in case of need 
secured by harvest produce
Free seedlings, technical assistance, 
life insurance, development projects
Source: Nolasco 1985, fieldwork 1995-96.
In a decade and a half, the coffee parastatal set ‘best practice’ benchmarking that still 
formed a standard in the late 1990s in coffee producer regions: Purchase guaranty and 
up to 4 cash and in-kind credits and after-sales compensation, delivery of subsidised 
inputs to the communities, free technical assistance. For many years producers felt 
uneasy if  ‘their’ organisations did not fulfil these expectations. Intermediaries had first 
adapted such mechanisms to control and attract peasant production. Through the years, 
money-lenders, merchants and coyotes not only exploited peasants, but played 
functional and to some extent legitimised roles (what could be called elite roles) in 
peasant communities. They adapted their business strategies to the peasants’ cyclical 
shortages o f cash before harvest and during the dry season, and their needs for insurance 
in cases o f illness and accident, and for trading surpluses o f food staples in exchange for 
manufactured products. They located in geographically strategic points to collect 
harvests efficiently at the entrance points to the sierras, in ‘rector centres’ (central town
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markets). The IMC first struggled to understand and then to overcome this embedded 
coffee marketing system.
Even at its peak, collecting more than 40% of the national harvests in 1982-83 (and 
almost the total in primarily minifundista regions like the Atzalan sierra), the IMC could 
not displace intermediaries. Intermediaries accommodated to new circumstances. How 
to explain such resilience? Though the widening gap between rural societies and the 
cities is an important factor, I argue that local intermediaries perform essential 
economic and cultural roles in embedded rural markets. They are better equipped for 
maximising the use of commercial capital, increasing turnover efficiency by shortening 
the cycles of purchase-sell-purchase. This is explained by two factors. First, they are 
linked to big buyers, so they usually have no shortage of working capital, or problems 
for selling coffee immediately. Intermediaries are backed with a purchasing or revolving 
fund, enough to buy all the coffee they can transport in one go, and paid usually 
straightaway in cash, to the extent that ‘trusting’ relations build up between buyer and 
‘coyote’. Sometimes (particularly, at the beginning of the harvest) coyotes invest their 
own savings and profits, financing the regional buyer when there is a need to ‘bridge’ a 
purchase.214
The advantage of intermediaries is their capacity to offer cash for coffee on the spot. 
Peasants do not hesitate to sell at lower prices to ‘coyotes’ as they are chronically short 
of cash and arrive at the harvest with debts and postponed consumption. The bargaining 
power of intermediaries is such that sometimes they default on informal ‘contracts’, 
manage to operate several collectors and trucks using buyers’ money, and sell coffee to 
whoever pays better prices, not necessarily those who provided them with working 
capital. Buyers know these tricks and sometimes they get rid of the most cunning 
‘coyotes’. Gathering a ‘trusted team’ is a time consuming process. It requires 
concessions from buyers to intermediaries: long lasting working relationships; 
competitive commissions and price premiums; preference on cash payments; credits in 
case of need and a considerable interaction. On the part of intermediaries, there 
occasionally appear incentives to leave coffee trading. There are good and bad harvests. 
In times of low prices - and narrower margins - some try to accommodate their capital 
in smaller local markets -  i.e. buying oranges and plantains (‘white bananas’). Many
214 James Putzel found among ‘Chinese traders’ in the Philippines similar features to these coffee 
intermediaries. He argues their ethnic identity is not the only factor that accounts for such economic 
behaviour, which has allowed them to flourish, but other factors related to market functioning in peasant 
societies (personal communication, 20-June-1997).
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more without their own trucks and capital, would have no other choice but to migrate to 
find a job in nearby cities, just as ejidatario producers do.
Buyers often cast a blind eye on the practices of ‘coyotes’ because they have no means 
of supervising so many purchasing spots and transactions in a short time. It would be 
costly and of limited use, because it is almost impossible to account for capital 
ownership once it is already converted into coffee. Intermediaries become indispensable 
to buyers, both for economic and socio-political reasons. They multiply the purchasing 
power of capital in an environment of imperfect competition.
Cultural detachment and specialisation is a second advantage of intermediaries. Local 
intermediaries penetrate areas unfamiliar to buyers, using their stigmatised presence for 
business purposes. Coyotes do what in the collective consciousness of producers 
appears to be “dirty work”: waiting long hours in communities, paying the lowest 
possible prices to producers. Generally speaking, intermediaries make use of different 
tactics to maximize their cut, but their behaviour varies a great deal if they belong to the 
community they are buying coffee from, or if they have kinship relations with particular 
producers. The degree of collective organisation among small producers can also 
influence intermediaries’ room for manoeuvre. In communities with local organisations 
buying coffee the levels of competition and information on prices are much higher.
The presence of coyotes is thus legitimised bearing the cross of stigma.215 Apart from
• • 0 1 ( \ keeping their profits secret, intermediaries build up local connections offering slightly
better deals to key people and ‘friends’ in the community. For instance, sometimes they
accept damaged coffee with no or minor discounts, wait until a late hour for a delivery,
or buy drinks for peasants.217
Intermediaries also exploit their cultural disengagement upwards, for they stretch the 
limits of a ‘trusting relationship’ with ‘urban’ buyers, pushing commissions up. They 
appear to be loyal, even thankful and submissive to buyers’ directives on price margins, 
routes and type of coffee sought; but that is only part of their game. Intermediaries 
receive a ceiling price to buy, which includes a commission margin, both for transport
215 The negative cliches about ‘coyotes’ reflect institutional features of this rural market: the local coffee 
buyer has not been legitimised as other businesses have, like retailing or collective transport; further 
transactions are not transparent.
216 There was a case in which the opposite happened, one of Topete’s compradores showed off his wealth 
through boastful suits, but this is exceptional for it easily leads to stronger moral condemnation and even 
eviction (it has happened in SPA and other communities).
217 Interview with Efrain Leon, Topete’s comprador from El Equimite.
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(flete) and for the collector (ireceptor); below that ceiling price formally the 
intermediary would be saving money for the buyer, but the fact is that most of those 
‘savings’ are usually appropriated by intermediaries. Successful intermediaries perfect 
their skills and save profits to buy tools and gain independence. Many intermediaries 
remain local buyers (coyotiyos), and profits usually finance a domestic economy 
physically near to producers.
‘Coyotes’ have several ways of increasing their profit margins:
a. Reducing the current price for berry coffee. If there is competition in a market place 
this is more difficult but still possible by direct or indirect means. They can alter 
weights, charge unfair discounts or simply lower the price if there is no competition. 
They may even establish a cartel when other buyers are known to them and can be 
trusted (that is, have the same room for manoeuvre), for most organisation’s collectors 
have no interest in this practice, as they are paid a fixed wage. Cartels are temporary due 
to many difficulties in sustaining them in better connected towns and in the best coffee 
producing areas, where more competitive markets operate.
b. Free-riding on buyers. This takes two forms: First, raising fees. Arguing tight 
competition, intermediaries bargain a higher ceiling price from their buyer patron. 
Additionally, they can mix lowland with highland coffee - of higher quality and price - 
and bring the bulk to the market as highlander coffee. Second, coyotes may use a third 
party’s capital to make deals of their own for particularly profitable lots (i.e. when they 
strike a good quality-price deal or a favourable price turn).
c. Higher turnover. Less opportunistic intermediaries -  with long term ties to 
communities - try to create economies of scale, give producers special bonuses on 
deliveries, integrate relatives in collecting points and even add their own savings to 
increase working capital and turnover.
'Coyotes’ marketing expertise and social distancing allow them to play both roles, 
community leadership and economic intermediation. Many local leaders started their 
climb out of peasant status as coyotes (as will be seen later in this chapter) to become 
local leaders, as they convert outside knowledge and marketing expertise into “political 
capital”. But there are some leaders who -  having profited from local organisations - 
start intermediary businesses; thus, converting political experience and contacts into 
economic opportunities. To the extent that these two forms of “social capital” are
196
fluently exchangeable, we can say that market and political intermediation are not 
completely different things. This mutability is a key to understanding local politics and 
some of the most pervasive constraints on collective action.
Theoretically, margins for profit making are very narrow for local organisations in 
Atzalan, because peasants have not developed the prospective idea (strategy) of building 
up collectively held assets, like upgrading processing and transport facilities or 
establishing an accumulation fund for ‘their’ organisations. If a profit is made, a moral 
obligation dictates that money has to be distributed within the community, regardless of 
business considerations. It is no coincidence that both independent and corporatist 
coffee organisations have to deal with this social sanction, which is more than a moral 
dictum; it is a social claim and a pre-emptive attitude. While Ojo de Agua’s pulping 
centre redistributed small amounts of money and organised a barbecue among
91 ftmembers, in the case of SPA’s co-op, profits were reinvested in improving co-op 
assets. Though leaders also organised the annual barbecue for members, they managed 
to get a vote of approval to reinvest profits in their processing plant (repairs and 
conditioning). They legitimise vote induction this way:
‘If we check with producers what to do with profits, they will never accept the 
idea of reinvesting in mill’s machinery and facilities.’ 219
Why do buyers not attempt to integrate even more directly with communities? As has 
been suggested, it is not necessarily more advantageous for several reasons. Alternative 
schemes have been tried without success. Some involved either hiring personnel or 
entering contracts with local organisations. But in this region, coffee business 
transactions take a long time: coffee harvest and wet milling takes around 200 days 
when run under profitable conditions: collecting coffee from small producers is a time-
990consuming and skilled activity, and as noted, stigmatises the purchaser; Permanent 
staff tends to lack the flexibility needed to wait long hours and to move intensively back 
and forth while remaining socially detached from producers. There is also a risk of 
getting involved with producers against buyers interests, for instance in terms of 
relaxing quality controls or making weight and price concessions. There is also a risk 
that staff would make money out of producers and buyers to their own benefit (as 
intermediaries do anyway), cheating on weight receipts, inflating transport costs and
218 Interviews with R. Barreda (17-Mar-1995) and T. Navarrete (10-Feb-1995).
219 Interview with Serafin Quiroz (16-Mar-1995).
220 The cultural image of coyotes represent a moral sanction to traders {traitors). See Evers (1994) for a 
historical analysis of the use of ethnic identities for business purposes.
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coffee weight losses, in order to improve commissions. This is just what happened to 
IMC employees, when the UEPC failed to appoint its own collector and supervise the 
process themselves.
Some local organisations in Atzalan commissioned one of their members to collect 
coffee, in Equimite, Loma de las Flores, and Tlacolulan. They had comparatively good 
results. Nevertheless, problems did arise, in some cases because the collector did not 
find his job worthwhile compared to the time he had to spend. For instance, Roque 
Landa, in El Equimite, was responsible for managing local purchases of SSS members 
in 1994-95, but he was not happy with his commission and in turn did not satisfy 
producers with the fee of N$20 per quintal, which was set in advance to finance the 
operation of the local collecting point. Thus, producers were not favourable towards a 
purchasing centre that leaves payment similar to that offered by private buyers. As a 
Tlacolulan producer put it:
“ ...it is too much work to run a purchasing centre: we have to work long hours, 
worry about getting good deals; and at the end we had to sell at a price no better 
than coyotes'. It is an albur [gamble], and you cannot always get it right.” 
(Gaudencio Claudio, 21-March-1995).
Despite this outcome, buyers from Tlapacoyan made little contact with local 
organisations. The buyer may have tried to avoid clashes with regional organisations 
(FRS-Azotal), which were better clients than local ones. But still more important was 
the buyers’ stereotypes of producers as unreliable, lazy, and politicised. They avoided 
getting entangled with local politics for other reasons. When I asked both grower- 
processor Topete (Loma Bonita) and the Herrera brothers (buyers in Tlapacoyan) if they 
were willing to trade with producers on a longer term basis, considering higher quality 
controls and economies of scale could be obtained (and leaving politics aside); they 
both answered they were ready to introduce price incentives for producers.221 This 
proved that although there are basic conditions to internalise more advanced and 
equitable price structures, this has not happened.
5,2 Political and economic functions o f (caciques '
Factional politics feed back on state intervention, the logic of which is to centralise a 
community’s representation for bargaining over service delivery (Bartra 1993; 
Friederichs 1989). Those who establish the right connections and gain access to
221 Interviews with Rolando Topete and Laureano and Jose Herrera.
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information that allows them to reach decision-making offices are able to benefit the 
most. The painful process of bargaining over public services for rural communities -  
from education and health to roads and credit - provides leaders with better chances to 
learn about the outside world. Local leaders occupy posts and get experience in dealing 
with local and federal organisations, as well as with market agents. However, co­
optation of local leaders by the political system slows down the process of peasant elite 
formation.
Since the XIX century, politics in Mexico has been based on elite alliance-making. The 
federal state was built on such an elitist basis, rather than through democratic 
representation or civic contracts. Apart from the political and cultural traditions 
inherited from the Spanish colony, this trend is also associated with social inequality 
and weak ‘civil society’ structures (political parties, unions, clubs and interest 
associations), which otherwise could mediate between a powerful state and ordinary 
people. There has been a wide gap between a very heterogeneous civil society and the 
ruling elites. This empty social space has been filled by caciques and all kinds of 
middlemen.
After the Mexican revolution, the corporatist structure set up by Presidents Calles 
(1930-34) and Cardenas (1934-1940) gradually incorporated those elites into the 
political system in a subordinated way. They formally represent class interests 
(peasants, urban workers and the so-called popular sector), but once incorporated into 
the CNC-PRI structure they can be recruited to the regional and state-level (very few to 
the national level) circles of the political elite, mediating with the groups they originally 
came from. This benefited both the political system and elites’ own interests (Skerrit, 
1996; Knight, 1992; Guerra, 1988 and Cordoba 1974).
Paradoxically, the Mexican political system, which co-opts leaders amongst
999intermediaries and caciques - who are not necessarily the same - has also made them 
targets of state policies. Until recently, state agencies have assumed intermediaries were 
responsible for the exploitation of peasants and growing inequality of rural societies, 
and one of the underlying causes of underdeveloped agriculture. By labelling most 
market agents as intermediaries, coyotes or caciques, the bureaucrats neglected the
222 While intermediaries, in general, refer to market brokers (and profit takers), their economic power is 
based on important functions such as financing and centralising peasant production, managing risk and 
moral hazard, etc.. Caciques, on the other hand, are, above all, local bosses who enjoy a privileged 
position in the community, either legitimised or sustained by means of force or economic power or both.
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functions they played in dealing with delicate trade-offs between the communities and 
more modem agents and structures in the market.
Intermediaries not only absorb ‘transaction costs’ in commodity chains with an 
important participation of peasants, but also, particularly 'caciques', have privileged 
contacts with state agencies, politicians and rancher os, and knowledge on how to ‘get 
things done’. Even if motivated by ‘self-interest’, they may also perform functions of 
leadership, ‘representation’ and sometimes genuine defence of community and local 
people’s interests.
These ‘cacique’ leaders specialise in the workings of the state. They have come to know 
the bureaucratic maze and have accumulated insight and information about programmes 
and sources of funding. Some of them become professional intermediaries -  as was 
frequent in Veracruz - and have proven to be resilient against state attempts at 
modernising social representation in the countryside.224
In the communities of Atzalan local leaders start a political career by serving in low- 
ranking posts in the local government or Ejido Commissariat. Time-consuming 
‘commissions’ and cash expenses are a heavy burden, which most people try to avoid. 
Therefore, the connection between wealth and political status is two-sided. Caciques are 
regularly among the better-off ejidatarios, and by assuming representative functions 
they can legitimatize their economic advantage. However, they are allocated political 
responsibility (in local government and agrarian leadership) because they are more 
likely to perform more efficiently than those less well endowed.
When, in 1960, the IMC extensionists arrived in San Pedro Altepepan to disseminate 
new techniques, they talked first with the ejido elite. These were the same better-off 
ejidatarios who have long controlled the most important posts in local politics. 
Sometimes by appointing local bosses formally - as Municipal Delegates or leaders of 
local organisations - or informally (through status and de facto authority in solving 
community conflicts), ejidatarios avoid the risk of violence and ensure some sort of 
laissez faire peace. Because the cacique does not depend on his political activities to 
make a living he has more chances to make a ‘good leader’. This was the case in
223 During the 1970s the leftist-nationalist paradigm that dominated development thinking and policy 
making, promoted replacement of intermediaries by state agencies (Labastida 1976).
224 A comprehensive effort was carried out through Local Committees and Regional Funds, both created by 
the Solidarity Program.
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Chaparro Grande, Quilate Nuevo, Anayal, Loma de Las Flores and Paguahueca, where 
many ejidatarios agreed the cacique leaders were performing reasonably well, and there 
were no accusations of gross corruption. Local leaders often had retailing or a coffee 
wet processing business, in addition to their share of the ejido land.
Any conflict is a motive for ‘caciques’ to act and sell their ‘intermediary expertise’ to 
both, bureaucrats, and their peer ejidatarios. Caciques gained a new lease of life from 
Solidarity’s new community-led spending and its ‘poverty alleviation’ policies. Peasant 
communities have no conditions to produce complex, representative elites, so caciques 
have played that role. The political classes prevent peasant discontent, inducing 
‘representatives’ to institutionally channel and shape peasant demands. In normal times 
peasant leaders are lured to subsidiary political careers within regional and federal 
political groups. The more they ascend the political hierarchy of umbrella associations 
(local deputy, marginal Municipalities, or whatever commission behind a desk in the 
cities) the more dysfunctional they become in terms of representing peasant interests.
5.3 Caciquismo and local coffee leaders 9 careers
The interweaving lives of two local leaders -  Jose Luis Arcos (JLA) and Serafin Quiroz 
(SQ) - both very influential in Atzalan, illustrate the process whereby regional elites and 
their power structures of caciquismo relate to lower layers of local leaders. Table 8 
summarises these two life histories in order to compare the relationship of regional with 
local elites and with the ability of peasants to further their interests. The trajectories of 
these two influential local leaders share several things in common: their origin (both 
were San Pedro Altepepan locals and both of their parents came to settle in San Pedro as 
land claimants, though from different backgrounds and with different outcomes) and a 
deliberate link between their political and economic activities (politics was seen as their 
only way out of what they considered a hard, constraining life of the ejidatario 
descendants in this part of the sierra).
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Table No. 13
Jose Luis Arcos Lopez Serafin Quiroz Tepancatl
Ascendants Migrated from neighbouring town o f Altotonga, Puebla Migrated from the cold highlands o f Chiconquiaco sierra
Family
background
His grandfather was a Spanish-origin hacendado. His 
father joined early land claims in SPA, but was also a 
wealthy merchant, who left the ejido after grabbing more 
than 100 ha. He remarried when JLA was still a child, so 
JLA only inherited a small landholding.
Poor landless family who were early land claimants; they 
have remained ejidatarios, and have profited from 
agrarian politics.
Key jobs and life 
experiences
Lived outside the community; undertook jobs in Atzalan 
Municipality; made money as middleman; organised the 
coffee SPR ‘La Reforma’ and ran for Atzalan Municipal 
Presidency with popular support (1994).
Bought ejido land when young; led movement for ejido 
individual rights redistribution (land had soon become 
monopolised); long career from local posts to CNC 
regional organisations and Atzalan Municipal Presidency.
Economic 
position and 
status
Accumulated land holdings and trucks; access to massive 
institutional credit; appropriated La Reforma beneficio 
and FRS’ coffee machinery; in popular disrepute in 1996.
Acquired ejido lands for daughters; profited from income 
support programmes; SPA’s co-operative finances his 
political career; he is unwanted but still tolerated as local 
‘cacique’.
Business strategy Accounting skills and merchant discipline; multi-skilful 
ranchero; abandonned community and peasant identity; 
became rich using coffee producers’ and public resources.
Wife runs household economy; long but dysfunctional 
political activism; move back from regional politics to 
local coffee co-operative leadership; ‘politics’ is still the 
basis o f his peasant-like livelihood.
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Political career Classic PRI ‘popular sector’ CV with an array o f posts; 
allied Atzinta group; his candidacy in the 1994 local 
elections was very popular (but he offered to step down in 
exchange for political gains, i.e. he sponsored the arrival 
of Solidarity programme); promoted factional loyalty and 
patron-client relations.
Traditional CNC leader with appointments in local and 
state level organisations; has tried to ally with regional 
CNC factions unsuccessfully; took advantage o f the 
appearance o f UE ‘Jose Cardel’ from late 70s to 80s; 
leads SPA factional politics; preaches peaceful 
negotiation o f conflicts.
Coffee crisis 
juncture
Capitalised on Solidarity relief programmes; learnt new 
jargon and adapted to new institutional rules; outpaced 
peasant leaders.
Capitalised Solidarity on relief programmes to reactivate 
SPA’s co-operative, but remained attached to traditional 
CNC structure.
Impact o f  
Solidarity 
Programmes
Adapted to new solidarian discourse (i.e. repayment of 
loans); used entrepreneurial skills to run FRS-A and 
Saving Cases; became national leader o f Solidarity 
Saving Cases.
Hesitated at first between unfamiliar PNS rules and 
traditional cacique bargaining; finally opted out to uphold 
local leadership, coffee co-operative, and traditional 
CNC activism.
Grass-roots
support
Patron-client relations in La Reforma; rallied 
communities during the 1994 election; then relied on 
bargaining with local factions (exploits his position in the 
Roads Trust). Later became unpopular.
Isolated from wider alliances; relies on local rule and 
contingent junction with other leaders; exploits a critical 
attitude towards JLA and FRS. He was weakened but still 
managed local powers.
Regional
relations
Participated with Atzinta group and Tlapacoyan PRI’s 
popular sector; well known among rancheros, Solidarity 
officials, and Tlapacoyan coffee buyers.
Associated to Barreda’s AAS, but under subordinated 
terms; he has many -dysfunctional- contacts in CNC and 
LCA in Xalapa
* Based on in-depth interviewing with both leaders, December 1994 to March 1995, and February to April 1996.
The case o f Jose Luis Arcos: a successful accommodation
Jose Luis Arcos (JLA), according to gossip, increased his wealth considerably by taking 
advantage of his position as regional leader (Roads Trustee, FRS and CRS of Azotal), in 
contradiction to the general perception of relatively no corruption among leaders. The 
difference in this case is that JLA rejected community as the framework of his 
livelihood and opted for regional politics.225 After he became a regional leader, JLA 
moved to El Avion, built a country house and successfully kept representation powers 
without being held accountable to his community; there was practically no community 
pressure on him. Despite many instances in which he was a political representative, Jose
O') &Luis always focused on his long-term personal businesses.
Of Spanish origin, Jose Luis Arcos Lopez’s grandfather had a big rancho in Mecacalco, 
ruined by the Revolutionary armies. He moved northwards where he settled down to 
produce tobacco, sugarcane and aguardiente (sugarcane spirit) and where his father, 
Rodrigo Arcos, met a young tobacco ensartadora taking her to El Equimite, where JLA 
was bom.
Rodrigo Arcos was one of the wealthy ejidatarios who - after the ejido was granted - 
accumulated a 100 ha of ejido common lands. When redistribution took place 60 ha 
were taken from him. For a short while he united with land claimants, but later settled as 
landholder and merchant. After his father abandoned his family, JLA was successively 
raised in different households and towns, becoming familiar with diverse environments 
and people. Having no prospects of land inheritance, he undertook a modest job in 
Atzalan Municipality as a bus driver.
As a civil servant, JLA observed local politics closely and made acquaintances among 
the PRI rank and file. But soon he got tired of mistreatment from bosses and his lack of 
prospects for advancement. He made a breakthrough as a coyote selling oranges and 
other agricultural products.227
225 Although JLA rose to regional politics by leading a local organisation (SPR La Reforma), peer coffee 
producers from that community took no part in decision-making.
26 Since JLA offered his backyard as a place for installing the processing plant El Avion, he new it was 
likely the FRS Azotal would live a short life and had more chances of buying at a discount the valuable 
benejicio. When he became the Roads Trustee he was already owner of several vehicles, acknowledging 
the strategic importance of the rural road network for business making in the highlands, where he owns 
many coffee, banana and orange fields, as well as an ambitious tree plantation project.
227 JLA still owns and makes business with one trailer (30 ton) and an old lorry (6 ton), which transports 
coffee and road works materials. He also owns two compact cars.
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Later on, he launched a coffee organisation, where he started his political career. In the 
mid-1980s, after the IMC’s troubles started, he jumped to the coffee business organising 
the SPR La Reforma Cafetalera.228 With a small office in Tlapacoyan, ‘La Reforma’ 
integrated JLA’s kin and fellow producers of the highland community:
“We were working with the Rural Bank paying back every single year. We used to 
get the credit on time and distributed it in equal shares without bothering for 
instalments and paperwork. The harvest was sold together, discounting 
outstanding credits and interest, and profits distributed. The problems started when 
the frost hit us (1989) and then with Solidarity programme, because they came to 
give money for free. Now people are getting used to receive money without 
interests, and even try not to repay income support. When the IMC retired and 
transferred its beneficios we took one drier of 60 Qq. When prices were very low 
we started to produce small amounts of roast and ground coffee, and registered our 
own brand”. (Interview with JLA, 12-Nov-1994)
JLA’s ranchero and merchant family background, as well as his early mobility across 
different communities helped him to disengage from communal life. He did not have to 
waste time and effort in the CNC’s agrarian hierarchy, locally monopolised by a 
powerful political faction (Urbino Arcos and his compadre, god-father, Serafin Quiroz). 
Instead, JLA followed the PRI’s ‘popular’ sector path to local politics and started a new 
faction, which successfully adapted to ‘Solidarity politics’.229 He also pursued a 
regional leadership role. His familiarity and contacts with the outside world enhanced 
his ability to ‘get things done’ for several communities. He took the strategic initiative 
of setting up the Roads Trust, making regional alliances with lowland rancheros, 
merchants and local caciques. Finally, he always kept an eye on personal businesses 
while doing politics; this was a means for accumulating wealth. After all, JLA returned 
to Atzalan communities because there was no better place for him to do business.
The case o f Serafin Quiroz: the retreat o f  a traditional cacique
The case of Serafin Quiroz, old cacique in San Pedro Altepepan, is of a different nature. 
After a long political career and considering the high regional posts he held, Serafin 
made very little money. Despite his keenness to secure personal gains out of every 
position and state programme in which he participated, Serafin only accumulated wealth
228 SPR, stands for Rural Production Society (in Spanish), that is a form of local organisation which 
included ejidatarios as well as private landowners.
229 The Salinas regime (1988-1994) introduced the PNS - Solidarity income support for the poor - to 
soften the effects of structural adjustment. Along with this ‘new way of doing things’, the old corporatist 
privileges over public spending were partially withdrawn. New rules to access Solidarity funds were 
formally set up: proven grass-roots support; ability for local development projects design; individual 
targeting. This did not displace the discretionary power of the federal agency to allocate resources, but 
somehow there was much more competition between them (Diaz-Pineda 1992; Dresden 1994).
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in land (around 60 ha.), which he left to his daughters to avoid further discontent from 
ejidatarios, as he remained the typical eternal ejido representative (taking turns in 
almost every post of the Ejido Commissariat). His career was fairly inefficient, both for 
him and for the ejido. When he was Municipal President, he was incapable of attracting 
development projects (not even a classroom, people say). He was a heavy drinker and 
spent his ‘political commissions’, time and money, but with very poor results.
Member of a poor peasant family (of Nahuatl origin), Serafin Quiroz Tepancatl’s father 
was among the first tenants and, later on, land claimants of El Equimite. He was one of 
the first coffee producers to make long trips to Plan de Arroyos to sell his bola 
morteado coffee, taking the 10-12 year old Serafin with him. There Serafin’s father 
bartered with the wealthy merchants of the region. The young Serafin associated coffee 
with these opportunities for exchange and movement. He tried artisanal bakery and lime 
production, but none of them proved worthwhile. Soon, he took an opportunity to buy 
his first coffee finca.
After that, Serafin did not stop extending his landed wealth, thanks in no small part to 
his privileged position as agrarian representative and ejido authority, i.e. to his access to 
public resources and interaction with state agents. In 1962 Serafin was one of a dozen 
producers first willing to try the new techniques the National Coffee Council’s 
extensionists were introducing. He allocated 2 ha to modem coffee cultivation, with 
levelling curves and a more dense arrangement of improved coffee varieties.
But Serafin’s springboard was no doubt agrarian politics. In a state like Veracruz, where 
the PRI’s peasant sector exercised strong leverage in government, opportunities 
abounded (Heather Fowler 1979 and Skerrit 1996). Serafin’s political career was one of 
a traditional, grass-roots peasant leader, who started with modest ejido and community 
posts, from cuartelero (low ranking civil guard) and chief policeman to top agrarian 
appointments at regional and even national level within the CNC structure:
I was in the Regional Peasant Committee (CRC-CNC) [as Delegate at the end of 
the 1960s] and there were serious problems in our ejido. The President of SPA’s 
Ejido Commissariat was shot dead with a bullet in the head. People wanted me in 
that post, because since I was chief policeman in San Pedro Altepepan I always 
tried to conciliate, and convince trouble-makers through talking, instead of 
messing about with big guns. I think that is why I have been leader for so long. 
When my fellows asked me to be President, there were ejidatarios with up to 90 
ha!, and some 20 to 30 people were ‘working’ [as tenants and jomaleros] with the 
companero (fellow, partner). Then, I said ‘there has to be an economic
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redistribution’ [i.e. new land distribution]. If we are to harm ourselves, do it at 
least without putting the land at risk. ... I talked to these better-off people: look, if  
you have 80 or 90 ha, take only 10 ha - what is lawful - let us all have land and do 
business with us instead. They understood, and the redistribution went ahead in 
1973-74. Fortunately, at the same time there was this cattle raising credit scheme 
from the Rural Bank. Some producers got hold o f this opportunity and others 
ended up selling their animals to the same persons who had taken over their land. 
In terms o f land we are equal, but not in business...230
Table No. 14
Position Date Local Regional
Auxiliary to SPA’s Quarters’ Chief (cuartelero) 1955 X
Chief o f SPA’s Police Quarters 1956 X
Auxiliary to SPA’s Police Commander 1957 X
SPA’s Municipal Agent 1960 X
SPA’s Police Commander 1963 X
Representative o f SPA’s Executive Agrarian Committee 1963 X
President o f SPA’s Primary School Parents Society 1966 X
Delegate to Altototonga’s Peasant Regional Committee’s (CRC-CNC) 1967-69 X
President o f SPA’s Ejido Commissariat 1968 X
Member-Delegate o f SPA’s local coffee organisation (UEPC) 1972 X
Shadow Councilor o f the ‘Jose Cardel’ Ejido Union 1975 X
Unique Trustee o f Atzalan Municipality 1975 - 
78
X
Youth Action Secretary o f Altotonga’s Peasant Regional Committee 1978 - 
80
X
Unions Association at the Plan de Arroyos ARIC 1978- X
Co-operative El Equimite’s President o f the Administrative Council 1978- X
Altototonga Peasant Regional Committee’s (CRC-CNC) General 
Secretary
1983 - 
85
X
Atzalan Municipality President 1985 - 
88
X
Treasurer and Vocal o f  Atzinta’s Administrative Council 1991 X
President o f SPA’s Tele-Secundary School Parents Society 1991 - 
92
X
SPA’s Solidarity Local Committee (CLS) Delegate 1992 - 
93
X
Administrative Council Member o f the Azotal Coffee Regional Fund 
(FRC-A)
1992 - 
93
X
President o f SPA’s Solidarian Local Saving Case (CSAL) 1992 - 
93
X
Secretary o f Azotal’s Regional Solidarian Saving Case (CSAR) 1992 - X
Treasurer o f SPA’s Primary School Parents Society 1992 - X
Treasurer o f SPA’s Ejido Commissariat 1994 - X
Source: Interview with Serafin Quiroz, 28-Dec-1994.
From this Table (No. 15), we can see that Serafin started a political career and became a 
kind o f professional local representative. He could jump to the influential Regional
230 Recorded interview with Serafin Quiroz in the San Pedro Altepepan beneficio. January 15, 1995.
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Peasant Committee (CRC), entering regional politics within the official party (PRI). At 
the end of the 1960s ejido lands were already concentrated in the hands of a few 
families, who had advantages for exploiting common resources over the rest of 
ejidatarios (bigger families, money, working animals, contacts with merchants). Serafin 
Quiroz capitalised on community pressure to redistribute ejido lands, allocating 
individual parcels (of 10 ha approximately) to each ejidatario. This gave Serafin a good 
opportunity to increase his political authority and deepen his roots in agrarian politics. 
This is an interesting difference with other regional leaders, closer to ranchero status 
and formally more educated, who disengaged from local politics as soon as they could 
set foot in the regional and national agrarian hierarchy, as in the case of JLA noted 
earlier, and also that of Urbino Arcos - JLA’s cousin - and of Pedro Ramirez, all of 
them Atzalan leaders who could ascend through the CNC ranks - to the local Cattlemen 
Association, ‘Jose Cardel’ Ejido Union and up to the Barbasco and Coffee Producers 
Unions - without the need of ever coming back to their local constituencies.
Although SQ reached Atzalan’s Municipality office, a seat usually reserved to the 
regional elite, in fact this post was by chance ‘given’ to him by the then Governor of 
Veracruz. SQ was linked in turn to all influential regional factions: Almanza231 and 
Atzinta groups, and also to ARIC Plan de Arroyos, before Gabriel Barreda took over 
(see below). The Municipal Presidency crowned two decades of almost militant political 
participation in posts of regional relevance. By unanimity, his townspeople think he did 
a poor job, more so because he ‘could not bring about a single benefit to SPA’.
Not only in my interviews, but in meetings of all sorts, SQ talked at length about his 
multiple encounters with top officials and his high profile in several political events. 
Influyentismo politics (the use of personal contacts to have things done -  especially 
through the corporatist system) is still very pervasive in rural Mexico. For isolated 
communities contacts and information about the outside world were vital. And they are 
still very important, although people have much more exposure to the media and life in 
the cities since the 1980s, due mainly to migration and the expansion of electricity.
231 Led by Pedro Ramirez, the Almanza group formed ‘Jose Cardel’ EU and then became national leader 
of ARIC Libertad, a large organisation that controlled barbasco production, but also produced coffee, 
oranges, cattle and pepper. They enjoyed support from the CNC hierarchy and the Agrarian Reform 
Minister Paredes.
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5.4 System of favour exchange and co-optation of peasant leaders
Two interesting trends about these ways of doing politics are worth comment. First, 
there is an intense interaction between peasant communities and the federal and state 
governments through the CNC ranks, which produces a thick crop of agrarian leaders. 
‘To get things done’ (gestionar) has permeated collective expectations of rural groups 
ever since the revolution. From public service delivery to credit and technical assistance 
for agricultural projects, communities have made continuous efforts to have access to 
public resources. This has meant that communities have had to appoint suitable fellow 
peasants to develop the skills for securing every kind of support from government. Not 
everybody feels he can or wants to invest time and neglect his own business for the sake 
of the common good. Usually the opposite happens. Once someone shows a minimum 
of efficiency and willingness for performing jobs of local governance, it is not difficult 
to see that person perpetuate his position in office. Caciquismo performs to some extent 
this leadership function.
Second, the large rural bureaucracy fulfilled its functions side by side with the agrarian 
hierarchy, in a symbiotic fashion. Leaders facilitated the entrance of the state 
bureaucracy to communities, endorsing IMC programmes, in exchange for recognition 
of their leadership, personal status, benefits and favours (allocation of higher expected 
harvest and hence credit quotas; and gifts from IMC stocks, including manual pulpers, 
sprinklers, machetes, seedlings, etc.). Over time, these patronage relations became 
coded and institutionalized in a system of complacency, unwritten rules of political 
behaviour and duties between officials and leaders; the exchange of loyalty for favours.
From 1973 on, the IMC extended its regulatory functions and organised small producers 
in UEPC. The coffee board showed unparalleled economic and political power. The 
more productive capacity and financial success the coffee board achieved, the higher 
became its political profile and the demands from the political class, in terms of both 
coffee revenue and political influence. The IMC kept control over local and regional 
leaders and promoted their careers for mutual advantage. At the same time, the coffee 
board monopolised processing infrastructure and had a strong - though changeable - 
influence on coffee purchases. There is evidence on how the IMC put barriers to entry 
of new organisations when the 1975-76 coffee-boom encouraged the first producers’ 
attempts to break IMC’s control (much earlier than ARICs). When, in the 1980s, the 
IMC was not able to stop the ARICs fast growth, first in Misantla and then in
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Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos, in a typical corporatist fashion, the coffee institute and 
the CNC agrarian bureaucracy co-opted them with special favours and concessions, 
such as over-inflating their coffee stocks for export permit purposes and preventing the 
emergence of new organisations.
At the end of the seventies more than a hundred San Pedro Altepepan ejidatarios bought 
the local beneficio humedo (then a 40 Qq/day wet mill capacity) and created “El 
Equimite” co-operative to access credit and markets. Producers first struggled for IMC 
approval to gain access to Banrural credit. Finally, the IMC accepted on condition of 
renting the beneficio - as happened in Plan de Arroyos with other beneficio owners - but 
without paying fees to the SPA producers. In the early 1980s, SPA producers observed 
the expansion of the ARICs’ coffee businesses and tried to launch their own regional 
organisation, including small landowners, but did not succeed. At first, the CNC 
bureaucracy opposed the creation of overlapping organisations in the same region, since 
the Ejido Union ‘Jose Cardel’, and ARICs Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos already had 
influence in the Atzalan communities. Besides, IMC officials discouraged any 
competition with its gigantic Atzinta plant (in Tlapacoyan), even from a small wet 
processing plant in a distant sierra community. Moreover, small and medium 
landowners also did not want to get involved with ejidatarios.
Apart from its regulatory functions (coffee stocks certification and administration of the 
export quota permits), the IMC had a direct influence over thousands of UEPCs, which 
organised the vast majority of small producers. In such monopsonistic conditions, this 
organisation had the means to prevent the integration of an active national producers’ 
organisation, with a strong lobbying capacity. As in the case of every major 
agribusiness regulated by the state (sugarcane, tobacco, barbasco, etc.), the CNC 
organisational structure contemplated a National Coffee Producers Union with regional 
branches in the main producing regions. But those Unions were political instruments, 
which were granted public resources and political posts in the PRI (formerly the official 
party). Their national and regional leaders were appointed by the PRI structure, not by 
coffee producers and, consequently, they were loyal to federal leaders, not to their 
constituencies. The CNC’s Coffee Unions relied on the IMC’s economic and political 
sponsorship to get a seat in the IMC’s Marketing Committee and in every coffee forum, 
as well as to get export permits (until 1989). The CNC’s unions never had grass-roots
232 ‘IMC officials who operated the Atzinta beneficio wanted us to remain coffee berry producers’, 
Serafin Quiroz, Dec. 28, 1994.
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support or links with the former UEPCs or new local coffee organisations, as was the 
case of Veracruz’s Coffee Producers Union, led by Urbino Arcos for many years 
without due electoral process, lacking representation of any coffee constituency from 
Atzalan.233
Between the IMC and its UEPCs there was no other intermediary organisation, to 
establish a regional level of representation. On the contrary, in many ways, the Institute 
promoted UEPCs’ dependence on IMC deliveries, technical assistance and political 
patronage. The close relationship of IMC staff with the UEPCs started with the 
important functions of its delegate (socio delegado). He was in charge of UEPC matters 
(members’ census and accounts) and had to be regularly in close contact with the IMC 
Regional Delegation and its local Support Center staff, with whom he arranged delivery 
schedules (credit, inputs), attending every meeting called at the IMC headquarters. 
Delegates were trained in the IMC experimentation camps in modem coffee cropping 
techniques (pruning, ground levelling curves, use of agrochemicals, identification of 
coffee illnesses and plagues) and were supposed to pass on newly acquired skills to 
UEPC associates. This was a valuable reward in two different ways. To begin with, all 
expenses were paid for by the IMC and peasants had a lively experience far away from 
their communities along with many other delegates and coffee experts. Moreover, being 
socio delegado conveyed a high status to a leader in his community. Technicians and 
staff treated UEPCs delegates with deference on field supervision trips or at meetings at 
the IMC headquarters.234
The IMC created the UEPCs as a means of increasing its regulatory power over big 
growers and intermediaries, giving small producers access to institutional credit. In this 
way they could expand their coffee purchasing centres, make them operative and fully 
replicate the coffee market structure (forward credit/repayment in kind cycle). See 
Chapter 2 for a discussion on the role of the IMC on promoting rural organisations.
The IMC, as well as many social organisations, undermined caciques’ and 
intermediaries’ role in local development, on the grounds that they exploited peasants
233 Interviews to Serafin Quiroz, San Pedro Altepepan, Dec. 28, 1994; Miguel Ugalde, Martinez de la 
Torre, Feb 19, 1995; Antonio Concha, Tlapacoyan, Jan 25, 1996; and Jose Luis Arcos, El Avion, several 
interviews in January 1995.
234 This side of the IMC legacy has not been well assessed as all attention has been on its tendency to 
exercise unilateral control. It is alive in the memories of ex-UEPC members who expressed mixed 
feelings about the coffee organisation, including a widespread sense of loss and idealization of IMC’s 
golden years, when ‘true technicians’ were trusted and ‘before politics wrecked the IMC’. Out of all 
interviewed producers only a handful remained critical of the IMC performance and self-critical too.
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and prevented them from forming democratic organisations. State agencies and NGOs 
have not realized there are at present not many options of democratic representation in 
rural communities. Even leftist and so-called independent co-operatives ‘have to’ rely 
on the same kind of local bosses to carry out their agendas.
Differences in practices and discourse do matter, but caciques adapt themselves to new 
political winds. Solidarity introduced such a recycling of traditional leaders in Atzalan, 
including the so-called dinosaurs (old ruling party’s corporate leaders), who rapidly 
embraced Solidarity’s ‘efficientist’ discourse. The emergence of more democratic, 
grass-roots leadership was an exception, associated to internal community dynamics, 
rather than promoted by practices of the Solidarity programmes. These political 
dynamics tend to propel rural elites towards the periphery of the political class, into 
would-be urban politicians with urban lifestyles and manners. In some cases they 
remain in rural towns, but with a more urban or urbanized ranchero-type livelihood.
The lives of local and regional leaders show that caciques use peasants’ needs as an 
excuse for promoting their own interests. Their success depends on political positioning 
and links with outside rural and urban political groups, led by people who are 
‘connected to the top’. Ejido caciques focus on ‘getting things done’ and obtaining as 
many variants of income and production support as possible from state agencies, 
including those designed for co-operatives, unions and other associational schemes. In 
this way they get privileged access to public resources to finance their political careers. 
The political system lured them into a fairly dysfunctional political career in which their 
peasant cultural profile remains a stigma and a limitation rather than an instrument of 
identity, as in the cases of M. Caro and S. Quiroz who were promoted to regional top 
posts without constructive results.
Previous contacts outside their communities (with merchants, politicians, etc.) were 
vital to these local leaders. By the late 1990s, violence played only a minor role in 
factional politics, while community became the major setting of competition among 
dominant groups within the ejido. Hegemony of one or several families in each 
community prevailed. As discussed in Chapter 4, religious groups have counter­
balanced their power establishing a distance from the politicised field of caciques (local 
authority and ejido elections, public posts, development projects, etc.), where their 
competitive edge lies.
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Alliances of all kinds unfold around these dominant groups, and they are customarily 
expected to fulfil community duties: formal and informal community representation; 
legitimisation of their power through bestowing favours and offering political 
parenthood and close friendship; and higher contributions to community development 
projects. Some communities have been more successful in appointing caciques with a 
‘positive’ contribution to make in social bargaining, innovation and protection, while in 
others the main outcome is corruption and dysfunctional would-be regional leaders.
This portrayal of caciques as elites has tried to illustrate the tension among different 
facets of caciques. Attention has to be paid to the dynamic interrelation between 
peasants and caciques, social obligations and individual power. Becoming an 
intermediary is one of the main ways of advancement for the few well-off rancheros and 
merchants, but also for some fortunate peasants who learnt basic arithmetic and writing,
‘j ' l e
and find the way to gather working capital to get started in the coffee business.
But rural communities usually have different resources to legitimise economic 
differentiation. Allocating well-off fellows with leadership duties is one trading-off 
expedient. The community benefits from the expertise, time and resources of the well- 
off, although peasants also have to pay, accepting local boss rule and free-riding. 
Prestige economy is another expedient - fairly well studied by anthropologists - by 
which people usually get access to a small share of the profits of the rich; here the latter 
are paid with a higher status, more or less proportionally to their spending (Korsbaek 
1990; Cancian 1976 and Greenberg 1981).
The relationships between caciques, peasant communities and the state have been 
under-researched. Caciques can be effective local leaders and entrepreneurs as well as 
creatures of the corporatist, rent-seeking system. They are the expression of a process of
235 Sexton (1986) and Finney (1990) described among Papua New Guinea’s Gorokans similar 
characteristics during the 1970s and early 1980s. Local bosses gathered savings from relatives and 
kinspeople to invest in trucks and pulping facilities. That was the headway to the coffee business, not only 
to make money but also to achieve higher prestige. The brief Australian colonial administration 
encouraged (legitimate) business initiatives among natives, especially during the 1960s. Since 
independence (1975) business groups were promoted by the state, particularly coffee blocks for the 
collective and professional management of the coffee plantations taken over from white expatriates. 
Unlike the young PNG, in rural Mexico economic success could not always be translated into political 
capital (sometimes not even capital as such). Anthropologists have debated about the role of moral 
obligations (cfr. Foster’s idea of ‘limited good’ and studies on envy). Although Finney and Sexton 
suggest the preadaptation of Gorokan ‘tribes’ to business making, they also show evidence that those 
individuals that ignored social obligations were able to move on (that is why some of them avoided trade 
stores and others even migrated). But the cultural and institutional environments are very different: While 
the Mexican state ‘protected’ the peasantry from market pressures, the land reform added an 
interventionist framework in ejidos life.
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elite formation in peasant communities, a process of internal differentiation, but also of 
integration in markets and in a wider distant national society. Isolated, dispersed and 
simplified peasant communities have no suitable framework for complex local 
governance. Instead of creating incentives for democratic local governance and 
enforcing monitoring, the Mexican political system historically internalised rural 
factional politics, promoted clientelism and political careers for personal advancement, 
weakening loyalty of local leaders to their communities and any continuity of more 
complex local elite formation.
5.5. Business strategies o f coffee rural elites
Contrary to what we would expect from a vertically integrated commodity in a rather 
small regional market, in the coffee market of Tlapacoyan different business actors 
cohabit with heterogeneous economic strategies and market arrangements. The way the 
business-making practices of buyers and processors internalise the particularities of 
coffee production and involve small-scale ejidatario producers in the Tlapacoyan region 
(discussed in chapter 4) has strongly shaped the coffee market. Their business strategies 
show the imprint of peasants, their economic behaviour and asymmetric position in the 
market, as well as the requirements of export markets, binding together these two 
worlds of coffee. Dealing with peasants and with big exporters offers many profit- 
making opportunities, but also constraints, the management of which depend 
particularly on access to credit (usually in the form of advance purchases or revolving 
funds), intermediary networks, specialised knowledge of the coffee business and 
entrepreneurial skills.
Appendix 5 presents the strategies followed by five of the most important coffee 
growers and buyer-processors in the Tlapacoyan region and summarises an analysis of 
how these strategies interpret and shape the relations between peasants as coffee 
producers, clients, subalterns, poor and troublesome neighbours and subsidised 
competitors. All five of them belong to the same coffee elite because they have business 
relationships and frequently act as a group, mainly vis a vis federal and state authorities, 
although they still compete against one another. Two of them -  Antonio Concha and 
Gabriel Barreda - are members of well-established coffee merchant families (arriving in 
early XX century). Agustin Bello and Rolando Topete belong to a second generation of 
coffee entrepreneurs, linked to Senator Topete’s coffee plantation establishment in the 
mid-1950s, which channelled state resources to the then isolated hillsides of Loma
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Bonita and San Carlos. Only Laureano Herrera can be considered a representative of a 
new breed of coffee businessmen (speculators without roots in the coffee region, either 
as merchants, or as growers).
While three of them have coffee lands, owning plantations was not a strategic asset for 
any of them, while possessing processing facilities (all five) or access to foreign credit 
(three) were clearly strategic. Technical expertise and price formation proved to be 
complex issues. More than possessing the right economic strategy, each grower enjoyed 
specific competitive positions. The key problem for them was how to obtain profit from 
their particular competitive edges to enhance their businesses in the long term.
Despite high levels of economic integration of the coffee market, it is interesting to note 
how different business strategies and forms of integration emerge. It is common to hear 
that there are not secrets in the coffee business, but paradoxically everybody also 
recognises that in the coffee trade as easily as one can win big money, one can loose it.
Agustin Bello has set the standards of a successful coffee grower in Atzalan. In 1960 he 
established a beneficio and improved empirically -  by trial and error - the wet process. 
In 1955 he got started with the typica variety; changed in 1960 to bourbon and to mundo 
novo in 1965, two varieties Teziutlan growers introduced in the region. He changed to 
caturra in 1968 - taking advantage of the first improved varieties promoted by the IMC 
- and later on to garnica. After the 1989 crisis, he renewed 40 ha of his plantation, 
waiting for the cycle to bring back good prices, thus recovering from huge losses when 
the 1994 price recovery finally came. His knowledge of coffee cycles and cattle grazing 
-as means of saving and investing coffee surpluses - have characterised Bello’s 
ranchero strategy.
His chances of expansion were twice frustrated. First when the government expropriated 
100 ha. he had just bought, unaware they had been already claimed by peasants. Second, 
and more severely, when he was not able to capitalise his processing plant, the 
machinery and technology of which had not been upgraded since the 1960s. Bello did 
not blame the IMC intervention, since he acknowledged it benefited all growers and 
ejidatarios in particular, and did not eliminate competition:
“You could always buy coffee. After producers paid their loans to the IMC, they 
used to sell coffee to us. We kept up with IMC’s prices and were always able to 
compete. Our advantage was to pay in cash.” (Interview, 2-Feb-1996)
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While medium size growers like Bello flourished from the 1960s through the early 
1980s, in part due to support from state agencies (fertilisers, credit), the price crisis of 
1989-93 signalled their decline. With high input, labour and credit costs, the Bello 
family could no longer afford to operate as buyers on a competitive scale and keep up 
with processing plant repairs. In 1994-95 they bought coffee for ARIC-PA but they did 
not benefit, as competition - especially with Topete - narrowed their profit margins.
Even with good prices - like in the harvest 1995-96 -  the Bello brothers entered a 
survival stage, experimenting with typica variety and trying to adapt to harder times. 
Their relationships with local ejidatarios from Azotal and Cuatro Caminos communities 
seriously deteriorated. Agustin Bello requires from harvest workers good picking 
performance and imposes tight monitoring in the field and at reception of the cherries. 
These requirements led to a clash over the payment regime, for ejidatarios believe that 
pay at piece rate is unfair; they think that the quality of their work is of higher value 
(‘nobody does it even in our own fincas\ as one producer put it). In the eyes of 
producers, the problem of effort, quality and fairness of wages are a set of issues related 
to local traditions and values. As long as high quality coffee from Tlapacoyan was not 
recognised in the region, costs of selection were not compensated and consequently, 
Bello’s good cropping and processing standards were somehow misplaced; while he did 
not get adequate price incentives, he transferred to jornaleros no incentive at all. The 
Bello family mainly sold to ARIC-PA (the only agent with full dry processing 
facilities), which actually selected export quality and traded directly to the USA, 
receiving price incentives according to quality standards. Instead of introducing a new 
best practice - and a stronger long-run competitive position - Barreda (the buyer) chose 
to keep most of the premiums for ARIC-PA (meaning him-self).
The ranchero is the only agricultural group that considers quality standards in their 
strategies. The Bello family synthesised an expertise in coffee cropping and wet 
processing, taking into account the cyclical behaviour of the coffee market (they were 
the only ones to plant during the slump). Paradoxically, the ranchero coffee producer in 
Atzalan is an actor in retreat; they could not make their voice heard in the middle of an 
ejidatario milieu, lacking financial support during the crisis. Local labour and 
monitoring costs have also put pressure on their strategy, to the point that the Bello 
family had to look elsewhere to hire cheaper and more disciplined labour. Rising prices 
of inputs like fuel and spare parts, as well as wages, increased the operating costs of 
Bello’s San Carlos finca. After the 1994 recovery, credit remained very expensive and
216
competition increased. This meant for them, narrow profit rates for processing, and 
having to give up cherry coffee purchases, concentrating only on their own production. 
As Herrera put it,
“ ...there are cases of coffee growers in this region (he was talking about Bello) 
that after 20 or 30 years of being active in this business go on with the same 
beneficio, without improving (processing technology).” (Interview 5-Feb-1996)
Rolando Topete, the Tlapacoyan elite’s renegade entrepreneur, continued running Loma 
Bonita coffee plantation inherited from his grand uncle.236 Rejected by the old coffee 
elite in Tlapacoyan, and ‘betrayed’ by former tenants -  who should have been associates 
- he tried to integrate a modem plantation and an efficient processing facility, in order to 
surmount the limitations of both the traditional coffee elite and ejidatario producers. 
Short of funding - the 1989 crisis left him in arrears - he was victimised by speculators 
in Xalapa, until he was sponsored at the beginning of the 1990s by one of the new 
successful coffee exporters (Armando Escarcega).
A combination of funding and in situ operations gave Topete the upper hand in 
commanding a strong team of coyotes. Lured by Topete’s competitive commissions and 
low journey costs (Loma Bonita is halfway to both, low and highland Atzalan producer 
communities), coyotes under his control imposed monopoly practices in isolated 
communities. Other buyers had not gained permanent entrance and in 1995-96 the 
Azotal Solidarity Regional Fund (FRS-A) only operated two pulping centres, while 
producers decided to hire theirs.
Apart from this advantage, Topete’s good processing plant allowed him to expand in 
Atzalan very quickly, even quicker than his organisational structure could support (a 
very improvised family business, running with permanent repayment delays to coyotes, 
water shortages and high turnover of employees). Topete’s conflicting background as a 
landed heir, his fast coffee business growth (more of an exaggeration than a grounded, 
sustainable truth), and confrontations with FRS-A leaders gives him a social stigma and 
even disrepute. His approach to people made no concessions to local manners 
(particularly to envy and moral sanctions to wealth). After disappointing efforts to
236 See Chapter 2 where I introduced Topete’s story.
237 When cherry coffee fetches higher prices - buyers have good contracts or demand and competition 
among buyers is strong - financial needs for operating a wet beneficio are very high. In 1995-96 such 
were the conditions of the local market in Atzalan and the activities of the FRS-A almost came to a halt, 
while local organisations frequently found it more secure to hire their pulping centres (El Quilate Nuevo, 
Norberto Aguirre).
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associate with producers, he avoided contact with locals. His success and his personal 
image (to which he adds riding a powerful cross motor bike), result in a shocking 
presence to local people, who think of him as rude and foreign. His own coyotes 
transferred people’s antagonism from market traders to Topete, blaming him for the low 
prices they offer in some communities, and they did not hesitate in disclosing Topete’s 
unreliable payment regime.
Topete himself resented the tense environment for his long-term business, and was 
planning -  idealistically - to move to the highlands, to an isolated spot where he could 
set up a modem coffee plantation with state-of-the-art Costa Rican technology (plain- 
sun, high densities). At the same time his wealth and the ranch’s manor still impress 
leaders. Topete started to trade with exporter Pinero, under unfavourable 
conditions (with a return margin equivalent to only 1/8 of his own), but after four years, 
in 1994-95, he moved to Armando Escarcega (ESCARCESA), who offered much better 
financial terms.
Laureano Herrera, the successful new merchant, started as a petty seller of roast and 
ground coffee bags. An old acquaintance of Herrera’s grandfather, Escarcega started to 
finance him and his brother in 1988. After learning the coffee business the hard way as 
did Escarcega, the Herreras expanded consistently, becoming one of the main coffee 
traders in Tlapacoyan, second only to Barreda.
The technicalities of Herrera’s business were straightforward. He mastered a strategy of 
competitive returns to scale, exploiting price margins, and running high-risk operations. 
Two conditions were essential for him: high capital turnover (he enjoyed the backing of 
a big exporter), and a competitive price based on accurate knowledge of coffee cost 
structure. He was one of the ‘lucky’ speculators during the peso crisis, for he had plenty 
of coffee -  priced in dollars - when the December 1994 devaluation took place. 
Accustomed to a fixed price for big volumes of coffee (around one thousand sacks), he 
made high profits when the price moved upwards though he also risked high losses. 
That is why he would close transactions and sell very quickly. From those extraordinary 
profits of the post-recovery period, he expanded his processing plant, and planned to 
establish a small quality control lab.
238 It is revealing, JLA copied the facade of Topete’s house porch in Loma Bonita.
239 Piflero was well known for his frauds during the early 1990s, when brokers and TNCs started to arrive 
and invest in the liberalised Mexican coffee market. Interview with Rolando Topete (2-Feb-1996).
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Characteristic of Herrera was his austerity. Even his competitors respected Herrera’s 
hardworking schedules. He rejected the common practices of Tlapacoyan merchants - 
late opening times, mid-day and weekend nap closures, and extravagant conspicuous 
consumption. Instead of speculating in real estate and buying comfort, the Herrera 
brothers invested profits in expanding their business.
In terms of dealing skills, Herrera realised the importance of ‘loyalty’ to establishing 
trading partners. It is worth mentioning that FRS leaders have a close relationship with 
Laureano Herrera, and thought of him as a last-resource buyer, whenever they were not 
able to find a better contract outside Tlapacoyan. But apart from Herrera’s flexibility in 
giving a premium in particular deals, he was well known for his approach to 
bargaining. He knew the informal language to convey guarantees of trust (calculator-in- 
hand, Herrera would instruct them on price structure and draw a line showing when 
price stretching ‘is possible’ or not); he demonstrated respect and recognition for the 
‘social role’ of the FRS; in short, he invested in relationships of trust with FRS leaders 
and community representatives, and it paid off.
It is not possible to think that Topete, Barreda or even Concha and Bello, could abandon 
their ranchero status and urban outlook to deal in horizontal ways with peasant leaders, 
nor would they pass on information for free. Although Herrera did not care about 
Tlapacoyan merchants stigmatising him, he was perfectly aware of the business 
requirements, the tight constraints of high interest rates, the risks of not analysing day to 
day actual coffee yields against price and cost structures, and of dealing with uninsured 
loads of coffee. While he did regular business with Escarcega, he developed an 
alternative marketing channel with a Tulipan company in case Escarcega would not 
offer good enough prices.
Antonio Concha, with a dysfunctional mixture of coffee expertise and political 
experience (see below), had started his latest coffee business in 1994-95, over the price 
recovery but found it difficult to overcome the legacy of his involvement in the 
mismanagement and corruption of the former ARIC Tlapacoyan. He tried to rebuild the 
business he had virtually abandoned when pursuing a political career a dozen years 
before. Short of capital, Concha entered a subcontracting deal with FRS Tlapacoyan and 
Plan de Arroyos, which suffered from Concha’s difficulties in developing and 
cementing relations of trust. Although he tried to be open and fair, his lack of expertise 
was such that there were not enough guarantees to satisfy leaders’ anxiety of being
trapped. He tried giving advise and training to a FRS technician whose loyalty was later 
put into question by leaders.
The technical side of Concha’s business was very well grounded in the social capital 
created from three generations of coffee merchant activity. He attempted to add to this 
experience by sending his daughter and two sons to an elite private university, 
Tecnologico de Monterrey, although only one of them decided to work in the coffee 
business, processing quality control. Early in his life, he learnt what he considered the 
coffee merchant’s rules of thumb (Interviews, 20/27-Jan-1996):
• Field knowledge of producers’ cropping culture and a coffee quality that varied 
greatly according to the community.
• Impact of weather changes on actual yield (heat and rain increase cherry flesh 
and dead weight, while a cold climate increase bean yield, and so on).
• Full control of accurate weighting of the raw material: “as my business is 
buying and selling, I do not leave the scales to anybody else”, he said.
• Double-check the actual price margins (“you have to work out your coffee 
price from exchange rate and stock market price movements”).
He closely followed received wisdom, and went on integrating all of it together into 
what he called a 'ponderado flotante ’ (floating weighted index). For half a decade he 
made hundreds of composite tables correlating the behaviour of market prices with 
actual yields during the harvest by micro-region.240 As he remembered,
“I was a successful coffee trader for 30 years (I started to sell coffee since 10 
years old), but it was not enough for me. There was the need of putting the IMC in 
order. I knew everything about coffee, but I learnt a lot from an American broker 
who taught me that ‘the real business lies in beans blending’”.
Gabriel Barreda, an old merchant modernised, successfully avoided the fate of other 
buyers and merchants in Tlapacoyan, due primarily to his agile political activism with 
Solidarity officials (see below). After achieving complete integration - from primary 
production to dry processing, the only operating plant with that machinery - and 
building contacts with American brokers, in 1995 Barreda launched Asociaciones 
Agroindustriales Serranas (AAS), a holding company that quickly centralised the main
240 1 was able to review some of them in his personal yearly diaries, the latest of which was 1988.
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coffee investments of the region, including those of FRS-A. Operating with strict 
business strategies (‘cost equilibrium point’, relatively high coffee prices with heavy 
discounts on defects; operation on captive markets with wide profit margins), in two 
cycles AAS became one of the ten main coffee exporters, and the first gorda pepper 
(non-cultivated) exporter in Mexico. While it was only regional enterprise to reach 
export markets directly, it failed to spread down the rationale of market-led incentives.
Although Barreda complained about ‘opportunists’ and ‘newcomers’ who came to profit 
from the upturn in prices, he moved from the social field of the old merchant elite, and 
came to share more elements of the new merchant entrepreneurial-minded elite, who 
rationalised the coffee business in an unprecedented way. As Herrera said, everybody is 
competing against Barreda, who set the price in this region. AAS and its main coffee 
business branch (ARIC-PA) buy much of the region’s coffee, exercising an influence on 
producer prices.
Behind apparently technical issues like price regimes and operating areas, all of these 
businessmen have to make delicate choices such as building up stable relationships with 
producers and local intermediaries, as well as winning high quality coffee producing 
areas from competitors. Three closely interrelated features, characteristic of the coffee 
business, constrain the relations of the coffee elite with producers: (1) particular forms 
of integration between different segments of capital (productive, commercial, financial, 
national and international); (2) a regime of price formation which leaves very little room 
to reward quality and develop product differentiation; and (3) a very difficult process of 
negotiating value added along the productive chain.
5.5.1. Different forms o f integration to capital
The level of integration of production units in the region has been a critical factor in 
reaching a competitive position in the coffee market. It allows agribusinesses a steady 
flow of raw material, and more important, quality control to respond flexibly to demand 
patterns. Production units in this region are only indirectly integrated to the market. 
There is no contract or any other long-term arrangement. Due to the heterogeneity, 
dispersion and low productivity of predominantly small growers in the region, capital 
has focused on how to channel production in bulk. No serious efforts have been made to 
enhance quality controls for raising regional production value.
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Selection and grading (by shape, weight and colour) is mainly done in dry processing 
plants by mechanic and electronic selectors at the stage of golden (green) coffee. Except 
Barreda (ARIC-PA and AAS), no one established a full dry beneficio in the Tlapacoyan 
region (FRS-A is still setting up a new one, not yet operational). Why have processors 
and buyers not attempted to vertically integrate with small growers, by means of 
forward purchases, contract agriculture or any form of association? They have tried to 
do so in the past, but did not succeed for different reasons. Among the most important:
Money lending started to become obsolete as a result of increased competition among 
merchants and newly established processors in the 1960s. The introduction of improved 
varieties and of processing plants, encouraged small producers of natural coffee or bola 
-bonded by debts to merchants and lenders - to become free cherry coffee producers. 
When official credit was made available through the IMC in the early 1970s, private 
money-lending disappeared and forward purchases never widely reappeared.
Buver-processors’ attempts at integration. When Topete tried to run Loma Bonita 
flincas, at the end of the 1980s, he offered former tenants full land ownership in 
exchange for their coffee production. But small producers failed to fulfil the informal 
associative agreement, because they thought they were already entitled to Loma Bonita 
lands (unsuccessfully claimed from the Agrarian Reform Ministry).
At the beginning of the 1995-96 harvest, when Concha started operating former ARIC 
Tlapacoyan beneficio and was short of working capital, he proposed a hiring deal to 
FRS Tlapacoyan. Victims of their own mistrust, FRS leaders signed a disadvantageous 
maquila contract with Concha (at N$50/Qq and a very low fixed yield, of 258 kg/Qq).241 
FRS leaders learned from this negative experience and moved their business to Herrera, 
with whom they bargained for a more advantageous processing subcontract (N$45/Qq 
at a yield of 257 kg/Qq). More than schemes for integrating producers, these deals were 
short-term dealings between FRS leaders and buyer-processors. The latter aimed at 
solving a chronic working capital deficit and under-utilisation of the processing capacity 
(and high fixed costs).
241 Subcontracting can be arranged at actual yield or at a fixed yield. The theoretical rate of conversion of 
fresh cherries into parchment is 245 kg per quintal. Many factors may alter this rate either upwards 
(against producers’ return) or downwards (in favour of producers’ returns). So, it is important to work out 
what the actual yield will be.
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TNC forms of integration. Mercon’s branch Cafes Tulipan, was the seventh largest 
coffee exporter in Mexico (1995-96). It operated in Tlapacoyan buying parchment 
coffee mainly from merchants and organisations, without entering the cherry market and 
processing. In 1994 the company began purchases in Tlapacoyan and have since 
invested in building relations of trust, a reputation of fair weighting, recognising actual 
yield and delivering immediate cash payment.
The other buyer of parchment is TIASA, an affiliate of Atlantic Coffee, which devised 
an alliance with a local group of leaders to run Atzinta processing plant (240 Qq/day 
capacity). More than a market-led move, the associative arrangement, apparently, was 
designed to displace the political group and gain a long-term strong position in the only 
region in Mexico without the damaging coffee boar-worm.
The scale of operations, capital turnover and the level of integration define different 
competitive positions in the market, either as buyers or processors. In any case, the key 
component of a successful strategy is closeness to those who control capital, which 
means timing, delivery, sufficient amounts and favourable repayment terms of working 
capital. All buyers, from local coyotes to brokers, know this well enough. After the 
IMC stopped financing small producers (1988-89) and banks reduced their coffee 
credits - and increased interest rates (1989-90) - the region lost financial independence. 
Most coffee buyers and processors went bankrupt, and banks struggled to reschedule 
payments in order to recover part of their coffee loans. Even Banrural (the rural state 
development bank) was unable to finance medium private growers at a discount rate. 
The four FRSs in the region (Altotonga, Tlapacoyan, Plan de Arroyos and Azotal) were 
the only agents with liquidity in 1992-93 when the coffee crisis reached its bottom, and 
until the price recovery appeared in 1994.
With the coffee crisis of 1989-1994, the old coffee merchants lost their relative financial 
independence based on access to development credit and subsidised inputs. Their main 
competitive advantage under a regulated market (cash payment to producers) was also 
undermined. If the IMC withdrew, institutional sources of credit did so too. To the 
extent that integration with transnational financial markets represented the only
949available alternative to scarce and expensive credit, a new merchant elite - linked to
242 While credit has been considered the key problem in underdeveloped agriculture in general 
(Chakravarty 1989), for coffee cropping it is crucial, due to the maturity period of new plants (3-4 years); 
the constant need for renovation (decreasing returns per plant start at 8 to 15 years depending on the 
system); and the cyclical behaviour of the market, because during crises the cost of factors is defined by
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brokers or TNCs branches, and furnished with more rational entrepreneurial strategies - 
took the lead in Tlapacoyan. These diverse impacts were expressed in a clash between 
the old merchant elite (of ‘old ancestry’ according to Concha, or ‘of tradition’ as 
Barreda says) and a new elite, of successful ‘parvenus’ (as Barreda labelled them, 
though he became one of them).
As Appendix 5 shows, the Tlapacoyan coffee elite has integrated more or less directly 
to international financial and industrial capital through brokers and TNC branches 
operating in Mexico (Mercon’s Tulipan; Volcafe’s Becafisa; and Atlantic’s TIASA). 
Brokers have channelled coffee from the Tlapacoyan region through big exporters 
located in Xalapa and Coatepec, the main green coffee trading centres in central 
Veracruz, usually on a Free on Board (FOB) basis in Veracruz seaport. In this market 
prices for parchment coffee are higher than in Tlapacoyan, which is why producer 
leaders are always looking for a better deal in Xalapa and Coatepec. The major 
problems are transport costs (100 km of rough, curvy and insecure roads) and the risk of 
sudden price changes. At the same time exporters buy coffee from the Tlapacoyan 
region from local trader-processors. Trust is very important to sustain informal forward 
purchases, which is the main form of credit (to finance regional and local buyers). If 
they have ongoing businesses, exporters pay in advance around 50% of the value of 
coffee, fixed according to the New York spot market, and cashed as a revolving 
working capital fund. It is at the beginning of each harvest when Tlapacoyan buyer- 
processors and exporters negotiate. There are changes during the harvests among buyers 
and exporters, following the mutual evaluation and the conditions of financing imposed 
by exporters. At the end of the season exporter and buyer-processor settle operations.
5.5.2. Regimes ofprice formation
Depending on their strategic position in the regional coffee market, buyer-processors 
face price formation in different ways, though two in particular have been historically 
typical: (1) producers efforts to add value to coffee cherry; and (2) merchants attempts 
to integrate through contract agriculture or other forms of vertical backward integration. 
Since overproduction became a structural feature of the coffee market in the XX 
Century, growers have been encouraged to build a stronger price strategy processing 
cherry coffee. Producing parchment, they protect beans from physical deterioration and 
compulsory sale to intermediaries. Small producers -  individually considered - have no
other profitable activities.
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bargaining power in the market and that is why they have attempted to integrate 
vertically through co-operatives to undertake parchment production. In this way, 
moving from local to the regional market, they try to overcome intermediaries and low 
prices for cherry coffee. What has been promoted by independent organisations as ‘an 
appropriation of the productive process’ - internalisation of transaction costs according 
to the institutionalist jargon of Williamson (1985) - is in fact a claim against what is 
perceived as excessive returns to intermediaries and processors. Among the reasons why 
this project has not always been successful, the lack of technical expertise and efficiency 
in managing economic resources (economies of scale, productivity, quality and a 
competitive cost structure) are most important.
In the case of Atzalan, apart from weather constraints (excessive humidity makes the 
sun-dry process difficult for small producers in the Gulf region), the over-capacity in 
processing among wet beneflcios has cut down profit margins in this productive 
activity, making it increasingly difficult for producers to integrate forwards. Better-off 
ejidatarios and rancheros who owned or controlled pulping centres - mainly promoted 
by the IMC - abandoned primitive infrastructure due to the combined effect of the long 
price slump in 1989-93 and the transferral of IMC processing facilities (which meant 
the creation of 5 new wet beneflcios in the microregion of Atzalan). Growers facing a 
flat price market do not have incentives for coffee quality maximisation. The only 
opportunity left open to them is to choose among the prices of alternative buyers, when 
available.
There has been another historical movement in the opposite direction, from merchant 
capitalists who try to integrate backwards to coffee cropping and processing.243 For 
merchant-processors, their business strategy has consisted in exercising control over 
producers through different mechanisms: credit and forward purchases (mainly in the 
past), monopolistic positioning in local markets, corporatist arrangements (the captive 
markets of ARIC and FRS), or building competitive positions (control over good quality 
producing communities, networks of experienced intermediaries, competitive 
processing costs, etc.). During price slumps - and depending on bargaining power - 
merchants have passed on to producers an important part of the losses.244
243 See the demise of coffee haciendas in Colombia by Bogotano merchants during the 1930s (Palacios, 
1987), as well as in central Veracruz, Mexico, by the parallel process of land reform and merchant capital 
subordination. In Atzalan this process is still going on.
244 See the case of Venezuela during the 1930s (Roseberry 1986), and more recently the speculative wave
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In the late 1990s, due to increased competition, buyer-processors had to maximise their 
profit margins through faster capital turnover, more efficient processing, trading and 
book keeping (with the introduction of computing, professional accounting, increased 
concern about actual yield assessment and financial costs). Those with access to capital 
had different options, but none of them appeared to be interested in integrating 
vertically to agriculture, except in the cases of Bello and Topete (Concha reduced 
considerably his flncas and their relative importance in his business strategy).
Bello, without a financial sponsor and no conditions to access institutional credit, 
abandoned coffee purchases from small producers altogether in 1994-95. He 
concentrated on minimising production costs as much as possible (labour, agro­
chemical inputs, fuel), and maximising returns through quality (good cropping and 
processing techniques, and monitoring of harvest). Bello’s old wet beneficio became an 
extension of his strategic coffee cropping business.
Topete, in turn, focused on maximising wet processing margins, which meant getting 
the right volume of cherry coffee, offering competitive prices to producers and 
commissions to coyotes. Operating with low profit margins and covered against price 
swings (provided he sold all his coffee to Escarcega, his main source of finance) 
entailed a risk that he preferred to manage, giving up speculative gains. On the other 
hand, Topete compensated low processing margins with relatively high returns to his 
own plantation’s coffee, cultivated with modem technology.
In the case of Herrera, the price margin strategist, high capital turnover represented a 
rule of thumb. For a newcomer to a corporatist market, countering the strategy adopted 
by the bigger player (Barreda) proved to be very successful. As a consequence, Herrera 
set very competitive prices for producers, displaying good dealing skills. Another 
component of Herrera’s strategy consisted of expanding his area of activity to overcome 
the constraints of tight competition in good quality or nearer producing areas (the battle 
was only sustained by big competitors: AAS vs. TIASA). Although according to other 
coffee merchants, Herrera’s strategy seemed to be crazy, in fact he managed high risks 
using first-hand market information and very efficient price formation concepts. It is 
important to reckon that Herrera is the only case in which pre-emptive strategies were 
superseded by a superior understanding of price formation. It is not surprising that he
during the worst years of the crisis in 1991-92 and 2002-3 in central Veracruz.
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was the only merchant with plans for setting up a quality control lab (to assess actual 
yields fast and accurately).
Although Barreda set a de facto reference price, since the volume he traded was higher 
than any other buyer in the region, AAS and ARIC-PA systematically discounted the 
final price paid to parchment coffee producers. Assessment of quality was done after the 
transaction was agreed, and yield gains were not compensated to producers. As long as 
most of the coffee Barreda traded came from associates, he used the ‘corporate financial 
discipline’ argument to legitimise such practices. AAS clients were offered high prices 
in each deal, but final settlements generally presented discounts, which they had to 
accept as AAS’ shareholders, an argument that few seemed to agree with. That was the 
case of SPA co-op and the FRS-A, which complained that Barreda charged them with 
rather arbitrary discounts, higher than those of private merchants, and delayed payments 
sometimes for over a month, transforming sales into consignment and unwilling 
financing for AAS. The full implications of a more balanced and fair price formation 
practice have not been assessed. Concha’s discovery of an ex ante equilibrium point 
based on the knowledge of cost-factors, opened the possibility for a more efficient price 
incentive structure, which could represent a more efficient method to counter-balance 
interests and break with a long-established practice of bulk quality and a flat price 
market.
However, conditions for different market practices depend not only on knowledge and 
the technical conditions for applying it. Elites have to develop business institutions that 
materialise, legitimise and reproduce such practices. Why have merchants preferred to 
maintain secrecy over coffee business knowledge rather than build up market 
institutions? It is very difficult to find a satisfactory answer. However, it is well known 
that the stigma placed on merchants reinforces social seclusion, as long as business 
making remains a discretionary practice among traders. Moreover, Concha’s case 
reveals why corporatist organisations and the political system have been reluctant to 
reform the coffee sector. The cases of both Topete and Concha show that producers can 
seize opportunities of association with grower-processors.
Conditions for institutional build up in the sector existed in Tlapacoyan since the IMC 
financed small producers (without collateral) and introduced the principle of a price 
incentive (alcances). The IMC distributed forward credit to finance agricultural jobs and 
respond the major demand of peasants - for credit at harvest time. It used a similar
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mechanism as the Colombian rebate, introduced to allow producers to benefit from final 
profits (alcances). Nevertheless, this mechanism was corrupted on three accounts. First, 
the reference price was homogeneously calculated without recognising regional quality 
differences. Second, the IMC introduced artificial cost concepts in the price and 
prevented producers from participating in the administration of coffee incomes and 
from acknowledging profit margins. And third, alcances functioned as a compensatory 
mechanism, whereby the IMC gave producers a premium, independently of quality 
evaluations and distributed on a generalised basis. This way, instead of a performance- 
related incentive, alcances became an expected “profit”.
The first ARICs were also able to introduce new market practices, but preferred to use 
extraordinary profits politically, sometimes for personal purposes, reproducing IMC’s 
vices and generating new ones. Barreda’s AAS synthesises the historical experience of 
ARICs and coffee merchants in the region, achieving full vertical integration in the 
coffee producing region of Tlapacoyan. AAS did not fully profit from the rich practices 
of other buyer-processors (reviewed above), nor did it transfer market price incentives 
to its associates and to its business rationale. In spite of being the most mature business, 
AAS did not build on Concha’s expertise in assessing cost factors ex-ante\ nor the 
ability to efficiently exploit price margins (Herrera’s strategy). As Concha defined it, 
Barreda did not become a broker, but became subordinated to brokers. Had he become a 
broker he could have himself connected producers up into export markets and spread 
competitive market practices downwards.
5.5.3. Social divide between producers and merchants
Under extremely heterogeneous agrarian structures, with numerous small producers 
settled along wide areas in many coffee-producing countries, a certain level of 
centralisation of production, processing and policy-making is needed. Given the 
agricultural complexity and the labour intensive nature of coffee cropping, some level 
of decentralisation is unavoidable as well.
Historically, small producers have not overcome their primary producer character (even 
worse, in Atzalan most of them are cereceros, cherry coffee producers). Given a 
heterogeneous and disperse production, buyer-processors have guaranteed coffee supply 
through coyotes. Successive efforts at organising ejidatarios within co-operatives and 
other government-induced organisations have failed to deliver clear advantages to
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producers. Co-operative organisation could have been the most efficient way of 
gathering production and building up social capital - as in Colombia or Costa Rica (two 
successful cases of quality coffee exporting countries) - had caciques and political 
leaders not captured the benefits of support programmes. Such experiences have fed 
back on producers’ scepticism towards associations and their recourse oton bargaining 
on a communal or individual basis. This social divide made it difficult to develop a 
more sophisticated ‘coffee culture’ among small producers, with a wider understanding 
of the regional market and a richer and more diversified institutional framework.
The coffee elite in Tlapacoyan gained political experience at the national level and 
began dealing with big exporters and brokers. Generally speaking, they have chosen to 
profit from the ‘backwardness’ of peasants, their lack of technical knowledge about 
coffee quality and price formation, rather than increasing the size of the cake.
Coffee businesses still reveal the social and cultural structural gap between merchants 
and peasants. The extraordinary exception of Topete’s initiative to pull local small 
producers into modem coffee business through a partnership, proved at least his lack of 
insight about how best to breach that social gap. Topete put the blame only on small 
producers’ envy and distmst, and failed to acknowledge the complexity of changing 
embedded values and perceptions. Topete preferred not to deal personally with local 
producers and left the dirty work to coyotes. Herrera used a peasant-like approach to 
trust building with producer leaders (reciprocity values, informality, openness and 
flexibility), but he did not attempt to enter new forms of exchange, except by investing 
in his own business. Concha was not keen about small producers’ organisations, but 
when he agreed with a FRS on a subcontracting deal he was playing his game, for he 
was temporarily short of working capital.
The rational search for market competitiveness will eventually lead merchants to create 
more efficient exchange arrangements (and lower transaction costs) with producers. 
Though new practices have not fully appeared yet, there is already evidence of 
increased awareness among buyers and processors:
• Price incentives that at present benefit only merchants linked to exporters and 
brokers, remain unknown to producers.
• Transparent bargaining of price components, basically actual yield and quality 
attributes, is still constrained by gross subjectivity and excessive price cutting.
229
• Development of quality markers and incentives (according to origin and type of 
coffee) to gradually overcome load-mixing practices.
It is still not clear whether the existing spots of good quality coffee would make 
selective cherry picking and processing worthwhile. Concha and, to a lesser extent, 
others began maximizing tradable volumes, raising coffee quality loads to export 
standards by mixing good quality coffee. They were not adding value by making special 
lots, differentiating products or developing a brand or regional blend of higher 
attributes. Implicitly, competition among buyers to get hold of good quality spots has 
given local producers some kind of a premium (smaller or no discounts at all). The very 
moment a scheme to collect quality coffee can be put forward, the information of price 
incentives would leak to producers, who would start making claims over those 
premiums.
All these elements would eventually reach producers, speeding up market segmentation 
and to some extent producers differentiation, a process the IMC arrested by transferring 
resources from good quality coffee producers (highland communities and producers 
who had mastered long-standing cropping and processing techniques) to low quality 
producers (mainly communities in the marginal mid- and lowlands and second wave 
ejido grants to new-comers without knowledge about coffee, usually sponsored by the 
IMC).
As long as the new FRSs and leaders do not attempt to fill those knowledge and 
institutional gaps, producers will make little use of market mechanisms to improve 
returns. Their bargaining tactics follow exactly the opposite direction. After a long 
slump, small producers have not compensated for many years of neglecting their coffee 
fincas, except from the use of fertilisers and weeding, but they have engaged in no 
major plant rehabilitation or renovation. Far from a radical change in the socially 
accepted standards of cherry picking, old practices are still widespread: picking 
wholesale dry, over-ripe and non-ripe cherries, coffee leaves and other foreign matter.
There is little horizontal competition among processors, since little subcontracting takes 
place in this region. Most growers either sell their harvests in cherry or after processing 
them according to the infrastructure they own (up to escurrido -  drained - coffee if they 
only have a pulping centre; or up to parchment coffee, if they have the full wet mill). 
The subcontracting market has not developed despite the over-capacity of wet
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processing generated by the IMC transferral in this region. The inexperience of potential 
clients, apart from fear and distrust of merchant-processors, has prevented the practice 
of subcontracting, and its potential capital efficiency gains. Given corporatist practices 
and lack of accountability, subcontracting coffee lots from particular communities, 
could have introduced new checks on the performance of FRSs, forcing their wet 
beneflcios to achieve private sector standards.
In a more mature market there should be little differences in maquilas -  processing 
contracts - as long as competitors tend to adopt homogeneous quality standards and 
processing cost structures. This imperfect processing market has survived after surplus 
capacity emerged in the region for several reasons: (1) Most producers sell their cherry 
coffee right after the harvest and are not interested in partnerships; (2) consequently, 
producers were rather indifferent towards the low processing and marketing 
performance of FRS-A’s, for they care only about the price for coffee (everything else 
is secondary); (3) FRS quality standards are so low as to encourage medium growers or 
small landholders into subcontracting arrangements; (4) With few exceptions, buyer- 
processors are not interested in promoting subcontracting with unreliable ejidatario 
leaders.
There are two general possibilities for an efficient price formation. The first one is to 
lower the price for each factor according to market competition and bargaining power 
(producers’ cherry coffee, intermediaries' commissions, buyers’ transport and 
processing costs, and credit interests). Cyclical variations of coffee prices, distrust, 
asymmetric power relations and heterogeneity of actors have made long-term alliance- 
type arrangements complicated. Expectations of extraordinary profits from the final 
price of coffee, particularly during booms, have generated strong incentives for other 
actors to join in the distribution of the coffee surplus. Merchant elites mobilised capital 
-  in part state resources channelled through political activism - to gather coffee and 
control processing plants; traded goods and delivered services to peasant producers.
All buyers and processors oriented their strategies to realise a value hidden in coffee, 
usually out of reach to producers (even when they process their own parchment). Cherry 
coffee is paid anticipating a yield trend, which buyers work out depending on where and 
when they are buying. All buyers protect themselves from loss by assuming a pre­
emptive discount margin, wider or narrower according to competition. Private buyer- 
processors have failed to induce small producers into more competitive practices raising
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awareness of demand patterns, delivering price incentives, passing on technical 
assistance and input services that could widen the room for superior contractual 
relations. On the contrary, ‘their’ business is to detach from any reciprocal obligation 
and regular exchange, finding profit margins in the intermediation chain, mixing 
different qualities of coffee to pass a minimum standard. As peasants are ready to 
bargain on a moral and binding basis, buyer-processors use intermediaries to escape 
social pressure, and evade any contractual arrangement.
The second alternative has been to flatten market price distortions and internalise the 
price formation process, while keeping market incentives in sight. Colombians did this 
by transferring coffee surplus from booms to slumps (in a coffee fund) and building up 
a Federation of coffee co-operatives with powers to enforce quality norms along the 
coffee chain. This created the long-term contractual framework for alliance making 
within the domestic market (considerably stable prices and high returns for producers), 
and an outstanding quality consistency and price incentives for Colombian coffee. But 
this has required a mixture of high levels of market research and coffee expertise, on 
one hand, and a great deal of lobbying power and the use of state regulatory functions -  
transferred to the Coffee Producers Federation - to collect coffee taxes and monitor 
export quality standards, on the other. Despite sophisticated explanations,245 part of the 
success was due to a sound management of anti-cyclical and regulatory ‘economic 
institutions’.
5.6. Regional coffee elites and the organisational dynamics o f the coffee sector
The concept of ‘socio-economic field’ from organisational theory suggests that the aim 
of all public and private enterprises is capital accumulation. In this game, players make 
arrangements to legitimise profit-taking rights. As the main flows of investment capital 
move profitably, actors and institutions try to accommodate by new arrangements, and 
remain market players. Downing (1988) applied this analytical framework to the coffee 
sector in Mexico, arguing that in reaction to IMC regulatory intervention, private 
processors and exporters did not react by raising productivity and competitiveness, but 
chose to act politically. This has been a very Mexican way of big buyers and exporters 
for playing markets. In a slightly different way, introducing politics more into play, we
245 Almost every modem social theory has tried to explain the Colombian success in coffee: from the 
macroeconomic discipline of institutions; passing through the inter-regional and inter-class social balance 
that provided the two-party political system; the entrepreneurial drive and the democratic impact of the 
predominantly small landholder structure of the coffee sector. (Pizano and Chalarca 1997 and Bates 
1997).
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are following this track in understanding why coffee leaders systematically defeat 
peasant interests, while on the other hand merchant-entrepreneurs do not easily give up 
political advantages.
The regional elite took advantage of state promotion of ‘social organisations’ among the 
rural poor. For the ranchero elite there is often no other way of doing business beyond 
the regional level but through federal and state governments’ support. At least since the 
revolution, local elites in Martinez de la Torre, Teziutlan and Tlapacoyan have struggled 
to access preferential services and concessions from the state. Old coffee merchant 
families in Tlapacoyan have felt the competitive pressure from the big poles of 
attraction, Martinez and Teziutlan.246 Contrary to what has happened in these bigger 
centres, Tlapacoyan has depended considerably more on coffee incomes, because this 
town has functioned as a traditional market place for the coffee producing region. 
Besides, the main coffee businesses - buyers and processors - have their beneflcios and 
regional offices there, making Tlapacoyan the coffee market-place of the region. High 
coffee prices mean a steady flow of incomes at least for half a year and an increase in 
peasants’ consumption. In 1993, after four consecutive bad years for coffee, Tlapacoyan 
was a dying place. With the first cycle of good prices in 1995 employment picked up, 
retailing stalls and bars were again busy and peasants were wandering around with some 
money to spend.
Although ranchero families have a diversified economy - cattle, plantains, coffee and 
citrus - coffee production is still very important. The coffee boom of the 1970s and the 
expansion achieved through federal spending in the 1980s - by the IMC and other 
development agencies - represented a turning point for the old merchant elites of 
Tlapacoyan region, less engaged with the diversified economy of Martinez de la Torre. 
At the same time, this socio-economic change increased the expectations of better-off 
peasants and rancheros of the sierra. Old coffee merchant families, would-be 
entrepreneurial elite, entered politics in order to overcome market constraints and take 
advantage of a revitalized coffee sector. Meanwhile, the local leaders and some IMC 
officials - still performing political roles - seized the opportunity of privatisation to do 
business in the coffee sector.
246 See Chapter 2 for the historical account of this conflict.
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Table No 15
From merchants to politicians From local leaders to ‘social businessmen’
Typical cases 1. Antonio Concha (ARIC Tlapacoyan);
2. Gabriel Barreda (ARIC-PA/AAS)
Atzinta group: they were both, leaders like Israel Garcia and JLA and 
also ex-officials-tum-politicians, like M. Ugalde and J. Gabino
Social origin (AC) Old coffee merchant family in Tlapacoyan (now weakened); 
(GB) Old coffee merchant family in Plan de Arroyos (now weakened);
Leaders: ‘Caciques’ from Atzalan and Tlapacoyan communities. Ex- 
IMC officials: middle class professional employees.
Main reason 
for changing 
political and 
economic 
strategy
Under IMC (1970s and 1980s): Regulatory constraints curbed the coffee 
business, but also created negative incentives to play the system 
(corruption);
After the IMC (early 1990s): Salinas’ restructuring weakened the 
corporatist CNC and parastatals. At the same time, the IMC processing 
facilities were passed on to ‘social organisations’, along with generous 
Solidarity subsidies.
1970s and 1980s: New agrarian laws promoted ejido unions and ARICs, 
and parastatals expansion in the sugar, coffee, barbasco and other 
agribusinesses, generating incentives for a crust of local leaders to 
become professional intermediaries.
After IMC: Displaced by Salinas’ restructuring, they used accumulated 
technical and political skills, to seize IMC’s processing facilities and 
Solidarity resources.
Power
bargaining
ARIC in both cases, incorporating SPR and ejido communities as 
captive market and political clientele
Several formal associations: Union de Credito del Golfo, UE “Jose 
Cardel” and the USPR “Atzinta” (which holds the coffee plant). As for 
JLA: he controls the FRC-Azotal
Conjunctures 
ofpolitical 
change
1982-88 onwards: IMC weakens and the room for profitable coffee 
exports widens;
1989-93: IMC withdrew and the ability to create new alliances with 
Solidarity bureaucracy was decisive.
1988-92: The corporatist structure was weakened and the IMC 
transferred its processing plants to the so-called social sector. Solidarity 
support revived part of the traditional elites and promoted new 
components.
Accommodati 
on and new 
business 
strategies
(AC) ARIC Tlapacoyan broke, lacking the regime’s support. Concha left 
politics and went back to rebuild his farming projects: cattle, coffee, and 
bananas. He associated to an ecological tourism business.
(GB) Managed to ally with Solidarity bureaucracy, survived the crisis 
and became the main coffee exporter in the region. Funded AAS to get 
rid of the ‘social sector’ and attract new capital. He improved 
management and integrated with American brokers.
The Atzinta group split over power;
a) JLA withdrew, stuck with Solidarity and succeeded to lead the FRS- 
A. He took advantage of FRCs crisis and property entitlements 
vacuum and set the conditions for appropriation.
b) M. Ugalde with the ARIC Marver (limes); and
c) Atzinta group. Make a living from deceiving organisations and a 
fraudulent association with TIASA (which is interested in their 
failure).
AC= Antonio Concha; GB= Gabriel Barreda; JLA= Jose Luis Arcos (main leader of FRS-A). EU= Ejido Union; ARIC= Collective Interest Rural Association (of both, ejidatarios 
and private small landholders); USPR= Rural Production Societies’ Union; FRS-A= Solidarity Regional Fund of Azotal 
Source: interviews to all related leaders. See Appendix 8.
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The previous table (No. 16) sketches what happens to two of the main actors in the 
coffee market of Tlapacoyan. On one hand, local coffee entrepreneurs, who become 
increasingly involved in party or corporatist politics and, on the other, traditional leaders 
and representatives who make forays into business activities.
These two cases illustrate the process whereby the Mexican state deflects 
entrepreneurial potential from agricultural activities to political rent-seeking, severely 
undercutting the development of expertise, associations, human capital and networks of 
trust deeply rooted in the dynamics of the local economies. Both Antonio Concha and 
Gabriel Barreda were members of the coffee producing elite and both entered politics 
through a new form of organisation known as ARIC (Collective Interest Rural 
Association).247 These organisations were used by coffee elites not by accident. There 
was already discontent with the way the IMC was managing the coffee sector: the ever 
increasing bureaucracy and wastefulness in gigantic beneflcios (like in Atzinta); 
corruption in the allocation of export permits; and problems for producers being paid 
their alcances (differential between reference payment and final price). ARICs 
promoted the association between ejidatarios and big grower-processors, making 
possible vertical integration and more efficient concentration of small producers’ 
harvests. But more important, ARICs were able to receive directly the price differentials 
(between the domestic and the international price) that the IMC was capturing.
ARIC Tlapacoyan and Antonio Concha: a ranchero. coffee entrepreneur and politician.
When the ARIC Tlapacoyan (ARIC-T) was launched, Concha joined it as Manager, due 
to previously acquired experience as a coffee processor-exporter. Even though the price 
differential diminished considerably from 1982 onwards, ARIC-T was able to buy three 
wet beneflcios (one of them Concha’s) and a dry-one (the only one in the region). By 
the mid-1980s good prices set the conditions once again for an incredible expansion of 
ARIC-T based on booming exports of coffee, gorda pepper - traditionally collected 
from the wild - and Persian limes. In 1986 coffee exports to the US expanded and 
ARIC-T opened a marketing office in San Antonio, Texas (Gala Corp.), and at the same 
time, ARIC-T was managing the regional distribution franchise of Fertimex, the state 
fertiliser monopoly (with 3 trailers, 21 trucks and pick-ups). In 1989, before going 
bankrupt, ARIC-T had 1500 members from 10 ejidos and 8 SPR, and 92 full-time staff.
247 At the end of the 1970s the new Ley Agropecuaria tried to create conditions for boosting investment in 
the depressed primary sector and breaking the political divide between ejidatarios and landowners, 
allowing their joint organisation into the new ARICs. See Chapter 3 and Hoffmann (1992).
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Just as the IMC did with the coffee surplus, ARIC-T was investing in basic 
infrastructure projects and became the main political patron in the region. Since the 
mid-1980s Concha understood the role of intellectuals while ARIC-T expanded and 
threatened to go out of control; he then formed a group of advisors with two 
professionals, former FIRA economist advisor Luis Lara and American consultant 
George Ben.
Based on ARIC’s success, Concha went on with his political career and tried in 1987 
to lead the CNC’s Coffee Producers National Federation. In doing so, he had the 
blessings of the political class in Veracruz (Governor Gutierrez Barrios group) and CNC 
national leaders, but the federal group around the then powerful Budget and Planing 
Minister Carlos Salinas successfully backed Leyver Martinez (a coffee leader from 
Chiapas) for the Presidency. Nevertheless, Concha was appointed General Secretary 
from where he took, in 1988, several coffee policy initiatives.249
While he was ARIC manager, he enjoyed success and his influence in the CNC ranks 
increased. As a member of the IMC’s Marketing Committee, Concha’s expertise 
influenced the design of new strategies and sound policies for the coffee sector. 
According to Concha, the IMC put producers' leaders at odds with industry 
representatives, ‘who just needed to give us a slap’; and his proposals to organise the 
transferral under associative schemes with the IMC were dismissed by the ruling group. 
Something similar happened when he served as Deputy for Veracruz and FNPC-CNC 
Secretary, for his ideas on how best to restructure the coffee sector were seen as 
personal advances.
Although Concha was aiming for a high office, he ‘accepted’ the position of Local 
Deputy for Tlapacoyan District under Dante Delgado’s Governorship (1988-91). Once 
he was elected, he widened his group adding political elements to it: Israel Sanchez, as 
‘public speaker’ and Miguel Ugalde, ex-IMC official, as ‘co-ordinator’. Concha’s group 
was then very active with several projects not only on coffee and citrus, but on rural
248 He had been Tlapacoyan Municipal President; Marketing Secretary of the Agrarian Communities 
League of Veracruz (LCA); General Secretary of the Citrus Producers Regional Union in Martinez de la 
Torre; and had also several appointments in government offices as CNC’s representative (SARH, IMC, 
Rural Bank, etc.). (Antonio Concha Deputy Archive, Project’s Executive versions; and interviews with 
AC).
249 The most important ones were to free FREC’s funds (125,000 million pesos) for the harvest 1988-89; 
change the national coffee marketing system; give majority to producers’ representatives in IMC’s 
Technical Committee; and bring back the IMC to its original attributions, promoting associations between 
producer organisations and the IMC, instead of the plant transferral scheme (which finally prevailed). 
Antonio Concha Deputy Archive, Project’s Executive versions; and interviews with AC.
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infrastructure and CNC’s financial restructuring, taking on board the ARIC-T collective 
action and agribusiness experiences.250 At its peak, Concha’s group expanded its 
influence to ARIC Marver, oriented around citrus exports in Martinez de la Torre.
But it was too late for him. President Salinas cut back the state’s regulatory functions, 
subsidies and traditional support for the corporatist PRI structure, picking an outsider to 
‘restructure’ the CNC (Hugo Andres Araujo). The combined effect of the 1989 coffee 
crisis and Salinas’ economic and political restructuring led ARIC Tlapacoyan to 
bankruptcy and prevented Concha from going further with his political career. 
According to Antonio Concha:
If at first, the IMC and Banrural ‘protected’ ARIC Tlapacoyan (overinflating our 
coffee stocks to get higher export permits and credit), when Salinas took office 
things changed, even our friends in the CNC and Veracruz Government did not 
back me. I was playing socialism, and did not realise the changes that were 
taking place, until it was too late (interviews with AC).
The Tlapacoyan ARIC’s processing plant was repossessed by Banrural, and remained 
closed for 5-6 years, until Concha bought it back from the Bank in November 1994. He 
made it functional in 1995 and by 1996 it had a processing capacity of 18-20,000 Qq 
per cycle. This way, Concha got back to business as a private entrepreneur, although he 
had a subcontracting deal (maquila) with FRSs Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos during 
the cycle 1995-96.
Even though Antonio Concha used the fast success of ARIC-T and his accumulated 
knowledge of the coffee business, his high-flier political career was based on traditional 
loyalties in the agrarian corporate structure (CNC, FNPC, LCA). Salinas’ new ruling 
group shattered it and Concha could not adapt. He had no grass-roots support, nor sound 
alliances within the new groups (Solidarity for instance). All he attempted was to 
rebuild his ranchero businesses, taking advantage of his accumulated wealth and his 
family’s capital.
250 The details of these projects are worth review, for they entailed a kind of self-transformation project 
for the CNC’s corporate structure. The main projects were: 1. A system for coffee production control at 
all stages, from reception to warehouse storage, eliminating losses and excessive intermediation; 2. A 
Citrus Institute based in the former IMC experimental camp and linked to new processing infrastructure 
in Martinez de la Torre (abandoned); and 3. A new system of Peasant Contributions to improve CNC’s 
funding on the basis of its ability to increase agricultural prices for peasant harvests. Antonio Concha 
Deputy Archive, Project’s Executive versions; and interviews with AC.
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2 S 1The case of Gabriel Barreda. a new coffee entrepreneur.
Physician Gabriel Barreda joined ARIC Plan de Arroyos (ARIC-PA) immediately after 
the coffee crisis. The Barreda family were old merchants and coffee buyers in Plan de 
Arroyos, dependent on highlanders’ product. Before the road to Tlapacoyan was built in 
the mid-1980s, Plan de Arroyos became an isolated area, subordinated economically to 
Tlapacoyan and politically to Atzalan.
Berreda saw how Salinas’ regime was severing the old corporatist structure and took 
advantage of it. During the first two harvests ARIC-PA confronted losses and the 
organisation went bankrupt. Although Barreda was not a coffee producer, he entered the 
scene alongside tenants his family had in El Progreso, and who were members of ARIC- 
PA. He first became Manager in 1985 and later on President of ARIC-PA’s Board (and 
continued as such over the next three periods). The same year he helped to reschedule 
Banrural outstanding credits and facilitated the use of the Barreda family’s processing 
infrastructure. By 1986 they built their own beneficio (with a processing capacity of 180 
Qq) and a warehouse with credit from Banrural/FIRA.
Although ARIC-PA was affected by the 1989 slump and frost, they also took full 
advantage of the market space left by the IMC in the region since the 1988-89 harvest. 
To achieve this, Barreda had to stretch his abilities for alliance making and lobbying, for 
- as was the case of ARIC Tlapacoyan and others - they were singled out as an elite 
organisation by the Solidarity federal and regional bureaucracy. At first they were not 
considered eligible for Solidarity income support, nor for taking part in IMC’s 
infrastructure transfer.
The Barreda group was ‘nearly’ isolated by the INI-Solidarity state bureaucracy and 
traditional CNC-PRI Tlapacoyan groups. However, thanks to personal bargaining with 
Solidarity federal officials, Barreda was able to enter the coffee emergency actions and 
every Solidarity coffee programme in Tlapacoyan. At the bottom of the coffee slump 
and speculation (1991-92), Barreda became a Solidarity activist, promoting income
251 Based on interviews with Gabriel Barreda, Alberto Andrade, Antonio Concha and Felix Barrio, 
Hoffmann (1992) and Baez (1993).
252 Since first emergency programmes during autumn 1989, federal officials picked what they saw as 
grass-root organisations, leaving out what they considered corporatist ones. Among the latter, ARICs 
were prominent for its record on corruption and mismanagement. Even CNC’s Ejido Unions were 
sometimes discarded, at least in the first stages. Later on, the corporate structure, Governors and the same 
federal bureaucracy relaxed criteria for entrance (INI-Solidarity Support Program for Small Coffee 
Producers in Veracruz, 1992. Hernandez 1992; Hoffinann and Olvera 1993; Dresser 1992).
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support repayment and backing the constitution of a Solidarity State Coffee Fund. His 
major move was to host Solidarity National Week in Plan de Arroyos, a rather 
secondary coffee producing area if one considers other more productive and politically 
influential zones of central Veracruz. In this national meeting President Salinas 
addressed coffee, pepper and vanilla producers, all of them beneficiaries of the PNS.
Barreda’s effective lobbying fulfilled its purpose (to save ARIC Plan de Arroyos from 
the same fate of other ARICs). Then he went back to business, integrating big producers 
and organisations in Tlapacoyan, Altotonga and Plan de Arroyos, into a regional coffee 
and pepper exporting firm: Asociaciones Agroindustriales Serranas (AAS).254 With 
centralised business-like management in Barreda’s hands, AAS increased profits and 
became the main exporter of pepper in Mexico, and the main coffee buyer and direct 
exporter in Tlapacoyan (controlling around half the regions’ production capacity of 
100,000 Qq of parchment coffee and a turnover of more than 20 million dollars a 
year).255
Gabriel Barreda remained loyal to his roots (merchant and coffee processing family), 
through successful bargaining for support from the state, particularly from Solidarity. 
He never pushed his political engagement beyond the coffee business’ needs during the 
crisis; and even at the peak of his activism, he did not embrace a political career. He 
broke a political siege against him, bargaining with federal officials, to whom he 
provided advice on coffee matters, and some personal favours.
The case of the 4 Atzinta group’ and the disintegration of the old elites.
The role of traditional leaders in the coffee business has not been very successful either. 
Traditional leaders from the agrarian corporate structure have failed to become 
entrepreneurs, even if they showed great abilities to survive Salinas’ restructuring. They 
ended up divided, grabing the remains of several organisations (‘Jose Cardel’ Ejido
253 At the bottom of the coffee crisis, the most important regional coffee organisations in Veracruz - 
beneficiaries of the Solidarity Program met in Coatepec, (February 12, 1992), and agreed on: to 
promote repayment of Solidarity credits (future programmes relied heavily on this) and debt restructuring; 
demand subsidies for primary production, training on managing beneflcios and further vertical integration 
with the grinding and roasting industry; create a Solidarity State Coffee Fund and transform Solidarity 
into a Ministry! Some observers talked about ‘solidarian leaders’ and ‘solidarian entrepreneurs’, as a new 
type of actor, emerging from Salinas’ modernisation strategies (Baez 1993).
25 Interview with Serafm Quiroz and Nicolas Hernandez. See Appendix.
255 Interview with Alberto Andrade, SPR Tasolapa, 19-Jan-1996.
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Union; the credit union UCREGO; ARIC Marver and Atzinta, most of them in terminal
*yzfi
crisis, indebted, lacking grass-roots and clear state support).
Once Concha’s group was weakened, the ARICs indebted and state support withdrawn 
from them, Miguel Ugalde and Israel Sanchez seized the opportunity of integrating the 
Union de Credito del Golfo (UCREGO), a new associative figure promoted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (SARH) at the beginning of the 1990s. They led Tlapacoyan 
CNC-PRI ranks into this newly created space, aiming at CNC’s share of FIDECAFE257 
coffee credits and IMC’s Atzinta plant, about to be passed on to the social sector.
Barreda and SPR Tasolapa leader Alberto Andrade (his ally in the neighbouring 
Altotonga region) initially joined them, reaching posts in the credit union, but soon 
resigned along with other leaders who realised how Ugalde and Sanchez ran the union 
for personal purposes.
In 1992 the transfer was concluded, and although Atzalan local leaders (Serafin Quiroz 
and Jose Luis Arcos) figured in the first Atzinta Board, through manoeuvring Sanchez 
took full control of it the following year, and they had to step down. Sanchez 
administration was a failure despite making deals with transnational coffee enterprises, 
Volcafe and TIASA. Banrural took shares from Atzinta as a way of payment of 
outstanding debts, and gave Atzinta new credits for the cycle 1995-96. TIASA proposed 
an association scheme for running the plant as an insurance for repayment. Indications 
of how Atzinta was run confirmed the suspicions of several buyer-processors that all 
that TIASA wanted was Atzinta bankrupt, in order to take it over (as happened 
elsewhere in Veracruz with other beneflcios). There were not only ‘crazy’ price wars 
between Barreda and Atzinta in Plan de Arroyos (cycle 1995-96), but also stolen 
parchment coffee from Atzinta had been offered on the black market. The main leader, 
Sanchez, was successfully sued by the former Atzinta President, and in an attempt to
'yco
avoid losing control over Atzinta, Sanchez bribed representatives. Although the
256 Surprisingly, the last coffee programme in the region, which financed the purchase of modem 
Colombian pulpers, made eligible two of the Atzinta group organisations (UCREGO and UE Jose 
Cardel). Alianza para el Campo/Covercafe, Programa de Transferencia de Tecnologia Industrial, 
November 5, 1997.
257 The former FREC savings -  a fund created from an export tax to finance coffee retentions under ICA’s 
quota system - was finally freed in 1991 after two years of pressure from umbrella organisations. A coffee 
trust was created: FIDECAFE, and Bancomext managed it delivering marketing credits to CNC, UGOCP, 
CNOC and other organisations. In the case of the CNC, 5 Credit Unions were created with that money: 2 
in Chiapas, and one each in Puebla, Oaxaca and Veracruz. Most of that money was never paid back.
258 JLA was offered a pick-up as a repayment of his shares (worth around 20 million pesos) and his right 
to return to his post, illegally taken away (interviews with Biologist Alfredo Celis, TIASA’s appointed
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‘Atzinta group’ actually disappeared, Ugalde and Sanchez tried again to engage in 
leadership/business making. Ugalde moved to Martinez de la Torre and tried to 
reactivate ARIC Marver in 1994, once citrus prices had recovered. He adopted a new 
discourse preaching about social entrepreneurship and condemning state intervention in 
producer organisations, because “it failed to pass on to peasants an efficient productive 
culture”.
The Tlapacoyan agrarian factions received transitorily two leaders from the old 
merchant elite (Barreda and Concha), acting upon the structures set by the regulatory 
coffee board (IMC), which entailed more difficulties than opportunities for the local 
elites.
Pina, Concha and Barreda managed to link their respective family capital with peasant 
production through ‘social organisations’ (ARICs), achieving with this new space 
important advantages over previous trading schemes. First, they made evident the high 
profitability of vertical integration up to export markets on a wider scale (a niche 
exploited usually by TNCs, brokers and state boards). Second, they modified the terms 
of the relation between capital and peasants (traditionally top down: merchant 
elite/producers), opening it to an apparently more horizontal, partnership-like 
relationship. Although producers’ loyalty and commitment was not clear, they 
succeeded in channelling state credit and preferential support, allocated only to ‘social 
organisations’. A crucial circumstance was the programme to transfer IMC processing 
plants to social organisations, for they could channel support from state bureaucracy and 
represent again a peasant clientele.
5.7. Conclusions: elites, business strategies and coffee markets
Capital integration was the only strategy to overcome the coffee crisis but it was 
marginal for all the elites in primary coffee production. Only some grower-processors 
kept running medium-size plantations (Topete and Bello). Profitability of coffee 
cropping went down and many medium-size growers with processing facilities were the 
first to move either to milling and trading, or to give up coffee altogether. Only those 
with access to a dry processing mill and able to deliver graded green coffee (washed 
unhusked beans) had access to export markets. Among local producer organizations and 
buyer-processor businesses in Tlapacoyan, only Barreda’s Asociacion Serrana
Manager to Atzinta; Antonio Concha; Nicol&s Hem&ndez and several other Atzinta’s intermediaries in 
Atzalan. See Appendix 8).
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Agroindustrial (ASA) owned a full dry mill and was able to directly reach export 
markets.
TNCs were inclined to buy parchment coffee in Tlapacoyan from local organisations 
and buyers rather than going all the way down to communities and fincas in order to 
collect coffee cherries. Buying parchment in bulk was less risky and sometimes more 
profitable than buying coffee cherries locally. Margins in primary processing were very 
low because the market was overcrowded with wet mills and pulping facilities. Their 
main competitive advantage was purchasing power and economies of scale. One of the 
key components of the TNC business strategies buying parchment coffee in Tlapacoyan 
was the delivery of credit at cheaper rates than other competitors in the local 
marketplace. They had international sources of finance with almost unlimited funds at 
lower rates and longer terms. In fact, these credits were advanced purchases, which gave 
TNCs the upper hand in terms of integrating small producers and buying at more 
competitive prices.
Regional buyers preferred to collect coffee cherry and parchment to pass them on to 
exporters in Tlapacoyan as well as in Xalapa-Coatepec. They had the knowledge and 
skill to choose the communities with the best coffee, bargain with small producers and 
make extra profits with high-yield and quality coffee purchases as well as faster capital 
turnover. Even with small margins they were usually very efficient in buying, 
processing and selling.
Coffee coops focused on collecting and processing members’ coffee and on selling 
parchment at the best possible price. They were unable to go further in the coffee chain 
(producing and exporting green coffee, or roasting considerable amounts of their own 
stocks). They made margins only with wet processing and finding the best selling deals. 
Volume, quality and timely deliveries were always their main constraints. Despite 
enjoying government subsidised financing, they were far more inefficient than private 
millers in capital turnover.
If we look at profit margins they were rather different for each agent. Some local and 
regional buyers kept speculating to strike extra profits with low-price purchases, hoping 
to sell at a higher price (Topete, Herrera, Bello and Concha to some extent). Particularly 
for local intermediaries (coyotes) their primary advantage consisted in manipulating 
social contacts, running purchases on their own with someone else’s money and
242
exercising a monopolist control over isolated communities. Some experienced millers 
(like Concha and Topete) had a stronger advantage on quality and yield assessment or 
transport efficiency and economies of scale (sometimes also making additional charges 
on defects and manipulating actual yield and weight to their advantage). On the other 
hand, the main “social” organisation, ASA (in fact a private holding company 
manipulating coffee unions), benefited from its captive clients (formally “members”), 
and was able to sustain corporate control over local coops through patron-client 
relations and the delivery of subsidised credit. Finally, TNC branches followed more 
formal and transparent practices in terms of weight, yield and quality assessment, apart 
from paying at shorter terms, however, they applied more complicated proceedings, like 
sample inspection and tasting, filling in of forms, and issuing bank cheques. More 
importantly, they were tougher in bargaining for defect discounts, loss of bags, office 
hours, etc.
None of these strategies applied full international best-practices, but they showed a 
great diversity, technical innovation and social interlocking. Each strategy had 
consequences in terms of social interrelation, competitive advantages and 
disadvantages, failure points and downward-upward integration to specific markets. 
None of them had clear incentives for quality, multi-annual contracts or other schemes 
to build up trusting relationships. TNCs performed purchasing strategies according to 
national guidelines on a day-to-day impersonal basis. Flexibility to go about bargaining 
and ability to speak “producers’ language” gave local and regional buyers a great 
leverage. Turnover was however the master key to the most successful strategy. Buyer- 
processor-exporter business ESCARCESA (Armando Escarcega and his buyers Topete 
and Herrera) was able to run an efficient scheme of low-margin fast-tumover purchases 
backed by an American importer who provided large funding with no interest.
All these strategies had failure points that eventually became barriers to sustaining 
competitiveness. Cherry buyers were always struggling with peasants’ tricks (foreign 
matter in coffee bags) and the yield problem (some varieties had more pulp than beans). 
Grower-buyers had limited purchasing capital and were always struggling with running 
high fixed costs (big harvests in their own plantations and high prices forced them to 
reduce purchases from small producer). Almost all buyers faced pre-emptive tactics 
from producers reproducing a vicious cycle of distrust, cross-cheating and inefficient 
transactions (coffee quality and aggregate competitiveness suffering throughout). Coops 
were unable to gain loyalty from associates and were always pressed into paying high
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prices for cherry (in cash), and they had little experience with wet processing, 
managerial and marketing skills. If we add staff swindling and lack of incentives to fix- 
commission intermediaries, we can understand why their turnover was much slower 
than private buyers and why they all went broke. TNC branches had their own 
problems, some of them associated to local coops (TIASA-Atlantic Coffee) or local 
buyers (Concha-BECAFISA). The experience with the alliance TIASA-Atzinta was 
particularly negative. Both sides ended up in legal conflicts over accounting and 
overdue credits (and the ownership of Atzinta mill, used as collateral).
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Table No. 16
G. Barreda A. Concha R. Topete L. Herrera A. Bello
1. Origin and 
starting 
point in the 
coffee 
business
Member of an old 
merchant family in Plan 
de Arroyos, reactivated 
ARIC-PA in 1985
Member of an old 
merchant family. Moved 
from trading coffee 
(1950s to 1970s), to lead 
ARIC Tlapacoyan 
(manager in 1982)
Inherited senator Topete’s 
estate and mill (Tlap). In 
1988 established fincas 
and a new beneficio. 
Learned the trade from 
Concha
In 1986-87 started as 
‘coyote’ o f Escarcega, 
and as buyer from 1989- 
90 on
Migrated from Mecacalco, 
Altotonga, bought cheap 
forest lands to invest in 
coffee (1955)
2. Formal training Physician (UNAM) None Agronomic Engineer 
(UACh)
None None
3. Organisational 
business form
ARIC-PA’s manager in 
1985; set up AAS in 1994
ARIC Tlapacoyan (1981- 
89), then informal family 
businesses
Informal family business 
(Loma Bonita ranch and 
fincas)
Informal, recently Cafes 
San Jose, S.A. (1994)
Informal family business 
(San Carlos ranch and 
fincas)
4. Integration to 
agriculture
No Yes. El Encanto ranch 35 
ha. Sold 2 fincas. Also has 
25 ha of Dom. bananas; 
and 25 registered cattle.
Yes. 75 ha coffee finca 
with caturra. Also cattle
No Yes. Grower with 110 ha. 
Also cattle
5. Labour 
contracts
No Yes, both, permanent 
ranch workers and peons 
in harvest
25 permanent mill and 
finca workers (trained and 
with high wages) & 500 
temporary peons.
No Seasonal outside peons by 
piece rate and simple 
accommodation
6. Processing 
capacity 1995- 
96
Drying train: 800 Qq/day, 
100,000 Qq all cycle
Drying train: 120 Qq/day, 
18,000 Qq all cycle
Drying train: 200 Qq/day; 
Pulping: 130 ton/day
Drying train: 420 Qq/day 
(7 dryers of 60 Qq each); 
Pulping: 100 ton/day
Drying train: 60 Qq/day 
(use only 30 Qq/day due 
to water scarcity); 
Pulping: 3-4 ton/day
7. Subcontract fees 
and Processing 
costs (maquila) 
1995-96
N.d. Subcontract at N$80/Qq 
(claimed actual costs of  
N$50/Qq)
Subcontract at N$50/Qq 
(N$30/Qq are claimed 
actual costs)
Subcontract at N$45/Qq 
(N$20 actual costs; N$10 
cover risk, N$15 interests 
and profit).
Subcontract at N$40/Qq
8. Production*
(Q<1 parchment)
55,000 (from which 
exported 145 lots)',
N.d. 12,000 25,000 600
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9. Integration to 
brokers
Directly to American 
brokers
Directly to Becafisa 
(Volcafe) and Reicaf
Indirectly through 
Escarcega
Indirectly through 
Escarcega
No. Sells mainly to 
ARIC-PA (Barreda)
10. Financing Credits in US$ (Libor + 
5); brokers, and 
associates’ financing in 
kind
Forward purchases 
(Becafisa and Reicaf)
American brokers through 
Escarcega’s** revolving 
fund (interest-free)
N$1 ’200,000 from 
Escarcega’s** revolving 
fund (interest-free); and 
N$300,000 from Banrural
Own savings (from coffee 
and cattle ranching)
11. Operating area Plan de Arroyos region, 
Tlapacoyan and Atzalan 
piedmont and highlands
Altotonga highlands 
mainly (Temimilco, 
Altotonga) and a cushion 
buying point in El 
Naranjo (PA), in case o f  
freezing in the highlands.
Atzalan piedmont and 
highlands
Cherry: Tlapacoyan, 
Atzalan, Hueytamalco, 
Jalacingo and Altotonga; 
part o f Misantla. 
Parchment: pulls out 
5,000 Qq from Totonacan 
Sierra
Local. San Carlos Ranch 
fincas.
12. Operational 
strategy
ARIC-PA subcontracts its 
wet mill to cut down fixed 
costs.
AAS operates with strict 
costs passing discounts on 
to producers
Selection of quality coffee 
by origin and season’s 
yield performance. 
Subcontracts maquila to 
FRS (Tlapacoyan and PA)
Located in the foothill of  
the producing zone; main 
buyer, pay higher prices 
for gaining volume
High turnover and 
economies of scale. 
Expertise in dealing.
Process mainly own 
cherry coffee and small 
surpluses o f ejidatarios
13. Intermediaries 
and marketing 
points
No. Buys to FRS, local 
organisations and medium 
growers, in Plan de 
Arroyos and Tlapacoyan
5-6 coyotes mobilised 
back and fore in his 
trucks. Also buys in his 
Tlapacoyan plant
8-10 independent coyotes, 
who mobilise in their own 
pick-ups
20 coyotes with their own 
vehicles and Herrera’s. 
Also buys coffee in his 
store and new plant at 
Tlapacoyan
No
14. Payment 
scheme to 
producers
Pays against actual yield, 
imposing discounts. 
Delays o f 2 weeks or 
more.
Cash Cash, although delays of 
2-8 days are common
Cash Cash
15. Type o f  coffee 
traded
Buys mainly parchment 
and sells gold coffee
Buys cherry, drained and 
parchment; sells 
parchment
Grow caturra, and buy 
cherry and drained coffee
Buys cherry, drained and 
parchment coffee; sells 
parchment
Grow caturra mainly
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16. Access to 
market 
information
Direct access to NYBOT. 
Insights from American 
coffee industry.
Teletext and insights from 
brokers (Volcafe and 
Reikaff)
Depends on checking 
price twice a day with 
Escarcega
Teletext and constant 
check o f margins with 
Escarcega
Relay on other private 
processors and buyers
17. Processing 
technology and 
quality controls
Traditional wet process 
and full dry train and 
electronic classifiers.
No controls o f origin, nor 
technical expertise in 
assessing coffee quality.
Traditional wet process. 
Well designed plant (two- 
levels), but old. Control of 
origin and daily yield 
control at each processing 
stage.
Traditional wet process. 
Mill’s good mechanic 
order. Good dryers with 
energy-saving gas system. 
Full train and small 
roasting and grinding 
machines.
Traditional wet process. 
Plant utilisation to full 
capacity.
Empirical expertise on 
beans quality, but not 
control o f origin. Daily 
control on actual yield.
Old mill & traditional wet 
process (sun-drying). 
Empirical expertise; good 
washing and fermentation. 
Own method for assessing 
yield (based on 10kg).
18. Management 
and
administrative
technology
AAS operates as a holding 
with highly centralised 
management. AAS has 
professional accounting 
and fiscal advisor. 
Administration is fully 
computerised.
Own method to assess 
cost equilibrium point, 
based on cross- 
correlations o f price, 
exchange rate, costs of 
production and seasonal 
variation of coffee yields. 
Use computer.
Improvised and 
centralised management. 
Loose accounting. No 
control on processing and 
financial losses. Existing 
computer just store 
records.
Divided processing and 
administrative 
management. Strong 
accounting and control o f  
strict ‘price costs’ 
(maquilas, credit, 
expenses), and daily 
control o f actual yields.
Centralised management, 
based on coffee business 
experience. Basic 
accounting, but tight 
production costs 
discipline
19. Market niche No. Although realises 
export quality
No. Selects quality coffee, 
but has to operate with 
available qualities to reach 
export volumes.
No. Sells bulk parchment 
without controls o f origin 
and quality
No. Buys almost 
everything: cherry, 
escurrido and parchment 
coffee.
No. Sells bulk parchment, 
and escurrido when 
capacity lacks
20. Competitive 
advantages
1. Bigger buyer (price 
regulator)
2. Imposes equilibrium 
point and strict costs ex 
post;
3. The only dry mill and 
scale o f operation to 
access export markets
1. Expertise in assessing 
equilibrium point ex ante 
and selecting quality 
coffee;
2. First-hand information 
from brokers gives higher 
protection in dealings.
1. Lower transport costs 
(plant close to producing 
communities);
2. Processing efficiency 
and economies o f scale;
1. Strong funding, 
economies o f scale and 
high turn over;
2. Efficient price setting 
and competitive dealing.
1. Vertical integration 
and anti-cyclical 
knowledge (investing 
during crisis);
2. Good wet process;
3. Energy savings (mixed 
sun-drying and wood 
fuel).
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21. Risk 
management
Minimise through tight 
price policy and ex-post 
cost equilibrium
Minimise through 
sophisticated ex-ante cost 
equilibrium
inimise through setting 
price to small lots (130- 
150 sacs)
Speculates and cut down 
high risk through fast 
capital spinning
Minimise with counter 
cyclical strategies, self- 
financing and quality 
coffee cropping
22. Competitive 
constraints
1. Cost of money;
2. Price o f cherry coffee 
(due to competition);
3. Dissatisfaction of  
associates with payment 
methods, and 
unaccountable practices.
1. Lack o f capital and 
outstanding debts
2. Sub-utilisation of 
processing capacity.
1. Over-consumption and 
scarcity o f water;
2. Lack o f quality 
controls and coffee losses;
3. Distrust raises staff 
costs, commissions and 
prices to pay.
1. High risks not insured 
(price drop, assaults);
2. Depends on broker’s 
funding on an informal 
basis.
1. Labour supply and high 
monitoring costs;
2. Old plant with limited 
processing capacity;
3. No use o f credit (he 
retired from buying).
23. Overall 
business 
strategy
Focused on maximising 
returns to capital (coffee 
and pepper) and 
minimising risk
Focused on quality control 
from buying to processing 
(coffee cropping is 
subsidiary)
Tend to focus on wet 
processing profit margins 
(crop coffee himself to 
secure supply)
Focused on realising 
profit margins in the 
coffee trade (speeds up 
processing and selling, 
cutting down high risk)
Focused on realising a 
coffee cropping rent 
(processing is subsidiary)
24. Adaptation to 
restructuring
1. Allied PNS, got a dry 
train and rescheduled 
debts;
2. Took advantage to 
grow and launched Asoc 
Agroind Serranas 
(holding);
1. Sold fmcas, 
rescheduled debts and 
recovered his mill.
2. Focused on processing 
and marketing. 
Reactivated other 
businesses
Got involved with El 
Barzon debtors 
movement. Repays 
according to capacity 
(defined discretionarily)
Took advantage to grow 
(in 1994-95 went from 2 
to 7 dryers).
Retreated to self- 
financing; experiment 
with 6 ha o f typica variety 
for further renovation
25. Expansion 
plans
Try to strengthen its 
position: main pepper 
exporter and one o f the 10 
first coffee exporters 
nation-wide.
No. Will intercrop coffee 
and banana. Experiments 
with composts for banana 
and cattle food. Co-invest 
in a eco-turism project.
Yes. Will increase density 
to 2,800 p/ha with 45,000 
Gamica F-16 (40 Qq/ha) 
and projects a modem 
highland plantation.
No, 1995-96 was of  
‘survival’, although he has 
plans for installing a 
quality control lab.
No (he thinks is time of 
maintenance rather than 
expansion)
* Figures for 1995-96 cycle
** In 1995-96 Armando Escarcega Fugigaki (ARESCA, Xico, Veracruz.) had 14 coffee dryers (a total processing capacity of 840 Qq/day); operated with a credit of 6 million 
dollars, buying 10,000 Qq of parchment coffee a day from 400 suppliers. With exports of around 125-150,000 bags, he was perhaps the second coffee exporter at national level. 
Source: Fieldwork and in-depth interviews to R. Topete and L. Herrera, 2 and 5 Feb. 1996.
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CHAPTER 6
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
COFFEE INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS
In pulling together some of the main analytical perspectives of this thesis (the role of 
elites, the strategies of producers, the impact of property rights and sound coffee 
organisations and sectoral institutions), this final chapter will use the insights of the case 
study of Atzalan, Veracruz, and the discussion of the international coffee market in 
Chapter 4, to draw comparative perspectives between Mexico, as a failed coffee sector 
restructuring case, and Colombia, as a successful case of both, institutional continuity 
and market oriented policy change.
The development of the coffee market witnessed a radical change during 20th Century. 
Being a plantation crop of colonial origin, the 1930s slump put an end to big estates and 
extensive systems of exploitation. While, the oligopolistic position of Brazil could not 
stop the impact of changes on the coffee market, it postponed their effects, benefiting a 
producer country, Colombia, that understood the underlying long-term weakness of the 
Brazilian monopoly and the opportunities opened to free-riding.259
The post-war period saw a huge increase in coffee demand. Coffee exports were seen as 
a key element to provide the African colonial administrations with hard currency. 
Coffee boards and state agencies proliferated. Over-production in the 1960s led to 
increased regulation of the international coffee market. At the same time, international 
regulations globalised coffee boards and state agencies (institutos in Latin America and 
caisses d ’estabilization in Francophone Africa).
In Appendix 7 ,1 compare the trajectories followed by Colombia and Mexico in building 
up and managing the coffee sector in order to assess the cornerstones of different 
institutional arrangements. The institutions that have contributed most to shaping the 
coffee markets in these two countries are anti-cyclical institutions. There is an 
underlying reason: coffee is a perennial export crop and long-term competitive 
advantages have to be based on crop productivity, quality and market positioning.
259 See Bates 1997b
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Those countries that tightened budgets on coffee R&D and basic infrastructure, 
withdraw credit, neglected coffee plantations and relied on sectoral transfers at every 
single price slump cannot afford a sustainable coffee sector, nor a sustained market 
position in the international coffee market.
6.1 Market formation and institutions
While the coffee market in Mexico was promoted by the government in late XIX 
Century (to the benefit of landed elites) and more clearly in the mid-XX Century (to the 
benefit of ejidos and landowners), in Colombia the late expansion of the coffee market 
was based on big landowners and merchants. Land reform was avoided and the 
predominance of a small producers’ sector was the result of market adaptation in the last 
three decades. While in Colombia entrance to (and even exit from) the coffee 
production has been strongly regulated, in Mexico entry and exit remained unregulated 
and coffee expanded far beyond suitable lands. In Colombia coffee has been not only 
the main “income-generating natural resource management strategy” (cfr Bebbington 
2001), but a hegemonic crop for more than a century, while in Mexico was perhaps 
strategically important for less than three decades (1960s to early 1980s).
6.2 The key anti-cyclical institutions and organisations
By the end of the XIX Century Latin-American coffee elites had realised that the 
cyclical behaviour of international coffee markets affected investment and long-term 
competitiveness. In 1906, Brazil drew up the Valorisation Scheme. In Colombia, 
stabilisation was also considered the answer to ensure long periods of sustained 
investment. It was well known that long periods of price stability under the quota 
system and domestic price control encouraged growers to invest in plant renovation and 
technological modernisation (for Colombia see Ortiz, 1973).
With direct involvement of the government the Federacion Nacional de Caficultores de 
Colombia (FNC) developed a set of interlocking coffee institutions, which altogether
260 I consider hegemonic crop a crop system of strategic relevance in the economic structure of a region 
(employment, infrastructure, surplus creation, vertical and horizontal cascade effects), by which this crop 
influences resource allocation and price factors formation. It is also hegemonic because of its impact on 
business opportunities, social expectations, functional organisations and economic institutions. If the 
hegemonic crop sustains this character through long periods of time, it also influences the formation of 
power structures and state organisations, as well as the system of social interaction, bargaining and 
alliances. In this case it is common to find either a powerful elite who monopolises this hegemonic crop 
and prevent entrance, or state agencies that capture the market. A balance of private-state actors’ interests 
is rather unstable. For the case of sugar see Mintz 1986 and for coffee Paige 1997.
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explain its high levels of efficiency. They created Almacenes de Deposito (warehouses 
with grading and certification services), the Caja Agraria in 1931 (which became a 
coffee bank), and a R&D centre in 1939 (Cenicafe). Of particular relevance was the 
National Coffee Fund (1940) and its ability to tax coffee exports and directly use 
collected funds - based on the so-called parafiscalidad regime261 - in public goods 
provision in coffee producing municipalities. The rationale of stabilisation of domestic 
prices, and seizing booms for massive plant renovation led to strategic consistency. 
Introduction of HYV and plain-sun cropping technology allowed producers to take full 
advantage from the ‘bonanza’ period (post 1975-76).
As a collective tax, directly administered by the FNC, the Coffee Fund allowed massive 
investments in infrastructure and continuous plant renovation, particularly during price 
booms. The second half of the 1970s was decisive for Colombia; had they not invested 
in plant renovation and infrastructure in the late 1960s, they could not have profited 
from the unprecedented rise in prices. This timing was needed by actors in the top 
coffee organisations right down to those in the coffee fincas.
IMC officials were to some extent trying to copy the successful “Colombian model”. In 
the early 1980s Mexico copied the Colombian Fondo de Cafe, but it was an isolated 
measure and some years later the federal bureaucracy mismanaged and consumed these 
funds. Again, since the latest price slump (2002-3), the Mexican government introduced 
a compensatory mechanism based now on producers’ savings.
My data on Atzalan show that apart from price stability, it took massive federal 
investment in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s to ensure peasants access to
261 A World Bank sponsored country study (Giovanucci et al 2002) call into question this regime and the 
whole coffee institutional framework in Colombia, “coffee funding cannot supplant state funding of 
public goods”. This study advised the coffee tax paid by producers to be low, stable and fixed through 
time, use collected funds in market research and promotion and channel state funds through regional 
coffee coops.
262 Bates (1997c:45-53) argues that the Colombian coffee sector offers a paradoxical case, in which the 
state has promoted exports and transferred export tax collection to the FNC, which in turn assumed the 
delivery of public goods in the form of development projects in the coffee producing regions. Contrary to 
what happens in African countries (exploitation of agriculture by the state and redistribution of coffee 
surplus outside the sector), in Colombia -says Bates- there is an efficient public coercion within the coffee 
sector as long as the FNC -a  public/private organisation- performs like an economic institution, not a 
political one, because it uses its coercive powers to promote long term profitability. He found the 
explanation in politics, that is, electoral competition allowed coffee producers room for manoeuvring, 
autonomy from the state and a power that they used to solve problems emerged from market 
imperfections.
263 Retention Scheme enforced by the government but made out of producers’ contributions per quintal of 
coffee sold. When prices in the “C” market (NYBOT) quote above 100 dollars per 100 pounds, retentions 
are deducted and deposited in a Trust, and when prices drop below 80 dollars price compensation applies.
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new varieties, higher densities of coffee per hectare and inputs. Nevertheless, full 
modernisation was never achieved. Before the price collapse of 1989, peasants had 
given up operating the Instituto Mexicano del Cafe (IMC) technological package, and 
have since re-adapted the coffee groves to associated patterns.
In all Latin American countries institutional arrangements have benefited an unequal 
structure of property and access to resources. However, the Colombian case suggests 
that less inequality does not prevent high levels of competitiveness. On the contrary, 
apart from the provision of food staples and cheap labour, small coffee producers have 
contributed to finance the development of infrastructure through direct and indirect 
taxation on coffee, an issue that has been greatly neglected in scholarship and policy 
debates (Roseberry, 1995). It is true, as Bates (1981, 1983, 1989) has insisted, that 
medium and big growers took the lead in organising the coffee lobby.
In Mexico, the IMC tried very late to introduce a stabilisation fund, but given the lack 
of autonomy, coherence and accountability, when it finally did, the fund was 
ineffective. Contrary to Colombia’s case where public and private agencies reinforced 
one another, in Mexico the IMC weakened the private sector organisational process, 
eroding the long-term prospects of the coffee sector in two major respects: first, there 
were no checks and balances on parastatal performance, nor strong leadership in the 
growers’ organisations. And second, producers lost contact with market trends and price 
incentives.
6.3 Price formation and structure o f incentives
In Colombia, the state did not seize the coffee surplus, for the coffee elite had strong 
bargaining power, and at the same time was not at odds with the political class. A long­
term compromise led to a sustainable balance of power in setting the coffee agenda. 
Society financed the coffee sector through devaluation during price slumps. But in the 
late 1980s, Colombian officials and intellectuals started to challenge the allocative 
efficiency and long-term risks of such a strategy. After the coffee crisis and the 
privatisation of coffee organisations, even the Colombian political class started to 
change the coffee agenda, though without a clear consensus after decades.264
264 Diego Pizano, President of the Central Bank of Colombia, personal communication, April 1996.
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The particularities of the Mexican case have been discussed throughout this study. It is 
worth summarising that the political system deepened the underlying inefficiencies of 
the IMC. Though there is evidence of fast growth of the Mexican coffee sector based on 
direct intervention and massive investment, it mainly benefited medium and big 
growers, particularly those with access to export markets. While the IMC tried to 
introduce ‘international best practices’, Mexican realities were not suited to such 
practices. Heterogeneous' agroecological areas, a polarised rural social structure 
(particularly where indigenous peoples were still bonded to merchant capital) and a 
skewed access to credit and resources. Under such circumstances IMC’s homogeneous 
schemes were deemed to fail; income support for the disadvantaged indigenous 
producers meant excessive profits for some and price premium losses for others.
In Mexico, the coffee sector was never considered in the modernising strategy of the 
ruling elites. During the golden years of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
agenda, 1950s to 1970s, coffee was only important as a cheap source of currency. 
Structural adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s send coffee to oblivion. There has been 
not a single strategic attempt at a comprehensively redesign of public policies in this 
sector. However, massive subsidies have prevailed to alleviate poverty and prevent 
unrest in politicaly sensitive grwoing areas. When financial crisis come up (1982-83, 
1994-95) opportunistic short-term credit programmes also emerged to capture hard 
currency.
6.4 Efficiency and competitiveness o f different institutional arrangements
There is no conclusive evidence of long-term sustainability of different systems of 
production, since many factors influence their performance. Historical analysis points to 
the great flexibility of family units to allocate labour, produce food stuffs and resist 
cyclical crisis; and the social conflicts arising from property rights inequality (land 
reform threats and claims on distribution gains). The less unequal the access to 
resources the more stability the coffee sector could enjoy in the long run.
Partial evidence on soil depletion and energy efficiency analysis points to the 
vulnerability of modem unshaded technologies, and increased reliance on 
agrochemicals to compensate for fertility loss and higher pest resistance (Nestel, 1993; 
Toledo, 1995). The extent to which some of the Colombian haciendas disappeared in 
the 1930s because of the slope washing that created ‘soil rivers’ (Palacios, 1980) has not
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been satisfactorily assessed. The post-crisis coffee market scenario deepened this 
adverse ecological impact of modem technologies (the loss of shade for fire-wood was a 
world-wide reaction in peasant regions). A counter-trend emerged in the USA in favour 
of ‘green’ coffee cropping, i.e. shade grown and bird-friendly coffee. In this case the 
indirect evidence has to be complemented with more complex models that take into 
account agroecological formations (differential carrying capacity) and overall 
agricultural practices during long periods of time.
Sensitivity models suggest that big plantations are more vulnerable under low price 
conditions and where there are no subsidies for inputs (Villasenor, 1991), precisely the 
conditions Mexico faced during the structural adjustment and the coffee slump era of 
1989-1994. Classic studies in economic history and political economy of the coffee 
market have established the factors that account for the quick growth of this 
agribusiness at the turn of the XX Century, up to the end of the quota system (Ocampo 
& Botero 2000, Kalmanovich 2001), such as the change in consumption patterns and 
lower transport costs and the experimentation with labour regimes and marketing 
networks to reach economies of scale. The crisis of the 1930s and the end of the Second 
World War radically modified the structure of the market. The booms and slumps and a 
chronic overproduction shaped new institutions at the turn of the century. The financial 
crisis of the 1980s and market-led strategies accelerated this process.
Institutions can only be evaluated in the specific circumstances of the international 
market and of each producing country. My comparative review of these two countries 
reveals that success or failure can only be explained by the specific combination of 
structural dynamics and collective actions. The ability to build coffee institutions to face 
collective problems such as credit, means of communications, and supply of labour, 
were historically the first basis for merchants and growers to act collectively and use the 
power of the state. But the capacity to adapt such initial institutions to a moving market 
was just as important, for new patterns of consumption, technologies and market 
opportunities did arise. As Bates (1989) has pointed out, initial economic institutions 
can be positively modified through changes in property rights and market incentives.
Apart from suitable institutions - which are just enabling arrangements vis a vis specific 
market structures - it has been critical to seize market opportunities to reach competitive
265 Rice & Ward (1996). Recently, environmental services have been added to the list coffee certification 
labels, like the payments of carbon certificates to diversified-tree shade grown coffee plantations (related 
to World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund and the Kyoto Protocol, 1997). See Pineda et al (2005)
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positions. This occurred in the 1930s when Colombia and Costa Rica profited from 
Brazil’s problems, again in the boom of the 1970s, which benefited Colombia in 
particular; in the 1980s when Indonesia exploited the parallel market; and in the 1990s 
when Vietnam and Brazil took advantage of the world crisis to expand output. These 
cases illustrate situations in which free riders are likely to appear. Most of Third World 
producing countries got locked-into the quota system of negative incentives (high cost 
structures, wide profit margins, big bureaucracies, corruption in allocating export 
permits, free-riding on other countries’ quota and black market), and were not in the 
least prepared to face new market conditions.
Apart from seizing flows of coffee surplus, it has been more important to manage social 
claims on them. In Mexico the political class, and the corporatist leadership, have often 
misused coffee surplus to generate electoral consensus and loyalty. In contrast, 
Colombia promoted higher productivity in the sector and a more efficient use of coffee 
incomes thanks to a mix of market-led policies and quasi-state intervention through the 
FNC in key regulatory areas (infrastructure, R&D, marketing, and certification). This 
has been possible through an interlocking of coffee elites, as well as an authoritarian 
efficiency, making a strong case for long-term competitiveness and ‘institutional 
efficiency’. This is not, however, a straightforward problem, especially when 
considering horizontal and vertical linkages of the coffee sector with the rest of the 
economy, or social distribution effects. How long is the long-term? While Mexico bet 
for social peace and employment, top officials and leaders enjoyed privileges. They 
compromised the long-term efficiency of the sector, in order to guarantee short term 
‘social stability’. It is not an accident that the coffee crisis brought violence to the 
Mexican mountains, while in Colombia de “eje cafetero” is not as affected by guerrillas 
as other regions. A new international economic and political environment forced Brazil 
and Colombia to give up monopolistic policies; they also started to diversify former 
coffee lands, reducing subsidies and transfers to the coffee sector, justified as national 
priorities in the past.
The accountability of state coffee organisations has been vital to provide a ‘learning and 
self-corrective ability’, characteristic of institutionalised organisations. In the absence of 
accountable representation, bureaucratic structures generate their own interests and 
dynamics, as in the case of Mexico with the IMC in which the ‘political cadre’ overtook 
technicians in terms of numbers and decision power. The IMC and the coffee strategies 
chosen by the ruling class were not accountable to coffee producers, generally divided
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and voiceless. Price setting in any regulatory framework can quickly become a complex 
exercise where inefficient costs are hidden. The larger the number of intermediary 
instances introduced, the more room for corruption and price taking agents, not only 
within state organisations but also in the private sector. The creation of a strong coffee 
lobby in Colombia, and the permeability of the political system and the federal 
bureaucracy to its interests, created special circumstances that were not present even in 
Brazil (Bates, 1997). The coffee elite was willing to generate a national market niche 
and incorporate it to this venture. The coffee elite leads the FNC, a private association 
and participates in the boards of several state organisations (not necessarily related to 
the coffee sector). An interlocking of the coffee elite, the political class and the 
academic intelligentsia provided a non-state monitoring of the coffee business, 
something that never took place in Mexico.
The choice of market strategies and state interventions involves a complex set of issues 
that depend on the social structures that have emerged in each country. In a country like 
Mexico, where there has not been a strong private producing sector of growers and 
industrialists, the state had to create the conditions to build up a national coffee market 
from the 1950s through the 1970s. Moreover, Mexico had and still has an extremely 
polarised social structure, with an unequal regional landscape, where a big peasantry 
and numerous indigenous peoples have become minifundista coffee producers. Facing 
such a scenario it was not unlikely the political class going ahead during the 1960s and 
1970s with intermediating agribusinesses with parastatals, in order to cushion social 
conflict. Mexico has been famous for allowing peasants room within the IMC’s 
operational arrangements, and at the same time securing the interests of big growers, 
exporters and industrialists, with exactly opposite strategies. These recipes guaranteed a 
great deal of conflict, and high operating costs to the parastatal. The resulting 
accommodation can be called a ‘general pre-emptive strategy’, where every one 
disagrees on almost everything except from free-riding on others.
The long-term consequences of creating social spaces for different economic 
rationalities have not been properly understood (i.e. vertically integrated agribusiness 
vs. rural livelihoods). Since the 19th and early 20th century most of the big players of 
the coffee market made historical choices about land entitlements, repressing land 
reform movements that solved several conflicts and gave a clearer profile to key formal 
and informal institutions and organizations, like political parties, agribusiness and co­
operative organisations (see Barrington Moore 1966 on the relationship of the political
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system and landed elites). Mexico had a violent revolution and a conflictive land reform 
process that was not clearly defined, nor quickly finished, and remained an object of 
strong social conflicts in rural areas right into the XXI Century. The ruling elite 
sustained national consensus around a ‘populist/ISI strategy’, severely compromising 
the window of opportunity to generate an upward moving force in rural areas - based on 
the differential expectations of peasants and urban groups.266 The success of the 
Colombian case was apparently based on the interlocking of the coffee elite (merchant, 
growers, exporters) and the political class, displacing direct TNC intervention, but 
preserving a close understanding and use of the international commodity and capital 
markets since the 1930s (the domestic market was always very limited).
The institutional coherence of the coffee sector can be evaluated by two types of 
economic institutions:
a) Coffee institutions engineered by the ruling classes, arising from ‘special 
interests’ that regulate markets and usually become object of legislation and 
reforms to the state apparatus (i.e. unions, boards);
b) Coffee institutions that emerge from sedimented market structures, exchange 
and customary social contracts among market agents (i.e. funds, auctions).
The efficiency of the state’s ‘economic machine’ in Mexico relied heavily on the
767bureaucratic apparatus as a whole. Parastatals did not have financial autonomy, and 
were not accountable to market agents (producers, consumers), nor to an independent 
Congress, which could set targets and evaluate performance according to both market 
and social welfare criteria. In some periods the IMC drew on coffee returns to finance 
its expansion, but occasionally it also drew on the federal budget, particularly during 
price slumps. In any case, it failed to fund the coffee sector, according to the IMC’s 
regulatory functions, actual administrative costs and the market value of its economic 
activities (cherry harvest, transport and milling). That the IMC had self-financing
266 Hobsbawn (1994) points out that rising expectations in the peasantry generate stronger economic 
claims. Research on the history of several commodities in Mexico (tobacco, barbasco and coffee) has 
confirmed that ‘rural development’ can more easily take place if ruling elites use this historical gap to 
increase agribusiness profitability and capitalisation. Once peasant producers become aware of the 
unequal terms of trade and/or unfair price formation, social movements emerge. When they did not realise 
the nature of those unequal structures, other farmer groups, students and urban middle classes have come 
into the picture (Diaz Pineda, 1986 and 1991).
267 The Organic Law of Federal Administration ascribed each parastatal to a sectoral authority, which 
formally set up functional attributions and restrictions. The Agricultural Minitry (SARH) used to set 
targets for the IMC and had representatives in the Board of Directors. The Treasury, in turn, controlled 
foreign currency, debt and income.
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capacity was proven during the second half of the 1970s, when it managed to generate a 
surplus fund, just making use of the futures markets.268 It has been pointed out that most 
of the market institutions in the field were captured by merchant/growers, who 
represented the ‘best practice’ available in the socio-cultural horizon in Mexico and 
even Latin America. However, the upper institutional crust (parastatals legal framework 
and centralised control of them, credit institutions operating schemes and property 
rights, Presidentialist and corporatist political system) prevented a more efficient 
outcome from those arrangements, and a better adaptation and tuning of coffee 
institutions and organisations to the dynamics of the international market.
While some institutions and organisations promoted greater rates of saving and 
investment in the coffee sector (clearly the Coffee Fund and other integrated services in 
Colombia), in Mexico the whole set of organisations dealing with the coffee sector 
failed to achieve institutional continuity in a changing market environment. It has been 
seen that anti-cyclical mechanisms of coffee organisations were vital to sustain long­
term credit, due to the long-term maturity of agricultural capital and the constant need 
of plant renewal and R&D (as noted earlier, new coffee bushes take 3-4 years to 
produce the first harvest, and start a decreasing yield after 8 to 12 years, depending on 
variety and management). The key feature to guarantee stability is the institutional 
environment, although changeable consumer markets and competitive moves of 
producer countries frequently alter the logic of organisations. What were efficient state 
organisations during the quota system have proven inefficient under the so-called free 
market period. Nevertheless, the old ones provide the basis to find new solutions to old 
structural problems (cyclical behaviour of markets, price instability and risks), as well 
as new market trends (patterns of consumption, new processing technologies, etc.). The 
structural problems of producing coffee have not changed that much. What has 
essentially changed is the balance of power between market agents and the patterns of * 
surplus distribution, and not the old ‘labour’ and ‘yield’ problems, which have 
embedded the coffee market for the time being.
268 This ‘illegal’ mechanism gave some room for financial autonomy (bridging the arrival of the always 
delayed federal budget), but also bureaucratic power, that generated great opposition within the ranks of 
the ruling group -  a struggle that ended up with a suit against the IMC Director. Managerial initiative and 
economic success in a ‘second-ranking parastatal’ had no room in the priorities of the political elite. Other 
stories confirmed almost the same pattern (in the case of barbasco see Gereffi 1980 and Diaz Pineda 
1991; for Tabamaex see Aguilera 1981, Jauregui 1984, Diaz Pineda 1986). Parastatals with ‘red numbers’ 
(indebted) were of no concern to financial officials, ready to extend generous budgets to sustain subsidies, 
bureaucracy and inefficiency.
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Following Granovetter’s (1985:487) argument on embeddedness, I conclude that 
economic institutions are not necessarily the more ‘efficient solution’ to ‘economic 
problems’. These two terms of the equation are socially constructed, all ‘attempts at 
purposive action’ on the part of merchants and the farmer coffee elite (to solve problems 
of labour supply, credit, infrastructure, access to markets, etc.) were ‘embedded in 
ongoing systems of social relations’ and usually ended up as trade-offs between market 
and social structures (the balance of power among producers, merchants and 
entrepreneurs; of socio-cultural forms in the producing regions, and of social knowledge 
and technology). This account of coffee institutions and organisations adds to the 
embeddedness argument.
The business strategies of Tlapacoyan coffee merchant-processors, analysed in Chapter 
5 reveal some of the subtleties of the coffee market structures. Vertical integration, 
theoretically an optimum solution to coffee supply, has not always been achieved, nor 
even pursued by most of the successful merchants and processors. This phenomenon 
has to do with the profitability of coffee cropping, given underdeveloped basic 
infrastructure, non-existent long-term financial support, labour supply problems and 
negative price incentives. Peasants have filled this gap, adapting their capabilities to the 
type of regional market created by the coffee elite. Capital integration, has then taken 
shape through intermediaries and merchant-processors, as well as through the ever­
present producing organisations (playing not a different role). But, at the same time, this 
network of intermediation allowed access of small producers to financial capital 
(geographically dispersed groups, short-term contracts, no collateral). Many of the so- 
called market institutions constitute remnants of longstanding exchange relations. 
Producing a perennial crop commodity according to specific standards has imposed 
some more or less common rules that have been historically encountered with very 
different institutions and social actors. Thus, only to a very limited extent do economic 
arrangements provide ‘the most efficient answer’ to constraints.
6.5 Coffee market, traditional technologies, social capital and knowledge
Bates (1997) points out that the coffee market is well known and abundantly studied. 
Despite that fact, coffee statistics are unreliable in many respects and little is still known 
about social change at the micro level (technological change, cropping patterns, 
interrelations of coffee surplus with other farm and non-farm income sources). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, macroeconomic models are based on gross assumptions about
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average technology and yields, while national statistics still lack a clear differentiation 
of coffee producers’ total land and land allocated to coffee cropping and value added in 
the agricultural and industrial phases along the coffee chain (Junguito and Pizano, 1991; 
Diaz-Pineda, 1992).
Knowledge and statistics on coffee have been dominated by the national coffee 
agencies’ own interests. Hence, the official stories of the respective countries portray 
success stories, which highlight how coffee has conveyed democracy, land 
redistribution, efficient institutions and managerial skills to each region. When the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was in force, national level statistics were 
manipulated to cover up free riding, the unwanted extension of the coffee frontier (when 
diversification was highly needed), economic espionage, smuggling and black market 
and drug money laundering. 269
Although the end of the quota system has eliminated the coffee black market and the 
‘institutional free riding’ (or monopsonic competition under ‘open economy’ 
conditions), 270 the privatisation of international market organisations is not going to 
replace the national infrastructure for scientific research and improve socio-economic 
statistics. While the IMC concentrated on assimilating the best available technologies 
and practices (in particular from Colombia and Costa Rica, for evident similarities), it 
could advance research to a greater development stage (i.e., reproduction of normalised 
hybrids and introduction of byo-technologies, for example).
There has not been systematic research on the political economy of the Mexican coffee 
sector, except for short-term diagnois of the IMC’s small Marketing Department, unlike 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and Kenya where systematic research is undertaken. 
Based on standard market research and cost structure planning, the IMC generalised a 
national price structure (which considered technological packages), generating transfers
269 Not only are Mexican coffee statistics unreliable but also those of countries like El Salvador under 
military rule in the 1980s. The extent of Indonesian trading in the parallel market has not been 
documented.
270 According to the distinction drawn by Ostrom (1996), the transition from open access unlimited 
resources towards limited access to scarce resources defines the difference between common resources 
and common pool resources. As the international demand for coffee is rather stable (tends to fall in some 
important consumer countries like USA, but increases in newly integrated ones like Japan), and cyclical 
crises have severely damaged the vulnerable economies of developing countries, the coffee market was 
managed as a CPR under the ICAs and still now tends to be managed to some extent as a CPR among the 
members of the retention scheme association (created after the ICA’s economic clauses were no longer in 
effect). As Colombia and Kenya did in the past to Brazil, now Mexico and other small producing 
countries are free-riding on these association efforts (Bates, 1997).
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from efficient producers to inefficient ones, mixing regional qualities, and cutting 
incentives for productivity.
As mentioned previously, the IMC commissioned an over-ambitious survey of the 
coffee producing regions from CECODES during 1976-79, co-ordinated by social 
anthropologists, which was not published until 1986 and had consequently hardly any 
impact in the decision making process, nor in the academic debate. Since the first 
official coffee institute was created in 1949, there have been few scholarly accounts of 
the institutional performance of the coffee sector. Even the IMC did not publish their 
analysis, except Villasenor’s classic Caficultura Moderna en Mexico (1987), more an
771 •agronomist’s manual. The withdrawal and relegation of most of the pioneering 
generation of Mexican coffee experts from IMC top posts by the early 1980s - including 
Villasefior - signalled the decadence of the Mexican coffee agency, increasingly
777 •dominated by political agendas and politicians. Except for extensionist leaflets on 
coffee cropping, the wealth of studies and research the IMC carried out (census, atlas, 
R&D) was little known outside this organisation. After a wave of studies of peasant 
movements in the 1970s,273 little progress was made to understand the workings of rural 
coffee markets and elites, the internal dynamics of the IMC and the coffee sector 
performance in the context of the international market.
6.6 Social sciences and institutions
The main body of recent literature on the coffee sector has been produced by two small 
teams. The French CIRAD mission (social geographers, mainly) based in Xalapa City, 
Veracruz, who originally focused on agroecological issues in that region, but have 
produced original work on the role of rancheros, coffee basin ecosystems and bio­
technologies. Universidad Atonoma de Chapingo’s (UACh) research units CIESTAAM 
(an agribusiness research centre) and CRUO-CENIDERCAFE (a regional unit in 
Huatusco, Veracruz) have developed some of the few permanent lines of basic 
agronomic and coffee agribusiness research. Although UACh’s agricultural
271 A unique testimony on IMC’s policies as it was based on internal research and seminars.
272 Former president, De la Madrid (1982-88) started to fund the CNC with the IMC budget (interviews 
with Antonio Concha, 25 & 27-Jan-1996).
273 Mainly Marxist focused Social Anthropology and Rural Sociology, disciplines which registered the 
indigenous struggles against the IMC and cacicazgos, for price increases and regulation. See P6rez Castro 
1989, Esteva (ed) 1983, Bartra 1993, Par6 1991b.
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professionals have shown a wide focus and a sound concern on the coffee market, their 
work lacks a methodological bridge between their scientific enquiries on coffee 
cropping and the broader analysis of coffee market and state policies. Until recent years 
a small team has adopted an interdisciplinary methodology to assess coffee quality 
factors in depth.
In comparison, Colombia’s strong tradition in Economics was fully incorporated in the 
FNC management, providing a macroeconomic perspective to strengthen producers’ 
bargaining capacity. The same academic elite - graduates of the Universidad de los 
Andes’ Department of Economics with post-graduate degrees at Princeton, Cambridge, 
etc. - have directed and represented the FNC and Colombian delegates to the ICO in 
London, as well as top officials in the central bank and the ministry of agriculture.274 
Moreover, coffee representatives with a background in Economics have been elected 
senators and deputies.
The bulk of the coffee literature in Colombia is dominated by Economics, even historic 
and institutional analyses are based on the economic history and political economy of 
the sector. Historically, the problems of labour regimes, price setting, public policy, 
market competition and allocation of resources in the coffee sector have been the object 
of public debate in Colombia, in government offices and Congress, academic 
publications and in the media.
In Mexico, sector statistics and professional analysis of coffee have been very limited. 
From the 1970s on, specialised reports of several organisations appeared: the IMC and 
financial organisations (FIRA, Banrural and Bancomext) were publishing market 
reports, mainly for internal use and in most cases not accessible to researchers. Most 
theses and academic papers carried out in Mexican universities during the 1970s and 
1980s focused mainly on agrarian and other sociological issues, usually based on 
Marxist theories, lacking analytical depth and empirical research (access to IMC 
statistical series was very difficult). All the research, records and statistics produced by 
the IMC were essentially internal and were not very accurate. Politically sensitive files 
were always considered the property of each Director and were lost when they left 
office.
274 Universidad de Los Andes Department of Economics was set up at the beginning of this century and 
has remained central for higher officers in key positions in the financial sector of the government and the 
FNCC. See Palacios (2001) for an insightful essay on the role of elite economists in Colombia.
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6.7 Conclusions
Not all coffee institutions are purely market-led or regulatory arrangements, nor all 
coffee institutions were entirely successful all the time. The Kenyan auction system was 
an efficient mechanism for price discovery for a period of time. The National Coffee 
Fund was very successful as stabilization and anti-cyclical mechanism for some time. 
Likewise, the Instituto Mexicano del Cafe (IMC) was somehow successful at organising 
peasants and increasing exportable production (1 million bags each decade between the 
1960s and 1980s). On the other hand, the role of coffee in the domestic economy and 
the society as a whole has changed more rapidly than coffee systems of production and 
trading. This change has been relatively slower in Colombia, and much faster in 
Mexico. Almost all types of economic institutions suffer from failure points that may in 
some context lead to economic inefficiencies, social conflict and institutional inertia. 
The ability of the coffee elites to shape economic institutions to sustain long term 
competitiveness, social bargaining, specialised knowledge and sophisticated support 
policies (anti-cyclical funding and bargaining favourable or at least neutral 
macroeconomic policies), are more important than the model or type of coffee 
economic institutions in itself.
The FNC has learned the discipline of grounding their demands and lobbying pressure 
on macroeconomic considerations. In Mexico -  as seen in Chapters 3 and 5 - pressure 
groups’ short-sighted politics dominated in coffee organisations and public 
programmes. Regional and national coffee organisations relied on political bargaining 
rather than sound macroeconomic arguments. While top graduates in Economics have 
advised the FNC’s decision-making on price and marketing policies, as well as on long­
term plant renovation and cost-efficiency strategies, in Mexico the financial 
bureaucracy has dealt with the coffee crisis with “neutral” policies (income support 
transfers, subsidised machinery and credit, and very limited marketing promotion) 
which lack a long term vision. Although some basic research was carried out in the 
1970s and 1980s (soil studies, bio-technology and experimentation on new hybrids), 
they were a secondary concern and the scientific agenda was always postponed.
Even with some delay, in Colombia, the FNC, since early 2000s scholars and officials 
were able to discuss the need for overhauling most of the existent coffee organizations 
and in five years they have recover the lead in new market segments (specialty coffees).
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In Mexico, the lack of even basic coffee statistics, not to say scientific research and 
thorough revision of two decades of coffee policy improvisation and sustained 
institutional capture -  from one model to another - has led to mass labour migration, 
downgrading of coffee infrastructure and environmental degradation in all coffee 
regions. A commissioned study found a picture of disaster in the Mexican coffee sector: 
increased costs of production, loss of productivity and competitiveness, low value added 
of undifferentiated coffees, and considerable waste of public resources in inefficient 
subsidies (see Giovannucci and Juarez 2006).
As shown in this brief revision, to reach a competitive position in the international 
coffee market, efficient economic institutions are important but not enough. Almost all 
coffee producing countries are now embracing compensatory mechanisms, but with 
dysfunctional mechanisms given the current structural oversupply. Short periods of 
price recovery provide insufficient surplus to compensate for long periods of low prices. 
Without a proper understanding and management of coffee cycles and long term 
competitiveness factors (labour supply, quality, productive diversification, institutional 
design), as seen in Chapter 4, compensatory policies will only drain scare public 
resources. Simple single “commodity” compartimented agencies are less and less able 
to govern complex markets.
In Chapter 5 I reviewed the critical role of elites to shape, improve and adapt or 
completely change institutional arrangements in changeable coffee markets. Elites are 
influential in the emergence of a framework for social interaction amongst coffee actors, 
to bargain sound public policies and set up flexible organisations able to produce 
knowledge and adapt technology for long periods of time. But as Chapter 2 and this one 
have shown, the state intervention has always been indispensable in the coffee market. 
In the final chapter I will conclude how all these dimensions can be put together to 
better understand the position of small producers in the coffee industry and figure out 
possible alternatives to the coffee crisis.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 1 of the thesis I laid out an interdisciplinary framework for analyzing 
contemporary peasants. Chapter 2 presented a case study of the formation of a small 
scale coffee producing ejidatario in Atzalan, Veracruz, through a historical review of the 
regional market formation and the impact of agrarian reform. In Chapter 3 I followed up 
the emergence of state-sponsored coffee coops and analyzed the underlying reasons 
why they were unable to represent the interests of small coffee producers and to 
generate a sound economic strategy to face the market. Chapter 4 examined the 
objective and subjective conditions of peasant survival in the coffee market, considering 
the natural conditions of production, the complex dynamics of coffee cycles and the 
peasant families’ coping strategies. In Chapter 5 I introduced the analysis of the coffee 
elites and the influence of their economic strategies. Chapter 6 presented a comparative 
institutional perspective of analysis, taking Colombia as case of relative success and 
Mexico of failure.
In drawing together the conclusions to this study I first consider the overarching 
question concerning the reasons why peasants survive in the coffee sector in Mexico. In 
Section 2, I discuss the extent to which elites and their business strategies shape the 
market and why the lasting and badly managed agrarian reform has contributed to 
developing distrust and an inefficient coffee market. In Section 3 I reflect on some 
recent market changes and the new opportunities and challenges presented to small 
coffee producers. Section 4 presents theoretical conclusions emerging from the study, 
particularly on flexible forms of small commodity production, complex rural livelihoods 
and land endowments. In Section 5 I recap some of the institutional arrangements that 
play conflictive roles in the coffee market. Finally, I present a brief reflection on some 
recent coffee crisis issues raised in the literature, which only serve to reinforce my 
conclusions.
265
7A Peasants and diversified livelihoods
In order to answer the question about why peasants have managed to survive, three 
closely interrelated problems have been taken into consideration throughout the thesis. 
First, land, the ejido and rural communities are a lot more than just factors of 
production. In line with Bebbington’s argument about place formation, ejido 
communities provide organisational means that become especially relevant for peasant 
livelihoods in the context of loss of profitability in agriculture and particularly the 
structural crisis of the coffee economy. Access to land and labour arrangements have 
been closely associated to ejido membership. At the same time, ejido interactions and 
social obligations determine the workings of embedded factor markets. Small ejidatario 
coffee producers in Veracruz show economic strategies that contain a dynamic tension 
between market competition and cooperation, individualism and collective action.
Secondly, the price formation of coffee, although determined by international markets, 
involves a rich bargaining process among different regional actors that take part in 
production, transport, processing and marketing of coffee. Asymmetric power and 
access to information and productive factors strongly influence individual choices. 
Apart from objective factors (natural constraints to coffee production, geographic 
distances and obstacles, and transaction costs to access export markets), there are 
human, cultural, institutional and political factors that play an important part in 
explaining the “efficiency” of national coffee markets. While some producing countries 
have prevented land reform and encouraged private property on medium and large 
coffee estates, others like Mexico have led to an extensive small coffee producing 
sector. It is important how coffee producers and other market agents have historically 
assimilated and rationalised their social interactions, how the coffee market institutions 
have been built through actors’ strategies and state intervention. As an example, I 
presented the case of price formation which is far from a mere interplay of demand and 
supply; instead it synthesises social expectations and pressures from all agents for 
increasing their respective share and challenging the share claimed by others. In this 
way, embedded peasants’ practices and elites’ business strategies in the Mexican coffee 
sector have resulted in a very inefficient institutional framework.
Thirdly, elites are important in rural societies because they establish a privileged link 
with peasants, both in the coffee market and in other areas of social interaction. Their 
strategies of accommodation vis a vis the state and powerful actors (agribusiness and
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politicians at regional and national levels) have created opportunities for regional 
development, specialisation and integration in national and international markets. The 
fate of entire rural regions can be traced perfectly by following the political action of 
rural elites. I offered the historical perspective on a coffee producing region in Central 
Veracruz, whose local elites channelled federal and state resources, mobilised peasants 
and challenged state intervention in key economic activities. Elites are interlocked with 
peasant communities in many different and complex ways, not only through patron- 
client relationships and intermediation of commodity chains, but complex alliances 
(participation in marketing co-operatives and other types of social organisations and 
political action to get public services like road construction and maintenance). Elites’ 
knowledge of coffee markets has an effect on business making and market institutions 
(contracts and grading systems, price formation, value creation incentives, and market 
structuring and development). In turn, peasant organisations and their economic 
strategies are strongly influenced by this elite framework. Elite business strategies 
influence, and are influenced by, these interactions with peasants. If coffee buyers and 
mill entrepreneurs base their business strategies on farm-gate buy-outs, flat prices, 
unfair discounts, weighing tricks and opportunistic pressures on indebted peasants, 
these will lead to distrust, social stigma, shrewdness and pre-emptive tactics. 
Internalising inequality and distrust will give rise to weak coffee institutions and 
organisations.
7.2 Coffee markets, business strategies and trust
The state shaped decisively institutional arrangements governing the coffee sector, even 
after complete privatisation (1993). Up to the middle of the XX Century, the coffee 
market had not been developed by the private sector. A new regulatory framework 
contributed to expand considerably the sector during the 1960s and especially the 1970s 
adding ejido lands and labour to the coffee market. The combined effect of an 
international quota system and strong state intervention transformed the workings of the 
regional markets. Though with many inconsistencies, the state defined the domestic 
price structure for coffee, based on the rationality of the main beneficiary of its policies: 
a specialised small to medium size producer from the comparatively more efficient 
regions (well connected and modernised).
The IMC system pursued economies of scale and generated a distorted structure of 
incentives for two reasons: (a) coffee was priced in bulk, so efficient producers and high
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quality coffee highlander producers did not get price incentives while inefficient and 
bad quality coffee producers were in fact subsidised; and (b) quality was homogenised 
in order to reach a minimum quality, acceptable to the international market, so the IMC 
blended bad quality with good quality coffee, losing origin controls and market prestige 
(formerly gained by haciendas and ranchero regions).
The practice of a minimum bulk quality promoted negative incentives and producers 
largely were removed from market discipline (particularly with respect to cost structure, 
quality consistency and markers). Pre-emptive business strategies, in turn, led to a low 
pricing of Mexican coffee, and an inefficient structure of incentives for producers, 
intermediaries and processors alike. The practice of concealing benefits from each other 
deepened mistrust and social divisions. Wasteful policies for reaching badly understood 
economies of scale, bureaucratic carelessness about processing standards, and 
corruption spoiled the social environment for trust and co-operation between coffee 
actors.
All along the productive chain, social claims - from jornaleros to producers, 
extensionists and technicians, exporters, industrialists and financial institutions - add a 
heavy burden on coffee surplus, affecting labour standards, distribution, savings and 
investment patterns. That is, the long-term competitive position of the Mexican coffee 
sector. In every link the logic of the free-rider or the exit option seems to prevail:
• Paid by piece rates, harvest wage labour still picks coffee cherries as if they 
were ‘milking’, damaging branches, collecting leaves and mixed cherries -dry, 
ripe and unripe - affecting plants and the quality of coffee. Cases of petty 
robbery increase during harvest time.
• Most producers are not encouraged to bring good quality cherries to ‘their’ 
organisations, or set collectively accepted quality standards. Producers deliver 
bulk quality cherries, adding stones, bananas and other impurities in order to 
gain weight and price.
• Out of distrust, producers do not accept delivering their coffee to organisations 
if not paid cash in full on the spot. Although there is nothing wrong with this 
stand (self-enforcing market), in the case of coffee, it means higher operational 
and financial costs and lower participation of producers’ capital in the value 
chain.
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• Local intermediaries exercise a monopolistic control in isolated communities, 
lowering prices, cheating on their bosses (regional buyers), making businesses 
on their own with buyers’ capital, ‘inflating’ the price supposedly paid to 
producers and mixing highland with lowland coffee.
• Some buyers alter scales, while others offer ‘competitive prices’ imposing ex­
post unfair discounts on agreed transactions.
• Grower-processors have got used to punishing producers in advance - and 
usually in excess -  for the delivery of low quality beans. They profit from 
quality coffee without passing price incentives on to good producers and when 
possible they hide quality problems in coffee supplies to brokers and roasters. 
Commonly, some speculators do not fulfil forward sales and credit contracts.
• Brokers and TNCs also penalise Mexican coffee as a matter of rule, usually 
with 5 to 10 points below the market price for Mexican prime washed -  which 
is already rated at a discount in the ‘C’ contract of the NYSE. Discounts tend to 
get stringent under low-price, oversupply conditions and lenient when high 
prices and scarcity prevail.
Mexican producers, buyer-processors and exporters have lost an important margin in 
export transactions because of a ‘deteriorated market image’ and quality inconsistency. 
However, market arrangements are also moulded by the way elites design their business 
strategies as they interact with the market. Among the main market structures that set 
the stage on which merchant-processors start playing, we find the nature of the coffee 
production processes and labour regimes (if they are growers). The way they plan how 
to control part of the coffee surplus embodied in peasant commodities sets the 
framework that regulates social relations between producers, intermediaries, processors 
and exporters.
Market structures and the choice of business strategies shed light on the role of trust in 
the coffee market, which has had seven important consequences:
(1) Asymmetric relations of power do not favour horizontal, strict market transactions,
but monopolistic and exploitative exchange. While poor peasants have rarely been
incorporated into modem market contracts, even big exporters and trasnational
corporations have adapted to cacicazgo power structures (where buyers recruit caciques
as middlemen).
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(2) Isolation, lack of competition and weak producer organisations (not aware of the 
actual value of their product and labour) give merchants and processors few incentives
* • 275for modernisation; most merchants have felt no need to develop trusting relations.
(3) Old coffee elites in Teziutlan, Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos, including a small 
ranchero contingent, do not form a regional common identity, nor do they aim at 
building up an inclusive market prestige in coffee production, which they could share 
with small producers as ‘partners’ (as happened in central Veracruz where coffee elites 
created a rich ranchero regional culture, as well as in other coffee producing regions 
world-wide).276
(4) When the coffee board first regulated the market, merchants and processors played 
the ‘peasant card’, exploiting their needs for cash, not met initially by the IMC; and 
when the board did (organising producers’ UEPCs), merchants played the system to 
their advantage. The quota system became a bureaucratic maze of coffee stocks, 
recounting and export-permits management that transferred even to low ranking staff 
considerable power that was frequently misused. Coffee elites met state intervention 
with peasant organisation and mobilisation.
(5) From the producers’ point of view, the coffee board, created on one hand, a 
corporate welfare system in exchange for bulk quality coffee and, more importantly, 
loyalty to the political system. Alongside, it created an economy of waste throughout 
the coffee sector that did not reward quality standards or efficiency. IMC staff were 
very busy in meeting international quotas and the ruling party agenda. The 
shortcomings of IMC’s homogenous technological package did not adapt to Mexico’s 
varied and socially complex peasant regions. While the parastatal tried to benefit 
peasants, its action made it more difficult to bring about a competitive minifundista 
coffee sector, of the kind that had emerged in Colombia, for example. The IMC left 
behind a mix of coffee varieties that still generate processing problems; loss of 
international reputation for regional coffees and underdevelopment of coffee research
275 Putzel (1997) discusses the concept of social capital arguing that social networks and relations of trust 
in the market place only develop when there is a need to overcome market imperfections and to decrease 
transaction costs.
276 In Costa Rica, Colombia and Kenya, as shown in Chapter 6, some of the most advanced coffee 
producing countries, the small grower is the main actor in the coffee sector, characterised by relatively 
high levels of cohesion, organisation and political bargaining (Bates 1997c; Rosberry et al. 1995 and 
Hedlund 1992).
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and technology. With no price incentives, most Mexican small producers still deliver 
blending quality coffee.
(6) Transactions are terminated at the very moment of the coffee exchange; there is no 
further involvement among producers and buyers. The problem with this type of private 
exchange is that it cannot provide for the long term institutional development of a 
competitive sector. Merchants and processors have not attempted to incorporate growers 
in the formation of capital (meaning both sharing of risks and profits). When the IMC 
tried to do it, several problems prevented success. The IMC’s multiple price-setting 
procedures introduced discretionary calculation of cost concepts. Mounting financial 
breaches were usually transferred to producers as price discounts.
(7) Unequal access to resources has been systematically challenged, first, by a long 
lasting struggle for access to land. A much delayed and incompletely executed land 
reform, did not put in place sound institutions for enhancing rural development in the 
ejido sector. Much of the government investment in agriculture was skewed to the 
modem private sector. This abandonment was compensated by development projects 
from the early 1970s to rhe mid-1980s, and income support programs during the 1990s 
that proved of little help in transforming ejidos’ socio-economic position. On the 
contrary, state intervention promoted ‘paternalistic’ and corporatist practices and 
political loyalty to the PRI system. Inefficient distribution of land and definition of 
property rights has led to a polarised social structure, where neighbouring landlords do 
not enjoy legitimacy, and peasants have no access to credit and the possibility to 
advance to ranchero status.
8) Institutional embeddedness on the coffee state agencies has been particularly 
negative to market institutional development for two reasons:
• Above social embeddedness there was a destructive institutional capture and 
politization from early 80s (not seen in Brazil, Colombia or Costa Rica), and in 
the 1990s discontinuity and destmction of institutional structures;
• Underestimation of social, environment and economic importance of coffee 
sector (particularly since 80s, under structural adjustment policies).
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7.3 Changes in the coffee market and opportunities for poverty reduction
As discussed in Chapter 4, the future of agribusiness is projected not as full 
mechanisation of every single crop, but rather as a trend towards standardisation of 
products, regardless of production methods, and normalisation of production costs 
across regional and climatic variations. Increased awareness about sustainability has 
added a value to ‘green’ technologies and labour-intensive productive processes. Both 
trends make new room for small-scale family farming, unthinkable during the historical 
period ranging from the first food regime to the beginning of the third one.277 Now, 
support to ecologically friendly methods of production is not restricted to fair trade and 
development aid, but a new structural component of international trade and market 
competition. Although declarative stances overshadow the green discourse, concerns 
about the preservation of conditions for life on the Earth are here to stay.
Supply and demand do not explain any longer the current trends of coffee markets. 
Even if over-supply tends to play an important role in long-term price decline, we 
cannot ignore other factors (why sustained low prices have not been able to create a new 
balance?). Speculative hedge funds investing heavily in coffee and increased 
concentration of coffee industry in key links (primary production, bulk trading, roasting 
and soluble industry, retail chains) have distorted market signals.
The forceful entry of Vietnam and massive investments in Brazil in the coffee sector are 
very important factors. The Vietnamese government encouraged the expansion of the 
coffee frontier to integrate poor peasant areas into rural development to gain foreign 
exchange.278 Brazil not only moved coffee areas northwards where the risk of frost is 
much lower, but also planted millions of coffee trees, improved productivity and 
quality, while raising internal consumption (up to 5 kg per capita a year). Coffee
277 Talbot (2004) used the theoretical insight of food regimes and systemic cycles to analyze the 
increasing industrialization and globalisation of food production and trade. Following Friedman and 
McMichael, he distinguishes three food regimes: the first was established in the imperialist period (1880- 
1914), and was characterised by a rapid expansion of food production in settler states and trade between 
nation-states. The second food regime (1945-1970s) was based on the hegemony of the US after World 
War II (fordism in the USA and Europe) and state-led industrialisation in developing countries). This 
regime became obsolete with the expansion of TNCs, energy-food-currency shocks in 1970s and 
structural adjustment in 1980s. Thus begins the third one, the “globalization project” which aims at 
creating specialized agricultural sectors integrated to the global production system, limiting state 
intervention and promoting global market institutions. The decline of US hegemony and the emergence of 
countertendencies go in hand with the last regime.
278 Although not formally recognised, the USA has effectively provided war reparations in the form of 
development assistance and advice from international agencies such as the World Bank. Personal 
communication of Dr. Jurgen Polhan, a German agronomist who took part in technical assistance 
missions in Vietnam in the late 1990s.
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production expanded in the context of boundless markets, while the coffee regulatory 
framework and agrarian laws have been relaxed, frontier lands have been opened to 
agriculture, facilitating land market transactions and export production.
During the 1990s, in countries like Brazil and Colombia and a few more, the 
productivity of coffee trees increased because of improved varieties, better use of 
agrochemicals and a more sophisticated agronomic management. The relative position 
of small producers in a global supply chain has changed, transforming the mechanisms 
and share of coffee value-added. National and international coffee regulatory structures 
were in most cases removed. Coffee became subject to a net buyers’ market. Bargaining 
power shifted in favour of six international trading companies, which control over half 
of world coffee exports and two major roasting companies (Nestle and Philip Morris), 
controlling over half of world sales of roasted and instant coffee (Ponte, 2002). This 
was achieved not only by means of lobbying at the international level, but also through 
strategic planning and technical innovation. As a result, the distribution of value in the 
coffee chain has changed significantly. Bad quality coffee processing improved 
(steaming lessens the harshness of robustas and naturals) as did the beans to instant 
coffee ratio.
If Mexican coffee growers receive from 5 to 8% of the retail price of coffee in the USA, 
the remaining 92-95% is allocated to local intermediaries, international brokers, 
roasters, instant coffee manufacturers, and retailers. Around 320,000 growers produce 
coffee in twelve states of the country. Over two million people are employed in the 
coffee sector. Nearly 6% of the economically active population of Mexico depends on 
the crop for their livelihoods, and in the countryside the figure rises to a quarter of the 
active population. Of Mexico's coffee-growing townships, 84% register high or very 
high levels of poverty. In contrast to the large plantation farming common in other parts 
of the world, in Mexico most coffee growers are smallholders and 65% are indigenous. 
By failing to take advantage of changes in the international coffee market, the Mexican 
state and elites have ignored what could be a major route to poverty reduction in rural 
areas.
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7.4 Theoretical perspectives on contemporary peasants
Small scale commodity production
To better understand contemporary peasants from a Marxist perspective, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, Friedman (1978, 1991), Byres (1982), Bernstein (1982, 1992 and 1994) and 
other authors have revised creatively theoretical models like the simple commodity 
production or the peasant modes of production. They redefined these according to 
Marx’s metaphor of a hybrid of capitalist and worker within a peasant-like form of 
production, that is a family unit with access to means of production (land and tools), but 
making use of them through self-exploitation of family labour (Bernstein 1992:31-33). 
Bernstein highlighted that primitive accumulation during the XIX Century was 
increasingly replaced by regimes of proletarian, semi-proletarian and household labour 
(petty commodity production), that were generated by the class relations of capitalism 
(1994, p. 50). He added a more dynamic approach to the problems of transitions, the 
concept of simple reproduction ‘squeezed’, which allowed him to explain how the 
unsuccessful efforts of poor peasants to reach simple reproduction of their capital and/or 
labour, pushed them to semi or full proletarianisation. He argued that the priority over 
labour or petty commodity production (and of the character of the labour regimes) has 
to be assessed concretely, in order not to lose the richness of historical processes. He 
warned that petty commodity producers are not ‘collective’ capitalist/workers, since 
access to resources, consumption and decisions, on the one hand, and the burden of 
labour, on the other, are spread out unevenly within peasant households (across status, 
age and gender).
Bernstein also insisted that the commoditisation process is both uneven and historically 
variable and recommended assessing the relevance of the model according to concrete 
agrarian structures and livelihoods (1992:33). Although Bernstein made these important 
observations to counter mechanistic interpretations of such a metaphor, some questions 
about this model remain unresolved. One of the problems with the explanation is that it 
tends to encapsulate complex articulations of capitalist markets and multifaceted social 
forms in all-encompassing models, when they need to be explained. As Bernstein and 
Byres have shown, simple commodity production implies many different transitions. A 
second problem comes from the characterisation of ‘peasants’ as workers or commodity 
producers. In the first case, the use of the category semi-proletarians refers to a 
transitory condition, for peasants were not completely dispossessed from land, but were
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in one or another stage of becoming proletarians. Here it is clear that if the condition is 
not met, and most of contemporary rural producers are permanently incorporated in 
seasonal labour markets, the concept semz-proletarian is just indicative of the partial 
condition of peasant producers as wage labourers. However, it is a negative definition of 
what they are not (neither peasant, nor fully proletarian). It does not shed light upon the 
structural reproduction, nor the dynamics of that social sector. Thompson warned 
against substituting real, lived social processes with categories. I would add that it is 
also necessary to reject static categories that sterilize creative thinking needed to 
understand the myriad ways in which rural livelihoods do transform.
The characteristic constraint of the small size of landholdings and scale of activities has 
been analysed as both an advantage but more often a constraint. For many agricultural 
products there is no correlation between productivity and landholding scale, but in most 
cases there is an inverse relationship. Assessing the ability of small producers to 
generate a marketable surplus requires an analysis of the really existing market 
structures and the nature of productive processes in which they take part. The answer 
does not come straight from the scale of operations. Nor does it come from the ability of 
producing a physical surplus product.
Peasants will remain small scale, aiming at simple reproduction, for an indefinite period 
of time. In other words, they aim at self-consumption at subsistence levels while only 
the lucky ones will join the rural upper classes. If differentiation does form a home 
market then capitalism develops. Labour migration further increases differentiation, for 
mainly middle peasants move out of the communities. Other mechanisms to achieve 
upward movement are investing in local transport, retail shops, land acquisitions and 
livestock. However, these ventures are undertaken in spite of the ejido institutional 
framework, which assumes an egalitarian ideology that not only does not encourage 
entrepreneurship, but curtails land, capital and labour markets. Based on insights from 
different approaches - new institutional economics, economic anthropology and 
economic sociology - debates on developmental transitions in Italy and South-east Asia 
(Bull and Comer, 1993; Holmes 1989; and Finney, 1990) have highlighted the 
importance of linkages between rural industries, ethnic merchant groups and systems of 
marketing and financing.
275
The concept o f rural livelihoods: taking account o f assets, rights and agency
Livelihoods or styles of life can be considered a middle ground between social 
structures and agency. They are not completely arranged according to will, nor are they 
a direct product of social structures. It is a social space where individuals exercise a 
great deal of innovation and creativeness. Yet, the scope of the complexity and variety 
of livelihoods is strategic. People arrange in the long run, both social constraints and 
opportunities within generational and individual life-span frameworks. Livelihoods 
have to do with household strategies and agency.
Avoiding the evolutionist bias of transition theoretical approaches, the concept of 
livelihoods makes more room to account for socio-economic differentiation, cultural 
diversity and the complexity of rural societies. In order to understand the social 
reproduction of rural communities, the multiple off-farm activities and their new social 
quality (permanent but informal, diversified and more linked to real markets) were 
considered in this thesis. Although we are witnessing fast changes in land use patterns, 
break down of natural eco-systems and poverty, the interesting new phenomenon is that 
capitalism is not absorbing rural labour but encouraging flexible labour regimes by 
which the relationship with communities of origin persist in different ways. The 
arrangements devised by small coffee producers in Atzalan, Veracruz, have made 
access to land as an important though secondary source of employment and incomes, 
providing a rich network of relations, economic options and livelihoods. I have called 
these organisational functions (Bebbington 2001 proposes place formation). At the same 
time, families regarded seasonal wage labour as another important source of monetary 
income to sustain traditional agriculture, self-provisioning, and coping strategies. There 
were very few families without off-farm activities.
The structural inter-penetration between markets - local, regional, and even international 
ones - and the rural communities is what explains the rural character of contemporary 
rural livelihoods. In some cases, some ‘peasant’ regions have become multinational, 
because seasonal labour migration to the USA, for instance, represents their main 
income source. The state of Veracruz did not experience long-term or long-distance
77Qmigration until the coffee crisis in thel990s.
279 According to official figures around one million inhabitants of Veracruz have migrated to the USA 
since the coffee crisis of early 1990s.
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Contemporary coffee producing peasants in Mexico are integrating in different ways to 
changing international markets. We are witnessing not only greater levels of 
commoditisation (producing for market exchange), but an unstable and more complex 
accommodation to changing agricultural markets, as well as land and labour markets. 
The way livelihoods’ strategies are arranged is complex and dynamic for five reasons:
1. Diversification and multidirectional strategies. Different members of the family 
actively pursue farm and off-farm activities, sometimes relying on labour migration and 
integrating incomes originating in rural and urban activities. In this way, members 
engaging in off-farm urban activities usually accounted for an important part of the 
family’s incomes and were influential in sustaining traditional agriculture or at least 
rural residence. Diversification is a major force to upgrade livelihoods, but it not 
necessarily leads to better outcomes (Ellis 2001). As long as men are working outside 
longer times, women became more connected to farm activities and also to land rights 
management and even community responsabilities than they used to. Remittances from 
urban jobs help the rural family to sustain basic productive tasks like maize sowing or 
coffee harvesting, but is also changing family roles and gender relations.
2. Flexible integration to markets. Coffee producing families in Atzlan carry on with a 
dynamic balance between self-consumption crops and cash-crops, according to product 
market conditions, labour opportunities, income support programs and their own 
productive capabilities (land asset base, schooling and social skills, dependency ratio, 
etc.). It was not possible to distinguish a clear trend towards full wage labour, nor 
successful peasant resistance, but an unstable shifting from one land access-based 
livelihood to more migrant labour income-based livelihood, depending on access and 
opportunities in labour and commodity markets. While some families moved out of the 
ejidos under the pressure of diminishing coffee incomes and family bonds 
disintegration, some others have successfully diversified and upgraded living 
conditions.
3. Selective openness and risk bearing. Dichotomies like peasant/proletarian, wage 
worker/self-exploited peasant, commodity producer/self-consumption producer, etc. are 
but abstract concepts difficult to identify in the real world or to apply. While closeness 
was the key for XIX century peasant survival through liberal land reforms (selective 
participation in labor and commodity markets), openness and flexibility to integrate in 
different markets appears to be the key to new livelihoods and survival strategies at the
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turn of the XX century. Risk management through market means and rights 
reivindication are the key to successful livelihoods improvement (Moser et al 2001), 
and this is where most vulnerable are Atzalan ejidatario coffee producers.
4. Labor and land were used intermittently in different activities, within a coping 
strategy. Decreased profitability in almost all agricultural activities gave wage labour an 
increased importance for the family economy. However, this engagement cannot be 
read as increased proletarianisation, since the circuit wage labor -  traditional agriculture 
- wage labor is very strong. Off farm wage labor helps to carry on with agriculture, 
while maize-coffee production helps to reproduce the rural family (land ownership and 
social networks). While global forces push small producers out of coffee and traditional 
agriculture, some other global changes create new opportunities to recreate rural 
livelihoods (environmental services, opportunities to add coffee a higher value, etc.).
5. With the streamlining of the state, peasants lost traditional spaces to bargain public 
resources. At the same time, new opportunities for collective action have emerged. 
Coffee producers have learnt the hard way the workings of coffee markets, how to work 
out the internal price for green coffee and the farm price for fresh cherry coffee, and so 
on. Outside experience from labor migration has widened the scope of collective action. 
Local coops have been superseded by small producers. Tensions between regional 
organizations, local coops and families have widened. While coffee coops are trying to 
rationalize coffee production and marketing, families are more interested in overall 
coping strategies.
Land Endowments at the root o f livelihoods
Access to land is ‘the root’ of some of the most important features of coffee producers’ 
livelihoods: reproduction of social and cultural capital and access to other forms of 
capital. In turn, achieving some degree of food security bring about a risk management 
framework to flexibly engage/disengage from labour and commodity markets when 
crises of different kinds have challenged rural livelihoods (See Shanin, 1990:24; 
Bebbington 1999). There are two different land endowments. First, is the natural set of 
qualities and productive potential of the ecological niche they share through a piece of 
land. It is not by accident that most contemporary peasantries have survived in 
mountainous environments. Tropical mountain chains have a high carrying capacity, 
water resources (particularly around the condensation height), and a rich biodiversity
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with varied food staples productive potential (grains, roots, fruits and other perennials), 
and different types of forestry. Extreme temperatures and varied micro-climates also put 
natural constraints on both pests and plant diseases, as well as on the choice of crops. 
On the other hand, steep slopes and poor communications represent high transport and 
monitoring costs and small economies of scale. Where these natural and technical 
barriers to capital persist (transport costs, economies of scale, labour intensive 
operations), peasants find a space of accommodation. Agricultural jobs that have not 
been broken down into a few repetitive actions and mechanised, remain largely in the 
hands of ‘peasants’, as Shanin argues (1990, pp. 26-27). Perhaps more than two-thirds 
of world coffee production is still produced by peasants and small growers. Capital- 
intensive plantations in Brazil and many other producing countries may account for the 
other third. Although coffee mechanization is always improving and becoming cheaper, 
it accounts for a small fraction of capital-intensive plantations (due to initial costs, 
economies of scale, and quality constraints).
Land entitlements and constructed rural space or place (Bebbington 2001) enhance 
access to other forms of capital, namely social, cultural and productive capital, and this 
is the second -  and more important - endowment. There is a socially constructed 
productive potential of the whole local and regional economy, built on the social 
division of labour, property rights, knowledge and generational mastering of the 
ecological niches (selection of breeds, adaptation of technologies, etc.). Access to land 
is, on the other hand, the entrance point to community property rights and status 
systems, entailing therefore a high potential for social complexity. Being a member of a 
peasant community usually means minimum access to basic building, manufacturing, 
and agricultural technologies, germ-plasma and the genetic pool of local livestock. As 
economic institutions are socially embedded within the ejido system, property rights 
over these collective goods have not fully entered the open market.
The ability for producing food-stuffs for self-consumption and the personal bonds 
among family members, glued by social obligation and moral values, have been crucial 
in reacting flexibly to market changes. But at the same time, this ability has been 
instrumental in locking family labour into exploitative regimes in different places and 
historical periods (Stolcke, 1995). In Atzalan most coffee producing families have not 
been able to reach self-sufficiency. In the area I studied very few families or villages 
were able to benefit from the new spaces created by open markets. Socioeconomic 
conditions at national and local level were not favourable for most families in Atzalan
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during the coffee crisis and as a consequence very few adapted to open markets and 
became entrepreneurial farmers. From a historical perspective, the Atzalan’s peasant 
family economy has not seen a successful or simple transition to single-location urban 
families or to coffee specialisation and entrepreneurial development.
Rural families in Atzalan seem more a complex social unit with great organisational 
resources to create value, and to mobilise social capital (Coleman 1990). In this sense, 
the family unit focuses its members’ efforts on gathering different sources and types of 
value (use values, monetary values, exchange values, etc.), redistributing goods and 
resources regardless of exchange value (solidarity amongst members and family self- 
interest). The family can draw incomes and resources from wage labour, petty 
commodity production, handicrafts, petty trade, hunting and gathering, and traditional 
agriculture. What are thought of as peasants or semi-proletarians are sometimes the 
reconstituted communities of colonised indigenous people, expelled migrants, refugees,
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unemployed and landless people of varied origin. The result is frequently ‘peasant­
like’ communities in the sense that they still depend on land and practice agriculture to 
some extent.
It is true that peasants have no insurance for everlasting survival. Both, ruling classes 
and agribusiness are continually terminating peasants’ spaces in several ways. 
Consequently, it is relevant to understand why coffee spaces are still open and how long 
will they be able to stay open. The key processes that will determine the answer are 
some of the following (and they are happening in coffee producing areas):
• Primitive accumulation has been achieved through the introduction of land and 
labour markets by economic and non-economic means (taxes on land, claiming 
rights on ‘untilled’ lands; violent dispossession; colonisation; enforcement of 
wage labour); introduction of land rent; taxes on land and production; tied-credit 
and indebtedness;
• Mechanisation of agriculture, employment of high yield varieties and inputs, 
leading to an overflow of cheap commodities (taxes and other legal dispositions 
complement eviction from homelands);
280 Bull & Comer (1993) studied the specific conditions in which the peasant family economy made a 
transition to diversified entrepreneurial-worker-farmer and rural-urban livelihoods in Italy.
281 The process of colonisation of forest lands by landless and refugee families in Latin America and 
Africa conform to the same pattern. The landless’ movement in southern Brazil can be analysed as the 
reconstitution of peasant communities by the urban and rural poor.
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• Regimentation of land use through contract agriculture, and semi­
proletarianization of peasant labour on a site (tobacco, tropical fruits);
• Changing the patterns of consumption to a specifically-shaped product through 
improved varieties, biotechnology and green revolution-type packages 
(sweetness, taste, shape, size, appearance);
• Producing cheaper substitutes based on research and industrialisation to cut 
down raw material use (i. e., soluble instant coffee to save green beans);
• Pressures on subsistence economy, transforming peasant families into petty 
commodity producers and then eliminating them through market competition 
and credit segmentation.
7.5 Multilayered and overlapping institutions
The institutional approach alone cannot solve the causation problem, since institutions 
are a multilayered and overlapping construct. In other words, different levels and 
combination of institutions are responsible for a particular outcome. For instance, land 
reform and the centralised coffee state agency -  two distinguishing features of the 
Mexican coffee sector - were both captured by elites, corporate peasant leadership 
(CNC), the ruling party’s bureaucracy (PRI) and the landed bourgeoisie, so we cannot 
simply say the Mexican coffee sector has failed because there was a distributive land 
reform that curbed full property rights or because the coffee board prevented quality 
price incentives from developing. More than a decade of structural adjustment and 
“liberal” reforms in the coffee sector (land titling, privatisation of the coffee board, 
income support programmes) achieved little in terms of developing efficient coffee 
markets. The new efficient market institutions are nowhere to be seen. On the contrary, 
debt bondage and monopolist practices are taking hold again in the coffee market.
Socially embedded institutions (social sanctions, a sense of fairness, and past 
experiences) have constrained competitiveness of Mexican coffee markets. The way 
social inequality has been addressed in the coffee producing regions has reduced the 
mobility of market factors. High costs of production, low productivity and absent price 
incentives for quality have undermined Mexico’s competitive position in an 
oversupplied international market (see Giovanucci & Juarez 2006). Labour and quality 
bottlenecks have not been solved due to the lack of elite vision, suitable public policy 
instruments and market incentives.
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The interaction of the state with rural elites has been detrimental for peasants in many 
ways. Elites have captured state institutions and resources before and after privatisation 
and continuously manipulated dysfunctional peasant organisations. A badly managed 
privatisation of the Mexican coffee sector destroyed human and institutional 
resources,282 and made little difference or even made matters worse for small producers. 
The welfare system-like character of the former coffee state agency (IMC) was not 
replaced with a set of more efficient market oriented institutions and organisation to 
promote rural finance, risk management, scientific research, technical assistance, quality 
management, and marketing. Rural credit and risk insurance of some sort do not exist; 
very basic short-term research is done in a couple of universities (CENIDERCAFE of 
Universidad Autonoma de Chapingo, in Veracruz, and Colegio de la Frontera Sur, in 
Chiapas); technical assistance is limited to contain important plagues and diseases, 
while wholesale income support programmess have kept flowing without productive 
results.283
The value of coffee exports has stagnated, despite higher levels of production; the 
regulatory framework does not provide incentives for competition and quality, nor for 
transparent and efficient transactions and proper labelling. The new spaces for small 
producers in niche markets -  like organic, sustainable, fair-trade and origin coffees -  
have not been taken advantage of and most producers are not able to gain entrance. 
Mexican indigenous coffee producers were pioneers and still are the main producers of 
organic coffee, but they are reducing their share in this niche. The same is happening 
with other niche markets.
The invisible hand of the market has not solved structural problems that require strong 
collective action: access to market information, basic research and technological 
development, counter-cyclical institutions and organisations, and incentive frameworks 
for sector-level efficiency. A market approach alone has not solved these types of
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institutional problems in any coffee producer country. Coffee institutions have
282 Hundreds of specialised technicians, research projects and experimental sites, germplasm banks, and 
four decades of institutional memory all were lost to the coffee sector.
283 Giovanucci & Judrez 2006.
284 Successful policy innovation in the coffee sector during the last decade has come from a mix of market 
mechanisms and sound public policy making. Vietnam became the second world coffee producer with a 
massive investment in coffee scientists, technical assistance and state-led rural development, now 
producing Arabica coffees. Colombia has cut down production and started to focus on productivity and 
product differentiation with a consistent and unified quality certification framework. Brazil has intensified 
scientific research to improve coffee yields and quality, while a successful marketing campaign raised 
internal coffee consumption considerably, including the young population.
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emerged at the interface between the strategies of coffee elites, the collective action of 
producers and sound state policies.
Social capital has often been discussed in terms of networks of trust, institutional 
building, civic co-operation and solidarity, practices that prevent free-riding and 
plundering (Putnam et al., 1993). To sum up, compared with one successful storie in the 
international market (Colombia) discussed in Chapter 6, several policy lessons can be 
drawn to enhance social capital in the Mexican coffee sector:
• Land reform institutionalised distrust between minifundista and rancheros - 
unequal land entitlements and access to resources are socially visible and
• 9 0 crepudiated by ejidatarios - and has reduced the social space for co-operation. 
More than Procede still land titling programmes, what is required are 
incentives and also transparent regulation for elites to build up more 
competitive markets for producers and increase internal consumption.
• Social barriers and lacking basic infrastructure have created spaces for a thick 
crust of intermediaries, which perform functional roles but may increase 
transaction costs in the coffee chain. The links in the coffee commodity chain 
in Veracruz match up with not only economic functions but also social 
segments. The leaders of coffee organisations and local intermediaries tend to 
emerge from leading ejidatario-ranchero families, the same way as mill- 
owners and buyers tend to come from outsider families, freed from ejido social 
obligations. In other words, elites invest vast resources (social and economic 
capital) in building up political and business careers, but usually against the 
collective good (1ejido, coffee coop, and functional organisations).
• The definition of “coffee property rights” and formal contracts are difficult to 
reach at for capital turns over very fast and agents’ interests are conflicting. 
Prices are unstable, quality classification is rather discretionary and weak 
contract enforcement in Mexico makes coffee trading a high-risk business. 
Therefore, small producers in Atzalan sidestep cooperative ventures and 
business partnerships, even if this means remaining low-value cherry 
producers. They demand up-front cash payment for their coffee (cherries or 
parchment) and forsake potential further gains in the coffee chain. While 
distrust leads to higher transaction costs under ideal assumptions, in weak
285 Pepin-Lehalleur et al. (1995) found that among similar ejidos, constructive interrelations with 
neighbouring ranchero towns made a difference in terms of social expectations and development.
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market situations cautious distrust prevents big losses to producers and gives 
risk-takers and well-connected agents opportunities for making extraordinary 
profits. Among exporters and brokers trust alleviates to some extent the costs
•  •  286  pof information gathering and time-consuming verification. The cost of 
formal safeguards to manage risk (sophisticated insurance mechanisms through 
future markets or long-term contracts) reinforces trusting transactions among 
big players.
7.6 New forms o f value and quality conventions
Peasants are not paid for the intrinsic quality attributes of their coffee, first of all, 
because they are not completely aware of how value is created. While the material bases 
of coffee quality are always in the beans, particularly from skillfully tended plantations 
and well processed coffee beans, value is far from being the creation of peasants and 
growers. It is the industry that selects, blends and processes coffee beans ‘creating’ that 
quality. Atzalan producers deliver a non-graded bulk quality coffee, which is taken by 
Tlapacoyan merchants and processors as blending quality coffee. Usually the actual 
material components of coffee quality are not much different when they arrive at a 
roasting factory, but several corporate agents have radically transformed the coffee 
product. Buyers generated homogeneous and container-size volumes, mills selected 
defective beans, and cuppers produced generally accepted quality assessments 
(certifications, labels and brands, concurrent catering and comfort services).
Coffee quality is defined by a new set of conventions, in which buyers, roast & soluble 
TNCs, and end-market service chains are exercising new forms of legitimation, 
justification, and control (see Ponte 2003). They have shaped standards, classfication 
systems, scientific research and technological development to achieve hegemonic 
control of quality conventions. Why would producing countries -  not to mention 
producers’ organizations -challenge these new ways of creating value? Why would they 
define what a good coffee is, or what the main quality factors are and how to assess 
them in the day to day transactions? Old standardized conventions of coffee quality
286 Overseas brokers and Mexican export companies have a good rapport; they speak the same language 
and exchange a great deal of information and insight and tend to see their businesses as complementary 
services. In comparison, small producers have a conflicting relationship with merchants and tend to see 
all kinds of intermediaries as opportunistic agents and at best, necessary evils. In the same vein, Marshall 
(1989) stresses the significance of trusting relations between brokers and exporters.
287 However, buyers acknowledge that up to 80% of this region's coffee can be of export quality. A recent 
study on Veracruz coffee found that even at 600 m.a.s.l., some Atzalan coffees reached high grown 
quality CRCV-CRUO: 2005.
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(size, acidity, height, maximum number of defects) are changing in the international 
markets towards a more complex set of norms, in which product information, 
traceability, safety, uniqueness, innovation, convenience and others forms of concurrent 
value are equally or more important than the intrinsic quality of beans.
What is sold as coffee consists of many different products in which coffee beans are but 
a very small component.288 Upscale coffee shops sell a service package with highly 
differentiated products rather than coffee.289
Afterword
The core of this thesis was written between 1996 and 1997, while fieldwork and 
primary data largely refer to the 1993-1996 time period. Reflection on the scope of the 
coffee crisis since then has involved numerous debates, articles and to a lesser extent 
scholarly research. Following the “fad” of new institutional theory, some authors 
ventured into the coffee problem. The book of Robert Bates (1997a) was an exceptional 
piece. The technological revolution in coffee agronomics, biotechnology (the coffee 
genome mapping is almost finished), chemistry and roasting, has grown considerably.290 
Although auction markets have been used in the coffee market since a long time ago, 
the use of Geographical Information Systems on-line with integrated multi-layered 
databases on specialty single-origin coffee lots, has made it possible to carry out real­
time transactions of the best coffees in the world.
The phenomena of chronic overproduction and long-run trend of declining prices, as 
well as the environmental and social costs of these trends, has been the object of heated 
debates. Those in the World Bank who predicted a short-term shock and then a long- 
lasting recovery have not rectified, nor modified their free market framework. A 
historical and geopolitical approach provides clues to understand such a complex crisis. 
As Clarence-Smith and Topik (2003) point out, even after the long crisis, coffee is still 
the most important agricultural export for Latin America (the principal export in seven 
countries), and second overall in value to petroleum. While the continent continues to 
produce more than twice as much coffee as the rest of the world combined, Africa and
288 A 3 dollar regular cup at Starbucks contains roughly 8 grams of roast and ground coffee worth 3 cents 
of a dollar at current C market prices.
289 Ponte 2002, Gibbon & Ponte 2004 and Wasserman 2002:8.
290 Akiyama & Varangis (1989) were among the coffee economists who forecasted a positive outcome 
with the end of the International Coffee Agreement.
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Asia are catching up. Vietnam used its peasants and state power to become the second 
coffee producing country in the world.
The coffee market has been differentiating during the last decade, following the patterns 
I described in Chapter 4, continuing to open up new opportunities for small high quality 
and differentiated producers, and is also expelling high-cost and institutionally 
unprotected small producers. We can see the trend towards a two-tier market:
• The “C” contract for Arabica coffees in the New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) (or London International Financial Futures Exchange -  LIFFE - and 
other European exchanges for robustas)
• The “C” + market, meaning the premium coffees exchanged at a premium over 
the C price. Within the second premium tier there are also two trends: the 
sustainable markets (defining sustainability in terms of shade grown, organic 
and fair-traded coffees) and the specialty markets (defined as clean cup, 
traceable and single origin, special process coffees). Premium markets are also 
anchored to the mainstream market and will tend to reduce the premium margins 
as supply grows and premium consumption starts to loose momentum. While 
premiums for the sustainable markets are fixed, the specialty market at the 
moment does not have a fixed ceiling, but this is bound to decline as supply 
grows.
Some specialists have advocated to reverse liberalization and to re-establish some 
regulatory framework (Talbot 2005), others contend that this is no longer possible on 
the basis of structural market trends (Daviron & Ponte 2005). In line with these authors, 
others have even suggested that international supply management is possible (Mailzels 
et al 1997). The markets for tropical beverages have traditionally been among the most 
unstable of the World markets for primary commodities, with sharp and unpredictable 
short-term price cycles, and consequent intermittent instability and uncertainty in the 
export revenues of producing countries. At the same time, world demand for these 
beverage crops is very price-inelastic, and it is this characteristic which makes them 
suitable for some form of international supply management designed to reduce their 
short-term market fluctuations and/or to raise depressed levels of prices (Maizels et al 
1997:21)
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And yet some others insist that the best solution to low prices is low prices (Wasserman 
2002).
Although there are innovative initiatives to face the coffee crisis problem worldwide, 
we are far away from a new consensus or less likely to enforce a new period of 
regulations:291
• The Common Code of the Coffee Community (4C), a German initiative (GTZ 
and the European Coffee Federation), has developed a code of practice for 
promoting sustainable coffee markets;
• Eliminating low grades of coffee and encouraging diversification in marginal 
lands for coffee (ICO resolution, 2002);
• The expansion of the Q Auction and Q contracts for high quality coffees, an 
institutional initiative of the Specialty Coffee Association of America (SCAA), 
with correspondents in Europe and South America.
• Introducing taxes to consumption and another tax for import-export transactions 
(resembling the Tobin capital gains tax);
• Reintroducing a regulatory framework -  similar to the former International 
Coffee Agreements - to fix a sustainable price band;
• Promoting full liberalisation of agriculture worldwide to create spaces for 
inefficient coffee producers in other agricultural markets.
Is it possible to make progress in the short-run? The premium markets are growing 
faster than mainstream markets, but there are already signs of failure in fair-trade and 
sustainable coffees. High costs of third party certification and operation, unequal 
participation in higher prices paid by consumers, and problems of accountability and 
traceability of coffee suggest that access to differentiated markets is not straitforward. 
All sorts of sustainable and fair trade coffees amount to 5-8% of the total coffee traded 
in the market. As Ponte has argued in many producing countries after liberalisation 
traders have been paying homogeneous prices for coffee. No price differentials are 
offered to small holders for good quality coffee. That is the case of Mexico. Exporters 
who cater to specialty markets are increasingly relying upon estates through vertical
9Q9integration and long-term contracts to small farmers are being marginalized. That is
291 Following mechanically Polanyi, Talbot suggests that after the ravages of the recent coffee crisis, 
protest and pressures of coffee growers worldwide will eventually generate the opposite movement of the 
pendulum towards a ‘reregulated market’ (i.e. a new intemacional agreement on coffee).
292 Ponte 2002.
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happening with organic and specialty coffees, and soon may happen to shade grown 
coffee.293
An important problem of income support policies in the coffee sector is the relabelling 
of coffee projects as “poverty alleviation” initiatives, downgrading the aim of helping 
producers to survive, rather than bringing them to ‘development’.294
In spite of a decade of debates and new scholarly work on coffee, this thesis provides a 
sound basis to understand from different perspectives why the breakdown of national 
coffee sectors, conflictive pro-cyclical/anti-cyclical sectorial policies, split actors in the 
coffee chain and urban political bureaucracies have combined to set the stage for a 
structural crisis of coffee in the world. Structural overproduction, long term price 
decline of coffee and price instability are at the surface of this institutional crisis. What 
is below is a deep social polarization; the exclusion of indigenous peoples and 
peasantries; the decline of coffee elites and formerly rich rural societies; the increased 
technological and productivity divide between urban and rural activities; the 
shorcomings of sectoral coffee organizations in managing complex agroecological 
systems and segmented markets; and the shrinkage of collective action of coffee actors 
at local and regional levels.
Among the policy alternatives the focus of my thesis would suggest are the following:
• Enhancing coffee producing regions’ rural livelihoods as a strong base for 
fighting rural poverty, instead of self-defeating subsidisies to coffee (structural 
overproduction is rooted in this coffee incomes dependency). Part of the solution 
would be to find new forms of coffee price insurance and productive 
investments, usually absent in coffee producing regions. Environmental services 
are an option to contain aforestation of abandoned coffee fincas. Another 
alternative to the coffee crisis is to widen the domestic markets for coffee, 
particularly in Mexico where average consumption percapita per year is less 
than one kilogram;
293 The Global Environment Facility (GEF), through the United Nations Development Programme has 
allocated Rainforest Alliance with a 7 year grant to increase certified shaded from 1 to 10% of world 
production . GEF Report, 2006.
94 See Bebbington (1998) and Sen (1999). In the early 1990s, there were in Veracruz around 8 different 
income-support and credit programmes targeting small coffee producers (Diaz P. 1992); and they were 
still running a decade later.
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• Developing a new type of complex institutions in rural areas to mobilise 
resources across commodity markets and across farm/non-farm activities during 
the agricultural cycles. Coffee capital concentrates in only four months of 
harvest at the beginning of which producers draw from on all kind of assets to 
meet their consumption and working capital needs. Then most of this massive 
capital goes away of the coffee producing regions, only a small part becomes 
maize or other forms of productive investment, apart from two-three months of 
family basic consumption. If coffee capital moves more dynamically across self­
consumption food staples, other cash crops, non-agricultural and off-farm 
activities, as well as to coffee again, the multiplier effect would be far greater.
• Differentiate social and environmental values o f  different types o f  coffee. While 
unshaded modem-technology coffee comprise the vast bulk of Brazilian or 
Colombian coffee, for many other like Mexico, shade grown coffee with 
traditional methods of cultivation are still predominant. The productivity and 
profitability gap among world coffee systems of production are at the root of the 
chronical overproduction long-term scenario. High prices for coffee will always 
be an incentive for massive investment on the part of modernised coffee sectors, 
while price slumps will always be sufficient cause for price subsidies and 
support programs in coffee exports dependent countries. And this vicious circle 
sets in motion indefinetly. Certification of social and environmental values of 
shade grown coffee may abate the structural overproduction problem.
• To boost the emergence o f more complex rural societies and elites, with 
increased capabilies to find alternatives to monocroping coffee it is needed to 
invest in human capital formation, fight isolation, upgrade basic infrastructure, 
diversify local economies, extend the range of cash crop, non-agricutural and 
off-farm activities, introducing modem financial services and rural markets 
information.
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APPENDIX No. 2
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Producers* Surface* Yield Production Yield Production Yield Production Yield
(ha) Qq/ha Qq Qq/ha Qq Qq/ha Qq Qq/ha
Mexico (country) 9.00
5,425,700
8.80
7,043,470
11.44
6,652,170
9.66
Veracruz (state)
67,579 152,993
10.30
1,295,000
8.46
2,150,000
14.05
1,750,500
11.44
Tlapacoyan (region)
9,836 15,829 _ 152,910
9.66
253,866
16.04
206,695
13.06
Atzalan
(Municipality)** 6,738 10,832 102,875
9.99
170,796
15.77
139,060
12.84
SPA (ejido)
* 1997
**83 communities
Source: Consejo Veracruzano del Caf6, Unidad de Apoyo a la Produccidn, 1997, and 
(for Mexico) Base de Datos Estadisticos de Cafe, Consejo Mexicano del Cafe, 1997.
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APPENDIX No. 3
IMC technology Atzalan growers elite* SPA Ejidatarios’ practices
V
ar
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tie
s
Improved strains of Typica and Bourbon (since 
1950s), and Mundo Novo (1960s). Adapted the dwarf 
Caturra (1960s) to ‘help’ producers for its yield in 
cherry. Developed Gamica F-3 (1978). Not yet 
stabilised, Gamica and other superior Catuai strains 
were not widely distributed. The IMC did not control 
distribution, regional suitability, or quality traits.
The CNCf guided the establishment of their fmcas in 
the 1950s. Since the 1960s rancheros introduced 
modem varieties extensively. Big grower-processors 
substituted red Caturra due to its low yield in the 
bean, and tried Gamica F-6 and Costa Rica 95. But 
some are partially reintroducing more resilient 
varieties like Typica and Mundo Novo.
Most producers accepted the new varieties for 
replanting, not for renewing the whole fmca. They 
introduced modem varieties gradually, but without 
proper variety controls (and records). Their fmcas are 
‘chilatoles’ (a mixture): red caturra (40%), MN 
(20%), Bourbon (15%), Typica (10%) Gamica (10%) 
and others
D
en
sit
y
For coffee fmcas under shade, the IMC advised the 
symmetric alignment o f 2.5 x 2.5 m (1,600 plants/ha) 
or 2.0 x 2.5m (2,000 plants/ha), or even higher 
densities with asymmetric levelling curves in suitable 
lands (deep soils and the right climatic conditions).
Symmetric alignment at 2.5 x 2.5 m, even with 
Typica, Bourbon and MN since the 1960s. In the 
1980s some of them moved towards plain-sun 
technology (2.0 x 2.0 m without shade), although the 
crisis was a serious setback
At the peak of coffee funding (1980-82), some 
ejidatarios tried higher densities. But most o f them 
adopted a modified ‘veracruzano’ system: 1,600 to 
1,300 plants/ha (2.5 x 2.5m and 3.0 x 2-2.5 m), 
blending traditional and ‘the first IMC’ technology.
Sh
ad
e
The IMC promoted an ‘induced shade system’, of 
100 to 150 trees/ha of a single species, Inga genus, 
which fixes nitrogen in the soil and has a suitable 
thin-wide shade. Inga and coffee trees had to be 
planted at the same time, and pruned to keep a 
suitable 50-80% shade. The canopy had to be 
regulated every year.
Better off ejidatarios were the first in participating in 
the rotary ROY A and MECAFE programs (only a 1/3 
could enroll at a time), and fully applied the induced 
shade system. With IMC assistance, big growers tried 
plain-sun technology. During the crisis some 
ejidatarios have intensively substituted Ingas with 
banana and/or orange trees (200 orange trees/ha or 
300-400 banana trees/ha.)
Only a minority -those enrolled in ROYA and 
MECAFE programs- established one-species shade, 
although the majority has come close to it after the 
crisis. Most o f them substituted shade trees with 
orange and banana trees (partly damaged by the 1989 
frost), although keeping the old arrangement and 
density: 100 trees/ha. Only a few are replanting Inga 
trees again.
Pr
op
ag
at
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n 
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d 
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Nurseries (sowing in plastic tube-bags) were the 
main method (grafting and cloning were not widely 
used). The IMC taught seedling planting in pits with 
terraces (instead of spontaneously grown plants and 
narrow hoe-holes). The IMC produced millions of 
HYV’ seedlings, but adaptive research of specific 
varieties by region lagged.
Growers have usually created their own nurseries or 
bought in private nurseries HYVs (Gamica F-5, 
Costa Rica 95, Azteca de Oro, etc.). Grower- 
processors have systematically renovated coffee 
fmcas, even during the crisis.
Community seed beds/nurseries had been set up 
when IMC or official funding was available. After 5 
years of crisis, producers started to replant with 
spontaneous sprouts (from fallen seeds of doubtful 
quality), replacing dead and unproductive plants. 
Lack of funds and the risk of theft have prevented 
some producers to establish new nurseries.
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Introduced modem pruning techniques: plant 
formation (size, growth regulation), rejuvenation 
(lopping off) and upkeep of productive tissue and 
sanitation. The IMC researched on scattered pruning 
by row of different ages that had to be followed by 
the selection of 2 to 4 stems (but was not diffused).
Modem intense systems by row were never applied, 
due in part to lack of technical assistance, financial 
long-term support, and labour cost and supply 
problems.
Grower-processors use suspension pruning at 1.7 m 
(Colombian), ‘at pickers reach’.________________
Producers abandoned intense pruning by row (using 
jigsaw). They carry out scattered pruning of dead or 
damaged branches, and little shade pruning. What the 
IMC could not do, frosts did (1979,1983 and 
especially 1989). By lopping off, producers improved 
plants, applying IMC advice.____________________
Lauto(mo4>
Fertilisation research started until mid-1950s. 
Standard for low fertilisation areas (peasant’s) was 
350kg/ha twice a year. Recommended formula for 
Tlapacoyan region was 18-12-00, but the IMC 
usually distributed 18-12-06 for all regions (due to 
Fertimex economies of scale). Advised on the use of 
Inga shade to cut down chemical fertilisation. Foliar 
fertilisation was only used in nurseries. Composting 
was not widely researched, nor encouraged._______
In early 1980s the Ministry of Agriculture carried out 
soil analysis for some coffee organisations (and 
leaders were the first). The same IMC made soil 
analysis in the lowland plantations, which have 
applied 3 to 4 fertilisations, depending on liquidity. 
Recently they started to take up Costa Rican 
techniques of foliar fertilisation, balancing formulas 
with small components.
Due to distrust, lack of incentives, training, and 
monitoring, 50-60% of producers did not draw on 
agrochemicals delivered by the IMC (some used 
them for other purposes or even sold them). During 
the crisis 1989-93 producers did not fertilise fmcas at 
all. They did again until 1994-95, when the price 
recovered. A common practice has been to fertilise 
twice a year after the harvest to help plants recover. 
Urea is widely used for both, maize and coffee._____
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Recommended the use machete for weeding at 
ground level (instead of hoe); Inga’s shade; pulp 
composting, mulching and live barriers, terracing in 
sharp slopes; and draining channels to prevent 
erosion.
Some practices were adopted, like draining channels, 
mulching and recycling pulps, but not terracing or 
efficient live barriers. The cost of labour to set up and 
maintain such work has shift the balance in favour of 
using chemicals.______________________________
The only well established practices are mulching 
(weeds and cut wood), and the use of machetes for 
weeding. Shade has been partially cut down to 
interplant oranges and bananas.
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For traditional producers, the IMC advised machete 
weeding at least twice a year, and it advised the use 
of herbicides. Within the rotary MECAFE and 
ROYA application of chemical sprays was 
compulsive
Grower-processors use intensively herbicides and 
pesticides, although depending on the price for coffee 
of the previous year, these applications can be 
adjusted from 2 to five. Better off ejidatarios take 
advantage of local labour and combine the use of 
chemicals and machete weeding._________________
Due to labour pressures before and after harvest 
(labour migration and maize cropping, respectively), 
producers tend to favour agrochemicals over labour 
weeding and adjust disease/pest control chemical use 
according to available incomes from the previous 
harvest
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The IMC (1979) designed a coffee physiology survey 
(based on 6 conditions from normal to useless trees).
It was meant for defining fincas’ management needs 
of maintenance, rejuvenation and renovation. But the 
IMC credit and inputs delivery scheme expected 
producers to carry out weeding and fertilisation at 
least twice a year (apart from maintenance pruning, 
shade regulation and pest/disease control)._________
Grower-processors have managed their fincas relying 
on family’s accumulated expertise, without book 
keeping, IMC survey methods and planning. They 
have kept basic records on overall production, costs 
and yield. Take advantage of counter-cyclical 
management Some better off ejidatarios hire a finca 
administrator, while they hold a urban job or do 
politics.____________________________________
Small producers have never used book keeping 
practices, nor even basic registers. They have worked 
out maintenance needs and production costs through 
labour orders of measure. Production is estimated on 
the basis of blossoms and weather. Depending on the 
previous year’s coffee price, they adjust 
agrochemical use and maintenance jobs (pro-coffee 
cycle management).___________________________
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IMC technology Atzalan elite’s technological development* SPA Ejidatarios’ practices
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IMC’s R&D was institutionally marginal, and lacked 
a scientific long-term base. Tried to adapt the 
Colombian experience and Hawai’s modem 
technology (Maiyland Univ.). In the 1960s the IMC 
committed important resources to diversification. In 
the 1970s it reached 200 experiments, but were 
oriented to ‘priority problems’.** The best research 
was never successfully released to the field. 
Homogenous recipes were applied and popularised 
by unqualified staff. Senior staff and R&D programs 
were continuously reshuffled according to sexenios’ 
agenda (1972 and 1982 for instance)_____________
Some modem techniques were tried with mix results. 
Soil quality and altitude are not suitable for high 
densities. Labour supply is becoming a problem. 
After the IMC disappeared, there has been no 
technical assistance at all. Private firms are 
promoting Costa Rican technology (7,000 plants at 
1.8 x 0.80m with CR95).
With the experience of the crisis -indebtedness lack 
of institutional support, hardening of banking 
services-, some growers have gone back to less 
intensive cropping methods.
There has been no technical assistance since the IMC 
withdrawal. Small producers have experimented by 
themselves during the last decade, putting on trial 
specific techniques: interplanting orange and banana; 
using Urea as fertiliser for both, coffee and maize.
In general they abandoned early attempts at intensive 
pruning and higher plant densities, considered 
unsuitable to them for different reasons. Small 
producers have settled for more manageable mix- 
technologies, nearer to traditional and ‘the first IMC’ 
technology, rather than to a modem one.
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IMC staff adapted institutional policies to different 
regions, according to the bargaining power of local 
elites (and their ‘social organisations’), and type of 
producers (cherry and parch producers; highlanders 
or lowlanders; good and bad payers; good and bad 
producers, etc).
Since the CNCf, technicians engaged with Atzalan 
rancheros (upper middle coffee growers of 5-15 ha) 
that first accepted their advice, allocating trial plots 
with the new technology. Dynamic interaction with 
them explains the development of some regions 
(Xicotepec, Pue., is paradigmatic). An informal, but 
institutionalised classification o f ‘good growers’ and 
‘pickers’ (peasants) developed.__________________
IMC Tlapacoyan Delegation’s senior staff interacted 
with the local elite and regional political groups.
Field technicians were allowed to give assistance to 
grower-processors, formally or informally. Political 
groups influenced the choice and timing of technical 
assistance and funding programs at local level. 
Corporatist policies (creation of UEPCs to channel 
IMC programs) develop a strategic, but not definite 
divide. Corruption, mixed with political manipulation 
of the IMC by bureaucracy, politicians and leaders 
made regional and local elites continuously marginal 
and dependent of those expedients. Elite groups also 
embraced politics; and for some the new ARICs were 
a way out in the early 1980s.____________________
The local elite was commonly a vital link in the IMC 
day-to-day functioning: from the choice of UEPC’s 
delegates and purchasing centers’ representatives, to 
the nomination of participants in die ROY A and 
MECAFE rotary programs, local bosses always 
influenced the IMC priorities.
They initially played a facilitator role in learning and 
spreading the new technology, but also generated 
distrust among poorer ejidatarios unable to keep up 
with new technology adoption.
Small producers were always keen pupils of ‘good 
technicians’. They usually experimented according to 
their means and understanding. Feedback and in-farm 
experimentation was limited.____________________
* It considers rancheros in the lowlands and the better off ejidatarios, with whom the IMC had closer contacts. Although there are no formal
** The modem technology of coffee considers four key components: 1) Analysis of tree physiology, specially leaf activity; 2) Soil dynamics; 3) Plant structure, specially pruning 
methods; and 4) Systematic correlations by region: environment, technology, yield, quality.
Source: IMC 1979; Sema 1990; Villaseflor 1987; Nestel 1995; Escamilla 1993. Interviews to ex-IMC staff: Ing. A. Villaseflor, Ing. C. Villarreal, Ing. M.A. Nuflez, Biol. A. Celis, N. 
Hernandez, F. Barrio. Interviews to landowners Agustln Bello (San Carlos Ranch) and Rolando Topete (Loma Bonita Ranch) and ejidatarios of SPA, Atzalan.
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APPENDIX No. 4
Relative importance Consumption Levels Imputed Consumption Costs Relative
Item Full Adjusted Daily
Norm.
Full Adjusted Yearly Daily
Adj.
Weight
Rank Source Freq. Months Months Range
(%)
(N$) (N$) (N$) (N$) (N$) (%)
Maize 1 domestic P 8 4 75-100 1.83 439.20 192.15 631.35 1.73 16.18
Black beans 1 domestic P 8 4 50-100 1.71 410.40 153.90 564.30 1.55 14.46
Clothes and shoes 3 exchange I 2 0 0-00 1.37 500.00 0.00 500.00 1.37 12.81
Vegetable oil and/or lard 1 exchange I 8 4 50-100 1.14 273.60 102.60 376.20 1.03 9.64
Sugar 1 exchange P 8 4 50-100 0.80 192.00 72.00 264.00 0.72 6.77
Milk 3 dom/exch I 4 8 0-50 1.50 180.00 78.75 258.75 0.71 6.63
Chillies (dry, fresh) 1 exchange P 8 4 0-50 0.57 136.80 51.30 188.10 0.52 4.82
Pork, beef, canned fish 3 dom/exch I 4 8 0-50 0.86 103.20 45.15 148.35 0.41 3.80
Poultry 2a dom/exch I 4 8 0-50 0.71 85.20 37.28 122.48 0.34 3.14
Alcoholic drinks 3 exchange I 4 8 0-50 0.66 79.20 34.65 113.85 0.31 2.92
Soap, detergent, bleach 2 exchange P 4 8 0-50 0.64 76.80 33.60 110.40 0.30 2.83
Soft-drinks & juices 3 exchange S 4 8 0-50 0.64 76.80 33.60 110.40 0.30 2.83
Potatoes 2 exchange S 4 8 0-50 0.58 69.60 30.45 100.05 0.27 2.56
Tomatoes and onions 2 exchange I 4 8 0-50 0.57 68.40 29.93 98.33 0.27 2.52
Biscuits and sweet bread 3a exchange s 4 8 0-50 0.50 60.00 26.25 86.25 0.24 2.21
Oranges 3a domestic s 3 0 0-00 0.69 62.10 0.00 62.10 0.17 1.59
Energy (1) 2 dom/exch p 4 8 0-50 0.32 98.40 136.80 235.20 0.64 6.03
Eggs 2a dom/exch I 4 8 0-50 0.29 34.80 15.23 50.03 0.14 1.28
Metal tools (2) 1 exchange p 12 0 0-00 0.10 35.10 0.00 35.10 0.10 0.90
Other spices 2a dom/exch s 8 4 50-100 0.07 16.80 6.30 23.10 0.06 0.59
Rice 2 exchange s 4 8 0-50 0.11 13.20 5.78 18.98 0.05 0.49
Salt 1 exchange p 8 4 50-100 0.03 7.20 2.70 9.90 0.03 0.25
Bananas 3 domestic I 0 12 0-100 0.51 0.00 3.60 3.60 0.01 0.09
TOTAL 16.20 4,110.80 11.26 105.36
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* Based on a family with two adults, one teenager and one child. Daily expenses at current local market 
prices (March 1995)
Rank: 1.- Esential goods throughout the year. 2.- Consumption depends on available produce (2a) and 
cash flows. 3. 'Luxury' goods, only consumed in season (3a) and cash peaks.
Source: Domestic.- Produced in the household. Exchange.- Only aquired by market exchange.
Dom/exch.- A variable part is produced, and another purchased in the market.
Frequency. Goods 'P' are permanenetly consumed (little adjustment). 'S' are only seasonally purchased 
(or available). And goods 'I' are intermitently purchased (or available).
Need of exchange Actual Monetary Expenses
Item None Complete Minimised Yearly Daily
Months Months Months Range (%) (N$) (N$) (%)
Maize 6 2 4 50-100 247.05 0.68 6.33
Black beans 6 2 4 50-100 230.85 0.63 5.92
Clothes and shoes 0 2 0 0-00 500.00 1.37 12.81
Vegetable oil and/or lard 0 8 4 0-50 376.20 1.03 9.64
Sugar 0 8 4 0-50 264.00 0.72 6.77
Milk 0 4 8 0-50 258.75 0.71 6.63
Chillies (dry, fresh) 2 6 4 0-50 153.90 0.42 3.94
Pork, beef, canned fish 0 4 8 0-50 148.35 0.41 3.80
Poultry 6** 2 4 50-100 122.48 0.34 3.14
Alcoholic drinks 0 4 8 0-50 113.85 0.31 2.92
Soap, detergent, bleach 0 4 8 0-50 110.40 0.30 2.83
Soft-drinks & juices 0 4 8 0-50 110.40 0.30 2.83
Potatoes 0 4 8 0-50 100.05 0.27 2.56
Tomatoes and onions 0 4 8 0-50 98.33 0.27 2.52
Biscuits and sweet bread 0 4 8 0-50 86.25 0.24 2.21
Oranges 12 0 0 100 0.00 0.00 0.00
Energy (1) 6 4 2 0-50 55.20 0.15 1.41
Eggs 4** 2 6 50-100 50.03 0.14 1.28
Metal tools (2) 0 12 0 0-00 70.20 0.19 1.80
Other spices 2 6 4 50-100 18.90 0.05 0.48
Rice 0 4 8 50-100 18.98 0.05 0.49
Salt 0 8 4 0-50 9.90 0.03 0.25
Bananas 12 0 0 100 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 3,144.05 8.61 80.58
(1) Energy: a) Firewood (12 man-days), 52 Lt. of paraffin + 12 batteries a year; or b) Equivalent gas + 
electricity bill. (2) Hoe, punch, machete and filing.
* Based on a family of 2 adults, 1 teenager and 1 child. Daily expenses at current local market prices (March 1995) 
** When there is abundance of maize produced by the household
Rank: 1.- Esential goods throughout the year. 2.- Consumption depends on available produce (2a) and cash flows. 3. 
'Luxury' goods, only consumed in season (3a) and cash peaks.
Source: Domestic.- Produced in the household. Exchange.- Only aquired by market exchange. Dom/exch.- A 
variable part is produced, and another purchased in the market.
Frequency: Goods 'P' are permanenetly consumed (little adjustment). 'S' are only seasonally purchased (or 
available). And goods 'I' are intermitently purchased (or available).
Source: fieldwork, Atzalan, 1995.
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A PPEN DIX 5 CO FFEE AG RIBUSINESS INTEG RATION IN TLAPA CO YA N
TRANSNATIONAL CORPS. 
Branch or associates
MERKON
Tulipan
PURCHASE CENTRE 
Tiapacoyan
VOLCAFE
Becafisa
Tiapacoyan 
parch market
4
Small Producers 
parch sellers
ATLANTIC COFFEE 
TIASA
TIASA 
Atzinta local coops
Atzinta
W e t Milt
Purchasii 
Local 1
rig Points 
buyers
►
Small Producers 
cherry sellers
Big grower-miilers 
Belo, Villasefior, etc.
Small & medium 
size growers
ASOC. SERRANAS AGROIND. 
Gabriel Barreda & associates
r
SPR TAZOLAPA 
Alberto Andrade
Wet mill 
Local organisations |
Purchasing 
Centres 
Comlsslon agent
"------f — '
i
Small Producers 
cherry sellers
ARIC PLAN ARROYOS 
Gabriel Barreda N.
Wet mill 
Local organisations
Purchasing 
Centres 
Comission agent
Sm al Producers 
cherry sellers
FRS AZOTAL 
Jos6 Luis Arcos
Wet mill 
Local organisations
Pulping centres
Purchasing 
Centres 
Comission agent
Small Producers 
cherry sellers
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COFFEE BROKERS 
American
NATIONAL PARCH MARKET REGIONAL PARCH MARKET
Exporters in Xalapa, Coatepec, Xico
4----- -
i
Buyers in Tiapacoyan
Wet milts 
Tiapacoyan region
Wet mill 
Tiapacoyan
Buyers-Millers BECAFISA FRS Tlap-PA Coop. Ouicempacayot!
Various small Antonio Concha F. Cecena et al Tomas Navarrete
Wet mill 
Pochotita
I
Purchase Points 
Local buyers 
 »-------
Purchase Centres 
Comission agent
'— ? —
Pulping centre 
Local organisations_ g _
Purchase Centres 
Comission agent
V--------   /
Small & medium Small Producers Small Producers SmaB Producers
size growers parch sellers associates associates
ESCARCESA 
Armando Escdrcega F.
CAFES SAN FRANCISCO Grower, buyer, miller
Laureano Herrera Rolando Topete
Wet mill 
Tiapacoyan
Purchase points 
Local buyers
 ?--------ii
Small Producers 
cherry sellers
Wet mill 
Loma Bonita
Purchase points 
Local buyers
 --------
Small Producers 
cherry sellers
A PPEN D IX  No. 6 CO FFEE CO NVERSIO N RA TES TO A CO NSTAN T (Qq) *
% kg/Qq Name in English Name in Spanish
60 270 Unripe cherry coffee Cafe verde
65 245 Ripe cherry Cereza 4.26 : 1 **
65 140 Pulped beans Despulpado 2.43 : 1
64 120 Soaked beans Escurrido 2.09 : 1**
45 100 One-day sun-dried beans Seco de agua 1.74 : 1
12 100 Dry floaters Espumilla seca n.a.
12 80-92 Natural unhusked Capulin o bola n.a.
23.5 65 Semidry parch Pergamino cuerno 1.13 : 1
12 57.5 Dry parch Pergamino seco 1:1
11-12 46 Gold or green beans Cafe oro o verde 1 : 1.25**
36.66 (a) Roasted beans Cafe tostado
17.7 (b) Instant coffee*** Cafe instantaneo 2.6:1 (gold)
(a) Merchants in Mexico apply up to 18% “merma”, that is 37.72Kg/Qq
(b) Merchants in Mexico apply up to 2.8 kg of green coffee for 1 of instant coffee 
(instead of the actual of 2.6 kg).
Qq = 100 lb; Spanish quintal is the most important coffee weight measuring unit in Latin 
America. It is a constant across all processing stages and types of coffee, allowing 
for the assessment of productivity to a theoretical equivalent.
* These conversion factors kg/Qq are theoretical, built by the IMC taking Typica’s
average yield as a model. Changes in plant variety, harvest stage, height of growth 
and weather conditions do affect the actual coffee yield: cherry => bean. Each 
country has developed its own standards. For instance in Guatemala lQq of gold 
coffee approximate 45kg (instead of 46 in Mexico)
** Key rates of conversion to assess actual yield in the processing chain. Through long 
observation and use, empirical as well as accurate methods of assessment have 
emerged (cherry to parchment; parchment to gold).
*** Historically, the rate of raw coffee into instant coffee has diminished according to 
more efficient technologies.
Source: Based on El cafe y  su procesamiento industrial. IMC, 1980; Villasenor 
1987 and own fieldwork in Veracruz, Mexico.
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APPENDIX No. 7 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON COFFEE INSTITUTIONS: COLOMBIAN AND MEXICO
COLOMBIA
I. Historical and structural
Coffee market 
formation
Santander and Cundinamarca big landowners and merchants moved into the coffee business making possible a first expansion between 
1870 and 1900. At the beginning of the XX century and until 1930, a second more important expansion took place, based on the 
successful Antioquena frontier land migration, based on small landholders. Huge expansion after the 1930s.
Access to land and 
agrarian structure
There were frontier lands for migrants at the turn of the Century. New spaces opened up with the crisis of haciendas and its fractionating 
during the 1930s (Caldas and Valle), and up to the 1970s in frontier lands. Competitive pressures (i.e. cost of labour) has consolidated a 
small size landholder as social base of the coffee sector, although the presence of a medium-size modem plantation sector is still 
economically and politically important.
Property rights Full private property over landholdings; tenancy arrangements became obsolete in the 1930s. The Law 200 of 1936 consolidated private 
property rights over estates and farms against expectations of land reform. The period of “la violencia” prevented modernisation reforms 
during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1961 a moderate land reform project was stopped up. In 1986 a limited redistribution took place in the 
form of a targeted colonisation in frontier lands.
Coffee lands (size, 
scale and 
dispersion)
Most lands are of good quality, high altitude, well drained and suitable depth. After reaching a million hectares in 1970, the coffee 
frontier has been cut down -particularly during the 1990s- to add up only 805,000 hectares in 2000, while die number of producers has 
almost doubled in the same period (from 303 thousand producers in 1970, to 566 thousand in 2000). The coffee fincas have now an 
average size of only 1.4 ha within small landholdings of 4-8 ha; the rest is used for food staples (maize, yucca, beans) and other cash 
crops (plantains, fruits, macadamia nuts) and cattle rising. During recent crisis Colombia has cut down less competitive areas.
Main systems of 
production
Intensive unshaded fincas are predominant, although around 30% of producers cany on a semintensive -under shade- cropping 
technology. This sector is now increasing, but it is under-reported. Soil depletion has stopped the use of more intensive densities, 
although a cloudy weather system creates a natural green house effect.
Labour problem Family and migrants from poorer regions have provided wage labour (former tenancy arrangements were superseded in the 1930s). In the 
1990s labour costs have increased considerably in total production costs.
Domestic market Medium intake level (5 kg/ per head a year) and developed a culture of coffee consumption
Transport network Natural endowment (sailing rivers) helped initial development; coffee stabilisation fund supported the creation of transport infrastructure, 
but it has stopped with the crisis of the 1990s
II. Economic institutions (Regulatory, anti-cycle devices)
Coffee regulatory 
institutions
National producers association since the end of XIX century, became the FNC in 1927. It is a private-public entity; with regulatory and 
tax collection authority. It has had professional and accountable management since the 1930s. The key institution for price stabilisation 
and policy continuity is the National Coffee Fund (1940); until recently gave coffee producers assurance of purchase and price (now only
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the former). Through “parafiscalidad”, the FNC collects export taxes and invest in public goods (education, health, technical assistance, 
training, and marketing services). There were constraints to traditional technology. Undercapitalised and weakened after the 1989-94 
crisis. In 2001 a special commission was set up to deal with reforming the coffee institutional framework (the role of the National Coffee 
Fund and parafiscalidad regime, the FNC and regional coops in ensuring market access rather than price; participation of Colombia in 
differentiated markets, etc.).
Management of 
coffee cycles
The National Coffee Fund (1940) has functioned since 1958 as price stabilisation institution (absorbed the state attribution to tax exports, 
based on the so-called parafiscalidad).295 Stabilisation of domestic prices allowed massive plant renovation and seizing coffee bonanzas. 
Introduction of HYV and plain-sun cropping technology allowed producers to take full advantage from the ‘bonanza’ period (post 1975- 
76). There has been a bargaining power balance between government and the FNC that has allowed smooth equilibriums, “mutual 
capture”, and a wide space for alliances building. Terms of exchange are usually favourable to coffee returns: devaluations under crisis 
and investment on coffee regions’ infrastructure and other assets during booms avoided the “Dutch disease”. Highly trained staff has 
allowed efficient, long-term policy making. It has been particularly important a strong tradition in Economics -particularly at elite 
University of Los Andes- from which many important FNC managers and officials come from (it was fashionable for young graduates to 
get posts at the FNC).
Price formation 
and payment 
system
Quoted with a premium on the NYSEC, an important part of Colombian coffee is directly marketed by the FNC through supply contracts 
with importing companies (last decades used to be around 50%, now is 30%). Around 20% of exports are high quality specialty coffee. 
Internal prices were higher than external prices during the 1990s, although the gap has been narrower during the last decade. Prices paid 
to producers are 70-75% of FOB prices, that is, among the highest in the world.
Quality controls Control of varieties, standards of picking and strict control of regional origin. The FNC has been delegated the authority to oversee the 
quality of all coffee exports.
Monopsony The FNC -and the Colombian government- regulate the domestic market, based on a network of purchasing points and guaranty of 
purchase that the Coffee Fund makes possible. Additionally there exists an alliance with Colombian exporters and processors.
Research and 
development
Chinchina’s Centro Nacional de Investigaciones (1938) developed new cropping technology, applied by medium growers, then spread 
out into small ones. The FNCC created also a coffee business research centre.
IQ. Macroeconomic policies
Coffee sector 
strategy
Since the 1930s Colombia opted for market competition (free riding on Brazilian monopoly) to maximise premiums for high quality 
coffee based on a long-term competitive position (quality, production costs, marketing). Led the creation of a sectoral market of 
Colombian Milds (washed arabica). After the 1990s crisis coffee policies have focused on regaining productivity and market positioning 
in specialty and differentiated niches.
Vertical
integration
Colombian authority does allow vertical integration but control exports to retain 100% Colombian coffee blends. At the primary 
production level, there is a decentralised model. Family and rural processing infrastructure is generalised, involving growers in quality
295 Since 1978 government officials and producers have the same representation in the National Coffee Fund and share decision making on domestic prices and other coffee policies.
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controls. The FNC became shareholder of a bank and Gran Colombiana fleet (broken and sold).
Seizing structural 
opportunities of 
the coffee market
Successful free-riding on Brazilian booming monopoly during the 30s, and strategic technological modernisation during the 1975/78 
boom (only Colombia and Costa Rica did it, through massive renovation with new technologies). Moved towards specialty coffee niche 
and other differentiated markets after the 1989 crisis.
IV. Political and organisational
Social capital System of medium cities organise coffee capital; strong regional identity and knowledgeable elites linked to government, FNC and 
researchers. Strong tradition in mainstream Economics, intensively applied to the coffee sector. Absorbed Brazil experience. Producers 
interacted with professionals and technicians to build up appropriate institutions for the sake of a ‘national business niche’. Regional 
elites -in which medium size producers are important- exercise a strong influence on the FNC.
Representation and 
Collective action
Coffee elites have influenced the two-party system and the FNC (created in 1927), enjoying direct representation in local and federal 
government. The FNC captured state functions to regulate the coffee sector. Managerial skills, market knowledge and strong lobbying 
allowed coffee growers to legitimise the coffee agenda as a national priority. FNC’s representation structure follows production criteria; 
it has open membership to small producers since mid-1970s.
Lobbying capacity Very strong, but is diminishing after the 1989 crisis. Could impose devaluations during crisis. To avoid ‘Dutch disease’, the coffee lobby 
induced transfers to development projects in the coffee sector. This is changing in the last years (with an independent central bank and 
liberalising policies).
MEXICO
I. Historical and structural
Coffee market 
formation
Important since mid-XX century under state promotion and quota system free riding
Access to land and 
agrarian structure
Land reform, successive distribution and fractionating, and IMC policies promoted minifundista peasant and indigenous producers. Split 
from modernised rancheros and big plantations, it consolidated a polarised social structure with divided organisations.
Property rights Land reform gave access to land but not to resources; and distorted land market. A majority of coffee lands are micro-plots of less than 2 
ha, both ejido and small landholdings. Most of them have no collateral despite recent liberal agrarian reforms, which have not addressed 
access to resources.
Coffee lands (size, 
scale and dispersion
Generally medium quality (narrow layer of organic matter on top soil) and highly heterogeneous. Mexico has not cut down marginal 
lands, but on the contrary they amount around 25% of the total. In 1990 71% of producers had 36% of the coffee lands (in units of less 
than 2 ha) and contributed with 25% of national production.
Main systems of 
production
The minifundista sector carry on with a mixed technology from traditional politcultivation to semi-intensive under shade cropping. Only 
a minority of big states introduced plain-sun modem technology
Labour problem Family labour is the main source, though bottlenecks exist due to diversified uses of labour capacity
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Domestic market Low intake level (1 kg per head a year) and low culture of coffee consumption (sector laws allow industry to add 30% foreign matter into 
coffee products)
Transport network Few regions well endowed; coffee development follows expansion of federal transport network; there are still high transport costs and 
intermediation.
Q. Economic institutions (Regulatory, anti-cycle devices)
Coffee regulatory 
institutions
IMC (1959-1993) regulated domestic prices, delivering forward credit, inputs and technical assistance. Centralised coffee processing 
inefficiently. Lacked financial autonomy and price incentives policy. It was not accountable to producers. Favoured small producers 
through welfare projects; but only modernised medium growers at high transfer costs.
Stabilisation and 
the management of 
coffee cycles 
(surplus/deficit)
The IMC had no financial autonomy. It had to bargain its budget on a yearly basis. IMC’s credit delivery to producers always lagged 
behind fiscal cycles. Attempts to introduced sound cyclical mechanisms during 1970-80s failed due to political sexenios and fiscal cycles. 
The central government used coffee surpluses politically. In 1986, the creation of the FREC -more linked to surplus stocks regulation, 
than domestic price stabilisation- was too little too late. After the IMC withdrawal and the indebtedness crisis, FREC’s funds were 
transferred to FIDECAFE trust and used as credit collateral for producers’ organisations, which did not repaid loans in full.
Price formation and 
payment system
NYBOT “C” contract at a discount price (usually from 5 to 25 points), minus costs to main export sea or border ports, insurance, and 
other transaction costs
Quality controls Mixing of varieties in fincas; mixing of qualities in the field and loss of origin controls by intermediaries
Monopsony The IMC never displaced competition fully; bought up to 25% of the national harvest in 1984-85 and stopped buying coffee in 1989.
Research and 
development
Only Gamica (F3) was developed by the IMC, at experimental stage; other research was not spread (case of grafting); only medium 
growers and small ones in communicated areas adopted IMC technology package.
m . Macroeconomic policies
Coffee sector 
strategy
Bureaucracy failed to acknowledge coffee sector priority; ISI model and oil boom, made coffee a second-ranking sector. Priority was 
allocated to economies of scale, maximising returns under the quota system and extending welfare benefits, including incorporation of 
marginal lands and a big bureaucracy. The state promoted irrational growth to ffee-ride on the quota system.
Vertical integration The IMC created a highly centralised processing infrastructure, in part outside producing zones. The sector’s restructuring reversed this 
process.
Seizing structural 
opportunities of the 
coffee market
Very bad institutional timing. Technological modernisation was late (1980s), populist and regionally unequal. The federal government, 
the IMC bureaucracy
and coffee leaders made inefficient use of boom surpluses.
Management of 
booms and crisis
No long-term counter-cyclical policies (but negative peso overvaluation during
the 1989-94 crisis); lack of financial autonomy and political pressures used to aggravate IMC indebtedness
IV. Political and organisational
Social capital The coffee board assimilated modem technology and formed a strong bureaucracy with competent technicians; but confronted and
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disorganised regional coffee elites. Introduced potentially sound arrangements (stabilisation fund, research centres, etc. as in Colombia), 
but failed to make them accountable to producers, and to generate learning interactions and local adaptations. Gap between IMC’s 
socially-minded policy making -as well as political capture by bureaucracy- and coffee business strategies and marketing expertise.
Representation and 
Collective action
Private sector failed to organise on a national basis. When state intervened, they imposed corporate control on producers through local 
UEPC, small producers were dependent on IMC decisions.
Lobbying capacity Producers bargaining power has been very limited and conditioned by CNC-PRI corporatist politics. PRI’s ‘sectors’, regional cleavages 
and polarised social structure have prevented a strong coffee producers lobby at national level. Independent organisations used to played 
pressure tactics on the IMC and got limited concessions. They have failed to adopt managerial strategies, except for the small organic 
coffee/fair trade sector.
Main sources: For Colombia: Palacios 1980; Bates 1994, 1997a, 1997c; Junguito and Pizano 1991; Cardenas 1994; Roseberry et all 1995; Giovanucci et all 2002. For 
Mexico: Nolasco 1985; Villasenor 1987, 1991; Santoyo Cortes et all 1994; SafFord 1995; Giovanucci & Juarez 2006.
304
APPENDIX No. 8 
FIELDWORK INTERVIEWS 1994-96
Name o f  interviewee Post Date
Alarcon Trujillo, Ernesto Atzalan Municipality President 1/25/1995
Andrade, Alberto (Lie) SPR Tasolapa President 1/19/1996
Arcos, Raquel FRS A Administrative Secretary 2/20/1995
Arcos, Raquel FRS A Administrative Secretary 2/24/1995
Arcos, Raquel FRS A Administrative Secretary 3/19/1995
Arroyo Guerrero, Jose Ejidatario producer, Loma de las Flores 3/11/1995
Barreda, Gabriel (Dr) Asociaciones Agroindustriales Serranas, manager 1/19/1996
Barreda, Ranulfo Ejidatario producer and local buyer 2/27/1995
Barreda, Ranulfo Ejidatario producer and local buyer 3/17/1995
Barreda, Ranulfo Ejidatario producer and local buyer 1/29/1996
Barrio, Felix Former IMC’s technician at Tlapacoyan 1/18/1996
Bautista, Felix & Benjamin Garcia Agrarian struggles veterans, Equimite 3/26/1995
Bello, Agustin (Don) Grower miller 2/2/1996
Bonilla, Constancio SSS SPA associate 3/14/1995
Buenavista ejido Ejido producers, meeting with 2/1/1996
Caja Regional de Solidaridad
Azotal CRS-A, Annual Assembly of savings groups 3/18/1995
Caja Regional de Solidaridad CRS-A, Monthly Assembly of Local Credit
Azotal Committee 1/28/1995
Cajas Regionales de Solidaridad
Tlapacoyan and Plan de Arroyos CRS-T & PA Annual meeting 1/16/1995
Caro, Manuel CLS, representative, Rancho Grande 12/14/1994
Casteldn Gonzalez, Francisco Small independent grower and carpenter 3/19/1995
Castillo Guzman, Leonardo CRS tresurer 1/30/1996
Cecefia Mendoza, Francisco CRS-T & PA, President 11/16/1994
Cecefia Mendoza, Francisco CRS-T & PA, President 1/28/1996
Celis, Alfredo (Biol.) TLASA-Atzinta mill, manager 1/23/1996
Claudio Miranda, Gaudencio Ejidatario producer, Tlacolulan 3/21/1995
Claudio Miranda, Gaudencio Ejidatario producer, Tlacolulan 3/27/1995
Claudio Miranda, Gaudencio Ejidatario producer, Tlacolulan 2/1/1996
CLS Anayal CLS’ representatives, meeting with 2/22/1995
CLS Azotal Ejidatario producers, meeting with 12/13/1994
CLS Quilate CLS Quilate producers, meeting with 1/21/1995
CNOC CNOC, national meeting, Xalapa, Ver. 2/10/1995
Coffee pickers Family of coffee pickers in El Jardin-Tlacolulan 2/28/1995
Conasupo community shop Local shop tender, price list 3/11/1995
Concha, Antonio Buyer miller 1/20/1996
Concha, Antonio Buyer miller 1/25/1996
Concha, Antonio Buyer miller 1/27/1996
Concha, Antonio Buyer miller 2/5/1996
Cordoba Candelario, Miguel CLS, representative 1/30/1995
Damaso Avila, Julian CLS, representative 1/29/1995
Diaz Miron to Tierra Nueva,
fieldtrip Fieldtrip notes 1/29/1995
Dominguez Bemabe, Constantino CLS, representative 12/26/1994
Equimite producer & JAL FRS-A President, meeting with 3/14/1995
Escarcega, Armando ARESCA, Xico, coffee buyer and exporter 11/19/1997
Esteve, Eduardo AMSA, General Director 11/12/1997
Ezequiel 'cheque' Local buyer 2/24/1995
Ezequiel 'cheque' Local buyer 3/17/1995
Faus, Francisco AMSA, Dos Rios mill, Regional Manager 11/27/1997
FIRA technician Coffee, orange and plantain production costs 
Administration Councils of 4 FRS, annual
FRS (4) evaluation meeting 2/16/1995
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FRS (4)
Administration Councils of 4 FRS, annual 
evaluation meeting 12/7/1994
FRS (4) / Banrural
FRS representatives and Banrural Martinez de la 
Torre manager, meeting amongst 2/17/1995
FRS-A FRS Azotal representatives, meeting with 1/24/1995
FRS-A FRS Azotal representatives, meeting with 12/10/1994
Galindo, Heriberto SSS Secretary 2/23/1995
Gamboa Barraza, Salvador PROCAMPO, District Coordination 2/7/1996
Garcia Herrera, Victor Ejidatario producer 3/21/1995
Garcia Landa, Lorenzo CLS president 1/30/1996
Garcia Leandro, Maria Amulfo Barreda’s mother 3/27/1995
Garcia Leandro, Martin Ejidatario producer 12/28/1994
Garcia Zendejas, Adrian Ejidatario ampliacion producer 12/28/1994
Garcia, Jr Ejidatario producer’s son and pastor 3/8/1995
Garcia, Jr Ejidatario producer’s son and pastor 3/9/1995
Garcia, Amulfo Local Jomaleros Commeety, representative 3/27/1995
Garcia, Delfma Community promoter 2/1/1996
Garcia, Joel Local buyer (Topete’s coyote) 2/2/1996
Garcia, Pablo
SPA ejido, Comisariat President, ejido producer 
and landowner 3/8/1995
Garcia, Pablo
SPA ejido, Comisariat President, ejido producer 
and landowner 3/23/1995
German Tepeycan mill tresurer 1/15/1996
Guerrero, Pablo SSS associate, Loma de las Flores 3/7/1995
Guerrero, Pablo SSS associate, Loma de las Flores 3/11/1995
Guerrero, Ruben Local buyer (Topete’s coyote) 2/3/1996
Guzman Monfil, Jacobo Coop SPA secretary; SPA mill administrator 12/28/1994
Guzman, Jacobo (Don) Coop SPA, associate 3/7/1995
Hernandez Acosta, Panfilo Caja de Solidaridad Quilate, president 12/26/1994
Hernandez Acosta, Panfilo Caja de Solidaridad Quilate, president 1/21/1995
Hernandez Moguel, Lauro Ejidatario producer 3/3/1995
Hernandez Moguel, Lauro Ejidatario producer 3/22/1995
Hernandez Moguel, Lauro (hijo de) Ejidatario producer’s son 1/28/1996
Hernandez, Luis CNOC, national advisor (Mexico City) 11/25/1994
Hernandez, Miguel Cafes Tulipan buyer, Tlapacoyan 1/25/1996
Hernandez, Nicolas FRS-A technician 1/17/1995
Hernandez, Nicolas FRS-A technician 2/3/1996
Hernandez, Nicolas FRS-A technician 2/7/1996
Herrera, Laureano Buyer miller (Escarcega’s buyer) 3/27/1995
Herrera, Laureano Buyer miller (Escarcega’s buyer) 2/5/1996
IMC Tlapacoyan, ex-Deleg Former IMC delegate in Tlapacoyan 2/7/1996
Jardin, El SSS El Jardin, producers of 2/27/1995
Jomaleros Agricolas Programme Promoters 1/20/1996
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 12/9/1994
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 12/11/1994
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 1/23/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 1/24/1995
Josd Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 1/24/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 1/29/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 2/10/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 2/17/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 2/19/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 2/21/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 2/26/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 2/23/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president 3/29/1995
Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez FRS-A president, biographical notes 2/16/1995
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Jos6 Luis Arcos L6pez Local journalists, interview with 1/29/1995
Juan Manuel PROCEDE’s Technician 3/17/1995
Landa Ortiz, Roque SSS Equimite, delegate 12/27/1994
Landa Ortiz, Roque SSS Equimite, delegate 3/17/1995
Landa Ortiz, Roque SSS Equimite, associates and delegate 3/2/1995
Landa, Patricio (Don) Ejidatario producer 3/28/1995
Leon Landa, Seferino Ejidatario elder, retail shop owner 3/8/1995
Leon Mota, Jorge Ejidataria producer’s son 3/9/1995
Leon, Efrain Local coffee buyer (Topete’s) 2/2/1996
Loma de las Flores SSS Loma de las Flores, meeting with producers 3/6/1995
Lopez Diaz, Epifanio FRS Altotonga advisor 12/16/1994
Lopez, Julian FRS Tlapacoyan advisor 12/9/1994
Luciano Suarez, Genaro Ejidatario producer’s son 12/28/1994
Luna Moguel, Genaro Ejidatario producer 3/28/1995
Marcos Ejidatario producer 1/28/1996
Maria Eugenia Coop Quicempacayotl, Coordinator 1/19/1996
Marin Zendejas, Fernando (primo
Oseas) Ejidatario producer (ampliation grant)
Ejidatario producer (former IMC mill unloading
3/19/1995
Marin, Miguel worker) 3/6/1995
Marin, Oseas SSS SPA, President 12/27/1994
Martinez Martinez, Leonel SSS Equimite, buyer 1/23/1995
Mauro, tio de Police guard and ejidatario producer 3/11/1995
Mendoza Isabel, Alberto SSS, delegate 3/14/1995
Mitchell, Bill Oxford, agriculture consultant 6/13/1998
Moguel Salazar, Cirilo Ejidatario producer, El Jardin 3/22/1995
Moguel Salazar, Cirilo Ejidatario producer, El Jardin 3/13/1995
Monfil Bautista, Gabino SSS El Jardin, delegate 12/28/1994
Monfil Bautista, Gabino Leaseholder in El Jardin
Consejo Veracruzano del CafO, Executive
3/13/1995
Morales, Eligio Coordinator 2/9/1996
Moreno Posadas, Victoriano (Dr) UMR IMSS-Solid, physician 3/22/1995
Navarrete, Tomas Coop Quicempacayotl, Coordinator 2/10/1995
Navarrete, Tomas Coop Quicempacayotl, Coordinator 1/27/1996
Navarrete, Tomas y Ma Eugenia Coop Quicempacayotl, Coordinators 3/28/1995
Nufiez, Ing Former IMC Regional Delegate in Tlapacoyan 2/1/1995
Ortiz Hem&ndez, Alfredo San Pedro Altepepan mill’s worker (landless) 12/27/1994
Ortiz Hemdndez, Alfredo San Pedro Altepepan mill’s worker (landless) 3/12/1995
Paguahueca ejidatario producers SSS Paguahueca members (ampliacidn grant) 12/11/1994
Parra, Fernando de la (Ing) Mexican Coffee Council, Technical Director 11/5/1997
Quilate, fieldtrip to Fieldtrip notes 1/21/1995
Quiroz, Serafin FRS-A tresurer and Coop SPA president 12/28/1994
Quiroz, Serafin FRS-A tresurer and Coop SPA president 1/29/1995
Quiroz, Serafin FRS-A tresurer and Coop SPA president 2/9/1995
Quiroz, Serafin FRS-A tresurer and Coop SPA president 16/03/95
Quiroz, Serafin FRS-A tresurer and Coop SPA president 2/24/1995
Quiroz, Serafin FRS-A tresurer and Coop SPA president 1/29/1996
Rafael SPA Leaseholder 2/28/1995
Ramirez Dominguez, Juan, and
others Chaparro Grande, ejidatario producers 3/20/1995
Ramirez, Victor Landowner and cattle rancher in El Jardin 2/27/1995
Ramirez, Victor Landowner and cattle rancher in El Jardin 3/19/1995
Raymundo (Ing) FRS T-PA Technician 1/19/1996
Raymundo (Ing) FRS T-PA Technician 2/6/1996
Reyes Guerrero, Isabel Caja Solidaria Azotal, Administrative Secretary 2/2/1995
Rodriguez, Ignacio Leaseholder 2/1/1996
Rogriguez, Armando Ejidatario producer 1/30/1996
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Romero Claudio, Maximino Tlacolulan ejidatario producer 3/21/1995
Romero Cordoba, Yocundo Tlacolulan ejidatario producer 3/21/1995
Romero Mota, Epifanio Tlacolulan ejidatario producer 3/21/1995
Romero Mota, Fortunato Tlacolulan ejidatario producer 3/21/1995
Rosas Flores, Albertina Tlacolulan ejidataria producer 3/19/1995
Rosas Flores, Albertina Tlacolulan ejidataria producer 3/27/1995
Rosas Landa, Jose Equimite ejidatario producer 3/28/1995
Rosas, Lucrecia Ejidatario producers’ daughter 
Cuatro Caminos, Tierra Nueva, SPA and
3/22/1995
Rural road official unveiling inhabitants of neighbouring communities 3/2/1995
Salas, Austreberto Former leader of FRS Tlapacoyan 1/24/1996
Sanchez, Manuel Solidarity Brigade, Coordinator 12/6/1994
Sanchez, Manuel Solidarity Brigade, Coordinator 1/16/1995
Sanchez, Manuel Solidarity Brigade, Coordinator 2/7/1995
Sanchez, Manuel Solidarity Brigade, Coordinator 1/24/1996
Santana, Ing Banrural Martinez de la T, branch manager 2/1/1995
Santillan, Gilberto Former coyote and SSS Tlacolulan buyer 3/21/1995
Segura, Clara Elena (Chemist) Sanidad Vegetal, SARH, Soil Studies specialist 2/7/1996
Skerrit, David Instituto de Historia, UV, historian (PhD Oxford) 1/23/1996
SPA Coop, Annual Assembly 1994-
95 Coop SPA members, Annual Assembly 2/24/1995
SPA Coop, Extraordinary Assembly Coop SPA members, Extraordinary Assembly 3/12/1995
SPA ejido SPA Ejido Assembly 2/26/1995
SPA ejido Coffee ejido fincas fieltrip notes 3/12/1995
SPA to Chaparro Grande Fieldtrip notes 3/11/1995
SPA, ejido neighbours Informal talk, notes 2/25/1995
SPA, ejido neighbours Informal talk, notes 3/7/1995
SPA, SSS Planteles SSS Planteles associates, meeting with 3/4/1995
SPA, wet mill Physical inspection 12/28/1994
SPA, wet mill Input-output book keeping 3/26/1995
SPR Anayal Ejidatario producers associates, meeting with 2/28/1995
Tejero, Miguel CEPCO, advisor
Visit to secondary school and meeting with third
2/10/1995
Telesecundaria SPA grade students 3/22/1995
Tierra Nueva, CLS CLS Tierra Nueva, representatives 12/12/1994
Tlacolulan local authority Tlacolulan community meeting 3/21/1995
Tlacolulan producers Tlacolulan producers, meeting and field trip with 3/1/1995
Tlacolulan producers Tlacolulan producers, survey 3/12/1995
Topete, Rolando Grower miller, deep interviewing
Caja de Solid. Azotal, president; Caja Regional de
2/2-9/1996
Trujillo, Pedro Solid., tresurer, FRS-A Secretary 12/26/1994
Ugalde, Miguel ARIC Marver (lime), manager 2/2/1995
Ugalde, Miguel ARIC Marver (lime), manager 
COVERCAFE, Desarrollo Agroindustrial,
2/19/1995
Vargas, Ignacio (Ing) Coordinator 11/22/1997
Vazquez Moreno, Juan (Padre) Parroquia de San Jose, Tierra Nueva, priest 
Former IMC researcher (developed Gamica
1/28/1995
Villarreal, Cecilio (Ing) hybrid) 11/20/1997
Villaseflor Mir, Andres (Ing) Grower miller
Former IMC researcher and official (27 years
1/26/1996
Villaseflor, Andrds (Ing) Technical Director) 11/6/1997
Zapote producers Zapote producers, meeting with 1/30/1996
Zendejas Garcia, Juan Ejidatario producer 2/28/1995
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